ACCEPTED 15-25-00116-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/11/2025 6:32 PM No. 15-25-00116-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN I N THE F IFTEENTH C OURT OF A PPEALS15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS KEN PAXTON, ET AL . , 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Appellants, Clerk v. DELIA GARZA , ET AL . , Appellees.
On Direct Appeal from the 419th Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas No. D-1-GN-25-003445, Consolidated With No. D-1-GN-25-003531 & No. D-1-GN-25-003581
APPELLEES’ REPLY TO APPELLANTS’ RESPONSE TO APPELLEES’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RELIEF
TO THE HONORABLE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Temporary relief is necessary to maintain the status quo while this Court
considers Appellants’ appeal. Appellants’ response amounts to a sweeping assertion
that his authority is effectively unlimited and that any delay in producing reports
(that were never previously sought) somehow constitutes irreparable harm. The
Attorney General offers no evidence—none—that a temporary delay will cause any
concrete injury, especially when Appellants will be able to obtain the requested
reports should they ultimately prevail on this appeal.
By contrast, Appellees face immediate and irreparable harm under the trial
court’s detailed findings: hundreds of hours of diverted staff time, disclosure of confidential information, and the threat of removal from office in a quo warranto
action. Appellees sought relief just six weeks after the rules took effect, won a
temporary injunction after a full evidentiary hearing, and now seek only to preserve
the status quo while this Court reviews the temporary injunction order.
The Attorney General claims broad rulemaking power under a statute that
says nothing about rules. Appellees are not asking this Court to resolve those
questions now but rather before they are required to comply with the Challenged
Rules. Appellants’ opening brief is due in 17 days. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a)(2).
This is precisely what temporary appellate relief is for. At this stage,
Appellees need not prove they will win—only that Appellees have demonstrated—
and the Attorney General has not refuted—that Appellees’ challenge raises serious
legal questions and that the equities favor a continued stay. See In re Tex. Educ.
Agency, 619 S.W.3d 679, 683–84 (Tex. 2021).
ARGUMENT
Preliminarily, the Attorney General’s assertion that Appellees
“manufacture[d] an emergency” instead of “prepar[ing] to comply,” Resp. at 3, is
not only irrelevant, it is belied by the record.
Appellees began preparing to comply with the Challenged Rules before they
took effect and told the Attorney General that producing the requested reports is
extraordinarily burdensome. Evidence presented at the temporary injunction
hearing establishes that Appellees already have spent hundreds of hours preparing
2 the requested reports. 2RR74:5-22. Before Appellees requested that the Attorney
General agree to temporary relief in this Court, Appellees asked the Attorney
General to postpone or extend the reporting deadlines either during the pendency
of litigation or until September 1, but he refused. 2RR148:3-7.
Regardless, Appellees would have needed temporary relief from this Court
no matter when they filed their lawsuits. Appellees brought suit a mere six weeks
after the Challenged Rule took effect on April 2, 2025. Then, after extensive
conferral with the Attorney General, they noticed the temporary injunction
hearing shortly thereafter. Even had they filed earlier, less than three months
between the effective date and due date of the first report would never have been
enough time to fully litigate the validity of the rule. And, in the end, it was the
Attorney General who waited until 4:00 pm June 27, 2025—the Friday prior to the
Monday compliance deadline—to file his notice of appeal.
I. The Attorney General glosses over the Rule 29.3 balancing standard, which prioritizes “preserv[ing] the parties’ rights.”
The Attorney General misapplies the Texas Supreme Court’s balancing test.
Even where “the State has an intrinsic right to enforce its own laws,” In re State,
711 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. 2024) (cleaned up), the balancing of harms is “a required
aspect of a court’s effort to preserve the parties’ rights pending appeal.” Id. at
645 (emphasis added). Here, the Attorney General acknowledges Appellees have at
3 least some rights at stake. (E.g., Resp. at 25–26 (the right and responsibility to
prosecute cases)).
A temporary injunction applicant “is not required to establish that it will
prevail on the final trial.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002)
(citing Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968)). And the decision
on this motion does not even decide the merits of the temporary injunction—that
is what the appeal is for. This is why, in In re State, the Texas Supreme Court made
“no definitive statement about the merits” but instead found temporary relief
justified when the movant simply “raised serious doubt” about the validity and
constitutionality of the actions that the movant sought to stay. 711 S.W.3d at 646.
