Kelly v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

10 Mass. L. Rptr. 258
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedMay 18, 1999
DocketNo. 98449B
StatusPublished

This text of 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 258 (Kelly v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelly v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 258 (Mass. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

Botsford, J.

This negligence action concerns personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff William J. Kelly (Kelly) when he fell on the stairs at the Oak Grove station of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). Kelly brings claims against both the MBTA and Empire Cleaning Company, Inc. (Empire) on the theory that they failed to clean the station properly, and against the MBTA only for failing to provide adequate handrails along the stairway. The plaintiff Terry Kelly claims a loss of consortium as a result of her husband’s injuries. Each defendant now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56. Empire also moves for summary judgment on the cross claims of the MBTA. For the reasons below, Empire’s motions for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ complaint and on the MBTA’s cross claims are allowed, and the MBTA’s motion for summary judgment on the handrail claim is denied.

BACKGROUND

The summary judgment record reveals the following facts. Any factual disputes presented have been resolved in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. On April 29, 1997 at approximately 11:00 a.m., Kelly entered the Oak Grove MBTA station in Malden, Massachusetts. While proceeding down the stairway to the train platform, Kelly tripped and lost his balance on a piece of paper or a wrapper. (Kelly Ans. to MBTA Interrog. No. 3.) He was unable to identify the length of time the wrapper was on the stairway. (Kelly Depo. p. 66, 11.20-25.) When he reached out to grab the handrail alongside the stairway, he was unable to obtain a grip. (Kelly Ans. to MBTA Interrog. No. 3.) He fell sideways down approximately twenty steps, ending up about two or three steps from the bottom of the stairway laying across the steps. (Id.)

At the time of the accident, the MBTA had contracted with the defendant Empire for “complete cleaning maintenance of the Oak Grove MBTA station.” (MBTA contract, plaintiffs’ Ex. F.) The agreement required “continuous sweeping of all station areas to include: platforms, stairs, entrance passageways, etc.” (Id.) The contract also required that Empire “keep the stations free of dust, debris, stickers, posters, decals, unauthorized signs and graffiti. . .” (MBTA contract, plaintiffs’ Ex. G.) No Empire employee was present at [259]*259the Oak Grove station when Kelly fell (Empire Ans. to plaintiff Interrog. No. 3), and no records exist concerning when the station was last inspected prior to the Kelly’s fall. (Empire Ans. to plaintiff Interrog. No. 8.)3

The Oak Grove MBTA station was constructed in the 1970s, and the stairway and handrails were installed at that time; the station was opened to the public in 1977. (MBTA Ans. to Kelly Interrog.) The handrails are solid wood, measuring five and seven-sixteenths of an inch wide and one . and seven-sixteenths of an inch thick, and running the continuous length of the stairway. No changes have been made to the handrails since their installation. (Sullivan Aff.)

DISCUSSION

This court grants summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact and where the summary judgment record entitles the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 419, 422 (1983); Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy. v. Allianz Ins. Corp., 413 Mass. 473, 476 (1992). The moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute of material fact on every relevant issue. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 17 (1989). Where the party opposing summary judgment carries the burden of proof at trial, and the moving party demonstrates that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of establishing an essential element of his case, summary judgment is appropriate unless the party opposing the motion sets forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991).

I. Cleaning and Maintenance of the Oak Grove Station

The plaintiffs allege that both defendants were negligent for failing to clean and maintain the Oak Grove station properly, although they focus primarily on Empire. Plaintiffs allege that Empire had a duty to provide “complete cleaning maintenance,” that Empire breached this duty when it failed to keep the stairway clear of debris, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of Kelly’s injuries. Empire’s summary judgment motion addresses this claim.4

For summary judgment purposes I accept as a fact that Kelly slipped on a paper or wrapper. However, there is no evidence showing the length of time the wrapper was on the stairway before Kelly fell. Kelly only saw the wrapper out of the comer of his eye as he was falling and could not tell by looking at the wrapper the length of time it was on the stairway prior to his fall. Indeed, the wrapper was never found. In order to recover, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that Empire (or the MBTA) knew or should hav j known of the presence of the paper on the stairway and failed to remove it within a reasonable time. Oliveri v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Authy., 363 Mass. 165, 167 (1973); Welch v. Angelo’s Supermarket, Inc., 27 Mass.App.Ct. 1106 (1989) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed where no evidence presented concerning length of time green vegetable matter had lain on floor before plaintiff fell). See Sahagan v. Commonwealth 25 Mass.App.Ct. 953, 953-54 (1988) (defendant entitled to directed verdict where plaintiff, who struck non-rusty metal sign post stump on bike path maintained by the MDC, presented no evidence from which one could infer that the defendant either created the defective condition, was informed of it, or should have known about it).

Where, as here, there is no evidence regarding how long the wrapper was on the stairs, the plaintiffs’ negligence claim based on the condition of the stairs should fail. See Welch v. Angelo’s Supermarket, Inc., supra, 27 Mass.App.Ct. at 1106; Sahagan v. Commonwealth supra, 25 Mass.App.Ct. at 953. However, the plaintiffs argue that under its contract with the MBTA, Empire had a duly of continuous service and continuous cleaning, and that these contractual obligations give rise to liability on Empire’s part in the circumstances of this case.5 There is some factual support for the argument. For instance, if the accident happened at 10:59 a.m., as the MBTA’s report states, and if the personnel schedule submitted by Empire is correct, there should have been an Empire employee on site cleaning the station at the time of the accident, and there was not. It is further unsettling, at the least, that Empire has no records of employee inspections conducted at the Oak Grove station.

Nevertheless, Empire’s contractual obligations to the MBTA did not heighten its common law duly to Kelly of reasonable care. See Corsetti v. Stone, 396 Mass. 1, 11 n. 8 (1985). In order to establish liability on Empire’s part, therefore, the plaintiffs must show that the dangerous condition, i.e. the wrapper on the stairway, existed for such a time that Empire knew or should have known of its existence. Thus, even assuming an Empire employee should have been at the Oak Grove station at the time of the accident, Empire cannot be found liable in the absence of any evidence that the wrapper was on the stairs long enough for the employee reasonably to have been aware of it — that it was not dropped the instant before Kelly’s fall.6

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Related

Pederson v. Time, Inc.
532 N.E.2d 1211 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1989)
Oliveri v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
292 N.E.2d 863 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1973)
Corsetti v. Stone Co.
483 N.E.2d 793 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1985)
Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp.
575 N.E.2d 734 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1991)
Cassesso v. Commissioner of Correction
456 N.E.2d 1123 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1983)
Klein v. Catalano
437 N.E.2d 514 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1982)
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. Allianz Insurance
597 N.E.2d 439 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1992)
Sahagan v. Commonwealth
518 N.E.2d 888 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1988)
Welch v. Angelo's Supermarket, Inc.
534 N.E.2d 821 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
10 Mass. L. Rptr. 258, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-v-massachusetts-bay-transportation-authority-masssuperct-1999.