Keegan Bench, Lindsey Bench, John Doe 1 as legal guardian of L.B., a minor, and John Doe 2 as legal guardian of M.B., a minor v. United States of America

District Court, E.D. Washington·Decided May 1, 2026·No. 2:25-cv-00339·Unknown

Opinion

1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON May 01, 2026 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6

KEEGAN BENCH, LINDSEY BENCH, 7 JOHN DOE 1 as legal guardian of L.B., a Case No. 2:25-cv-00339-ACE minor, and JOHN DOE 2 as legal guardian 8 of M.B., a minor, 9 P (S R T O IP T U E L C A T T IV E E D ) O R R E D : ER Plaintiffs, DISCLOSURE OF NON-PARTIES’ 10 PRIVATE and/or SENSITIVE vs. PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION & PERSONAL INFORMATION 11

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

12 Defendant. 13 Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11) (Privacy Act) and Rule 26(c) of the Federal 14 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court, upon motion of a party and upon good cause 15 shown, “may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from 16 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Id. The Rule permits a court to order that “that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on 17 specified terms and conditions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2). 18 The United States requests this stipulated Protective Order pursuant to 5 19 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11) (Privacy Act) and Rule 26(c) to allow and provide for the 20 disclosure of sensitive personally identifying information (PII) of federal employees and/or other third-party individuals which is contained in certain U.S. Postal Service 21 and/or other federal retained documents, records and databases, and which records 22 1 and materials may be subject to discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), et seq., or other potential applicable discovery mechanisms provided for under the Fed. R. Civ. 2 Pro. The United States also seeks this protective order under Rule 26(c)(1)(B) for the 3 purpose of adequately protecting the disclosure(s) of sensitive PII and/or other 4 personal / personnel information of U.S. Postal Service employees or contractors with 5 the U.S. Postal Service or other non-party individuals, whose PII / confidential / sensitive information is entitled to be protected and kept confidential, and therefore this 6 order is needed to ensure that protection is afforded to these non-parties / third parties 7 under the Privacy Act and Rule 26(c). See Travis v. Fluor Hanford, Inc., 2007 WL 8 1074890, *1 (E.D. WA April 5, 2007); Gautheir v. Hoye, 52 Fed. Appx. 28, 29 (9th 9 Cir. 2002). The law has long recognized that the Courts (federal and state), are 10 authorized to reasonably control - limit how parties get access to certain case-related 11 information and may restrict the use of these judicially compelled disclosures. E.I. 12 DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917) (“It will be understood that if, in the opinion of the trial judge, it is or should become necessary 13 to reveal the secrets to others, it will rest in the judge’s discretion to determine 14 whether, to whom, and under what precautions, the revelation should be made.”); see 15 also 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice 16 and Procedure § 2043, at 566 (2d ed.) (listing examples of protective orders “limiting the persons who are to have access to the information disclosed and the use [they] 17 may put the information”); U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Com. for Freedom of 18 Press, 489 U.S. 749, 769 (1989) (recognizing employees’ privacy interest in keeping 19 personal facts away from public eye). 20 The Ninth Circuit and its District Courts have long recognized significant privacy concerns for third parties who are not named in the case. “Federal Courts 21 ordinarily recognize a constitutionally based right of privacy that can be raised in 22 1 response to discovery requests.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Breed v. United States Dist. Ct. for Northern District, 542 F.2d 1114, 2 1116 (9th Cir. 1976)). This Court has significant discretion in granting a protective 3 order to prevent a third party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue 4 burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Gautheir v. Hoye, 52 Fed. Appx. 28, 29 (9th 5 Cir. 2002). Here, nonparty postal employees and/or contractors may be subject to annoyance and embarrassment if their sensitive PII and/or related personal or personnel 6 information were to be openly or publicly revealed and then widely disseminated. See 7 Travis v. Fluor Hanford, Inc., 2007 WL 1074890, *1 (E.D. WA April 5, 2007) 8 (granting protective order preventing - limiting production of confidential personnel / 9 personal information regarding employees who were not a party to action). The United States (USPS) asserts that absent a protective order, a violation of a 10 non-party’s privacy and/or sensitive personal interests and/or their interests under the 11 Privacy Act, which protects the privacy interests of federal employees and others, 12 could subject the disclosing agency, sub-agency, entity and/or sub-entity to potential civil liability under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g). 13 Since the Privacy Act’s protective interests of third parties’ interest in federal 14 databases is likely to be implicated here and because the subject requested discovery 15 information sought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 is likely to contain PII and/or sensitive 16 personal or personnel records of non-party federal employes or other private individuals, which information may be restricted or prohibited from disclosure under 17 the Privacy Act and/or other privacy statutes, regulations, laws, governmental 18 privileges and/or the court rules, absent a waiver from each individual employee or 19 official. Therefore, without determining the point, the parties stipulate to the resolution 20 of these sensitive personal information issues through the entry of a stipulated Protective Order. 21 22 1 For purposes of this Order, “Protected PII” means nonparties’ addresses, phone numbers, and/or email addresses. The United States requests and Plaintiffs stipulate 2 that the Protected PII may be marked confidential and be restricted and used only for 3 the purposes of this litigation. See e.g., May v. Fedex Freight Southeast, Inc., 2009 WL 4 1605211, *3 (M.D. La June 8, 2009) (rejecting proposed protective order deeming all 5 nonparty personnel documents with PII “confidential”). Accordingly, in the shared interest of expediting the flow of Rule 26 and other discovery material, and to help 6 facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over protected, sensitive, private and/or 7 confidential information – records – ESI, and pursuant to the court's authority under 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26

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Keegan Bench, Lindsey Bench, John Doe 1 as legal guardian of L.B., a minor, and John Doe 2 as legal guardian of M.B., a minor v. United States of America, (E.D. Wash. 2026).

Keegan Bench, Lindsey Bench, John Doe 1 as legal guardian of L.B., a minor, and John Doe 2 as legal guardian of M.B., a minor v. United States of America (Keegan Bench, Lindsey Bench, John Doe 1 as legal guardian of L.B., a minor, and John Doe 2 as legal guardian of M.B., a minor v. United States of America) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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