Kelly v. Department of Corrections

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJuly 13, 2020
Docket2:18-cv-01493
StatusUnknown

This text of Kelly v. Department of Corrections (Kelly v. Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kelly v. Department of Corrections, (E.D. Wis. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ BERNELL EDWARD KELLY,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 18-cv-1493-pp

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING THE COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 1) ______________________________________________________________________________

The plaintiff, a former Wisconsin state prisoner who is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights at the Dodge Correctional Institution. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. The plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this action because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. 28 U.S.C. §1915. The law allows a court let an incarcerated plaintiff proceed without prepaying the civil case filing fee if he meets certain conditions. One of those conditions is that the plaintiff pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b). Once the plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, the court may allow the plaintiff to pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On October 9, 2018, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.12. Dkt. No. 9. The plaintiff court received that fee on October 22, 2018. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing fee over time as he is able. II. Screening the complaint The PLRA requires federal courts to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court may dismiss a case, or part of it, if the claims alleged are “frivolous or malicious,” fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim under the federal notice pleading system, the plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint need not plead specific facts, and need only provide “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not do. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The factual content of the complaint must allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations, when accepted as true, must state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Federal courts follow the two-step analysis in Twombly to determine whether a complaint states a claim. Id. at 679. First, the court determines whether the plaintiff’s legal conclusions are supported by factual allegations. Id. Legal conclusions not supported by facts “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Second, the court determines whether the well- pleaded factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. The court gives pro se allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). A. Facts Alleged in the Complaint The plaintiff has sued the Department of Corrections, Miss Bowie, HSU staff, K. Johnson HSU manager and Cpt. A. Schultz. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. He alleges the following: The D.O.C. in DCI they gave me the wrong pills and they did nothing for 7 hours 8-23-18 at 6:45 AM right after breakfast it happened in my cell in the seg unit cell 27 you have to ask them because I really don’t know but I would like to know because they are messing with health.

Id. at 2-3. The plaintiff wants the HSU staff to pass out medications instead of guards; he believes he would not have gotten the wrong medication if the HSU staff passed out the medications. Id. at 4. B. Analysis To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right under the Constitution or laws of the United States and whoever deprived him of that right was acting under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Vill. of N. Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)). The plaintiff’s complaint cannot proceed as it is for several reasons. First, he has sued the Department of Corrections. “[S]tates and their agencies are not ‘persons’ subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983.” Johnson v. Supreme Court of Ill.,165 F.3d 1140, 1141 (7th Cir. 1999). This means that “[n]either the State of Wisconsin nor the State’s Department of Corrections is a proper defendant.” Andreola v. Wisconsin, 171 F. App'x 514, 515 (7th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff cannot sue the Department of Corrections, and the court will dismiss it as a defendant. Second, a person can’t be liable under §1983 unless that person was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). “An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 . . . if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at [his] direction or with [his] knowledge and consent.” Id. (quoting Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1005 (7th Cir. 1982). He “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Id. (quoting Jones v.

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Related

Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Roe v. Elyea
631 F.3d 843 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Thomas Crowder v. Russell E. Lash
687 F.2d 996 (Seventh Circuit, 1982)
David Johnson v. Supreme Court of Illinois
165 F.3d 1140 (Seventh Circuit, 1999)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Andreola, Daniel M. v. State of Wisconsin
171 F. App'x 514 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Gutierrez v. Peters
111 F.3d 1364 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
Kelly v. Department of Corrections, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-v-department-of-corrections-wied-2020.