NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3450-15T4
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION KEITH WILLIAMS, April 19, 2017
Petitioner-Appellant, APPELLATE DIVISION
v.
RAYMOURS FURNITURE CO., INC.,
Respondent-Respondent. _________________________________
Submitted March 15, 2017 – Decided April 19, 2017
Before Judges Alvarez, Accurso and Manahan.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Labor, Division of Workers' Compensation, Claim Petition No. 2015-21874.
Michael S. Harwin, attorney for appellant.
The Chartwell Law Offices, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Brittany Atkinson, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ACCURSO, J.A.D.
Petitioner Keith Williams appeals from the dismissal of his
claim petition by the Division of Workers' Compensation for lack
of jurisdiction. Because we conclude the judge of compensation erred in concluding the Division was without jurisdiction to
consider Williams' claim, we reverse.
The essential facts are undisputed. Williams, a New Jersey
resident, filed an online application for employment with
respondent Raymours Furniture Co., Inc. Respondent called
Williams at his home in Paterson to arrange an interview at
respondent's facility in Suffern, New York. Following that
interview, respondent telephoned Williams at his home to offer
him a job as a warehouse worker in its shipping and receiving
department in Suffern. Williams answered the phone and accepted
the job.
Williams worked exclusively in respondent's Suffern
warehouse. In 2014, he claimed he tripped over a hand truck in
the course of his employment and fractured his elbow. The New
York Workers' Compensation Board directed respondent to provide
Williams medical treatment and indemnity benefits.
A little over a year after the accident, Williams filed a
claim petition in New Jersey.1 Respondent answered, leaving
petitioner to his proofs as to all aspects of compensability and
1 Williams' New York petition does not pose an obstacle to jurisdiction here or raise an issue of comity. The law is well settled that a pending workers' compensation proceeding or award in another state does not bar a workers' compensation proceeding in New Jersey. See Williams v. A & L Packing & Storage, 314 N.J. Super. 460, 465-66 (App. Div. 1998), and cases cited therein.
2 A-3450-15T4 raised the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction.
Williams subsequently filed a motion to strike the affirmative
defense, which the judge of compensation denied in a brief
opinion from the bench dismissing Williams' claim with
prejudice. The judge found "[e]verything took place basically
in New York except for the residency of Mr. Williams." Because
the accident occurred in New York where Williams regularly
worked, the judge concluded there was "no reason for New Jersey
to assert jurisdiction."
On appeal, Williams contends the judge erred in concluding
New Jersey was without jurisdiction to resolve his claim
petition. Among other things, he argues his residency and the
formation of the contract in New Jersey are sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the Division. We agree.
Because the question before us is one of law, our review is
de novo. Sentinel Ins. Co. v. Earthworks Landscape Constr.,
L.L.C., 421 N.J. Super. 480, 485-86 (App. Div. 2011). It is, of
course, axiomatic that "the Workers' Compensation Court [now
Division] is statutory, with limited jurisdiction." Connolly v.
Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 317 N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div.
1998). Because its jurisdiction is statutory, it "is limited to
that granted by the Legislature and therefore 'cannot be
inflated by consent, waiver, estoppel or judicial inclination.'"
3 A-3450-15T4 Bey v. Truss Sys., Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 324, 327 (App. Div.
2003) (quoting Riccioni v. American Cyanamid Co., 26 N.J. Super.
1, 5 (App. Div. 1953)).
New Jersey's Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to
-146, does not have an extraterritoriality provision. See
Williams v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 175 N.J. 82, 88 (2003).
We, however, break no new ground in acknowledging that "[a]ny
state having a more-than-casual interest in a compensable injury
may apply its compensation act to that injury without violating
its constitutional duty to give full faith and credit to the
compensation statutes of other states also having an interest in
the injury." Connolly, supra, 317 N.J. Super. at 319 (quoting 9
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 86:00 at 16-55 (1997)).
Professor Larson notes six grounds for asserting
applicability of a particular state's compensation act:
(1) Place where the injury occurred;
(2) Place of making the contract;
(3) Place where the employment relation exists or is carried out;
(4) Place where the industry is localized;
(5) Place where the employee resides; or
(6) Place whose statute the parties expressly adopted by contract.
[13 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 142.01 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2016).]
4 A-3450-15T4 Larson has long expressed the view "that the state which was the
locus of any one of the first three items – contract, injury or
employment – and probably also of the next two – employee
residence and business localization – can constitutionally apply
its statute if it wants to." Ibid. New Jersey law is in
accord. See Williams, supra, 175 N.J. at 88; Connolly, supra,
317 N.J. Super. at 319-22.
Following "the principle that New Jersey generally will
take jurisdiction and apply its Act when the State has a
substantial interest," Williams, supra, 175 N.J. at 90, our
courts have found jurisdiction where New Jersey is the place
where the injury occurred, Boyle v. G. & K. Trucking Co., 37
N.J. 104, 112 (1962), where the petitioner was hired or the
employment contract formed, Gotkin v. Weinberg, 2 N.J. 305, 307
(1949); Rivera v. Green Giant Co., 93 N.J. Super. 6, 11 (App.
