[803]*803BUTTLER, P. J.
Petitioner seeks judicial review of an order of the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board (FDAB) which affirmed the respondent school district’s termination of his employment on the grounds of insubordination and neglect of duty. ORS 342.865(1) (amended by Or Laws 1981, ch 569, § l).1
Petitioner was a permanent teacher employed by respondent.2 He requested and was granted a one-year leave of absence for the 1979-80 school year. In March, 1980, petitioner applied for an extension of his leave of absence for the 1980-81 school year. Respondent’s superintendent advised petitioner by letter that he would recommend that no action be taken on petitioner’s request. Based on that recommendation, respondent denied the request at a special meeting of its board on April 23. Petitioner was notified of the denial on April 25.
[804]*804Petitioner then asked that respondent reconsider his request. On May 12, the superintendent wrote petitioner a letter, enclosing a copy of the superintendent’s briefing to the school board relating to petitioner’s request. That briefing concluded:
“It will be my recommendation to the board that Mr. Keene let the district know if he will be returning by May 16, 1980, for the 1980-81 school year. In order to be able to make the necessary education plans for next year, should no word be received by May 16, 1980, I recommend the district initiate steps to terminate Mr. Keene.”
Petitioner appeared at the board meeting on May 14 in support of his request for reconsideration of the one-year extension. However, he left that meeting before the board reached its decision. The following day the superintendent sent petitioner a certified letter advising him that his request for reconsideration had been denied and requesting petitioner to indicate by May 19 his intention to return. That letter was not received by him until May 27. He made no response, but did come in to the respondent’s office to pick up copies of materials from his personnel file. He did not at that time discuss his intentions with anyone on the administrative staff.
On May 15, the superintendent also sent petitioner a telegram, which was not delivered because of an error on the part of Western Union. Not having heard from petitioner, the superintendent attempted to contact him by telephone on May 19 and 20, but was unsuccessful. On May 20, the superintendent sent petitioner another telegram, which was received that day by petitioner’s wife. The telegram requested petitioner to advise respondent by May 22 of his intentions.
On June 24, having received no response from petitioner, the superintendent sent him another letter advising him that his failure to respond “is taken as a decision not to return to the District.” The letter went on to state that respondent would proceed to dismiss petitioner in accordance with the Fair Dismissal Law, unless petitioner preferred to resign, and gave him until July 9 to exercise that alternative, absent which the superintendent stated he would formally notify petitioner of his intention [805]*805to recommend petitioner’s dismissal to the board. Petitioner did not respond.
Thereafter, the superintendent gave petitioner a formal notice of intention to recommend dismissal on the grounds of inefficiency, insubordination, neglect of duty and inadequate performance, ORS 342.865(l)(a), (c), (d) and (g), relying, generally, on the foregoing facts. The FDAB, after finding the facts set forth above, which are not disputed, found that the school district was justified in concluding that petitioner was guilty of insubordination and neglect of duty, but not of the other grounds stated in the formal notice. One member of the FDAB panel dissented on the ground that, although the charges of neglect of duty and insubordination were substantiated, dismissal was not warranted by those facts.
The function of the FDAB on appeal is limited. It is the primary fact finder, but it may not substitute its judgment for that of the school board; if the facts relied on by the school board and found to be true, together with any additional facts developed at the hearing, are adequate to satisfy the statutory grounds on which the school board relied, FDAB may not reverse the dismissal, “* * * unless it determines, in light of all the evidence and for reasons stated with specificity in its findings and order, that the dismissal was unreasonable, arbitrary or clearly an excessive remedy. * * *” ORS 342.905(5);3 Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 56 Or App 197, 641 P2d 600 (1982).
[806]*806Here, the FDAB found that the facts relied upon by the school board were true and substantiated; petitioner does not contend otherwise. Instead, he assigns as errors of law the following: (1) the FDAB’s reliance on the letter of June 24, 1980; (2) its reliance on the May 20 telegram, and (3) a claim that the penalty was excessive.
In support of the first assignment, petitioner contends that the FDAB could not consider the letter of June 24, 1980, because it was not included in the statement of charges against petitioner. He is correct in asserting that the letter was not relied on by the respondent, but wrong in contending that it may not be considered for that reason. ORS 342.905(5) expressly provides that:
“* * * The Fair Dismissal Appeals Board panel shall determine whether the facts relied upon to support the statutory grounds cited for dismissal are true and substantiated. If the panel finds these facts true and substantiated, it shall then consider whether such facts, in light of all the circumstances and additional facts developed at the hearing that are relevant to the statutory standards in subsection (1) of ORS 342.865, are adequate to justify the statutory grounds cited. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that the letter in question was written after it was too late for petitioner to indicate his intention to return to his teaching job and, therefore, it is not relevant to a determination as to whether petitioner refused to respond to the school board’s directive to let the board know if he was going to return to his job. However, the FDAB’s order, taken as a whole, indicates that it treated petitioner’s failure to respond to the June 24 letter as simply another instance in which he remained incommunicado. The basic conclusion of the FDAB is that petitioner was clearly on notice that the superintendent was requesting that petitioner indicate whether he intended to return to his [807]*807teaching position so that respondent could complete its staffing needs for the following year, and that petitioner persisted in refusing to let him know. He simply remained silent; his failure to respond to the June 24 letter is but another example.
