COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-10-00027-CR
KELLI NOEL TORRENCE APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1 ----------
I. Introduction
Appellant Kelli Noel Torrence pleaded guilty to possession with intent to
deliver more than four but less than two hundred grams of methamphetamine
and was given six years’ deferred adjudication. See Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. §§ 481.102(6), .112(a), (d) (West 2010). In a sole point, she contends that
the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the evidence obtained as
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. a result of an allegedly illegal detention, which she argues was unnecessarily
prolonged to conduct a canine sniff. We affirm.
II. Background
Investigator Doug Deweese is a narcotics investigator with the Tarrant
County District Attorney’s office with more than twelve years’ experience in
narcotics investigations. On October 1, 2007, Investigator Deweese was
investigating narcotics leads in the White Settlement area of Fort Worth with his
field supervisor Sergeant Peabody. As Investigator Deweese waited outside a
convenience store while Sergeant Peabody got a drink, he saw a 1998 Dodge
Durango with license plate number 930JMJ that a confidential informant had
previously described to him as the vehicle Appellant used to deal ―ice‖ or
methamphetamine. The informant had said that Appellant ―was dealing in
narcotics and that she would many times carry narcotics in the Durango with
her.‖ After receiving this information, Investigator Deweese pulled Appellant’s
driver’s license number from Tarrant County Jail booking records, accessed her
driver’s license photograph through DPS records, and confirmed that the Dodge
Durango was registered to her.
Investigator Deweese and Sergeant Peabody remained in their vehicle and
watched as the Dodge Durango and another vehicle pulled close together in a
Waffle House parking lot and stopped ―driver’s door to driver’s door.‖ There was
only one person in each vehicle, the vehicles were close enough for the drivers
to reach one another, and it looked to Investigator Deweese as if the two drivers ―might have shook hands or possibly made a drug transaction.‖2 After about five
minutes, the vehicles drove away in separate directions. Although Investigator
Deweese could not recall the make of the second vehicle, he identified Appellant
in open court as the driver of the Dodge Durango.
Because he suspected criminal activity while watching the transaction
between Appellant and the second driver, Investigator Deweese called the Fort
Worth Police Department to determine if a patrol unit was available to make a
traffic stop. Fort Worth Police Department Officer A.R. White called Investigator
Deweese by mobile telephone, and Investigator Deweese provided Officer White
with information about Appellant’s vehicle, location, and direction of travel and
what had transpired in the Waffle House parking lot. Investigator Deweese also
informed Officer White that he would need his own probable cause—beyond the
information provided to him—before making the traffic stop.
Officer White located Appellant’s Dodge Durango and followed it until he
observed two traffic violations. He initiated a traffic stop, and upon approaching
the vehicle, he noticed Appellant ―reaching and making furtive movements in the
vehicle towards the center console and underneath the seat as if she were
reaching for or concealing something.‖ He asked Appellant to step out of the
2 Investigator Deweese later clarified that although he did not actually see any money or other items exchanged between the drivers and had not used binoculars, ―[i]t appeared to [him] as though they had made – either shaken hands or made a drug transaction‖ and that he believed it to be a drug transaction based on his many years of experience in conducting surveillance and seeing similar activity. vehicle because he knew of Investigator Deweese’s suspicion of drug activity
and thought Appellant might be reaching for a weapon or attempting to destroy
evidence. Officer White also noticed that Appellant was ―extremely nervous and
trembling.‖ He asked her routine questions about insurance and her driver’s
license but said that ―[s]he was fumbling around, extremely nervous, more
nervous than the average person is on a traffic stop.‖ Officer White also thought
Appellant was hesitant in answering his questions, and he observed her ―visibly
trembling‖ as he spoke with her. Another officer conducted a pat-down search of
Appellant but did not find any weapons.
Officer White returned to his car to check on Appellant’s license and
registration, and he also contacted Investigator Deweese by telephone, informing
Investigator Deweese that Appellant denied consent to search or having anything
illegal in the vehicle.3 Meanwhile, Investigator Deweese and Sergeant Peabody
had driven to a nearby location to watch the traffic stop and assist Officer White if
needed. While they waited, Investigator Deweese contacted the sheriff’s office
and requested a unit for a canine sniff of Appellant’s vehicle. After Officer White
had called Investigator Deweese, Investigator Deweese approached Officer
White and informed him that he had requested the canine unit, and Officer White
informed Investigator Deweese of his observations during the traffic stop and
3 Investigator Deweese similarly testified that Officer White had called him and had said Appellant was ―very nervous acting,‖ was fidgety, and had refused consent to a search of the Dodge Durango. gave Investigator Deweese Appellant’s driver’s license. Officer White then stood
by to assist Investigator Deweese.