Div. 1966), aff'd o.b., 50 N.J. 284 (1967), where the employment
is carried out, Phillips v. Oneida Motor Freight, Inc., 163 N.J.
Super. 297, 303 (App. Div. 1978), and where the petitioner is a
resident, Bunk v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 144 N.J. 176, 180-
81 (1996), at least where there exist some employment contacts
here, Parks v. Johnson Motor Lines, 156 N.J. Super. 177, 180-81
5 A-3450-15T4 (App. Div. 1978); Beeny v. Teleconsult, Inc., 160 N.J. Super.
22, 27-28 (App. Div. 1978).2
As the facts are undisputed that Williams accepted
employment from respondent by "speak[ing] the words of
acceptance into the telephone," thereby establishing New Jersey
as the place the contract was created, see 1 Corbin on Contracts
§ 3.25 (Perillo ed. 1993); Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 64 comment c (1981); Filson v. Bell Tel. Labs., Inc., 82 N.J.
Super. 185, 190 (App. Div. 1964) (noting "[a] contract is made
at the place where the final act necessary for its formation is
done"), the law is clear that New Jersey is an appropriate forum
for resolution of petitioner's claim petition, see Gotkin,
supra, 2 N.J. at 307; Rivera, supra, 93 N.J. Super. at 11,
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3450-15T4
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION KEITH WILLIAMS, April 19, 2017
Petitioner-Appellant, APPELLATE DIVISION
v.
RAYMOURS FURNITURE CO., INC.,
Respondent-Respondent. _________________________________
Submitted March 15, 2017 – Decided April 19, 2017
Before Judges Alvarez, Accurso and Manahan.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Labor, Division of Workers' Compensation, Claim Petition No. 2015-21874.
Michael S. Harwin, attorney for appellant.
The Chartwell Law Offices, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Brittany Atkinson, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ACCURSO, J.A.D.
Petitioner Keith Williams appeals from the dismissal of his
claim petition by the Division of Workers' Compensation for lack
of jurisdiction. Because we conclude the judge of compensation erred in concluding the Division was without jurisdiction to
consider Williams' claim, we reverse.
The essential facts are undisputed. Williams, a New Jersey
resident, filed an online application for employment with
respondent Raymours Furniture Co., Inc. Respondent called
Williams at his home in Paterson to arrange an interview at
respondent's facility in Suffern, New York. Following that
interview, respondent telephoned Williams at his home to offer
him a job as a warehouse worker in its shipping and receiving
department in Suffern. Williams answered the phone and accepted
the job.
Williams worked exclusively in respondent's Suffern
warehouse. In 2014, he claimed he tripped over a hand truck in
the course of his employment and fractured his elbow. The New
York Workers' Compensation Board directed respondent to provide
Williams medical treatment and indemnity benefits.
A little over a year after the accident, Williams filed a
claim petition in New Jersey.1 Respondent answered, leaving
petitioner to his proofs as to all aspects of compensability and
1 Williams' New York petition does not pose an obstacle to jurisdiction here or raise an issue of comity. The law is well settled that a pending workers' compensation proceeding or award in another state does not bar a workers' compensation proceeding in New Jersey. See Williams v. A & L Packing & Storage, 314 N.J. Super. 460, 465-66 (App. Div. 1998), and cases cited therein.
2 A-3450-15T4 raised the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction.
Williams subsequently filed a motion to strike the affirmative
defense, which the judge of compensation denied in a brief
opinion from the bench dismissing Williams' claim with
prejudice. The judge found "[e]verything took place basically
in New York except for the residency of Mr. Williams." Because
the accident occurred in New York where Williams regularly
worked, the judge concluded there was "no reason for New Jersey
to assert jurisdiction."
On appeal, Williams contends the judge erred in concluding
New Jersey was without jurisdiction to resolve his claim
petition. Among other things, he argues his residency and the
formation of the contract in New Jersey are sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the Division. We agree.
Because the question before us is one of law, our review is
de novo. Sentinel Ins. Co. v. Earthworks Landscape Constr.,
L.L.C., 421 N.J. Super. 480, 485-86 (App. Div. 2011). It is, of
course, axiomatic that "the Workers' Compensation Court [now
Division] is statutory, with limited jurisdiction." Connolly v.
Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 317 N.J. Super. 315, 318 (App. Div.
1998). Because its jurisdiction is statutory, it "is limited to
that granted by the Legislature and therefore 'cannot be
inflated by consent, waiver, estoppel or judicial inclination.'"
3 A-3450-15T4 Bey v. Truss Sys., Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 324, 327 (App. Div.
2003) (quoting Riccioni v. American Cyanamid Co., 26 N.J. Super.
1, 5 (App. Div. 1953)).
