Kauffman 360639 v. Mohave, County of

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedAugust 30, 2023
Docket3:23-cv-08030
StatusUnknown

This text of Kauffman 360639 v. Mohave, County of (Kauffman 360639 v. Mohave, County of) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kauffman 360639 v. Mohave, County of, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 MDR 2 wo 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Zion Z. Kauffman, No. CV-23-08030-PCT-JAT (JZB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Mohave County, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 Pro se Plaintiff Zion Z. Kauffman was confined in the Mohave County Adult 16 Detention Facility when he filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but 17 he is now confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman (ASPC-Eyman). Pending 18 before the Court are Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 18) and Fourth 19 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 19). The Court will grant the Application 20 to Proceed and will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint with leave to amend. 21 I. Fourth Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 22 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Fourth Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 23 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing 25 fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited 26 to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government 28 agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 1 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 2 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 3 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 4 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 5 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 6 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 7 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 8 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 9 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 10 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 11 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 12 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 13 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 14 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 15 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 16 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 17 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 18 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 19 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 20 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 21 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 22 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 23 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 24 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 25 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 26 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 27 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 28 . . . . 1 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 2 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 3 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 4 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but 5 because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave 6 to amend. 7 III. Second Amended Complaint 8 A second amended complaint supersedes the original and First Amended 9 Complaints. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios 10 v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court 11 treats the original and First Amended Complaints as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. 12 Any cause of action that was raised in the original or First Amended Complaints and that 13 was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without prejudice is waived if it is not alleged 14 in a second amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 15 2012) (en banc). Thus, the Court will consider only those claims raised in the Second 16 Amended Complaint against those Defendants named in the Second Amended Complaint. 17 In his three-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants the 18 Mohave County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), the Mohave County Adult Detention 19 Facility (MCADF), and the Rynning Unit and Special Management Unit 1 (SMU 1) at 20 ASPC-Eyman. He raises claims regarding the exercise of his religion, access to the courts, 21 basic necessities, medical care, property, and fees assessed by Defendant MCADF. 22 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, “all of the stuff [he] need[s],” and the ability to “wash 23 [his] stuff.” 24 IV. Failure to State a Claim 25 A. Defendant MCSO 26 The Mohave County Sheriff’s Office is not a proper defendant because it is a “non- 27 jural entity.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Braillard 28 v. Maricopa County, 232 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)). In Arizona, the 1 responsibility of operating jails and caring for prisoners is placed by law upon the sheriff. 2 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-441(A)(5), 31-101. A sheriff’s office is simply an administrative 3 creation of the county sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties and is not a 4 “person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss 5 Defendant MCSO. 6 B. Defendants MCADF, Rynning Unit, and SMU 1 7 Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person” who violates an individual’s federal 8 rights while acting under color of state law. Congress intended municipalities and other 9 local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies. 10 Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658

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