Keith Bryant v. the State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections; Secretary James W. Leblanc, Angela Griffin and Other Unknown

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: April 17, 2024
• Docket: 2023-C-0786
• Status: Published

Opinion

KEITH BRYANT * NO. 2023-C-0786

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, * THROUGH THE FOURTH CIRCUIT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC * SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS; STATE OF LOUISIANA SECRETARY JAMES W. ******* LEBLANC, ANGELA GRIFFIN AND OTHER UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS

ON SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2019-00473, DIVISION “N-8” Honorable Ethel Simms Julien, Judge ****** Judge Karen K. Herman ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge Karen K. Herman)

Jeff Landry ATTORNEY GENERAL Phyllis E. Glazer Christopher J. Rouse Assistant Attorney General Louisiana Department of Justice Litigation Division 1885 North Third Street, 3rd Floor Baton Rouge, LA 70802

COUNSEL FOR RELATORS - DEFENDANTS, STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS; SECRETARY JAMES LEBLANC; AND ANGELA GRIFFIN

William Most Caroline Gabriel MOST & ASSOCIATES 201 St. Charles Ave., Ste. 2500, # 9685 New Orleans, LA 70170

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT - PLAINTIFF, KEITH BRYANT

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT VACATED AND RENDERED APRIL 17, 2024 KKH TFL RLB SCJ TGC

Relators-Defendants, the State of Louisiana, through the Department of

Public Safety and Corrections, Secretary James W. LeBlanc, and Angela Griffin

(“Defendants”) seek supervisory review from the trial court’s September 19, 2023

judgment, which denied their motion for summary judgment. For the following

reasons, we grant the writ application, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and render

judgment in favor of Defendants.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 16, 2017, Respondent-Plaintiff, Keith Bryant (‘Plaintiff”), was

arrested and charged with aggravated second-degree battery.1 Plaintiff was unable

to post bail and remained incarcerated through the pendency of the criminal

proceedings. Plaintiff pled guilty as charged on January 11, 2018, and was

sentenced to serve one year at hard labor in the custody of the Department of

Corrections, with credit for time served. Plaintiff was released from custody on

April 18, 2018.

1 Aggravated battery is “battery committed with a dangerous weapon,” a violation of La. R.S.

14:34. Second degree battery is “battery when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury,” a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1. Both are crimes of violence. La. R.S. 14:2(B)(5)) & (6).

1 On January 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant suit alleging Defendants

detained him beyond his legal sentence after he had pled guilty. The petition

alleged that “under La. R.S. 15:571.3, [Plaintiff] was eligible to earn good-time

credit and could have only served seventy-five percent of his [one year] sentence –

or a total of 274 days.” Instead, Plaintiff served the full sentence of one year.

Plaintiff alleged he should have been released from the custody of the DOC on or

before January 14, 2018, and that he was “over[-]detained” by approximately

ninety-five days.2 Plaintiff claims that his continued detention past his good-time

release date violated his federal and state rights to due process of law, and caused

injury due to, among other things, false imprisonment and intentional infliction of

emotional distress.3

On May 10, 2019, Defendants removed the suit to federal court to address

Respondent’s federal damage claims and on August 26, 2019, filed a motion to

dismiss. The Eastern District Court granted the motion to dismiss, stating

“[b]ecause Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages pursuant to [42 USC] §1983 for

an alleged unconstitutional over-detention and has not satisfied the favorable

termination requirement of Heck [v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364,

2372 (1994)], he fails to state a claim under § 1983 upon which relief may be

granted.” Bryant v. Louisiana Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., unpub., 2019 WL

2 Plaintiff alleged he should have been released from “the custody of the DOC on or before

January 14, 2018.” However, in the opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argued that he should have been released “on or before February 21, 2018.”

3 The petition asserts several claims against Defendants, including violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment's Due Process Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violation of Article 1, § 2 of the Louisiana Constitution; Monell violation of § 1983 based on DPSC's policies and practices; false Imprisonment; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligence; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and respondeat superior liability of the State.

2 5538054, at *3 (E.D. La. 10/25/19). The Eastern District then remanded the matter

to the state court to address Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Thereafter, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to

dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims against them because these claims bear on the

nature and duration of his confinement and are thus barred by the doctrine set forth

in Heck. Defendant also argued that under Stemley v. Goines, 2006-1556 (La. App.

4 Cir. 4/11/07), 954 So.2d 403, proper jurisdiction for actions contesting

computation of good time dates is East Baton Rouge Parish.

The motion came for hearing before the trial court on September 8, 2023 and

the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment from the bench. The trial

court executed a judgment to that effect on September 19, 2023.

This writ application followed.

