KELLY-KOFFI v. Wesley Medical Center

241 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 557, 2003 WL 141058
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedJanuary 13, 2003
Docket01-1276-JTM
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 241 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (KELLY-KOFFI v. Wesley Medical Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KELLY-KOFFI v. Wesley Medical Center, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 557, 2003 WL 141058 (D. Kan. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

MARTEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Barbara Kelly-Koffi has brought the present claim of race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against her former employer, Wesley Medical Center. Wesley has now moved for summary judgment. After reviewing the arguments and the evidence, the court concludes that the defendant’s motion will be granted.

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir.1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiffs claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1987).

In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. “In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The uncontroverted facts establish that Wesley employed Kelly-Koffi from No *1291 vember 2, 1998 to August 26, 1999 as an RN in the Surgical Intensive Care Unit (SICU). Kelly-Koffi had previously worked for Wesley from 1986 until 1994, when she voluntarily left her employment at Wesley to pursue travel nursing. During her first period of employment, Beverly White, the Department Director of Nursing Critical Care Services, was Kelly-Koffi’s direct supervisor and had promoted her to a clinical advisor position.

As the Department Director of Nursing Critical Care Services, White’s responsibilities included the supervision of the SICU, the Medical Intensive Care Unit (MICU), 2 Tower, 8 Tower, the Hyperbaric Unit, Trauma Services, and the Float Pool. In 1998, Kelly-Koffi contacted White about coming back to work for Wesley. According to Kelly-Koffi, White told her that Wesley would hire her.

Patricia Edwards was the Manager of SICU at the time of Kelly-Koffi’s employment in 1998 and 1999. Edwards reported to White. Edwards interviewed Kelly-Kof-fi and recommended to Wesley’s Professional Practices Committee that she be hired.

As part of her employment with Wesley, Kelly-Koffi understood that she was responsible for the integrity and accuracy of Wesley’s documents and records. She also understood that various regulatory and legal documents required Wesley to maintain accurate documents and records.

Wesley’s policy regarding “Medication Administration” provides, in part, that an RN or LPN “shall assure that all medications scheduled within the tour of duty are administered appropriately.” Further, the policy provides that an RN or LPN “shall assure that medications are appropriately scheduled on the Medication Administration Record (MAR) and on the information in the handheld computer.” (Def. Exh 5).

Kelly-Koffi understood that accurate documentation is an important aspect of nursing and is something she was trained on during her nursing education. She also understood Wesley’s policy regarding medication documentation requiring medication to be charted promptly by the RN or LPN who administered the medication. She knew it was Wesley’s policy that medications should be administered within thirty minutes of the scheduled time.

Wesley’s “Code of Conduct” policy regarding controlled substances provides that: Many of these [controlled] substances are governed and monitored by specific regulatory organizations and must be administered by physician order only. It is extremely important that these items be handled properly and only by authorized individuals to minimize risks to us and to patients.

(Deft. Exh. 7, Dep. Exh. 26 at 10). On November 2, 1998, Kelly-Koffi signed an acknowledgment form certifying that she had received the Code of Conduct and understood that it represented mandatory policies of Wesley.

Wesley’s practice regarding wasting of narcotics that are ordered but not given to a patient requires nurses to have someone else witness and document the wastage.

On February 25, 1999, Kelly-Koffi received a written counseling for practice concerns, including a narcotics documentation issue, which is documented on a Constructive Action Form. The form raised several issues. First, with respect to patient care, the Form identified the following practice concerns: (1) an insulin drip had expired; (2) a Levophed drip had expired; (3) the morphine drip was running at the wrong rate (a narcotic documentation issue); (4) the chest tube was not suctioning; (4) no water was in the water seal chamber; and (5) blue dye was noted *1292 on top of the suction line.

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241 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 557, 2003 WL 141058, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kelly-koffi-v-wesley-medical-center-ksd-2003.