The balancing of harms between the various parties has two elements that
are critical here. First, whether damages or other harm can “feasibly be recouped if
it is later determined” that the harmful action was invalid is part of asking whether
harms are “irreparable” and thus entitled to additional weight. Id. at 647. Second,
when a governmental entity’s constitutional rights are impacted, that is where the
“status quo” question is particularly helpful, too—favoring a stay of state action
that would change another governmental unit’s “manner of governance” from its
“last, actual, peaceable non-contested status” before the lawsuit. Tex. Educ. Agency,
619 S.W.3d at 683–84.
Appellants do not address these factors or even mention In re Texas Education
Agency. They are dispositive here, if the traditional balance weighing is not enough. 4 II. Appellants show no harm and ignore Appellees’ harm.
The balance of harms weighs heavily in Appellees’ favor. At the temporary
injunction hearing, Appellees presented substantial evidence that they would be
irreparably harmed by compliance with the Challenged Rules, which the Attorney
General neither contradicted nor countered. Rather, the Attorney General presents
the legally incorrect view that government officials are irreparably harmed
whenever they cannot impose their view of the law.
A. The Attorney General has no evidence of harm.
Typically, “[w]hen the State files suit to enjoin ultra vires action by a local
official, a showing of likely success on the merits is sufficient to satisfy the
irreparable-injury requirement for a temporary injunction.” State v. Hollins, 620
S.W.3d 400, 410 (Tex. 2020). Here, however, Appellees are the government
officials bringing an ultra vires action, and Appellees have shown a likelihood of
success on the merits, as the district court found. Allowing the Attorney General
to invoke this doctrine in defending against an ultra vires claim would shield the
Attorney General from ultra vires actions even if he could show a likelihood of
success on the merits, which he certainly has not shown. Plus, there has been no
violation of law, as the Attorney General has claimed, for which he needs any
enforcement. The precise reason that Appellees need the temporary injunction and
stay is so that the Attorney cannot injure them in violation of the law.
5 Simply stated, the burden of having to delay enforcement of a brand-new
administrative rule, for which Appellees present a serious challenge, counts for
little against the thousands of personnel hours, millions of dollars, and confidential
information which the Appellees are poised to lose. Moreover, the Attorney
General does nothing to cast doubt on the substantial irreparable injuries that
Appellees have demonstrated. Nor did he make any evidentiary record below.
Rather, the Attorney General purports to create his own record on appeal with his
claim that “the Montgomery County District Attorney[] has already complied
with the initial reporting requirements” to “suggest[] that they are far less
burdensome than [Appellees] allege.” Resp. at 3. But Montgomery’s County’s
alleged report is not in the record, and Appellees have reason to believe that it is
far from complete and identifies many of the same burdens outlined in the
testimony by the Appellees, which, of course, is in the record. That is to say, the
Attorney General’s reference to an out-of-record report allegedly produced by just
one of the thirteen affected counties proves nothing.
B. Appellees showed abundant and unrefuted evidence of harm.
The district court found that Appellees demonstrated irreparable harm
including, in addition to interference with their constitutional prosecutorial
responsibilities, (1) the expenditure of “a significant amount of resources, personnel
time, and taxpayer funds,” which cannot be recovered as damages, and (2) the
disclosure of confidential information of various types. CR393.
6 Appellees’ evidence of harm was presented via many declarations and
testimony at the temporary injunction hearing. To give the Court a flavor:
Danny Smith of Travis County testified that his team has spent “hundreds
of hours just in the last two months” preparing to comply. 2RR74:5-22; see also
CR94. “[B]y focusing on [compliance] we are not focusing on what we can be
doing for the actual criminal cases that are filed in our office.” 2RR82:24-83:13.
