In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-23-00342-CR ___________________________
KEITH CORNELL HAYNES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1495333
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
A jury found Appellant Keith Cornell Haynes guilty of capital murder by
intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Kenishia Walker and Baby Walker by
shooting Kenishia Walker (who was pregnant with Baby Walker1) with a firearm and
by committing the two murders during the same criminal transaction. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A); Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 914 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). The State waived the death penalty, and the trial court sentenced Haynes to
imprisonment for life without parole. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.31(a)(2).
On appeal, Haynes raises four issues:
(1) the evidence was insufficient to show that he was the person who murdered Walker and Baby Walker;
(2) the trial court erred by preventing him from effectively exercising his peremptory challenge to an alternate juror;
(3) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting State’s Exhibit 117, a photograph of the entrance wound behind Walker’s ear, because the photograph was too gruesome; and
(4) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting State’s Exhibit 133, a photograph of Walker in her bloodied pajamas, because that photograph was also too gruesome.
1 Although Baby Walker was not yet born, for purposes of the Texas Penal Code, he was an “individual”: “‘Individual’ means a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(26).
2 We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support Haynes’s conviction, Haynes did
not preserve any complaint regarding how the alternate jurors were selected, and the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting State’s Exhibits 117 and 133. We
overrule Haynes’s four issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
II. Background
On the morning of Good Friday 2017, Walker’s nearly nine-year-old son,
Andrew,2 went upstairs to her bedroom and found her uncharacteristically still in her
bed. After trying to awaken his mother without success, Andrew pulled the covers
back and saw a bloody hole in her head.
At first Andrew tried to find his mother’s cell phone so that he could call the
police, but it was gone. He then ran to his neighbor’s townhome, relayed to her what
he had seen, and told her that his mother was dead. The neighbor, Candace
Howerton, called 911.
Officer Timothy Dillon, a first responder who investigated the scene, found a
projectile under the pillow beneath Walker’s head and a shell casing on the floor, but
he did not find a weapon. The medical examiner determined that the cause of
Walker’s death was a gunshot wound to the head and that the manner of her death
We use a pseudonym to protect the child’s identity. See McClendon v. State, 643 2
S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
3 was homicide. The medical examiner further determined that the cause of Baby
Walker’s death was “intrauterine fetal demise due to maternal death.”
On appeal, Haynes asserts that the evidence is insufficient to show that he was
the person who shot and killed Walker and Baby Walker.
III. Issues
We address Haynes’s sufficiency complaint first. We then address his
contention that the trial court erred in the manner that alternate jurors were selected.
Lastly, we address Haynes’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting two photographs over his Rule 403 objection that the probative value of the
photographs was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tex.
R. Evid. 403. For the reasons given below, we overrule all of Haynes’s issues.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In Haynes’s first issue, he asserts that the evidence is insufficient to show that
he was the person who shot Walker, killing both her and Baby Walker. Specifically,
Haynes contends that the evidence does not clearly place him at Walker’s residence at
the time the shooting occurred. He also points out that the handgun used to kill
Walker belonged to someone else, Jonathan Hill, and that Haynes’s DNA was not
found on the weapon. Thus, Haynes argues, the case against him was speculative.
1. Standard of Review
In our evidentiary sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found
4 the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at
2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021). We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute
our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine
whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative
force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State, 569
S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a
‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the
evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at
608. The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases;
circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt. Carter v.
State, 620 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
5 2. Application
For the reasons given below, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Haynes was the person who shot Walker and killed both Walker and Baby Walker.
The evidence showed that Haynes and Walker were in a relationship and that in
December 2016, Walker informed Haynes that she was pregnant with his child.
When Walker shared this news with others about a month later, she indicated to her
friends that while she was excited about the baby, she did not want a relationship with
Haynes.
Around the same time, Haynes sent texts to two different persons indicating
his interest in buying a “burner” gun.3 And a few weeks after that, in February 2017,
Haynes used his cell phone to search for information about the effects of rat poison
on someone who was pregnant and on whether rat poison could be fatal.
