Keil v. Seaman

314 F. Supp. 816, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11369
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedJune 11, 1970
DocketCiv. No. 70-25
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 314 F. Supp. 816 (Keil v. Seaman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Keil v. Seaman, 314 F. Supp. 816, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11369 (D. Md. 1970).

Opinion

FRANK A. KAUFMAN, District Judge.

Andrew F. Keil, a private in the United States Army, seeks to be discharged from the Army as a conscientious objector pursuant to Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6 and Army Regulation 635-20. On September 17, 1969, Keil filed his application for a 1-0 classification as a conscientious objector. That application was disapproved on November 8, 1969.

Keil was born and raised as a Roman Catholic, the faith of his mother. He was educated in Catholic schools on the elementary, secondary and college levels, graduating from Fordham University in June, 1968. While at Fordham, he applied for Marine Corps O.C.S. and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Platoon Leaders Corps Program. Later, he resigned his commission and was issued a general discharge from the Marine Corps under honorable conditions in October, 1968. In connection therewith, the Commandant of the Marine Corps noted that Keil had “failed to attain the accepted standards required successfully to complete Basic School.” Keil’s “failure was due, at least in part, to a lack of effort on his part” (September 13, 1968 communication from Commandant of the Marine Corps to Secretary of the Navy). Keil, himself, admitted that he lacked the “necessary drive or motivation to complete the course.”

In March, 1968, Keil was inducted into the Army. In his September, 1969 application, Keil stated that he did not apply for a conscientious objection classification by Selective Service and wrote -,1

3.k. 1. Although I had resigned my commission as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve only five months previous to induction, my beliefs concerning [817]*817the individual act of taking another’s life had not crystallized until after entry into the Army. While in the Marine Corps I was concerned with the responsibility of leading others into a situation where they would be required to kill, a situation I myself had not satisfactorily settled on a moral basis, nor one which I could advocate as being justifiable. I had not considered the moral implications on a personal level. I realized I could not accept the status of a combat leader with the hesitation I possessed. But at this time I did not face the problem of whether I myself would kill. I did not do so ’til after I was inducted.
2. Prior to induction I had no objection to serving in the army provided I did not have to bear arms. I had hoped I would be fortunate enough not to draw Infantry MOS and serve my two years in another task. I thought my education and past experience in the military as a second lieutenant who had resigned a commission in the Marine Corps would be considerations to prompt such a decision. My two prior applications were for a change of MOS, preferably medic, and though refused, indicated my desire. Since then, however my views have deepened and I find I must request separation from the Army.
3. I was not fully aware of what was necessary to qualify for this status, or if indeed I qualified at all as a Roman Catholic.
4. I knew my father, as a military man who retired from the Air Force as a LTC, would be affected by such an action in an unfavorable way. In like manner I was aware of the regard in which a conscientious objector is often viewed by civilians as well as the Armed Forces, and this contributed to my hesitancy in applying for conscientious objector status.

After Keil was inducted into the Army and while he was in basic training, he filed two (2) successive unsuccessful applications for 1-A-O conscientious objector status. After rejection of his said applications, he refused an order to take part in advanced infantry training, allegedly because of his beliefs; was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to serve two months in the stockade at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; served all but ten days of that sentence; and, while in the stockade, filed on September 17, 1969, a 1-0 application for discharge as a conscientious objector. In connection therewith, Keil, in his supporting statement, stated, in part:

I resigned my commission as a Second Lieutenant in the USMCR for reasons which closely approximate the reasons for which I am now asking CONOBJ status. . I stated, and it is on record, that I believed I could not fulfill the requirements of a combat leader, that I no longer considered myself qualified to be a Second Lieutenant and that I no longer had the desire to fulfill the mission for which I was being trained. Under these self-accusations and because my academic record was below average, I was relieved of my commission after stating my desire to resign and given a general discharge under honorable conditions.

But the record only reveals half of the story. The reason I could not qualify as combat leader or as second lieutenant, why I lacked the desire to be a leader and why I was academically deficient lies in my personal reaction to war. This personal reaction took a long time to formulate and be realized by myself and it is because of this that I find myself in my present difficulty. Why it was so long in coming lies in the training I had.

When I first signed up in the Platoon Leaders Corps Program it was for all the wrong reasons. The prestige of the position, the glamor of the uniform, the privilege of rank, and the misinter[818]*818preted glory of combat were the considerations that prompted me to enlist. I do not think it unusual that I was att- [sic] to the program for these reasons because it is more often than not these same appeals the recruiter purposely displays to induce and enhance potential applicants. These attractions gave me the impetus to sweat through the summer training sessions between semesters in college which I was subject to. In these sessions more was required in the line of physical effort than deliberate thought concerning what I was training for. I was urged not to think but to react and I soon realized it was indeed easier not to question but to obey.

It was in my senior year of college when I first began to 'doubt my position. The war in Viet Nam was being questioned ethically, politically, morally, and militarily and because I was known on campus to be involved in the PLC program and due to receive my commission upon graduation, I was often questioned regarding my position and required to defend my actions. All this happened in the typical campus atmosphere of challenge and debate and I was anxious to defend myself. But questions were being asked that I couldn’t answer with the military line I had absorped, questions that required a great deal of thought and analization and which is shadowed the black and white perspective into which my previous view of the war issue had fallen. The one universal virtue of a campus community, that of keeping an open mind, I had violated by being content to listen only to the accepted military standpoint. When I was questioned on social, ethical, and humanitarian standards I could not honestly defend the consequences of the actions which my position as a combat leader would require me to do.

I decided to go ahead and accept my commission, again, for the wrong reasons. I was already heavily committed to the program (though I could still have refused commissioning), my parents and friends were anxious for the event and other friends, who were in the program with me and whom I had encouraged to sign up, had persuaded me to stay. The doubts I still had, more pronounced than ever.

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Related

KANAI v. Geren
671 F. Supp. 2d 713 (D. Maryland, 2009)
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328 F. Supp. 753 (D. Maryland, 1971)
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318 F. Supp. 884 (D. Maryland, 1970)
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318 F. Supp. 891 (D. Maryland, 1970)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
314 F. Supp. 816, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11369, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/keil-v-seaman-mdd-1970.