O’Connor, J.
In this workers’ compensation case, we hold that an employee who has an emotional breakdown as a result of being told that she will be laid off from one department and transferred to another one, has suffered a personal injury “arising out of and in the course of . . . employment” within the meaning of G. L. c. 152, § 26.
[685]*685This is the insurer’s appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court, and affirmed by the Appeals Court, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 727 (1984), awarding compensation under G. L. c. 152 to Helen J. Kelly, the employee. The judgment reversed a decision of the Industrial Accident Board’s reviewing board which had affirmed a single member’s decision denying Kelly compensation. We granted the insurer’s application for further appellate review. We affirm the judgment entered in the Superior Court.
The findings of the single member were adopted by the reviewing board and, because they have evidential support and are not tainted by error of law, they are final. Haley’s Case, 356 Mass. 678, 679-680 (1970), and cases cited. We summarize the findings as follows. Kelly was employed by Raytheon Corporation for twenty-two years prior to August, 1977. At the time of the events giving rise to this case, she worked as an associate training specialist and was responsible for running Raytheon’s training center. She was happily married, had two grown children, and got along well with her supervisor.
On Friday, August 19, 1977, Kelly’s supervisor called her aside and told her that the company was cutting back in her department and that she would be laid off. Kelly began to cry, was unable to compose herself, and went home early. She remained upset over the weekend. When she returned to work on Monday, August 22, she was told that she could transfer to the cable department and work there as a foreperson. Kelly was not pleased to work in the cable department, and on that same day she became depressed, developed chest pains, and was taken to a hospital where she was put on medication.
Kelly remained out of work for six weeks. She returned to work in the cable department on October 5, 1977, but on October 14 she again developed chest pains and was taken to the hospital. Thereafter, she underwent psychiatric treatment for depression, she lost weight, and she experienced difficulty in sleeping. Based on the testimony of her psychiatrist, the single member found that Kelly “has been totally disabled from August 22, 1977 to date” and that “her depression was caused by her hearing that she was to be laid off from one department [686]*686and transferred to another.” The single member concluded, however, that Kelly had not suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment and therefore was not entitled to compensation. The reviewing board agreed. That conclusion is not to be reversed unless a different conclusion is required as a matter of law. Corraro’s Case, 380 Mass. 357, 359 (1980). We believe that the law does require a different conclusion.
The findings of the single member clearly establish that Kelly suffered a “personal injury” within the meaning of the act. We have held in several cases that emotional disability, if caused by employment, is a compensable personal injury under G. L. c. 152. Simmons v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., post 1007 (1985). Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 550 (1980). Albanese’s Case, 378 Mass. 14, 17 (1979). Fitzgibbons’s Case, 374 Mass. 633, 637-638 (1978). In none of those cases did we suggest that entitlement to workers’ compensation for emotional disability requires proof of facts in addition to those required when the disability is only physical, and we discern no basis in G. L. c. 152 for such a requirement. Nor can it properly be contested that Kelly’s injury was caused by her hearing that she would lose her position as a training specialist. Regardless of whether Kelly’s experience is viewed as a forced transfer from one position to another or as a layoff, the single member has determined with finality that Kelly’s disability is attributable to that event. The only new question presented by this case, then, is whether disability that results from an employee’s learning that she will be laid off from one department and assigned to another may be said to arise out of and in the course of employment, as is required for entitlement to workers’ compensation under G. L. c. 152.
A disability arises out of and in the course of employment if it is “attributable to the ‘nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment; in other words, [to] employment looked at in any of its aspects.’” Zerofski’s Case, 385 Mass. 590, 592 (1982), quoting Caswell’s Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502 (1940). Thus, the question is whether the event that caused [687]*687Kelly’s disability was an incident of employment “in any of its aspects.” We have no doubt that that event was such an incident, particularly in view of the long-standing principle that the workers’ compensation statute should be construed, whenever possible, in favor of the employee so as “to promote the accomplishment of its beneficent design.” Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349 (1914). Kelly, then, is within the class of persons the Legislature sought to protect by G. L. c. 152.
We reject any contention that Kelly is not entitled to workers’ compensation unless her emotional disability resulted from an unusual and objectively stressful or traumatic event. “Our decisions place injuries attributable to specific events at work within the business risks covered by the act, even when employment does not expose employees to an unusual risk greater than that experienced by the general public. Caswell’s Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502 (1940) (injury at work during hurricane). See Fitzgibbons’s Case, 374 Mass. 633, 638 (1978).” Zerofski’s Case, supra at 595 n.2. Furthermore, it is settled law that an employer takes his employee “as is,” that is, with whatever peculiar vulnerabilities to injury the employee may have, and that “an identifiable incident or strain need not be unusual or severe to support compensation if the particular employee succumbs to it. See, e.g., McManus’s Case, 328 Mass. 171 (1951) (bending over caused hernia).” Zerofski’s Case, supra at 593.