Two months later, in early April 2017, Haynes sent several text messages to
Walker in which he expressed frustration with her. In the messages, Haynes indicated
3 Haynes deleted text messages from his cell phone, and after the murders, the police were never able to locate Walker’s cell phone. The State was nevertheless able to recover a number of text messages from (1) Haynes’s cell phone, (2) Walker’s service provider, and (3) the cell phone of Jolisa Lang, one of Walker’s friends, who had received screen shots of text messages between Haynes and Walker, along with Walker’s request for advice on how to respond.
6 a strong desire to raise the baby with Walker, but the desire was not reciprocated.4
Other text messages between Haynes and Walker showed that the friction between
them continued into the week preceding Easter Sunday. And on the days leading up
to April 14, Good Friday, Haynes sent Walker a series of text messages indicating that
he intended to visit her on the night of April 13.
Before arriving that evening, Haynes sent a text message to an unknown
recipient in which he stated, “[U] kn I gotta handle this lil bih.” At trial, one of the
detectives interpreted this message to mean “[Y]ou know, I got to handle this little
bitch.” Data extracted from Haynes’s cell phone also revealed his movement prior to
his arrival at Walker’s home that evening. It showed that on April 13 Haynes left his
home in Plano and traveled to Dallas where Hill, his former co-worker, lived. From
there he drove to Arlington, where Walker lived. Andrew placed Haynes in Walker’s
bedroom later that evening.
According to Andrew, sometime around midnight, he woke up in his
downstairs bedroom and went upstairs to Walker’s room where he found both
Walker and Haynes awake in Walker’s bed. When he tried to climb onto the bed and
get between them, Walker instructed Andrew to either lie on the couch in her
bedroom or to go back to his room. Andrew initially chose the couch, upon which a
4 At one point, Walker confided in a text to one of her friends that she did not want to live with Haynes: “No ma’am. Not trying to live with anyone else. I’ve told him you don’t have to live with me to coparent.”
7 heavy blue backpack—that did not belong to either him or to his mother—had been
placed. After removing the backpack and briefly lying down on the couch, Andrew
returned to his room and fell back to sleep.
A few hours later, Andrew went back to his mother’s bedroom, this time
because he did not feel well. Again, he saw Haynes in bed with her. They were both
sleeping, but Andrew woke Walker up. After checking Andrew’s temperature, Walker
sent him back to his room, where he fell asleep again.
Around 4:30 a.m., Haynes received a text message suggesting that the sender
wanted him to return a gun: “Aye bro where you at I running late and I don’t go no
where without my gun.” Haynes replied about 20 minutes later, apologizing and
explaining that he had fallen asleep.
And at some point in the middle of the night, Howerton, Walker’s neighbor,
was awakened by a “big bang.”5 Howerton described it as sounding “like maybe a
gunshot or . . . something maybe hitting a wall.” But after waiting a few minutes and
hearing nothing else, she went back to bed.
Based on text message activity on Haynes’s phone, the police were able to
determine that Hayne’s phone was near Walker’s residence until at least 6:06 on the
morning of the murders. But for approximately the next three hours, no activity
occurred on Haynes’s cell phone from which the police could determine his location.
5 Howerton’s and Walker’s townhomes shared a common wall.
8 However, the police were able to determine that by 9:30 that morning Haynes’s cell
phone was near his residence back in Plano.
Andrew woke up that morning around 10:00 and went to his mother’s
bedroom. When he entered the bedroom, he noticed that the heavy blue backpack
was gone and that his mother was still in bed with the covers on. Because she
normally was up by 8:00 a.m., Andrew thought it odd that she was still in bed. He
approached his mother’s bed and tried to awaken her to no avail, and when he pulled
the covers back, he saw her bloody body and the hole in her head.
Andrew immediately looked for his mother’s cell phone so that he could call
the police, but even though Walker normally slept with her cell phone, Andrew could
not find it.6 He then ran to Howerton’s townhome, and she called 911.
When the police arrived, they saw no evidence of forced entry into Walker’s
home, and the detective who later investigated the murder testified that the absence of
evidence of forced entry indicated that Walker knew the shooter.