Investigator Deweese approached Appellant and observed that she
appeared nervous. She answered Investigator Deweese’s questions, but she
was fidgety and sweating profusely even though it was October. By contrast,
Officer White was not sweating despite wearing a bullet-proof vest and a dark
uniform. Investigator Deweese advised Appellant of his suspicion and what he
had seen, and he told her that a canine unit was en route but that it could be
forty-five minutes before the unit arrived. Investigator Deweese told Appellant
that she was free to leave but that he was going to detain her vehicle until the
unit arrived. Appellant elected to remain with her vehicle.
The unit arrived about twenty-five minutes later, and the canine alerted on
the rear passenger area of Appellant’s vehicle. Inside the Dodge Durango,
Investigator Deweese found a plastic container with a green leafy substance he
recognized to be marijuana and a yellow, plastic bowl containing a crystal
substance that later tested positive for methamphetamine.
Investigator Deweese testified that the area around the Waffle House,
where he had observed Appellant engage in a possible drug transaction, is a
―very high crime area‖ with a lot of drug traffic and criminal activity. He based his
opinion on his experience of executing search warrants in the area and
information from the Fort Worth Police Department that they ―saturate‖ the area
with patrol units because of the criminal activity. On cross-examination, Investigator Deweese clarified that he believes the high-crime area near the
Waffle House includes the geographic area ―within a mile or so‖ of the Waffle
House.
Investigator Deweese testified that he believed the information from the
confidential informant to be credible and reliable based on his experience with
the informant. Investigator Deweese had received information from the informant
on two or three different occasions when the informant had observed Appellant in
possession of methamphetamine, and the informant had last seen Appellant with
methamphetamine ―a week or so‖ earlier. However, Investigator Deweese could
not recall the date he acquired the information from the informant about Appellant
and said he received the information about Appellant either in person or by
telephone within a month of Appellant’s arrest. Further, although Investigator
Deweese testified that the informant had given him information that he had
successfully used on more than one occasion, he acknowledged that his affidavit
in this case only mentioned one prior felony arrest and that he could not
remember the date of the prior arrest. Investigator Deweese clarified, though,
that the affidavit does not mention other times he had obtained accurate
information from the informant and that he does not arrest every person he
investigates, even if he finds them in possession of drugs.
III. Discussion
Appellant does not challenge the traffic stop by Officer White but contends
there was no reasonable suspicion to detain her vehicle for a canine sniff after the traffic stop had concluded. The State responds that Appellant failed to
preserve her complaint for appeal and alternatively contends that police had
reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant’s vehicle to continue their investigation.
A. Preservation of Error
As a threshold matter, we address the State’s argument that Appellant
failed to preserve her complaint for appeal. To preserve a complaint for our
review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection,
or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling if they are not
apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a)(1); Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 238–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The
error alleged on appeal must correspond to the objection made at trial. Wilson v.
State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Further, the trial court must
have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or
the complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex.
R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 341 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004). A reviewing court should not address the merits of an issue that has not
been preserved for appeal. Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009).
―A motion to suppress is a specialized objection to the admissibility of
evidence,‖ and it must meet the same requirements as an objection. Id. The two
purposes of the specificity requirement are ―to inform the trial judge of the basis
for the objection‖ and provide ―opposing counsel the opportunity to cure the objection or supply other testimony.‖ Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (op. on reh’g). Here, the motion to suppress was timely,
and the trial court denied the motion. The issue is therefore whether the
complaint was sufficiently specific. Rule of appellate procedure 33.1(a)(1)(A)
requires that a complaint be made ―with sufficient specificity to make the trial
court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the
context.‖ Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
Appellant filed two motions to suppress. The second motion specifically
stated that the trial court must ―determine whether the canine sniff of [Appellant’s]
vehicle was, in fact, based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot.‖ It also argued that ―only if the sum of the information known by the
officers on the scene was sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion that
narcotics were in [Appellant]’s vehicle could the continued detention in order to
conduct a dog sniff be considered reasonable.‖ Moreover, the second motion
stated that ―the information allegedly received from the confidential informant
does not lend itself to a finding of reasonable suspicion.‖4 Finally, when the trial
court asked Appellant’s attorney at the suppression hearing ―where the [d]efense
is coming from on the suppression issue,‖ Appellant’s attorney specifically
mentioned the transaction at the Waffle House being consistent with innocent
4 The State characterizes Appellant’s second motion to suppress as only challenging the warrant for her arrest, but the State ignores the express statements quoted above that challenge reasonable suspicion to justify her continued detention for a canine sniff. conduct, the allegedly weak evidence that the transaction occurred in a high
crime area, the lack of information concerning the informant’s reliability, and
Appellant’s alleged nervousness, and he said that each of these was not a basis
for a warrantless search. Appellant’s attorney also stated that the issues for the
court are ―prior to the start of the canine‖ sniff. Appellant’s complaints on appeal
are exactly those expressly set forth in her second motion to suppress, which
was denied by the trial court. We do not agree with the State’s contention that
Appellant failed to sufficiently complain to the trial court that her detention was
prolonged for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion. We therefore hold that
Appellant preserved her complaint for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a) (requiring the complaining party to present to the trial court a timely
request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired
ruling); Wilson, 71 S.W.3d at 349 (stating that ―the point of error on appeal must
comport with the objection made at trial‖).