New Jersey's Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to
-146, does not have an extraterritoriality provision. See
Williams v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 175 N.J. 82, 88 (2003).
We, however, break no new ground in acknowledging that "[a]ny
state having a more-than-casual interest in a compensable injury
may apply its compensation act to that injury without violating
its constitutional duty to give full faith and credit to the
compensation statutes of other states also having an interest in
the injury." Connolly, supra, 317 N.J. Super. at 319 (quoting 9
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 86:00 at 16-55 (1997)).
Professor Larson notes six grounds for asserting
applicability of a particular state's compensation act:
(1) Place where the injury occurred;
(2) Place of making the contract;
(3) Place where the employment relation exists or is carried out;
(4) Place where the industry is localized;
(5) Place where the employee resides; or
(6) Place whose statute the parties expressly adopted by contract.
[13 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 142.01 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2016).]
4 A-3450-15T4 Larson has long expressed the view "that the state which was the
locus of any one of the first three items – contract, injury or
employment – and probably also of the next two – employee
residence and business localization – can constitutionally apply
its statute if it wants to." Ibid. New Jersey law is in
accord. See Williams, supra, 175 N.J. at 88; Connolly, supra,
317 N.J. Super. at 319-22.
Following "the principle that New Jersey generally will
take jurisdiction and apply its Act when the State has a
substantial interest," Williams, supra, 175 N.J. at 90, our
courts have found jurisdiction where New Jersey is the place
where the injury occurred, Boyle v. G. & K. Trucking Co., 37
N.J. 104, 112 (1962), where the petitioner was hired or the
employment contract formed, Gotkin v. Weinberg, 2 N.J. 305, 307
(1949); Rivera v. Green Giant Co., 93 N.J. Super. 6, 11 (App.
Div. 1966), aff'd o.b., 50 N.J. 284 (1967), where the employment
is carried out, Phillips v. Oneida Motor Freight, Inc., 163 N.J.
Super. 297, 303 (App. Div. 1978), and where the petitioner is a
resident, Bunk v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 144 N.J. 176, 180-
81 (1996), at least where there exist some employment contacts
here, Parks v. Johnson Motor Lines, 156 N.J. Super. 177, 180-81
5 A-3450-15T4 (App. Div. 1978); Beeny v. Teleconsult, Inc., 160 N.J. Super.
22, 27-28 (App. Div. 1978).2
As the facts are undisputed that Williams accepted
employment from respondent by "speak[ing] the words of
acceptance into the telephone," thereby establishing New Jersey
as the place the contract was created, see 1 Corbin on Contracts
§ 3.25 (Perillo ed. 1993); Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 64 comment c (1981); Filson v. Bell Tel. Labs., Inc., 82 N.J.
Super. 185, 190 (App. Div. 1964) (noting "[a] contract is made
at the place where the final act necessary for its formation is
done"), the law is clear that New Jersey is an appropriate forum
for resolution of petitioner's claim petition, see Gotkin,
supra, 2 N.J. at 307; Rivera, supra, 93 N.J. Super. at 11,
certainly in conjunction with his residency here, see Parks,
supra, 156 N.J. Super. at 180-81; Beeny, supra, 160 N.J. Super.
2 The qualifier of employment contacts here is commonly employed because although the Supreme Court stated in Bunk that "[a]s a resident of New Jersey, Bunk can bring his action in New Jersey," 144 N.J. at 181, jurisdiction was not contested there, making the Court's statement dicta. Although the point is not critical here as New Jersey is both the place of Williams' residence and where he was hired, we note that dicta of the Supreme Court is binding on us. State v. Breitweiser, 373 N.J. Super. 271, 282-83 (App. Div. 2004) ("[A]s an intermediate appellate court, we consider ourselves bound by carefully considered dictum from the Supreme Court."), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 628 (2005).
6 A-3450-15T4 at 27-28. Gomez v. Federal Stevedoring Co., Inc., 5 N.J. Super.
100 (App. Div. 1949), is not to the contrary.3
Because petitioner accepted respondent's offer of
employment in New Jersey and resides here, the Division has
jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim petition.
Reversed.
3 Respondent argues that Gomez stands for the proposition that both offer and acceptance "have to occur in New Jersey to confer jurisdiction for purposes of workers' compensation benefits." None of our cases, including Gomez, says so. A contract is formed upon acceptance. Thus the focus in Gomez was on where the petitioner assented to the offer of employment, not whether it was extended by the employer in New York or its agent in New Jersey. 5 N.J. Super. at 103 ("[T]he offer was accepted in this State by petitioner's acts."); see also Bowers v. Am. Bridge Co., 43 N.J. Super. 48, 55 (App. Div. 1956) ("Agency apart, the acceptance by petitioner in Trenton of the employment opportunity offered him so as to fix the situs of contract in New Jersey is adequately established by his action in signifying his assent to the proposal at the union hall in Trenton and in proceeding at once to Morrisville.").
7 A-3450-15T4