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[803]*803BUTTLER, P. J.
Petitioner seeks judicial review of an order of the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board (FDAB) which affirmed the respondent school district’s termination of his employment on the grounds of insubordination and neglect of duty. ORS 342.865(1) (amended by Or Laws 1981, ch 569, § l).1
Petitioner was a permanent teacher employed by respondent.2 He requested and was granted a one-year leave of absence for the 1979-80 school year. In March, 1980, petitioner applied for an extension of his leave of absence for the 1980-81 school year. Respondent’s superintendent advised petitioner by letter that he would recommend that no action be taken on petitioner’s request. Based on that recommendation, respondent denied the request at a special meeting of its board on April 23. Petitioner was notified of the denial on April 25.
[804]*804Petitioner then asked that respondent reconsider his request. On May 12, the superintendent wrote petitioner a letter, enclosing a copy of the superintendent’s briefing to the school board relating to petitioner’s request. That briefing concluded:
“It will be my recommendation to the board that Mr. Keene let the district know if he will be returning by May 16, 1980, for the 1980-81 school year. In order to be able to make the necessary education plans for next year, should no word be received by May 16, 1980, I recommend the district initiate steps to terminate Mr. Keene.”
Petitioner appeared at the board meeting on May 14 in support of his request for reconsideration of the one-year extension. However, he left that meeting before the board reached its decision. The following day the superintendent sent petitioner a certified letter advising him that his request for reconsideration had been denied and requesting petitioner to indicate by May 19 his intention to return. That letter was not received by him until May 27. He made no response, but did come in to the respondent’s office to pick up copies of materials from his personnel file. He did not at that time discuss his intentions with anyone on the administrative staff.
On May 15, the superintendent also sent petitioner a telegram, which was not delivered because of an error on the part of Western Union. Not having heard from petitioner, the superintendent attempted to contact him by telephone on May 19 and 20, but was unsuccessful. On May 20, the superintendent sent petitioner another telegram, which was received that day by petitioner’s wife. The telegram requested petitioner to advise respondent by May 22 of his intentions.
On June 24, having received no response from petitioner, the superintendent sent him another letter advising him that his failure to respond “is taken as a decision not to return to the District.” The letter went on to state that respondent would proceed to dismiss petitioner in accordance with the Fair Dismissal Law, unless petitioner preferred to resign, and gave him until July 9 to exercise that alternative, absent which the superintendent stated he would formally notify petitioner of his intention [805]*805to recommend petitioner’s dismissal to the board. Petitioner did not respond.
Thereafter, the superintendent gave petitioner a formal notice of intention to recommend dismissal on the grounds of inefficiency, insubordination, neglect of duty and inadequate performance, ORS 342.865(l)(a), (c), (d) and (g), relying, generally, on the foregoing facts. The FDAB, after finding the facts set forth above, which are not disputed, found that the school district was justified in concluding that petitioner was guilty of insubordination and neglect of duty, but not of the other grounds stated in the formal notice. One member of the FDAB panel dissented on the ground that, although the charges of neglect of duty and insubordination were substantiated, dismissal was not warranted by those facts.
The function of the FDAB on appeal is limited. It is the primary fact finder, but it may not substitute its judgment for that of the school board; if the facts relied on by the school board and found to be true, together with any additional facts developed at the hearing, are adequate to satisfy the statutory grounds on which the school board relied, FDAB may not reverse the dismissal, “* * * unless it determines, in light of all the evidence and for reasons stated with specificity in its findings and order, that the dismissal was unreasonable, arbitrary or clearly an excessive remedy. * * *” ORS 342.905(5);3 Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 56 Or App 197, 641 P2d 600 (1982).
[806]*806Here, the FDAB found that the facts relied upon by the school board were true and substantiated; petitioner does not contend otherwise. Instead, he assigns as errors of law the following: (1) the FDAB’s reliance on the letter of June 24, 1980; (2) its reliance on the May 20 telegram, and (3) a claim that the penalty was excessive.