Andrew was taken to the police station where he told the police that “Moosie”
had been at the house that night. A family friend who had gone to the police station
to pick up Andrew identified Haynes as “Moosie.”
Later that afternoon, Haynes met with detectives, confirmed that his nickname
was “Moosie,” and agreed to be interviewed. During his interview, Haynes
While he was searching for the phone, Andrew noticed a shell casing on the 6
floor.
9 maintained his innocence and insisted that Walker had been dating some “white guy.”
A detective testified that he was not able to substantiate Haynes’s claims about a
“white guy” because Walker’s family and friends said that she never mentioned having
a relationship with anyone other than Haynes.7
Haynes also gave consent to the police to search his apartment. In the
apartment, the police found a blue backpack.
Sometime after that, detectives visited Hill, and after learning that he owned a
Glock, they took possession of it. Detectives later learned that the shell casing
recovered from Walker’s home matched a known sample fired from Hill’s Glock.
Swabs were also taken from the Glock and were tested against Haynes’s DNA, but
Haynes was excluded as a contributor.8 Despite a lack of Haynes’s DNA on the
Glock, the lead detective stated that he did not change his investigation; Haynes was
eventually arrested and charged with capital murder.
On appeal, Haynes argues that the evidence was speculative and insufficient to
show that he was the shooter, for two reasons. We address these two arguments
separately.
Shiniqwa Walker, Walker’s cousin, testified that she did not know anything 7
about Walker’s dating a “white guy.” Lang, Walker’s lifelong friend, testified that Walker never talked about being in a relationship with anyone other than Haynes. Valencia Turner, also one of Walker’s friends, similarly testified that Walker never mentioned being in a relationship with a “white guy.”
DNA did confirm that Haynes was Baby Walker’s father. 8
10 First, Haynes argues that the evidence is not clear as to when he was seen at
Walker’s residence and when the shooting occurred. Haynes is correct that neither his
presence at Walker’s residence nor the shooting were pinpointed as to a specific time.
But the evidence did show that Andrew last saw his mother alive in the early morning
hours of April 14 with Haynes sleeping in her bed. Then at 10:00 a.m., Andrew
discovered that his mother was dead in her bed. If Andrew’s testimony is to be
believed, the shooting occurred sometime on April 14 between the early morning
hours and 10:00 a.m. And cell phone tracking evidence placed Haynes near Walker’s
townhouse from midnight until at least 6:06 a.m. Howerton’s testimony that she had
been awakened in the middle of the night by a bang was consistent with the shooting
having occurred before Haynes left Walker’s townhouse at around 6:06 a.m.
While Haynes suggests someone else could have committed the murders
between 6:00 and 10:00 a.m, a rational factfinder could have found that Haynes was
present in the townhome at the time the shooting occurred. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.
Second, Haynes points out that the handgun used to kill Walker belonged to
someone else, and that Haynes’s DNA was not found on the handgun. Thus, Haynes
postulates, the case against him was speculative. But while it is undisputed that the
pistol belonged to Hill and that Haynes’s DNA was not found on it, the evidence
against Haynes did not end there, and the rest of the evidence advances the proof
beyond the realm of mere speculation.
11 For example, the evidence suggests a reasonable explanation as to how Hill’s
pistol ended up in Walker’s residence. By tracing Haynes’s cell phone, the police were
able to determine that Haynes had traveled to Hill’s apartment in Dallas before
proceeding to Walker’s townhouse in Arlington. Somehow Hill’s gun ended up at
Walker’s residence, yet nothing suggested that Hill had been in Arlington on the night
of the murders. Although circumstantial, a reasonable inference from the evidence is
that Haynes brought Hill’s gun from Dallas to Arlington.
Had Haynes’s DNA appeared on the pistol, that would have helped the State’s
case, but the absence of his DNA on the gun did not necessarily weaken it. See Barker
v. State, No. 12-07-00200-CR, 2008 WL 5339935, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 23,
2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“It is true that the absence
of DNA evidence linking Appellant to the complaining witness does not enhance the
State’s case. But it does not diminish the State’s proof in the context of this case.”).
