Kelly Amber Blunt v. City of Roseville, Mich.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: October 22, 2024
• Docket: 24-1136
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0414n.06

No. 24-1136

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Oct 22, 2024 KELLY AMBER BLUNT, ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) CITY OF ROSEVILLE, MICHIGAN, et al., COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Defendants, ) ) OPINION MACOMB COUNTY, MICHIGAN, ) ) Defendant-Appellee. )

Before: GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Kelly Blunt alleged that two Roseville police officers

falsely identified her as someone involved in their undercover purchase of heroin at the Victory

Inn Motel in Roseville, Michigan. Based on that misidentification, an assistant county prosecutor

charged Blunt with several drug-related offenses—all of which were dismissed at her preliminary

examination. Blunt later filed this action and, as relevant here, the district court dismissed her suit

against Macomb County for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

We accept as true all factual allegations in Blunt’s complaint. See DiGeronimo Aggregates,

LLC v. Zemla, 763 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2014). In June 2020, two Roseville police officers—

Jason Otto and Bridget Lines—arranged to purchase narcotics at the Victory Inn Motel. Working

undercover, Otto followed someone named Dot into Room 430, where Otto asked for “Girl,”

meaning crack cocaine. Dot said they were “out of Girl,” but offered Otto either “Boy,” meaning

heroin, or “Ice,” meaning methamphetamine. Then a white female with tattoos on her arms came No. 24-1136, Blunt v. City of Roseville, et al.

into the room and said “they were out of Girl but the guys were currently cutting up Boy” in Room

428. Otto agreed to purchase $20 worth of heroin, which someone named Pete brought to him.

Otto and Dot then walked to Room 428, where Otto saw the same woman with tattoos on her arms

packaging heroin and running packages between the two rooms. Otto left the motel with three

grams of heroin. Two days later, officers returned to the motel and arrested Dot and Pete—but the

tattooed woman was not there.

Kelly Blunt—who says she has no tattoos—says that Officers Otto and Lines wrongly

identified her as the tattooed woman involved in the undercover buy at the motel. Based on that

identification, a Macomb County assistant prosecutor charged Blunt with multiple drug-related

offenses. Those charges led to Blunt’s arrest and required her to post bond, but the prosecutor

agreed to dismiss all of those charges at her preliminary hearing.

Blunt alleges that prosecutors knew the officers’ identification of her “was false and

unreliable.” She sued the City of Roseville, its officers Otto and Lines, and Macomb County for

malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Blunt voluntarily dismissed her claims against the

City defendants, and the district court granted Macomb County’s motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim.

We review that decision de novo. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 438-39 (6th Cir.

2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A plaintiff does so when the factual allegations contain “either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements necessary for recovery under a

viable legal theory.” D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

2 No. 24-1136, Blunt v. City of Roseville, et al.

Here, Blunt seeks to hold the County liable for malicious prosecution based on Assistant

Prosecuting Attorney Todd Schmitz’s decision to authorize a felony complaint charging her based

on false information and without probable cause. Municipal liability arises only for the

government’s own acts—so a plaintiff must allege an official policy or custom that was “the

moving force of the constitutional violation.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). And “liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish

municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,

481 (1986) (plurality).

Whether an official has final policymaking authority depends on state law. Id. at 483; see

Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 655 (6th Cir. 1993). Macomb County is a charter

county in which the elected Prosecuting Attorney appoints subordinate assistant prosecuting

attorneys. See Macomb County Charter, art. VI, § 6.2 (“The head of the department is the elected

prosecuting attorney.”); Mich. Comp. Laws § 49.41 (appointment of assistant prosecuting

attorneys); id. at § 49.42 (duties of assistant prosecuting attorneys).

Blunt makes no attempt to demonstrate that Michigan law vests the County’s assistant

prosecuting attorneys with authority to make final policy for the County. But Blunt does argue

that final policymaking authority can be “delegated by an official who possesses such authority.”

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483. And, Blunt contends, “assistant prosecutors were delegated the

authority to make prosecutorial decisions.” Pl’s Br., p. 9. But Blunt conflates the exercise of

prosecutorial discretion in making the charging decision with a delegation of authority to make

final policy for the County. “The fact that a particular official—even a policymaking official—

has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal

liability based on an exercise of that discretion.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481-82. And here Blunt

3 No. 24-1136, Blunt v. City of Roseville, et al.

has not alleged anything “more.” Instead, the complaint is conclusory throughout and lacks any

particular allegations as to why the assistant prosecutor’s decision to charge her was based on

policy—rather than (as in the usual case) the prosecutor’s understanding of the relevant

circumstances and law. The district court was right to dismiss her claim.

Nor do Blunt’s other theories of municipal liability find support in the facts alleged in the

complaint. See Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1160-61 (6th Cir. 2021). Nowhere in

the complaint do the factual allegations imply that a final policymaker approved or ratified the

assistant prosecutor’s charging decision. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127

(1988) (plurality); see also Feliciano, 988 F.2d at 656. Instead, Blunt herself alleged that the

prosecution agreed to dismiss all the charges at her preliminary examination. And Blunt’s passing

reference to a failure-to-train theory has no application to the County, because the complaint

alleged only that the City of Roseville failed to train its officers.

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.