B. Reasonable Suspicion
Appellant, challenging the information provided by the confidential
informant and the other information known to the officers on the scene, contends
that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain her vehicle for a canine sniff
once the initial traffic stop had concluded.
1. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review, giving ―almost total deference‖ to the trial court’s findings of historical fact supported by the record and reviewing de novo the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts that do not depend upon credibility and
demeanor. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When
the trial court fails to make explicit findings of fact, we ―review the evidence in a
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume that the trial court made
implicit findings of fact supported by the record.‖ Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488,
493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Weide v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007).
2. Applicable Law
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures by government actors. Weide, 214 S.W.3d at 24. Because this was a
warrantless search, the search is presumptively unreasonable, and the State has
the burden to rebut that presumption. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. A search or
seizure must be reasonable both at its inception and in its scope. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 25–26, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (1968). The scope is limited to
effectuating the reason for the stop. Id. Continued detention is justified only by
reasonable suspicion that another offense has been or is being committed.
Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Reasonable suspicion requires specific articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, would lead an officer to
reasonably conclude that the suspect is, has been, or soon will be engaged in
criminal activity. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492–93. This is an objective standard that disregards the officer’s subjective intent and looks solely to whether there was an
objective basis for the suspicion. Id. at 492. We do not separately evaluate and
accept or reject the individual objective facts relied on to establish reasonable
suspicion because doing so does not adequately consider the totality of the
circumstances; indeed, piecemeal evaluation and rejection of individual factors is
prohibited by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
274, 122 S. Ct. 744, 751 (2002); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9–10, 109
S. Ct. 1581, 1586–87 (1989). We also do not consider the subjective motivation
of the officer, but we do consider the officer’s training, knowledge, and
experience. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. Further, ―the cumulative information
known to the cooperating officers at the time of the stop is to be considered in
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.‖ Derichsweiler v. State, No.
PD-0176-10, 2011 WL 255299, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2011) (quoting
Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
When making a determination of reasonable suspicion, ―the relevant
inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty but the degree of
suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.‖ Sokolow, 490
U.S. at 10, 109 S. Ct. at 1587 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243–44
n.13, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2335 n.13 (1983)); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). ―When used by trained law enforcement officers,
objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined with permissible
deductions from such facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person.‖ Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 37–38 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 419, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695–96 (1981)).
The detainee’s behavior can be a factor in determining the existence of
reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25, 120 S. Ct. 673,
676 (2000). Evidence of nervousness, furtive gestures, sudden movements, or
flight alone may be innocent, but if these actions are combined with other factors,
they can give rise to reasonable suspicion. Id.; Worthey v. State, 805 S.W.2d
435, 438–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Officers may rely on their training,
knowledge, and law enforcement experience to reach their level of suspicion.
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 419, 101 S. Ct. at 695–96; Weide, 214 S.W.3d at 25.