LAW & DISCUSSION

“It is well-settled law that ‘[t]his Court reviews the granting of ‘[a]

summary judgment on appeal de novo, using the same criteria that govern the

[district] court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate.’ ”

Williams v. Infirmary, 2023-0180, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/23), ––– So.3d ––––,

––––, 2023 WL 8798466, at *3 (quoting Sebble on Behalf of Est. of Brown v. St.

Luke's #2, LLC, 2022-0620, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/6/23), 358 So.3d 1030, 1034).

“Generally, on a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof remains with

the mover.” Id. (quoting Everett v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 2022-0539, p. 6 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 5/2/23), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2023 WL 3193154, at *3). “But, if the

moving party will not bear the burden of proof on the issue at trial and identifies an

absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's

claim, action, or defense, then the non-moving party must produce factual support

3 sufficient to counter that assertion and establish that he will be able to satisfy his

evidentiary burden of proof at trial.” Id., pp. 6-7, ––– So.3d at ––––, 2023 WL

8798466 at *3 (quoting Cooper v. Brisco, 2022-0196, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir.

10/18/22), 366 So.3d 552, 555). “However, if the opponent of the motion cannot

do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be

granted.” Id. (quoting Cooper, 2022-0196, pp. 4-5, 366 So.3d at 556 and Ely

Edwards Enters., Inc. v. Pontchartrain Park CDC Real Estate Holdings, LLC,

2021-0623, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/13/22), 338 So.3d 50, 53).

Although styled as a motion for summary judgment, this case really presents

a question of jurisdiction. “Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power

and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or

proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the

value of the right asserted.” St. Bernard Par. Gov't v. Perniciaro, 2019-0604, p. 4

(La. App. 4 Cir. 3/11/20), 364 So.3d 185, 188 (quoting La. C.C.P. art. 2). “The

jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action or proceeding cannot be

conferred by consent of the parties or waived; a judgment rendered by a court

which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or proceeding is

void.” Id. (citing La. C.C.P. art. 3).

The lack of subject matter jurisdiction “can be recognized by the court at any

time, with or without formal exception.” VCS, LLC v. Louisiana Dep't of Econ.

Dev., 2023-0548, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/9/23), 379 So.3d 54, 58 (citing La.

C.C.P. art. 927(A)(8) and (B)); see also Bass P'ship v. Gravolet, 2012-0024, p. 28

(La. App. 4 Cir. 11/21/12), 105 So.3d 224, 239 (the lack of subject matter

jurisdiction “may be raised at any time, even by the court on its own motion, at any

stage of an action”).

4 The Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (CARP), La. R.S.

15:1171, et seq., authorizes the Department of Public Safety and Corrections to

adopt administrative remedy procedures for receiving, hearing, and disposing “of

any and all complaints and grievances by adult or juvenile offenders against the

state…” La. R.S. 15:1171(B). These procedures are the “exclusive remedy” for

such grievances, including actions pertaining to “time computations.” Id.; see also

Branch v. La. Dept. of Pub. Safety and Corr’s, 2012-0749, p. 2 n. 1 (La. App. 1

Cir. 12/21/12), 111 So.3d 1059; Owens v. Stalder, 2006-1120, p. 3 n. 5 (La. App. 1

Cir. 6/8/07), 965 So.2d 886, 888 (“a prisoner alleging an error in time computation

must pursue his claim through CARP, with appellate review first at the district

court and then with this court”). La. R.S. 15:1174(2) defines an “offender” as “an

adult or juvenile offender who is in the physical or legal custody of the Department

of Public Safety and Corrections, a contractor operating a private prison facility, or

a sheriff when the basis for the complaint or grievance arises. Any subsequent

event, including post-trial judicial action or release from custody, shall not affect

status as an ‘offender’ for purposes of this Part.” (Emphasis added).

In their writ, Defendants argue that Orleans Parish Civil District Court lacks

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because La. R.S. 15:571.154 mandates that

jurisdiction for actions contesting sentence computations, including good time, is

solely in East Baton Rouge Parish, citing Stemley, 2006-1556, 954 So.2d 403.

4 La. R.S. 15:571.15 provides in pertinent part:

Venue in any action in which an individual committed to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections contests the computation of his sentence or sentences, discharge, good time dates, or any action concerning parole shall be in the parish of East Baton Rouge.

(emphasis added).

5 They also contend that Plaintiff’s damages claims cannot be adjudicated until he

obtains a favorable adjudication of the alleged error in his sentence computation

through CARP. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s civil damages claims

cannot be adjudicated until the validity of his criminal sentence is determined by

the appropriate adjudicating body pursuant to the Heck doctrine.

However, Plaintiff argues that Orleans Parish has jurisdiction to hear his

claims because La. R.S. 15:571.15 applies only to claims by currently incarcerated

persons, which he is not; and that Heck does not apply to his claims because he

does not challenge his conviction or sentence, only his wrongful detention after

completing his legal sentence.

