IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION
KEITH LAWRENCE SOMERVILLE, ) ID #00529020, ) ) Petitioner, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) VS. ) 3:25-CV-2573-G-BW ) DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, ) ) Respondent. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the court is the Motion for Reconsideration in Accordance with Fed. R. Civil P. 59(e), received on February 25, 2026. See docket entry 16. Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the court CONSTRUES the motion as a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and DENIES it. I. BACKGROUND Petitioner Keith Lawrence Somerville (“Somerville”), a prisoner of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a denial of parole. See docket entry 2. On October 1, 2025, it was recommended that the petition be summarily dismissed
with prejudice. See docket entry 5. On October 30, 2025, the court accepted the recommendation over Somerville’s objections, summarily dismissed the petition with prejudice, and denied a certificate of appealability. See docket entries 7-8. Somerville subsequently filed a post-judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and appealed the judgment dismissing his petition. See docket entries 10,
12-14. On February 2, 2026, the court denied Somerville’s Rule 59(e) motion. See docket entries 11, 15. On June 4, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. See docket entry 17. Between the denial of his Rule 59(e) motion and the Fifth Circuit’s denial of a
certificate of appealability, Somerville filed the instant motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal of his § 2254 petition under Rule 59(e). See docket entry 16. II. NATURE OF FILING Somerville purports to bring his motion under Rule 59(e). See id. at 1.
Nonetheless, because he is seeking reconsideration of the judgment summarily dismissing this habeas action and filed his motion more than 28 days after entry of that judgment, his motion is properly CONSTRUED as seeking relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma,
Incorporated, 702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“A motion asking the court to reconsider a prior ruling is evaluated either as a motion to ‘alter or amend a judgment’ under Rule 59(e) or as a motion for ‘relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding’ under Rule 60(b) . . . is based on when the motion was filed.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 816 (2013); FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) (requiring motion to be filed within 28 days of entry of judgment). III. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) Under Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered earlier; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated, or applying the judgment prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). A Rule 60(b) motion must be made within a reasonable time and, for reasons (1), (2), and (3), no longer than one year after judgment was entered. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1).
Because Somerville does not invoke any of the reasons for relief from judgment under the first five paragraphs of Rule 60(b), his motion is considered under paragraph (6), which is the “catch-all” clause of Rule 60(b). Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 215-16 (5th Cir. 2002). Relief under this “catch-all” provision is available “only
if extraordinary circumstances are present.” Id. at 216 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Extraordinary circumstances ‘will rarely occur in the habeas context.’” In re Johnson, 935 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 1279 (2020). A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must also “show that he can assert a good claim or defense if his case is reopened.” Id. (cleaned up). The burden of establishing Rule 60(b) requirements is on the moving party, and a determination of whether that burden has been met rests within the considerable discretion of the court. See
Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993), and abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Somerville fails to show a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). To start, most
of his two-page motion is dedicated to revisiting and repackaging challenges to his underlying 1992 criminal conviction and sentence. See docket entry 16 at 1. Those claims have no bearing on Somerville’s § 2254 petition in this action, wherein Somerville expressly stated that the “[p]etition challenge is for parole not conviction or sentence” and that “this Petition only concerns parole and his revocation process.”
Docket entry 2 at ECF 5, ECF 16. The remainder of Somerville’s motion complains that the court’s order summarily dismissing his § 2254 petition “is a boiler-plate order” and takes issue with the handling of various filings in the Fifth Circuit on appeal of this court’s judgment. See docket entry 16 at 1-2. Somerville fails to
explain how – much less show that – his dissatisfaction with the court’s alleged “boiler-plate order” merits relief from judgment. As for Somerville’s complaints about issues on appeal of this case, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain such claims. See Demmitt v. United States, No. 2:15-CV-0059-J-BB, 2017 WL 563977, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2017) (Averitte, J.), rec. adopted, 2017 WL 564531 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2017) (Robinson, J.). Accordingly, because Somerville has not established the existence of extraordinary circumstances warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief and has not shown that
he can assert “a good claim or defense,” he fails to satisfy his burden under Rule 60(b)(6). See Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 173. The court therefore DENIES his motion. IV. CONCLUSION The court CONSTRUES the Motion for Reconsideration in Accordance with
Fed. R. Civil P. 59(e) (docket entry 16), received on February 25, 2026, as a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and DENIES it. V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Considering the record in this case and pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 22(b) and
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION
KEITH LAWRENCE SOMERVILLE, ) ID #00529020, ) ) Petitioner, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) VS. ) 3:25-CV-2573-G-BW ) DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, ) ) Respondent. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the court is the Motion for Reconsideration in Accordance with Fed. R. Civil P. 59(e), received on February 25, 2026. See docket entry 16. Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the court CONSTRUES the motion as a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and DENIES it. I. BACKGROUND Petitioner Keith Lawrence Somerville (“Somerville”), a prisoner of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a denial of parole. See docket entry 2. On October 1, 2025, it was recommended that the petition be summarily dismissed
with prejudice. See docket entry 5. On October 30, 2025, the court accepted the recommendation over Somerville’s objections, summarily dismissed the petition with prejudice, and denied a certificate of appealability. See docket entries 7-8. Somerville subsequently filed a post-judgment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and appealed the judgment dismissing his petition. See docket entries 10,
12-14. On February 2, 2026, the court denied Somerville’s Rule 59(e) motion. See docket entries 11, 15. On June 4, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. See docket entry 17. Between the denial of his Rule 59(e) motion and the Fifth Circuit’s denial of a
certificate of appealability, Somerville filed the instant motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal of his § 2254 petition under Rule 59(e). See docket entry 16. II. NATURE OF FILING Somerville purports to bring his motion under Rule 59(e). See id. at 1.