Holly Taylor of Travis County added that “[r]ecently” she “ha[d] dedicated most
of [her] working hours to implementing methods for data and document collection
and retention to comply with the challenged rules.” So has Williamson County
District Attorney Shawn Dick. (Mot. App’x Tab C-19 at § 14.). Amy Lechuga of El
Paso County “estimate[d] that accurately completing the initial report will take
over 12,000 hours of staff and attorney time,” and that the county would “need to
hire, at minimum, one software developer, two secretaries, one attorney, and one
functional data analyst permanently on staff.” CR109-10. Marsha Edwards of
Dallas County explained that compliance would “divert staff away from their core
roles and responsibilities.” CR256. Joshua Reiss declared that Harris County
“would have to hire 10 new, fulltime employees dedicated to a specialized ‘OAG
Reporting Unit,’” CR272, at an “initial cost . . . in excess of $11 million over the
next five years,” CR272-73. Jamissa Jarmon explained that Bexar County would
hire a third-party contractor because Bexar County’s IT department lacks “the
capacity, software, or personnel to review and search through such a large volume
7 of emails.” CR265-266. Fort Bend County would likely do the same thing. (Tab C-
18 at §§ 15–16.) Williamson County already has hired an outside contractor. (Tab
C-19 at § 14.)1
The same evidence demonstrates that Appellees would be irreparably injured
by the forced disclosure of legally protected confidential information. Holly Taylor
specified the categories of confidential information “that [are] commonly found in
[case] files” including “victim contact information, statements, and pseudonyms;
DNA testing of rape kits; graphic photos; grand jury testimony; identities of
confidential informants; criminal history information; mental health and substance
abuse treatment records; CPS records; and defense counsel’s confidential
communications with prosecutors.” CR100. Alma Trejo provided a very similar list.
CR105-06. Joshua Reiss stated “federal agencies will disapprove” of certain
required disclosures. CR275. The District Attorneys for Williamson and Fort Bend
Counties also expressed legal and ethical reservations of turning over materials
protected by existing federal and state laws. (Tab C-19 at § 8; Tab C-18 at § 12.).
1 Similar population-proportionate testimony was provided by Williamson County District Attorney Shawn Dick, (Tab C-19 at § 14); Fort Bend County District Attorney Brian Middleton, (Tab C-18 at § 13); Masha Edwards of Dallas County Criminal District Attorney’s Office, CR265; Jamissa Jarmon of Bexar County District Attorney’s Office, CR265; Alma Trejo of El Paso County Attorney’s Office, CR104; Amy Lechuga, CR109-110; and Danny Smith, 2RR119:8-20.
8 III. As the trial court found, Appellees raise serious questions concerning the validity of the Challenged Rules.
Discussion of the merits here is necessarily abbreviated, given the procedural
posture. But the Attorney General’s merits discussion is wrong in several ways.
A. The Attorney General lacks the authority to adopt the Challenged Rules.
The Attorney General acknowledges, as he must, that an agency rule is
invalid if the agency was not given authority to adopt the rule. See Response at 9.
However, he claims that Section 41.006 provides him with either express or implied
rulemaking authority. Neither is true.
The Attorney General first argues that Section 41.006 “sounds suspiciously
like an express grant of authority.” Id. at 9. But sounding “like” an express grant of
authority (whatever that means) is not an express grant of authority. There is no
question that Section 41.006 says nothing about adopting rules or engaging in
rulemaking, unlike the 20+ statutes that expressly authorize the Attorney General
to do so in discrete areas by using clear, unmistakable language. The Texas
legislature knows how to confer rulemaking authority on the Attorney General
when it wants to do so. It chose not to do so here. “[E]very word excluded from
a statute must also be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose.” Cameron v.
Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981).
The Attorney General argues, next, that “even if the statutory language did
not confer an express grant of rulemaking authority, there can be little question that 9 such rulemaking authority is implied.” Response at 9. As administrative law
professor Ron Beal explains in his amicus brief, no court in Texas has ever held
that an agency may adopt a rule when the agency was not given express rulemaking
authority. See R. Beal’s Amicus at 5.
The Attorney General cites Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Board, 249
S.W.3d 447, 452 (2008) for implied rulemaking authority. See Response at 9-10. But
Pruett is an express rulemaking authority case (like all other such cases). The
enabling statute in Pruett authorized the government agency to “‘adopt and post
rules necessary to implement this chapter.’” 249 S.W.3d 447, 453 (Tex. 2008)
(emphasis added). The Attorney General misconstrues Pruett by conflating two
separate powers—the power to promulgate a rule in the first place (which must be
expressly given) and the scope of that power once given (which may be implied).
As the Texas Supreme Court explained, “When a statute expressly authorizes an
agency to regulate an industry, it implies the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to accomplish that purpose.” Id. The question in Pruett was
not the existence of but the “scope of the Board’s rule-making authority.” Id. at 9.
The Attorney General also cites Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) v.
City Pub. Serv. Bd. of S.A., 53 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2001). See Response at 9. Like Pruett,
PUC is an express rulemaking authority case. The enabling statute in PUC states,
“‘[t]he Commission shall adopt rules . . . relating to wholesale transmission services,
rates, and access.’” 53 S.W.3d at 313 (emphasis added). The Texas Supreme Court 10 in PUC explained that rulemaking authority must be expressly given: “As we have
said before, the PUC is a creature of the legislature and has no inherent authority.