In Stemley, 2006-1556, p. 1, 954 So.2d at 403, an inmate filed suit in

Orleans Parish alleging that there was an error in the computation of his good time

credits and wrongful incarceration and/or false imprisonment stemming from the

error in calculation of his good time. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, finding

that the trial court lacked jurisdiction5 and that “pursuant to La. R.S. 15:571.15, the

19th Judicial District Court has jurisdiction over questions concerning the

computation of discharge times for prisoners.” Id. at p. 2, 954 So.2d at 404. This

Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating in relevant part:

La. R.S. 15:571.15 mandates that venue for actions contesting computation of sentence, discharge, parole, and good time dates shall be brought in the parish of East Baton Rouge. See State v. Robinson, 2001–1458, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/24/02), 818 So.2d 246, 250.6 Moreover, it is clear that an assessment of damages cannot be made unless and until the 19th Judicial District Court rules in Stemley’s favor on the petition for review. 5 Although the trial court dismissed the petition based on lack of jurisdiction, the defendants filed

an exception of improper venue.

6 Robinson, 2001-1458, p. 6, 818 So.2d at 250, stated “the 19th JDC has jurisdiction over

questions concerning the computation of discharge times for prisoners.”

6 Id. at pp. 4-5, 954 So.2d at 405.

Similarly, here, because Plaintiff is challenging the calculation of his good

time dates, only East Baton Rouge has subject matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the

fact that Plaintiff is not currently incarcerated is irrelevant to the application of La.

R.S. 15:571.15 because CARP applies to offenders, whether or not they are

released from custody. See La. R.S. 15:1174(2); see also Black v. LeBlanc, 2015-

1917, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 197 So.3d 215, 218 (an offender’s claim under

CARP requesting resentencing for recalculation of good time credit, was not

rendered moot by his subsequent release from custody).

The First Circuit has also recognized that any complaint pertaining to time

computation must be made under CARP “before seeking remedy from the district

court.” State v. Jones, unpub., 2023-0590, p. 1 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/11/23) 2023 WL

5953527 at *1 (citing Briscoe v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections,

unpub., 2017-0470 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/24/17), 2017 WL 3124096; Madison v.

Ward, 2000-2842, p. 11 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/3/02), 825 So.2d 1245, 1255 (en banc),

superseded by statute on other grounds); State v. Roussell, unpub., 2022-0227 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 6/21/22) 2022 WL 22319492022-0227; see also Williams v. Creed,

2007-0614, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/07), 978 So.2d 419, 422 (a “prisoner

alleging an error in computation of good time must pursue his claim through the

administrative remedy procedure [CARP], with appellate review first at the district

court and then with this court [the First Circuit]”). Accordingly, Plaintiff must raise

his challenges to his good time credit in East Baton Rouge before proceeding with

his damage claims in Orleans Parish.

7 In Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372, the United States Supreme

Court held, “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction

or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a [42 U.S.C.] §1983 plaintiff must prove

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §2254.” Thus, the Heck Court concluded, “when a state

prisoner seeks damages in a §1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372.

This Court has determined that the Heck doctrine “is applicable to state law

claims that challenge the legitimacy of a criminal conviction.” Barker v. H2 Law,

LLC, 2022-0629, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/10/22), 366 So.3d 540, 543 (no cause of

action for legal malpractice by plaintiff convict where claims involve collateral

attack on conviction); see also Lemoine v. Wolf, 2014-1546, pp. 8-9 (La. 3/17/15),

168 So.3d 362, 368 (noting that one rationale for the “bona fide termination

favorable to the [ ] plaintiff” requirement in a malicious prosecution claim is

Heck’s holding that “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles to challenge

validity of outstanding criminal judgments”).

Plaintiff asserts that Heck is inapplicable because he is not challenging his

one-year sentence issued by the trial court, but rather, the calculation of his good

time credits. However, as noted above, an offender’s claim regarding the

8 computation of good time credit must be addressed through CARP. See La. R.S.

15:571.15; Williams, 2007-0614, p. 4, 978 So.2d at 422; Madison, 2000-2842, p.

11, 825 So.2d at 1255.

Without a ruling issued through CARP and the 19th Judicial District Court

of East Baton Rouge Parish on the calculation of his good time dates, damages for

Plaintiff’s claims of wrongful detention cannot be assessed. Moreover, because La.

R.S. 15:571.15 mandates that actions contesting good time dates be brought in East

Baton Rouge, the trial court lacked authority over the instant lawsuit. Stemley,

2006-1556, pp. 4-5, 954 So.2d at 405. Prior to addressing Plaintiff’s underlying

claim for damages, Plaintiff must first obtain a ruling on the appropriateness of his

good time dates. As such, we grant the writ, finding Civil District Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, we grant the writ application, vacate the trial

court’s judgment, and render judgment in favor of Defendants.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT VACATED AND RENDERED