Similarly, the absence of DNA evidence does not necessarily make the State’s case
speculative. See Herrera v. State, 666 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2023, no pet.)
(“Appellant argues that the evidence is merely speculative because his fingerprints and
DNA profile were not found on the skimmer or the pump and the circumstantial
evidence does not support a reasonable inference that he endeavored to intercept
electronic communications. We disagree.”). While the evidence against Haynes was
circumstantial, the cumulative force of that evidence pointed to Haynes and only
Haynes. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608 (stating that appellate courts determine
12 whether the necessary inferences made by the trier of fact are reasonable based upon
the cumulative force of all the evidence). A rational factfinder could have found that
Haynes used Hill’s Glock to kill Walker and Baby Walker. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319,
99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.
We overrule Haynes’s first issue.
B. Selection of Alternate Jurors
In Haynes’s second issue, he argues that the trial court erred by preventing him
from effectively exercising his peremptory challenge to an alternate juror. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.15(d). The record, however, does not show that
Haynes objected to the manner of selecting the alternate jurors, does not show that he
objected to the alternate jurors selected, and does not show that he objected to the
jury panel as a whole. Haynes raises this complaint for the first time on appeal.
To preserve an alleged error for appellate review, a party must make a timely
request, objection, or motion and state the grounds for the ruling that the
complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make it
aware of the complaint, unless the context makes the specific grounds apparent. Tex.
R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); see McDonald v. State, No. 10-19-00067-CR, 2020 WL 103682, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 8, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). Because the record does not show that Haynes objected to the manner
13 in which the alternate jurors were selected, Haynes has not preserved his complaint
for appellate review.9 See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); McDonald, 2020 WL 103682 at *1.
We thus overrule Haynes’s second issue.
C. Admission of Photographs
In Haynes’s third and fourth issues, he complains about the trial court’s
admitting two photographs over his Rule 403 objection that the probative value of the
photographs was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Tex.
R. Evid. 403. In issue three, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting State’s Exhibit 117, a photograph of the entrance wound behind Walker’s
ear, and in issue four, he maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting State’s Exhibit 133, a photograph of Walker in her bloodied pajamas with
9 In Haynes’s brief, he hints that trial counsel’s failure to object might have deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. Even though Haynes did not raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in his motion for new trial, this claim may be raised for the first time on appeal. Spielbauer v. State, 634 S.W.3d 962, 967 n.2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, no pet.) (op. on remand). But even assuming that Haynes is raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, “[a]n appellate court should not denounce counsel as being ineffective without counsel having had the opportunity to explain their trial strategy.” Id. at 967. Having not raised this issue in the trial court or by way of motion for new trial, Haynes has not provided trial counsel such an opportunity, nor has Haynes shown that trial counsel’s performance—even assuming that it was deficient—prejudiced him in any way. See Walker v. State, 676 S.W.3d 213, 220–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. ref’d).
14 her one visible arm and hand bagged to protect them from contamination after her
body was removed from her bed.
We review a trial court’s ruling admitting evidence over a Rule 403 objection
for an abuse of discretion. Perez v. State, 562 S.W.3d 676, 689 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2018, pet. ref'd). Provided the trial court’s ruling falls within the zone of
reasonable disagreement, no abuse of discretion occurs. De La Paz v. State, 279
S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
2. Legal Principles
When analyzing a Rule 403 objection, the trial court must engage in a balancing
process. Upchurch v. State, 656 S.W.3d 170, 178 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022, no
pet.). The court must consider (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item
of evidence along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence and balance those
factors against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper
basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main
issues, (5) any tendency that a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the
probative force of the evidence would give it undue weight, and (6) the likelihood that
presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely
repeat evidence already admitted. Id.; see Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Newhouse v. State, No. 02-23-00265-CR, 2024 WL 3819307, at
15 *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 15, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
“Unfair prejudice” refers to the tendency to suggest a decision based on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. Davis v. State,
329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Evidence might be unfairly prejudicial
if, for example, it incites the jury’s hostility or sympathy for one side without regard to
the logical probative force of the evidence. Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 880 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007).