This is true of every state administrative agency and as a result every such agency
has only those powers expressly conferred upon it by the Legislature.” Id. at 316
(internal quotations omitted). The court also explained that implied powers come
into play only where there is first an express conferral of authority: “The basic rule
is that a state administrative agency has only those powers that the legislature
expressly confers upon it. But an agency may also have implied powers that are
reasonably necessary to carry out the express responsibilities given to it by the
legislature.” Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
In short, the Attorney General overstates the “concept of implied rulemaking
authority.” Response at 10. Professor Beal—who has no stake in this litigation—
refutes the Attorney General’s position more fully in his amicus brief. See R. Beal’s
Amicus at 1-5.
****
The statutory history of Section 41.006 confirms that the Attorney General
lacks the power to adopt the Challenged Rule—a point the Attorney General
fundamentally misunderstands.
Originally, a separate provision gave the Attorney General the power to
require reports, while the predecessor to Section 41.006 was merely a companion
provision that obligated the district and county attorneys to cooperate. TEX. CODE 11 OF CRIM. PRO. title. 1, ch. 2, sec. I, art. 30, (1879); id. title. 1, ch. 2, sec. II, art. 40.
The empowering provision only allowed the Attorney General to demand
“information necessary for his compliance with” his own statutory obligation to
make regular reports to the Governor. Id. title. 1, ch. 2, sec. I, art. 29, 30 (1879).
Then in the 1925 codification, the predecessor to Section 41.006 and the provision
requiring reports to the Governor were moved, while the empowering provision
was eliminated. TEX. REV. CIV STAT. title 70, ch. 4, art. 4413 (1925), id. title 15, sec.
3, art. 333.
This history underscores the absurdity of reading the Section 41.006 as a
grant of rulemaking authority to the Attorney General. The Attorney General’s
position in this case assumes that by repealing the empowering provision in a
recodification, the legislature radically expanded the information that the
Attorney General was permitted to demand. That is highly implausible. 2
B. The Challenged Rules exceed the Scope of Section 41.006.
Even assuming the Attorney General had the authority to adopt some rules
under Section 41.006 (which he does not), it still would not authorize this
rulemaking. “In deciding whether a particular administrative agency has exceeded
2 The committee analysis of the House Judiciary Committee also confirms the lack of authority. See H. Comm. on Judiciary, Bill Analysis at 4, Tex. S.B. 1228, 69th R.S. (1985) (emphasis added) (“It is the opinion of this committee that this bill does not delegate rulemaking authority to any state officer, agency, department, or institution.”). The Attorney General dismisses this key point as “irrelevant” because it involves “debate which took place on the [law’s] passage.” Response at 12. But there was no “debate” on rulemaking authority, just a clear statement from the Judiciary Committee that it was not conferred.
12 its rule-making powers, the determinative factor is whether the rule’s provisions
are ‘in harmony with the general objectives of the Act involved.’” Pruett v. Harris
Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 249 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Gerst v. Oak Cliff
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 432 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex.1968)). There is a fundamental
disconnect between a statute requiring ad hoc reports and an entirely new
regulatory scheme with an oversight committee empowered to remove officials
from office for any perceived violation thereof.
The Challenged Rules are also invalid because they “impose[] additional
burdens, conditions, or restrictions in excess of . . . the relevant statutory
provisions.” Tex. St. Bd. of Examiners of Marriage & Family Therapists v. Tex. Med.
Assoc., 511 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Tex. 2017). For example, Section 41.006 says nothing
about penalties for noncompliance, including that noncompliance would constitute
“official misconduct,” so the burden imposed by the threat of removal is plainly “in
excess of” the statute. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 56.8. It is no answer to say that the
Attorney General already has quo warranto power, because there can be no doubt
that Section 56.8 redefines “official misconduct”—downgrading it from
“intentional, unlawful behavior,” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 87.011, to a form of
strict liability for any violation, “without limitation.” 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 56.8
(1) & (2) (emphasis added). Other excesses exist too, such as the fact that Section
41.006 requires “reports” of “information,” not entire case files or internal
correspondence. 13 C. The Challenged Rules violate the separation of powers.