Nothing in Simmons v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., supra, Fitzgibbons’s Case, supra, Albanese’s Case, supra, or Foley v. Polaroid Corp., supra, is at variance with the above stated principles. Although the work-related events in those cases were unusually stressful, we attached no significance to the unusualness of the stress in arriving at our holdings. The unusualness of the stress in each case simply served to identify specific work-related events as causes of the employees’ emotional disabilities. In the instant case, despite the absence of an unusual, objectively stressful, event, the single member’s finding has nevertheless established that a specific work-related event caused the employee’s emotional disability. Nothing more is needed to satisfy G. L. c. 152.
[688]*688Cases involving injuries due to gradual deterioration, or bodily wear and tear, are inapposite.
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O’Connor, J.
In this workers’ compensation case, we hold that an employee who has an emotional breakdown as a result of being told that she will be laid off from one department and transferred to another one, has suffered a personal injury “arising out of and in the course of . . . employment” within the meaning of G. L. c. 152, § 26.
[685]*685This is the insurer’s appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court, and affirmed by the Appeals Court, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 727 (1984), awarding compensation under G. L. c. 152 to Helen J. Kelly, the employee. The judgment reversed a decision of the Industrial Accident Board’s reviewing board which had affirmed a single member’s decision denying Kelly compensation. We granted the insurer’s application for further appellate review. We affirm the judgment entered in the Superior Court.
The findings of the single member were adopted by the reviewing board and, because they have evidential support and are not tainted by error of law, they are final. Haley’s Case, 356 Mass. 678, 679-680 (1970), and cases cited. We summarize the findings as follows. Kelly was employed by Raytheon Corporation for twenty-two years prior to August, 1977. At the time of the events giving rise to this case, she worked as an associate training specialist and was responsible for running Raytheon’s training center. She was happily married, had two grown children, and got along well with her supervisor.
On Friday, August 19, 1977, Kelly’s supervisor called her aside and told her that the company was cutting back in her department and that she would be laid off. Kelly began to cry, was unable to compose herself, and went home early. She remained upset over the weekend. When she returned to work on Monday, August 22, she was told that she could transfer to the cable department and work there as a foreperson. Kelly was not pleased to work in the cable department, and on that same day she became depressed, developed chest pains, and was taken to a hospital where she was put on medication.
Kelly remained out of work for six weeks. She returned to work in the cable department on October 5, 1977, but on October 14 she again developed chest pains and was taken to the hospital. Thereafter, she underwent psychiatric treatment for depression, she lost weight, and she experienced difficulty in sleeping. Based on the testimony of her psychiatrist, the single member found that Kelly “has been totally disabled from August 22, 1977 to date” and that “her depression was caused by her hearing that she was to be laid off from one department [686]*686and transferred to another.” The single member concluded, however, that Kelly had not suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment and therefore was not entitled to compensation. The reviewing board agreed. That conclusion is not to be reversed unless a different conclusion is required as a matter of law. Corraro’s Case, 380 Mass. 357, 359 (1980). We believe that the law does require a different conclusion.
The findings of the single member clearly establish that Kelly suffered a “personal injury” within the meaning of the act. We have held in several cases that emotional disability, if caused by employment, is a compensable personal injury under G. L. c. 152. Simmons v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., post 1007 (1985). Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 550 (1980). Albanese’s Case, 378 Mass. 14, 17 (1979). Fitzgibbons’s Case, 374 Mass. 633, 637-638 (1978). In none of those cases did we suggest that entitlement to workers’ compensation for emotional disability requires proof of facts in addition to those required when the disability is only physical, and we discern no basis in G. L. c. 152 for such a requirement. Nor can it properly be contested that Kelly’s injury was caused by her hearing that she would lose her position as a training specialist. Regardless of whether Kelly’s experience is viewed as a forced transfer from one position to another or as a layoff, the single member has determined with finality that Kelly’s disability is attributable to that event. The only new question presented by this case, then, is whether disability that results from an employee’s learning that she will be laid off from one department and assigned to another may be said to arise out of and in the course of employment, as is required for entitlement to workers’ compensation under G. L. c. 152.
A disability arises out of and in the course of employment if it is “attributable to the ‘nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment; in other words, [to] employment looked at in any of its aspects.’” Zerofski’s Case, 385 Mass. 590, 592 (1982), quoting Caswell’s Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502 (1940). Thus, the question is whether the event that caused [687]*687Kelly’s disability was an incident of employment “in any of its aspects.” We have no doubt that that event was such an incident, particularly in view of the long-standing principle that the workers’ compensation statute should be construed, whenever possible, in favor of the employee so as “to promote the accomplishment of its beneficent design.” Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349 (1914). Kelly, then, is within the class of persons the Legislature sought to protect by G. L. c. 152.