In the context of admitting photographs of a corpse, courts should consider
the number10 and size of the photographs, whether they are in color or black and
white and the detail shown, whether they are gruesome, whether the body is naked or
clothed,11 and whether the body has been altered since the crime12 in some way that
might enhance the gruesomeness of the photograph to the appellant’s detriment.
Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
On appeal, Haynes makes no complaint about the number of photos that 10
were admitted into evidence.
Walker does not appear naked or unclothed in either of the photographs that 11
Haynes complains of on appeal.
In State’s Exhibit 133—the second photograph that Haynes complains about 12
in his fourth issue—Walker’s body was altered from the position in which it was found.
16 Generally, a photograph is admissible if testimony as to matters depicted in the
photograph is also admissible. Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). A trial court does not err merely because it admits into evidence photographs
that are gruesome. Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
3. Application
a. Complaints Common to Both Photographs—Size, Color, and Gruesomeness
Regarding the size of the photographs, at trial, Haynes first objected to the
photographs being displayed “across the screen in the courtroom.” But after the State
assured the court that it had no intention of displaying the photographs on “the big
screen,” Haynes voiced no complaint regarding the photographs’ size. Likewise, on
appeal Haynes takes no issue with regard to the size of the two photographs.
Regarding color, both photographs are in color, and Haynes contends that
black-and-white photographs would have been less gruesome. While black-and-white
photographs might have been less gruesome, they might also have been less
illustrative because a black-and-white photograph would not distinguish between red
and black—blood and shadow. The blood depicted on the color photographs
provided visual support for the testimony from Dr. Susan Rowe, the doctor who
performed the autopsy. Dr. Rowe testified that the bullet perforated Walker’s carotid
artery near the brainstem, went through her tongue, and exited through her mandible.
And she explained that once the carotid artery, which was under high blood pressure,
17 was severed, the severance would cause rapid bleeding, produce “a lot of blood,” and
quickly become fatal.
These color photographs enabled the jury to see the blood that she described
and thus evaluate the veracity of Dr. Rowe’s testimony. And because there is nothing
in this record to suggest that the jury would have given these photographs undue
weight, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing these color, as opposed
to black-and-white, photographs into evidence. See Mosley v. State, 643 S.W.2d 212,
220 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, no pet.) (rejecting argument that admitting color
photographs if black-and-white photographs were available constituted an abuse of
discretion).
Haynes also contends that the State had other less gruesome photographs in
evidence and that the availability of those photographs to prove the State’s case
should be considered. See Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Generally speaking, the decision on how the State prosecutes a defendant is best left
to prosecutors, as delegating that task to defendants would undermine the adversarial
system. See Hunter v. State, 691 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, no pet.)
(recognizing that our system is adversarial); McFadden v. State, No. 11-16-00221-CR,
2018 WL 4137594, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (criticizing conduct that would undermine our adversarial
process). In any event, as we explain below, State’s Exhibits 116 and 118—the other
photographs that Haynes identified and about which Haynes does not complain on
18 appeal—are similar to the two photographs he challenges on appeal.13 But State’s
Exhibits 117 and 133 are also different from States Exhibits 116 and 118 in that they
both provide additional detail that States Exhibits 116 and 118 do not.
b. State’s Exhibit 117
State’s Exhibit 117, a close-up photograph of the side of Walker’s head, is
limited to a depiction of the entry wound and the immediately surrounding area—
basically, the bullet’s entry point, Walker’s ear, and her hairline. State’s Exhibit 117
was an important building block in the State’s case with inherent probative force
because with State’s Exhibit 117’s admission, the jury could see photographic
evidence that Walker had been shot behind the ear as described, and the jury did not
have to rely solely on the credibility of any witness’s statements to that effect.
Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“We reject the
premise that visual evidence accompanying oral testimony is cumulative of the
testimony or that it is of insignificant probative value. Visual evidence accompanying
testimony is most persuasive and often gives the fact finder a point of comparison
against which to test the credibility of a witness . . . .”).