Nonetheless, because he is seeking reconsideration of the judgment summarily dismissing this habeas action and filed his motion more than 28 days after entry of that judgment, his motion is properly CONSTRUED as seeking relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma,
Incorporated, 702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“A motion asking the court to reconsider a prior ruling is evaluated either as a motion to ‘alter or amend a judgment’ under Rule 59(e) or as a motion for ‘relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding’ under Rule 60(b) . . . is based on when the motion was filed.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 816 (2013); FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) (requiring motion to be filed within 28 days of entry of judgment). III. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) Under Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered earlier; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated, or applying the judgment prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). A Rule 60(b) motion must be made within a reasonable time and, for reasons (1), (2), and (3), no longer than one year after judgment was entered. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1).
Because Somerville does not invoke any of the reasons for relief from judgment under the first five paragraphs of Rule 60(b), his motion is considered under paragraph (6), which is the “catch-all” clause of Rule 60(b). Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 215-16 (5th Cir. 2002). Relief under this “catch-all” provision is available “only
if extraordinary circumstances are present.” Id. at 216 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Extraordinary circumstances ‘will rarely occur in the habeas context.’” In re Johnson, 935 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005)), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 1279 (2020). A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must also “show that he can assert a good claim or defense if his case is reopened.” Id. (cleaned up). The burden of establishing Rule 60(b) requirements is on the moving party, and a determination of whether that burden has been met rests within the considerable discretion of the court. See
Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859 (1993), and abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Somerville fails to show a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). To start, most
of his two-page motion is dedicated to revisiting and repackaging challenges to his underlying 1992 criminal conviction and sentence. See docket entry 16 at 1. Those claims have no bearing on Somerville’s § 2254 petition in this action, wherein Somerville expressly stated that the “[p]etition challenge is for parole not conviction or sentence” and that “this Petition only concerns parole and his revocation process.”
Docket entry 2 at ECF 5, ECF 16. The remainder of Somerville’s motion complains that the court’s order summarily dismissing his § 2254 petition “is a boiler-plate order” and takes issue with the handling of various filings in the Fifth Circuit on appeal of this court’s judgment. See docket entry 16 at 1-2. Somerville fails to
explain how – much less show that – his dissatisfaction with the court’s alleged “boiler-plate order” merits relief from judgment. As for Somerville’s complaints about issues on appeal of this case, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain such claims. See Demmitt v. United States, No. 2:15-CV-0059-J-BB, 2017 WL 563977, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2017) (Averitte, J.), rec. adopted, 2017 WL 564531 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2017) (Robinson, J.). Accordingly, because Somerville has not established the existence of extraordinary circumstances warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief and has not shown that
he can assert “a good claim or defense,” he fails to satisfy his burden under Rule 60(b)(6). See Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 173. The court therefore DENIES his motion. IV. CONCLUSION The court CONSTRUES the Motion for Reconsideration in Accordance with
Fed. R. Civil P. 59(e) (docket entry 16), received on February 25, 2026, as a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and DENIES it. V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Considering the record in this case and pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 22(b) and
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the court DENIES a certificate of appealability. For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Somerville has failed to show (1) that reasonable jurists would find this court’s “assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong” or (2) that reasonable jurists would find “it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right” and “debatable
whether [this court] was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In the event that Somerville files a notice of appeal, he must pay the $605.00 appellate filing fee or submit a motion to proceed in forma pauperis that is accompanied by a properly signed certificate of inmate trust account. SO ORDERED. July 16, 2026. Ci of Ot CL A. FISH Senior United States District Judge