In support of the first assignment, petitioner contends that the FDAB could not consider the letter of June 24, 1980, because it was not included in the statement of charges against petitioner. He is correct in asserting that the letter was not relied on by the respondent, but wrong in contending that it may not be considered for that reason. ORS 342.905(5) expressly provides that:
“* * * The Fair Dismissal Appeals Board panel shall determine whether the facts relied upon to support the statutory grounds cited for dismissal are true and substantiated. If the panel finds these facts true and substantiated, it shall then consider whether such facts, in light of all the circumstances and additional facts developed at the hearing that are relevant to the statutory standards in subsection (1) of ORS 342.865, are adequate to justify the statutory grounds cited. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that the letter in question was written after it was too late for petitioner to indicate his intention to return to his teaching job and, therefore, it is not relevant to a determination as to whether petitioner refused to respond to the school board’s directive to let the board know if he was going to return to his job. However, the FDAB’s order, taken as a whole, indicates that it treated petitioner’s failure to respond to the June 24 letter as simply another instance in which he remained incommunicado. The basic conclusion of the FDAB is that petitioner was clearly on notice that the superintendent was requesting that petitioner indicate whether he intended to return to his [807]*807teaching position so that respondent could complete its staffing needs for the following year, and that petitioner persisted in refusing to let him know. He simply remained silent; his failure to respond to the June 24 letter is but another example. We do not read the order as relying on petitioner’s failure to respond to that letter as material to its decision and see no reason to remand for reconsideration without considering petitioner’s failure to respond to that letter. A reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts is that petitioner decided to take the additional leave he had requested, whether or not respondent approved his request, and that by not so advising respondent he stood a chance of receiving back pay if respondent attempted to terminate his employment.
Petitioner’s second contention, that the FDAB erred by relying on the May 20 telegram, is based on the proposition that the alleged acts of insubordination occurred while petitioner was on an authorized leave of absence, during which he was not under respondent’s control until June 30, 1980. Accordingly, the argument goes, respondent was not entitled to direct petitioner to do anything prior to the termination of his leave. Implicit in this argument is that it is up to the court to define the term “insubordination.”4 Again, we think petitioner misconceives the function of both the FDAB and this court. As we pointed out in Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, supra:
“* * * ORS 342.895 vests in the district school board the authority to dismiss a permanent teacher on the grounds set forth in ORS 342.865. In leaving the grounds for dismissal undefined, the legislature must have intended that the standards be applied at the local level based upon local standards. What may be ‘inadequate performance,’ ORS 342.865(1)(g), in one school district may be adequate in another. So, too, ‘immorality’ and ‘gross unfitness’ [footnote omitted]: what is acceptable in one district may not be in another.
“That delegative authority does not, however, leave the local board with unfettered discretion. FDAB review protects the teacher against arbitrary action, even though its [808]*808authority is limited to determining whether the facts relied upon by the local school board are ‘true and substantiated,’ and, if so, whether such facts justify the conclusion reached by the school board. In other words, the FDAB determines whether the local school board could reasonably conclude that those facts constituted immorality or gross unfitness. It is not the function of the FDAB to decide whether it would have reached the same conclusion based upon that evidence. * * *” 56 Or App at 204-05.
Here, the FDAB found that the facts relied on to support the recommendation to dismiss petitioner were true and were sufficient to support the statutory grounds for dismissal: insubordination and neglect of duty. The findings of fact made by the FDAB are unchallenged and are supported by substantial evidence; we cannot say that FDAB erred as a matter of law in concluding5 that respondent could reasonably conclude that those facts supported the grounds for dismissal of insubordination and neglect of duty even though petitioner was on a leave of absence at the time. We cannot say as a matter of law that it is impermissible for a school district, at the time it is working out its staffing needs,6 to insist that a teacher on leave of absence advise the superintendent whether he intends to return to his job at the end of that leave. Neither can we say as a matter of law that a local school board may not reasonably consider the teacher’s refusal to respond as insubordination or neglect of duty.
Petitioner argues, but does not assign as error, that because respondent’s normal procedure was to send permanent teachers written contracts for the following year, and to give them 14 days to respond, its action in this case was arbitrary. He relies on ORS 342.905(5), which provides in part that the FDAB
“* * * shall consider all reasonable written rules, policies and standards of performance adopted by the school district board unless it finds that such rules, policies [809]*809and standards have been so inconsistently applied as to amount to arbitrariness. * * *” (Petitioner’s emphasis.)
There is no evidence that respondent has had occasion to deal with, or that it has a policy or rule applicable to, the situation where, as here, the permanent teacher is on a leave of absence. There being no policy or rule, there is no evidence of its application. We cannot say that it was arbitrary as a matter of law to treat a permanent teacher on leave of absence in a manner different from one who is not.
Petitioner’s third assignment of error is that the penalty of dismissal is excessive. Under ORS 342.905(5), the board may not reverse a dismissal unless its order sets forth with specificity that “the dismissal was unreasonable, arbitrary or clearly an excessive remedy.” Petitioner does not contend that dismissal here was arbitrary; rather, he contends that, at most, he was guilty of poor judgment, and that does not merit dismissal. He suggests other things which the respondent could have done before any sanction was imposed, all of which would have given petitioner one additional opportunity to advise respondent whether he intended to return to his teaching job in the fall of 1980. No lesser sanction is suggested.
It is not for the FDAB, or for this court, to determine what is the most appropriate remedy, but only whether it was within the authority of respondent to dismiss petitioner on these facts. Assuming that we have the authority to reverse or modify a sanction which the FDAB has affirmed, we cannot say that the FDAB erred as a matter of law in concluding that the dismissal was not unreasonable, arbitrary or clearly excessive.
The FDAB’s order is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not wrong in substance. ORS 183.484(4).
Affirmed.