Haynes argues that State’s Exhibit 117 was “overly gruesome” and the
depiction of Walker’s wound “could have been illustrated to the jury through the
At trial, State’s Exhibit 116 was admitted for record purposes only and was 13
excluded from the jury’s consideration as duplicative of State’s Exhibit 117. State’s Exhibit 118 was admitted over Haynes’s objection that it was duplicative and too gruesome.
19 admission and display of State’s [E]xhibit 116 which is a much less graphic and
prejudicial photograph.”14 If, as Haynes contends, State’s Exhibit 116 is less
gruesome, it is only marginally so. Both are color photographs that provide a close-
up view of Walkers wound. The essential difference between the two is that they
were taken from somewhat different angles and State’s Exhibit 117 provides a slightly
closer view such that it more clearly shows the entry wound. As such, State’s Exhibit
117 added clarity that State’s Exhibit 116 did not provide. After reviewing the record
as a whole, including the photographs, we cannot say that the trial court acted outside
the zone of reasonable disagreement by not restricting the State’s evidence related to
the entry wound to State’s Exhibit 116 and witness testimony. See De La Paz, 279
S.W.3d at 343–44.
c. State’s Exhibit 133
State’s Exhibit 133 depicts Walker’s bloody torso. The body in the photograph
was altered in two ways: (1) Walker had been moved and repositioned on her back,
instead remaining on her side as she was found at the scene, and (2) a paper bag had
also been placed over her one visible arm and hand to protect them from
14 The trial court ruled that State’s Exhibits 116 and 117 were duplicative and gave the State the choice of one or the other, and the State chose State’s Exhibit 117. State’s Exhibit 117 was admitted for all purposes, and State’s Exhibit 116 was admitted only for record purposes. For purposes of Haynes’s argument, Haynes appears to be arguing that the trial court should not have given the State the choice between State’s Exhibits 116 and 117, should have excluded State’s Exhibit 117, and should have forced the State to proceed with State’s Exhibit 116.
20 contamination. Neither alteration, however, enhanced any gruesomeness, and the
alterations were explained to the jury.
As to Haynes contention that State’s Exhibit 133 was “overly gruesome” and
the depiction of Walker’s bloody torso was “already illustrated to the jury through the
admission and display of State’s [E]xhibit 118 which is a much less graphic and
prejudicial photograph,” we disagree. State’s Exhibit 118 was actually markedly more
gruesome than State’s Exhibit 133. State’s Exhibit 133 does not show Walker’s face
but only the bloody torso area, whereas State’s Exhibit 118—about which Haynes
does not complain—implicates more trauma and pain with its depiction of Walker’s
clinched fist near her face and both of her nostrils oozing blood.
To the extent that Haynes argues that State’s Exhibit 133 was cumulative of
State’s Exhibit 118, we also disagree. While they share similarities, State’s Exhibit 133
illustrates one more essential fact that the State was required to prove, i.e., that Walker
was pregnant. In State’s Exhibit 133, her pregnancy is unmistakable, whereas in
State’s Exhibit 118 her pregnancy is barely noticeable. Rather than enhance the
gruesomeness effect, State’s Exhibit 133 allowed the jurors to see that which was not
obvious in State’s Exhibit 118. The fact that Walker was pregnant when she was shot
and bled to death was directly relevant to proving that Baby Walker died as a result of
his mother’s bleeding to death. That State’s Exhibit 133 was gruesome in content
simply reflects the gruesome nature of the death of mother and child. It was
prejudicial to Haynes, but not overly so. See Shuffield, 189 S.W.3d at 787–88 (“[T]hese
21 photographs show only the injuries that the victim received and are no more
gruesome than would be expected.”).
As with State’s Exhibit 117, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion by not restricting the State’s evidence to the facts depicted in State’s Exhibit
118 and witness testimony. See De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343–44.
d. Ruling
Because we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
State’s Exhibits 117 and 133, we overrule Haynes’s third and fourth issues. Upchurch,
656 S.W.3d at 178.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled all four of Haynes’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: June 19, 2025