In addition, a confidential informant can provide the requisite reasonable
suspicion to justify an investigative detention provided additional facts are
present to demonstrate the informant’s reliability. See Carmouche v. State, 10
S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). ―In situations involving the police’s use
of an informant, we consider the informant’s reliability in analyzing the totality of
the circumstances.‖ Smith v. State, 58 S.W.3d 784, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S. Ct. at 695;
Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38). While an unverified tip may be insufficient to support
arrest or a warrant, a tip by a known informant who has provided information in
the past carries sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop. Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146–47, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923–24 (1972). 3. Discussion
Although Appellant does not challenge the initial traffic stop, we note that it
was reasonable because it was based on the patrol officer’s observation of two
traffic violations. Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995). This is true even though the traffic stop was a pretext for pursuing further
investigation of Appellant’s narcotics activity. Id. at 671, 674; Garcia v. State, 827
S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). But before the officers could detain
Appellant’s vehicle for a canine sniff beyond the time required for the initial traffic
stop, there must have been a reasonable suspicion that her vehicle contained
narcotics. See Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
When Investigator Deweese informed Appellant that he was detaining her
vehicle until a canine unit arrived for an olfactory sniff, the officers on the scene
had several pieces of information.5 First, a confidential informant had provided
Investigator Deweese with Appellant’s name, the make and model of her vehicle,
and her vehicle’s license plate number; the informant had seen Appellant with
methamphetamine on two or three occasions, most recently about a week earlier
and had said that Appellant often carried methamphetamine in the vehicle; and
the informant had given accurate information on more than one occasion in the
past, leading to at least one felony arrest. Investigator Deweese had confirmed
5 According to the applicable standard of review and because the trial court did not make findings of fact, we set forth the facts here in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. See Weide, 214 S.W.3d at 25; Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 493. that the Dodge Durango matching the informant’s description was registered to
Appellant, and he had accessed Appellant’s driver’s license photograph to
confirm her identity. Moreover, Investigator Deweese had watched as Appellant
and another person, in a high crime area, parked their vehicles ―driver’s door to
driver’s door‖ and either shook hands or exchanged something, and he believed
this to have been a drug transaction based on his training and experience.
Finally, the officers had observed that Appellant made furtive movements in the
cab of her vehicle, was more nervous than the average person during a traffic
stop, was visibly trembling and fidgety, was hesitant to answer Officer White’s
questions, and was sweating profusely on an October day.
This case is similar to two others in which our sister courts held there was
reasonable suspicion to justify the detention. See State v. 1998 Toyota Land
Cruiser, 277 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.); Gonzales v. State,
No. 04-06-00259-CR, 2007 WL 1752130 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 20, 2007,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In Gonzales, an undercover
officer received information concerning a large shipment of cocaine to the target
of an ongoing narcotics investigation. 2007 WL 1752130, at *1. The officer
began surveillance at the specified address and subsequently watched as
Gonzales pulled into the driveway. Id. The suspected drug dealer exited the
residence, entered the front passenger side of Gonzales’s vehicle, appeared to
have exchanged something with Gonzales, and returned to the residence. Id.
Gonzales drove away but was soon stopped for failure to wear a seatbelt. Id. While standing outside his vehicle as the traffic officer conducted a routine
background check, Gonzales began acting nervously, pacing back and forth, and
putting his hands in his coat pockets and inside his jacket. Id. The background
check revealed that Gonzales had numerous narcotics offenses and was on
probation. Id. at *2. At that point, the undercover officer requested a canine unit
for a sweep of Gonzales’s vehicle. Id. In total, Gonzales was detained for less
than thirty minutes. Id. Based on these facts, the court held that the trial court
did not err by determining that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe
Gonzales was involved in the ongoing criminal activity of drug trafficking. Id. at
*4.
In 1998 Toyota Land Cruiser, an officer was conducting surveillance for
alcohol violations and other offenses when he saw a truck parked in a parking lot
some distance from the nearby pizza parlor. 277 S.W.3d at 89–90. The officer
then saw the appellant drive the Land Cruiser into the parking lot and park next
to the truck. Id. at 90. The officer watched as the lone occupant of the truck
entered the Land Cruiser and the appellant, still in the Land Cruiser, grabbed a
back pack, retrieved items from it, and placed them on the center console. Id.
Believing that he had observed a drug transaction, the officer called for backup,
and the uniformed officers initiated contact with the appellant and the passenger
in the Land Cruiser. Id. Holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to
temporarily detain the appellant and the passenger in the Land Cruiser, the court
stated, ―[T]o an officer charged with conducting surveillance in the area for alcohol related and other offenses, [the observed circumstances] were
reminiscent of those performed in a drug transaction. Given that, [the officers]
had reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity was afoot.‖ Id. Similar to
both Gonzales and 1998 Toyota Land Cruiser, the officers in this case had
information about Appellant’s suspected narcotics activity, and they observed her
engage in a suspected drug transaction, make furtive gestures, act nervously
and visibly tremble and fidget, hesitantly answer Officer White’s questions, and
sweat profusely on an October day when Officer White was not sweating.