We reject any contention that Kelly is not entitled to workers’ compensation unless her emotional disability resulted from an unusual and objectively stressful or traumatic event. “Our decisions place injuries attributable to specific events at work within the business risks covered by the act, even when employment does not expose employees to an unusual risk greater than that experienced by the general public. Caswell’s Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502 (1940) (injury at work during hurricane). See Fitzgibbons’s Case, 374 Mass. 633, 638 (1978).” Zerofski’s Case, supra at 595 n.2. Furthermore, it is settled law that an employer takes his employee “as is,” that is, with whatever peculiar vulnerabilities to injury the employee may have, and that “an identifiable incident or strain need not be unusual or severe to support compensation if the particular employee succumbs to it. See, e.g., McManus’s Case, 328 Mass. 171 (1951) (bending over caused hernia).” Zerofski’s Case, supra at 593.
Nothing in Simmons v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., supra, Fitzgibbons’s Case, supra, Albanese’s Case, supra, or Foley v. Polaroid Corp., supra, is at variance with the above stated principles. Although the work-related events in those cases were unusually stressful, we attached no significance to the unusualness of the stress in arriving at our holdings. The unusualness of the stress in each case simply served to identify specific work-related events as causes of the employees’ emotional disabilities. In the instant case, despite the absence of an unusual, objectively stressful, event, the single member’s finding has nevertheless established that a specific work-related event caused the employee’s emotional disability. Nothing more is needed to satisfy G. L. c. 152.
[688]*688Cases involving injuries due to gradual deterioration, or bodily wear and tear, are inapposite. When disability results, not from a single work-related event or series of events, but from gradual deterioration, a causal relationship between employment and the disability can only be established by showing that the employment exposed the employee to “an identifiable condition [of the employment] that is not common and necessary to all or a great many occupations.” Zerofski’s Case, supra at 595. Compare Zerofski’s Case, supra at 596 (“Prolonged standing and walking are simply too common among necessary human activities to constitute identifiable conditions of employment”), with Madden’s Case, 222 Mass. 487, 496 (1916) (“When a pre-existing heart disease of the employee is accelerated to the point of disablement by the exertion and strain of the employment, not due to the character of the disease acting alone or progressing as is would in any rational work,” the injury is compensable under the act). However, when an injury is attributable to a specific work-related event, as here, or a series of such events, rather than to gradual wear and tear, the employee need not show that the employment exposed him or her to an unusual risk greater than that experienced by the general public. “To be compensable, the harm must arise either from a specific incident or series of incidents at work, or from an identifiable condition that is not common and necessary to all or a great many occupations” (emphasis added). Zerofski’s Case, supra at 594-595.
We agree with the Appeals Court that Kelly is entitled to compensation, and that Korsun’s Case, 354 Mass. 124 (1968), does not require a different result. “As the court noted in Fitzgibbons’s Case, supra at 639, ‘there was a lack of evidence [in Korsun’s Case] with which to connect the alleged precipitating event to Korsun’s employment. ’ There is no such failure to prove causation in the present case. And as further noted in Zerofski’s Case, 385 Mass. at 594, the language in Korsun’s Case (at 128) concerning apprehension about losing one’s job [as not arising out of the nature, conditions, obligations, or incidents of the employment] refers to injuries caused by the general stress of work which are rendered noncompensable by [689]*689the ‘wear and tear’ doctrine. We consider Korsun’s Case to have been limited by later opinions and to be inapplicable to the facts here.” (Footnote omitted.) 17 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 730-731 (1984).
Our reasoning essentially tracks that of the Appeals Court. But that court found “the result troubling and one which may involve a larger extension of liabililty than the [Albanese and Fitzgibbons] cases contemplated.” 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 733. We recognize that layoffs and job transfers are frequent events, and that emotional injuries are more prone to fabrication and less susceptible to substantiation than are physical injuries. Nevertheless, it is within the Legislature’s prerogative to determine, as a matter of public policy, whether one of the costs of doing business in this Commonwealth shall be the compensation of those few employees who do suffer emotional disability as a result of being laid off or transferred, and it is also the Legislature’s prerogative to say whether determination of the existence of such a disability is appropriately left to the expertise of the Industrial Accident Board. We construe G. L. c. 152, § 26, as providing that an employee who suffers emotional disability as a result of layoff or transfer is entitled to workers’ compensation, and as vesting in the Industrial Accident Board the responsibility to make the relevant factual determination. Because the single member found that Kelly suffered such a disability, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
So ordered.