Kembridge Corp. v. State

101 Misc. 2d 904, 422 N.Y.S.2d 303, 1979 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2787
CourtNew York Court of Claims
DecidedNovember 5, 1979
DocketClaim No. 61372
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 101 Misc. 2d 904 (Kembridge Corp. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kembridge Corp. v. State, 101 Misc. 2d 904, 422 N.Y.S.2d 303, 1979 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2787 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1979).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Harold E. Koreman, J.

Claimant moves for an order granting leave to serve an amended claim.

Under date of June 4, 1974, claimant entered into a contract with the defendant, acting through its Department of [905]*905Transportation for certain road reconstruction work. Claimant completed the work contemplated on or about July 7, 1975 and it was accepted by the defendant on or about October 25, 1975. Final payment under the contract was mailed February 25, 1977. The final check was cashed, and on April 4, 1977 claimant filed a verified statement of claim with the Department of Transportation. This was done in accordance with section 109-14 of the department’s standard specifications of January 2, 1973, which was incorporated by reference into the contract, and with section 145 of the State Finance Law.

The verified statement of claim which was filed with the department specified four items upon which the claim was based. Thereafter, on August 23, 1977, claimant filed a claim in this court which was, in fact, limited to those four items by alleging, inter alia, that the claim was founded upon the verified statement of claim which had been filed with the department. Claimant also alleged "[t]hat the specific items upon which this claim is based are set forth in the attached verified statement of claim”, and, as required by the rules of the Court of Claims (22 NYCRR 1200.35), attached a copy of the statement which had been filed with the department on April 4, 1977.

In the moving papers it is asserted that as a result of further analysis and investigation by claimant’s president and its attorney, and the preparation for and conducting of extensive examinations before trial it was discovered that the "[c]laim containing the Third Addendum did not set forth the full and total damages sustained by Claimant.” As a result of the foregoing, the present motion has been brought. The proposed "amended claim” attached to the moving papers reflects that claimant seeks to increase the ad damnum clause of the claim and to add to and change the allegations of breach of contract against the State.

The motion must be denied. Section 145 of the State Finance Law provides in pertinent part:

"Acceptance of final payment under a state contract

"No provision contained in a construction contract awarded by any state department or agency shall bar the commencement of an action for breach of contract on the sole ground of the contractor’s acceptance of final payment under such contract provided that a detailed and verified statement of claim is served upon the public body concerned not later than forty days after the mailing of such final payment. The statement [906]*906shall specify the items upon which the claim will be based and any such claim shall be limited to such items. Any provision of subdivision four, section ten of the court of claims act to the contrary notwithstanding, an action founded upon such statement of claim shall be filed within six months after the mailing of the final payment.”

Section 109-14 of the department’s standard specifications above referred to contains substantially the same language as the statute.

A research of case law does not reveal that the precise issue presented on this motion has ever been passed upon before, namely, whether an amendment may be permitted to a claim after acceptance of a final payment by a public work contractor and after he has filed a verified statement of claim, as required by section 145 of the State Finance Law.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, in Ferran Concrete Co. v Facilities Dev. Corp. of State of N. Y. (61 AD2d 1061), reiterated what it previously stated in Strain & Son v State of New York Health & Mental Hygiene Facilities Improvement Corp. (57 AD2d 211, 213), that the purpose of the statute was to eliminate "the inequity of requiring a contractor who wishes to assert a claim against the State or a department or agency thereof, to indefinitely forego final payment of amounts conceded to be due”. It is clear from the court’s examination of the legislative memoranda and the material contained in the bill jacket with respect to the enactment of section 145 of the State Finance Law (L 1970, ch 513) that in order to expedite payment to contractors of the amounts due and owing to them the Legislature authorized them to initiate an action for breach of contract notwithstanding the proviso in the contract stipulating that acceptance of final payment under such contracts shall constitute and operate as a release of any and all claims. However, the release provisions of the contract are nullified by section 145 only on condition that the contractor serves on the public body concerned a detailed verified statement of claim within 40 days of the mailing of the final payment to him and that an action founded upon such claim is initiated within six months. The several memoranda submitted to the Governor by various concerned parties also point out that a claim filed by a contractor in this court must be limited under section 145 to those items contained in the verified statement of claim. The legislative intent to so limit the claim was also noted in the [907]*907State Executive Department memorandum in support of the bill, later enacted as section 145 of the State Finance Law, wherein it is stated that "[a] similar bill was passed last year and, upon recommendation of the affected agencies, was vetoed by the Governor on the ground that no provision for prompt notiñeation of the details of the claim had been included in the bill.” (McKinney’s 1970 Session Laws of NY, vol 2, p 2953; italics mine.) In disapproving a similar bill in 1969 the Governor’s Memorandum stated that while it would simplify the existing procedures in the Court of Claims and expedite payment to the contractors of amounts concededly due them, the State would be placed in a most difficult position because it would not know until long after the performance under the contract had been completed what formed the basis of the contractor’s claim, and such delay in adequate notice could materially prejudice the State’s ability to properly defend an action in this court based on the contract. (See NY Legis Ann, 1969, p 663.) It is clear, therefore, that section 145 of the State Finance Law was enacted for the purpose of giving the contractor the right to collect as the final payment what is conceded to be due him. As to any other claims for work performed under the contract the acceptance of final payment operates to effectively release the State unless the contractor sets forth such claims in a verified statement and proceeds in the manner prescribed by the statute. The release clause such as is contained in section 109-14 of the department’s standard specifications has been consistently upheld and enforced by the courts in this State (Buffalo Elec. Co. v State of New York, 14 NY2d 453; Ferran Concrete Co. v Facilities Dev. Corp. of State of N. Y., 61 AD2d 1061, supra; Rosenman Corp. v State of New York, 32 AD2d 603), and as the court stated in Ferran Concrete Co. (supra, p 1062), "[t]he statute seeks to provide a limited waiver of the contractual release provisions”. (Italics mine.)

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
101 Misc. 2d 904, 422 N.Y.S.2d 303, 1979 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2787, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kembridge-corp-v-state-nyclaimsct-1979.