On this point the Attorney General attempts to downplay his demands. But
Appellees present a serious question that the Challenged Rules violate the
Separation of Powers Clause by preventing the prosecuting attorneys from
“effectively exercise[ing] [their] constitutionally assigned powers.” Martinez v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 493, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (emphasis in original). This is
because the Challenged Rules’ reporting requirements compel compiling “all
correspondence” and “entire case files” into collections that would otherwise not
exist. 3
D. The regulations lack a reasoned justification.
The absence of any “reasoned justification” is apparent on inspection of the
Texas Register entry adopting 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§56.1-56.10. CR182. As
demonstrated above, the Attorney General failed to give a reasoned justification
for the compliance costs, the transfer of highly confidential information, or for
deriving rulemaking authority from Section 41.006. And his claim that the
population requirement “will indicate trends for all counties in the state,” CR186,
can only be pretextual because there is no basis for assuming the largest counties
3 The Supreme Court granted temporary relief in a case the Attorney General cites as analogous. In re Tex. House of Representatives, 704 S.W.3d 830, 832 (Tex. 2024). That is because a dispute concerning “separation of powers at a high level” required the district court’s injunctive action “to prevent the case from becoming moot.” Id. at 832 (Young, J., concurring, in grant of temporary relief).
14 are meaningfully representative of trends throughout Texas. As stated in his press
release regarding the Challenged rules, this requirement is simply an attempt to
collect all the ostensibly “rogue” prosecutors without stating that approach in the
Texas Register. CR50.
PRAYER
Appellees pray that this Court grant its motion for temporary relief.
Respectfully submitted,
[Signatures Beginning on Next Page]
15 /s/ Leslie W. Dippel /s/ Bradley W. Snead Leslie W. Dippel Jonathan G.C. Fombonne State Bar No. 00796472 Deputy County Attorney & First Leslie.Dippel@traviscountytx.gov Assistant Todd A. Clark State Bar No. 24102702 State Bar No. 04298850 Jonathan.Fombonne@harriscountytx.gov Todd.Clark@traviscountytx.gov Tiffany S. Bingham Cynthia W. Veidt Managing Counsel State Bar No. 24028092 Affirmative & Special Litigation Division Cynthia.Veidt@traviscountytx.gov State Bar No. 24012287 Travis County Attorneys Tiffany.Bingham@harriscountytx.gov DELIA GARZA Christopher Garza TRAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY Deputy Division Director P.O. Box 1748 Affirmative & Special Litigation Division Austin, TX 78767 State Bar No. 24078543 Tel.: (512) 854-9513 Christopher.Garza@harriscountytx.gov Fax: (512) 854-4808 Office of the Harris County Attorney CHRISTIAN D. MENEFEE Counsel for Appellees Delia Garza, in her HARRIS COUNTY ATTORNEY Official Capacity as Travis County Attorney, 1019 Congress Plaza, 15th Floor José P. Garza, in his Official Capacity as Houston, TX 77002 Travis County District Attorney, and Travis Tel.: (713) 274-5101 County Fax: (713) 755-8924
Bradley W. Snead /s/Justin C. Pfeiffer State Bar No. 24032706 Justin C. Pfeiffer snead@wrightclosebarger.com State Bar No. 24091473 Michael Adams-Hurta jpfeiffer@gavrilovlaw.com State Bar No. 24097860 Gavrilov & Brooks, PC hurta@wrightclosebarger.com P.O. Box 56632 WRIGHT CLOSE & BARGER, LLP Houston, TX 77256 One Riverway, Suite 2200 Tel.: (832) 312-7900 Houston, Texas 77056 Tel.: (713) 572-4321 Attorney for Appellee Brian M. Middleton, in Fax: (713) 572-4320 his Official Capacity as Fort Bend County District Attorney (268th Judicial District) Counsel for Appellees District Attorney Sean Teare and Harris County
16 /s/ Bernardo Cruz /s/Randy T. Leavitt Christina Sanchez C. Robert Heath El Paso County Attorney State Bar No. 09347500 State Bar No. 24062984 bheath@bickerstaff.com Ch.sanchez@epcountytx.gov BICKERSTAFF HEATH DELGADO ACOSTA Bernardo Rafael Cruz 1601 S. Mopac Expy., Suite 400 Assistant County Attorney Austin, TX 78746 State Bar No. 24109774 Tel.: (512) 404-7821 b.cruz@epcountytx.gov CHRISTNA SANCHEZ Randy T. Leavitt EL PASO COUNTY ATTORNEY State Bar No. 12098300 320 S. Campbell St., Suite 200 randy@randyleavitt.com El Paso, TX 79901 LAW OFFICE OF RANDY T. LEAVITT Tel.: (915) 273-3247 1301 Rio Grande St. Austin, TX 78701 Counsel for Appellees El Paso County District Tel.: (512) 476-4475 Attorney James Montoya, El Paso County Attorney Christina Sanchez, and El Paso County Attorneys for Appellee Shawn W. Dick in his Official Capacity as Williamson County District Attorney (26th Judicial District) /s/Michael Satin Alexandria Oberman State Bar No. 24131555 aoberman@milchev.com Michael J. Statin (pro hac vice application forthcoming) msatin@milchev.com Laura G. Ferguson (pro hac vice application forthcoming) lferguson@milchev.com MILLER & CHEVALIER CHARTERED 900 16th Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 Tel.: (202) 626-5800 Fax: (202) 626-5801
Counsel for Appellees Criminal District Attorney John Creuzot; Dallas County; Criminal District Attorney Joe Gonzales; and Bexar County
