KELLY v. VERTIKAL PRESS LTD.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 2, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-02315
StatusUnknown

This text of KELLY v. VERTIKAL PRESS LTD. (KELLY v. VERTIKAL PRESS LTD.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KELLY v. VERTIKAL PRESS LTD., (E.D. Pa. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS J. KELLY, III, CIVIL ACTION Plaintiff,

v.

VERTIKAL PRESS, LTD, NO. 20-2315 Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Thomas J. Kelly III is a professional photographer residing in Pennsylvania. Defendant Vertikal Press, Ltd. is a business based in the United Kingdom. Plaintiff sued Defendant for alleged violations of the Copyright Act, as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., for posting Plaintiff’s copyrighted photo of a crane accident on its website without authorization. After Defendant failed to answer or otherwise respond, Plaintiff moved for entry of default judgment. For the reasons that follow, the case will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. I. FACTS

Plaintiff photographed a bridge collapse—seemingly caused by a large crane driving over a small bridge—in Pottstown, Pennsylvania on May 15, 2017. He registered five photos of the bridge collapse with the United States Copyright Office. On May 16, 2017, Defendant ran a story titled Crane Too Heavy for Bridge on its website, Vertikal.net, featuring one of Plaintiff’s photos of the Pottstown bridge collapse. Plaintiff avers that Defendant did not have authorization to use the photograph and that this unauthorized reproduction amounts to copyright infringement under Sections 106 and 501 of the Copyright Act. Plaintiff further alleges that the infringement was willful and intentional. According to Plaintiff, Defendant’s registered address is in Northamptonshire in the United Kingdom. Plaintiff served Defendant by mailing a summons and copy of the Complaint to Defendant’s office via FedEx, which was signed for and delivered on May 29, 2020. An Answer was due on June 19, 2020. Defendant did not answer or otherwise file a responsive pleading. On September 25, 2020, Plaintiff requested the Clerk of Court to enter default. In his declaration, Plaintiff’s attorney alleged that “[t]o date, we have not received a response to the Complaint.” On October 13, 2020, the Clerk entered default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 55(a) for failure to appear, plead, or otherwise defend. Now, Plaintiff moves for default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin the Defendant from further infringement of Plaintiff’s copyrighted works, seeks $150,000 in statutory damages for willful infringement of a registered copyrighted work pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), and requests reasonable costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $ 11,702 pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505. II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Because the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the Defendant it cannot render a default judgment and must dismiss the case. A district court may assert personal jurisdiction “over non-resident defendants to the extent permissible under the law of the state where the district court sits.” Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).1 Under Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute, a federal court has jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of

1 The Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the district court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 37. The plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing and may rely on inadmissible evidence to do so. Id. at 36-37; D’Onofrio v. Il Mattino, 430 F. Supp.2d 431, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2006). This means that the Plaintiff must produce evidence which, if believed, would be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b). Personal jurisdiction can be either general, permitting the court to exercise jurisdiction over all claims against a defendant because it is essentially at home in the forum, or specific, permitting the court to exercise jurisdiction only over a defendant’s forum-related activities. Id. As a preliminary matter, there is no general personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Plaintiff has made no allegations to show that Defendant’s “affiliations with [Pennsylvania] are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home” in this forum. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). Plaintiff’s bare allegation in its Complaint that “Defendant transacts business in Pennsylvania” is insufficient to establish that the U.K.-based company has continuous and systematic contacts with Pennsylvania. Plaintiff argues, however, that there is specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant based on its commercially interactive website. The exercise of specific personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process “only when the defendant has constitutionally sufficient ‘minimum

contacts’ with the forum, and where subjecting the defendant to the court’s jurisdiction comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 2002) (first quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); then quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In evaluating the Defendant’s contacts with the forum, the court must examine whether the Defendant has “availed [it]self of the privileges of [forum] law and the extent to which [it] could reasonably anticipate being involved in litigation in the [forum].” Id. at 370 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Third Circuit applies a sliding scale approach to determine whether a generally available website evinces a purposeful availment of the forum state. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying the framework from Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)). Under this framework, websites are placed on a spectrum ranging from passive websites, on which information is merely posted, to interactive websites, which facilitate commercial transactions between the

defendant and forum residents. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. This Court has previously explained the spectrum as follows: A passive web site generally cannot serve as the basis for personal jurisdiction, and a commercial interactive web site generally is sufficient to establish minimum contacts. [Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124]. The middle ground on the Zippo spectrum is occupied by web sites through which business is not transacted directly, but which allow for some exchange of information. Id. The jurisdictional sufficiency of web site in the middle ground “is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information.” Id. However, the Third Circuit has emphasized that “the mere operation of a commercially interactive web site” is not enough establish personal jurisdiction in every location where the web site is available. Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 454.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
KELLY v. VERTIKAL PRESS LTD., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-v-vertikal-press-ltd-paed-2020.