Appellant cites several cases to support her argument that there was no
reasonable suspicion to continue her detention to permit the canine sniff, and in
doing so, she separately challenges the information received from the
confidential informant and most of the other facts known to the officers. For
example, Appellant argues that the informant was not shown to be reliable and
that the information from the informant could have been stale and was not
independently corroborated by Investigator Deweese. See Smith, 58 S.W.3d at
789–93; State v. Williams, 812 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no
pet.). Appellant also points out that nervousness, sweating, furtive gestures, or
presence in a high crime area are not enough, alone, to support reasonable
suspicion. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 241; Sieffert v. State, 290 S.W.3d 478 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.); St. George v. State, 197 S.W.3d 806 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2006), aff’d, 237 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Herrera v. State,
80 S.W.3d 283 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d); Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d); McQuarters v. State, 58
S.W.3d 250 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d).
Appellant’s arguments are misplaced. First, Appellant’s attempt to
separate and individually challenge the individual pieces of information known to
the officers at the time of the continued detention has been rejected by the
Supreme Court. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S. Ct. at 751 (rejecting
piecemeal evaluation and rejection of individual factors). Rather than separately
analyzing and accepting or rejecting the objective facts known to the officers in
conducting a reasonable suspicion analysis, we must view all of the objective
facts in the aggregate as part of the totality of the circumstances. See id., 122 S.
Ct. at 751; Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492–93. Moreover, each of Appellant’s cases is
distinguishable and does not adequately address the totality of the circumstances
present in this case. For example, in McQuarters, the appellant was stopped for
suspicion of DUI, but the officer quickly determined that the appellant was not
intoxicated. See 58 S.W.3d at 253. And although the appellant appeared
nervous, he and his passenger gave conflicting accounts of their recent trip to
Dallas, the appellant’s license had been revoked, and the vehicle he drove was
rented but not to him or his passenger, the appellant did not lie to the officer or
have any prior drug offenses. Id. at 257. There was also no smell of marijuana
eminating from the car. Id. We held that although there was reasonable
suspicion of intoxication, there was none relating to narcotics activity because ―a
reasonable suspicion that [the] appellant was hiding narcotics in the car could not be rationally inferred from [those] facts.‖ Id. But McQuarters is easily
distinguishable because there was nothing in that case similar to Appellant’s
apparent drug transaction in the Waffle House parking lot or the information
obtained from the confidential informant. See id. at 253–54, 257.
And in Smith, there was no evidence in the record to establish the
informant’s reliability, and the officers did not observe any other conduct that
supported a reasonable suspicion of ongoing narcotics activity. See 58 S.W.3d
at 790–91, 792–93. In other words, even though the reliability of a confidential
informant is only part of an examination of the totality of the circumstances for
purposes of determining reasonable suspicion, Smith hinged entirely on the
informant’s reliability because there were no other objective facts supporting
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 789, 791–92. Unlike Smith, the informant in this
case had provided Investigator Deweese with accurate information in the past—
including information leading to at least one felony arrest; the informant had seen
Appellant with methamphetamine within the previous week; and the officers
observed Appellant engage in the apparent drug transaction at the Waffle House
and become nervous, fidgety, and hesitant during the traffic stop.6
6 Each of the other cases cited by Appellant is similarly distinguishable. None of the cases involved conduct similar to the transaction at the Waffle House, information such as that provided by the confidential informant, or both. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 241; Sieffert, 290 S.W.3d at 480–82; St. George, 197 S.W.3d at 812–14; Herrera, 80 S.W.3d at 286–87; Klare, 76 S.W.3d at 71; see also Williams, 812 S.W.2d at 47, 48–49 (noting that although the officer received information from an informant the day before, the officer observed nothing unusual or illegal at or near the time he stopped the appellant). The objective facts known to the officers on the scene at the time
Appellant’s initial traffic stop concluded, viewed in their totality, include the
information from the confidential informant, Investigator Deweese’s verification of
Appellant’s identity and vehicle, the apparent drug transaction at the Waffle
Ho2444use, and Appellant’s behavior during the initial traffic stop. These facts
provided the officers with a substantial basis for concluding that Appellant was,
had been, or soon would be involved in illegal narcotics activity. See Ford, 158
S.W.3d at 492–93; 1998 Toyota Land Cruiser, 277 S.W.3d at 90–91; Gonzales,
2007 WL 1752130, at *4. Therefore, there was reasonable suspicion to justify
Appellant’s continued detention for an olfactory inspection of the outside of her
vehicle. See Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492–93; 1998 Toyota Land Cruiser, 277
S.W.3d at 90–91; Gonzales, 2007 WL 1752130, at *4. We hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress, and we
overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
ANNE GARDNER JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: June 23, 2011