17 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Alysa Slocum on behalf of Brad Snead Bar No. 24049835 slocum@wrightclosebarger.com Envelope ID: 103056279 Filing Code Description: Other Document Filing Description: Appellees' Reply In Support of Appellees' Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief Status as of 7/14/2025 7:02 AM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Christopher Garza 24078543 christopher.garza@harriscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Cynthia Veidt 24028092 cynthia.veidt@traviscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Christina Sanchez 24062984 christina.sanchez@epcounty.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Jonathan Fombonne 24102702 jonathan.fombonne@harriscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
William FCole William.Cole@oag.texas.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Nicole A.Myette nicole.myette@oag.texas.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Tiffany Bingham 24012287 tiffany.bingham@harriscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Nancy Villarreal nancy.villarreal@oag.texas.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
William Farrell biff.farrell@oag.texas.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Joshua Woods woods@wrightclosebarger.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Bradley W.Snead snead@wrightclosebarger.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Michael Adams-Hurta hurta@wrightclosebarger.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Jacob Beach Jacob.Beach@oag.texas.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Ben Mendelson Ben.Mendelson@oag.texas.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Cynthia W.Veidt cynthia.veidt@traviscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
William H. Farrell bill.farrell@oag.texas.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Leslie W. Dippel Leslie.Dippel@traviscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Todd A. Clark Todd.Clark@traviscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Cynthia W. Veidt Cyntia.Vedt@traviscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Jonathan G.C. Fombonne Jonathan.Fombonne@harriscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Tiffany S. Bingham Tiffany.Bingham@harriscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Christopher Garza Christopher.Garza@harriscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Alysa Slocum on behalf of Brad Snead Bar No. 24049835 slocum@wrightclosebarger.com Envelope ID: 103056279 Filing Code Description: Other Document Filing Description: Appellees' Reply In Support of Appellees' Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief Status as of 7/14/2025 7:02 AM CST
Case Contacts
Christopher Garza Christopher.Garza@harriscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Justin C. Pfeiffer jpfeiffer@gavrilovlaw.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Christina Sanchez Ch.sanchez@epcountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Bernardo Rafael Cruz b.cruz@epcountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
C. RobertHeath bheath@bickerstaff.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Randy T. Leavitt randy@randyleavitt.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Alexandria Oberman aoberman@milchev.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Michael J. Statin mstatin@milchev.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Laura G. Ferguson lferguson@milchev.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
William H. Farrell H.Farrell bill.farrell@oag.texas.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Leslie W.Dippel leslie.dippel@traviscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Leslie W.Dippel leslie.dippel@traviscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Bradely W.Snead snead@wrightclosebarger.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Bernardo Cruz b.cruz@epcountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Bernardo Cruz b.cruz@epcountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Bernardo Cruz b.cruz@epcountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Alexandria Oberman Oberman aoberman@milchev.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Alexandria Oberman aoberman@milchev.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Alexandria Oberman aoberman@milchev.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Melissa Contreras m.contreras@epountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Isela Baeza i.baeza@epcountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Isela Jones carl.jones@epcountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Pamela Lopez Pam.Lopez@epcountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Alysa Slocum on behalf of Brad Snead Bar No. 24049835 slocum@wrightclosebarger.com Envelope ID: 103056279 Filing Code Description: Other Document Filing Description: Appellees' Reply In Support of Appellees' Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief Status as of 7/14/2025 7:02 AM CST
Case Contacts
Pamela Lopez Pam.Lopez@epcountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Amy Pollock amy.pollock@traviscountytx.gov 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT
Michael J. Satin msatin@milchev.com 7/11/2025 6:32:50 PM SENT