Kelly v. Silver

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 13, 2025·No. 7:25-cv-02279·Unknown

Opinion

DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOC #: SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATE FILED: 8/13/2025 SHYTIQUE KELLY, Plaintiff, against: 25-CV-2279 (NSR) L. SILVER; ANDREW MILLER; A. ACRISH; CAROL MOORES; R. BENTIVEGNA; ORDER OF SERVICE CARRIE; GIORDANI; RODRIGUEZ; JOHN DOE; C.O. P.; B. TUOHY, Defendants.

NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Eastern Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants denied him adequate medical care when he was incarcerated in Green Haven Correctional Facility.' By order dated April 30, 2025, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).? STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks

' Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. See Kelly v. Silver, No. 9:25-CV-0203 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2025). By order dated March 13, 2025, the Northern District transferred this action to this court. (ECF 4.) By order dated March 21, 2025, Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain directed that Plaintiff file an updated prisoner authorization (ECF 7), which Plaintiff did on April 11, 2025. ? Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). DISCUSSION A. Personal involvement To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official[.]” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing how Defendant B. Tuohy was personally involved in the events underlying his claims. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against this defendant for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff also names as defendants a John Doe corrections officer and “C.O. P.” The complaint, however, alleges no facts showing how these unidentified individuals were involved in the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims. Nor does the complaint include any information that would allow the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) to assist Plaintiff and the Court in identifying these defendants. In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants him 30 days’ leave to file an amended

complaint alleging facts showing how Tuohy was personally involved in violating his federal constitutional rights. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff may also allege additional facts showing how the John Doe correction officer and “C.O. P.” were involved in the events giving rise to his claims and facts that would allow DOCCS to assist in ascertaining their identities. Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint. B. Service on remaining named defendants Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service.3 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 2F (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Dr. L. Silver, Nurse Andrew Miller, Dr. A. Acrish, Carol A. Moores, Dr. Bentivegna, Nurse Carrie, Nurse Giordani, and Nurse Rodriguez through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals

3Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a summons be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have effected service until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that any summonses be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date any summonses issue. Service Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for each of these defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon these defendants. If the complaint is not served within 90 days after the date summonses are issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Kelly v. Silver, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Kelly v. Silver (Kelly v. Silver) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Meilleur v. Strong
682 F.3d 56 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)