Katz v. Katz

Supreme Court of Georgia

Katz v. Katz

445 S.E.2d 531, 264 Ga. 440, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 2410, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 612

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedJuly 21, 1994

DocketS94A0859

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 445 S.E.2d 531 (Katz v. Katz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Katz v. Katz, 445 S.E.2d 531, 264 Ga. 440, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 2410, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 612 (Ga. 1994).

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Opinions

Hunt, Chief Justice.

We granted discretionary appeal in this divorce case to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding the provisions of the final judgment pertaining to visitation in the event the mother moves. We find that it did, and reverse and remand.¹

By the terms of the final judgment and decree, Dr. and Mrs. Katz were given joint legal custody of their two minor children, with Mrs. Katz having physical custody. Dr. Katz was given visitation with the children every first and third weekend of the month, such visitation beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Thursday and ending at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, and also visitation on each and every Thursday from 10:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. Because the trial court had been informed that Mrs. Katz might move to New Jersey, it set forth alternative provisions governing the responsibility for the pickup and return of the children. In the event that Mrs. Katz stays in the metropolitan Atlanta area, Dr. Katz or his family members will be responsible for the pickup and return of the children. On the other hand, if Mrs. Katz moves out of the Atlanta area, she would be responsible for delivering the children to and picking them up from Dr. Katz’s residence. Because the children are young, the court made it Mrs. Katz’s obligation to travel with the children; even when the children are old enough to travel alone, Mrs. Katz will still have to travel with them since under the decree the point of delivery and pickup is to be the Atlanta airport. Finally, Mrs. Katz is to bear the cost of transporting herself and the .children to and from Atlanta, with Dr. Katz reimbursing her for 50 percent of the costs of the children’s, but not her, round-trip transportation.

The trial court abused its discretion in placing such burdensome responsibilities on Mrs. Katz should she decide to move from Atlanta. Nothing in the record supports the need for these provisions. They not only present formidable obstacles to and severe restrictions on Mrs. Katz with respect to the expense and inconvenience of frequent travel, the opportunity to move, and the ability to secure and maintain employment, but also subject the children to a rigorous travel [441]*441schedule which is likely to interfere with school and other activities. Accordingly, we reverse and, recognizing that visitation is an integral part of custody, Worley v. Whiddon, 261 Ga. 218, 219 (403 SE2d 799) (1991), remand the case so that the trial court may reconsider the issues of custody and visitation in light of this opinion.

Decided July 21, 1994 — Reconsideration denied August 8, 1994. Jeffrey E. Bogart, Susan A. Hurst, James W. Penland, for appellant. Weinstock & Scavo, Michael Weinstock, John M. Bruce, for appellee.

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, J., who concurs in the judgment only.

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Hunt, Chief Justice.

We granted discretionary appeal in this divorce case to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding the provisions of the final judgment pertaining to visitation in the event the mother moves. We find that it did, and reverse and remand.¹

By the terms of the final judgment and decree, Dr. and Mrs. Katz were given joint legal custody of their two minor children, with Mrs. Katz having physical custody. Dr. Katz was given visitation with the children every first and third weekend of the month, such visitation beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Thursday and ending at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, and also visitation on each and every Thursday from 10:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. Because the trial court had been informed that Mrs. Katz might move to New Jersey, it set forth alternative provisions governing the responsibility for the pickup and return of the children. In the event that Mrs. Katz stays in the metropolitan Atlanta area, Dr. Katz or his family members will be responsible for the pickup and return of the children. On the other hand, if Mrs. Katz moves out of the Atlanta area, she would be responsible for delivering the children to and picking them up from Dr. Katz’s residence. Because the children are young, the court made it Mrs. Katz’s obligation to travel with the children; even when the children are old enough to travel alone, Mrs. Katz will still have to travel with them since under the decree the point of delivery and pickup is to be the Atlanta airport. Finally, Mrs. Katz is to bear the cost of transporting herself and the .children to and from Atlanta, with Dr. Katz reimbursing her for 50 percent of the costs of the children’s, but not her, round-trip transportation.

The trial court abused its discretion in placing such burdensome responsibilities on Mrs. Katz should she decide to move from Atlanta. Nothing in the record supports the need for these provisions. They not only present formidable obstacles to and severe restrictions on Mrs. Katz with respect to the expense and inconvenience of frequent travel, the opportunity to move, and the ability to secure and maintain employment, but also subject the children to a rigorous travel [441]*441schedule which is likely to interfere with school and other activities. Accordingly, we reverse and, recognizing that visitation is an integral part of custody, Worley v. Whiddon, 261 Ga. 218, 219 (403 SE2d 799) (1991), remand the case so that the trial court may reconsider the issues of custody and visitation in light of this opinion.

Decided July 21, 1994 — Reconsideration denied August 8, 1994. Jeffrey E. Bogart, Susan A. Hurst, James W. Penland, for appellant. Weinstock & Scavo, Michael Weinstock, John M. Bruce, for appellee.

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, J., who concurs in the judgment only.

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Bluebook (online)

445 S.E.2d 531, 264 Ga. 440, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 2410, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 612, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/katz-v-katz-ga-1994.

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