Katherine Birl v. Ski Shawnee Inc

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: January 2, 2026
• Docket: 25-1070
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 25-1070 _____________

KATHERINE BIRL, AS PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF G.B., A MINOR AND IN HER OWN RIGHT; DAMIAN BIRL, AS PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF G.B., A MINOR AND IN HIS OWN RIGHT, Appellants

v.

SKI SHAWNEE, INC. _____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (No. 3:22-cv-01598) Magistrate Judge: Hon. Daryl F. Bloom

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on November 10, 2025.

Before: RESTREPO, McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: January 2, 2026) _________

OPINION* _________

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. Appellants, the parents and natural guardians of G.B., appeal the District Court’s

order granting summary judgment to Ski Shawnee, concerning injuries suffered by their

minor son. We will affirm.

I.1

Following injuries sustained while snowboarding, Appellants sued Ski Shawnee,

who moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claim was barred under the

Pennsylvania Skier Responsibility Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102(c) (“PSRA”).2 The

District Court granted the motion, finding that the risks involved in Appellants’ claim were

inherent to the sport of snowboarding and thus barred by the PSRA.3 This appeal followed.

II.4

We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.

Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir.), amended, 979 F.3d 192 (3d Cir.

2020) (citation modified). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. We must view the facts and evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). A dispute is genuine if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

1 As we write for the benefit of the parties, who are familiar with the background of this case, we set out only the facts and procedural history necessary for the discussion that follows. 2 JA59 3 JA14–16; Appellee Br. 5. 4 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 party.” Id. at 248. The “mere existence” of some alleged doubt as to the material facts will

not overcome summary judgment. Id. at 247–48. Because this action is based on diversity

jurisdiction, we apply Pennsylvania law. See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154,

158 (3d Cir. 2000) (“A federal court sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law

and federal procedural law.”).

The District Court did not err in finding that the PSRA barred the Appellants’ claim.

The enactment of the PSRA preserved the assumption of risk defense for suits that arise

from a skiing injury. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7102(c). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

determined that under the PSRA, a ski resort has no duty to protect skiers from risks that

are “inherent” to the sport of downhill skiing. Hughes v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 762

A.2d 339, 344 (Pa. 2000) (finding that being struck by another skier was an inherent risk

to the sport of downhill skiing). Inherent risks are “common, frequent, and expected.”

Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1186 (Pa. 2010) (holding that falling

from a ski lift was an inherent risk). To determine whether the PSRA bars a claim, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court developed a two-part test. Hughes, 762 A.2d at 344. We

must determine if (1) the plaintiff was engaged in the sport of downhill skiing, and (2) the

injury arose from an inherent risk to the sport of skiing. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court has suggested that the “no-duty” rule would not include risks that are “foreseeably

dangerous conditions not inherent” to the activity. Id. at 343–44 (quoting Jones v. Three

Rivers Mgmt. Corp., 394 A.2d 546, 551 (Pa. 1978)).

3 As to the first part of the test, the parties agree that because G.B. was snowboarding,

he was engaged in the sport of downhill skiing.5 We now proceed to the second part:

whether the injury was a result of an inherent risk to the sport of downhill skiing.

Appellants argue that if a ski resort deviates from established industry standards

when designing a jump, the defective design is not an inherent risk to the sport of skiing.6

They allege that Ski Shawnee deviated from established industry standards by failing to

consult with the National Ski Area Association (“NSAA”) Freestyle Terrain Resource

Guide (“Guide”) when designing their terrain park.7 The Guide recommends that terrain

park jumps include ample run-out space to “allow[] users opportunity to regain composure

and balance after utilizing the feature.”8 However, Appellants’ argument cannot overcome

our decision in Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2008).

The circumstances present in this case and Bjorgung are decidedly similar. In

Bjorgung, the plaintiff argued that the “dangerous conditions of the race course rendered

the risks faced by [him] ‘not inherent’ in the sport of skiing.” Bjorgung, 550 F.3d at 269

(citation modified). In that case, the plaintiff asserted several conditions that were not

inherent risks: “lack of safety netting; course plotting that directed skiers toward the left

5 Appellee Br. 20. 6 Appellant Br. 30. The Plaintiffs rely on Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., 394 A.2d 546, 551 (Pa. 1978). Jones involved a baseball spectator’s injury and did not concern the PSRA. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed Jones while developing the doctrine of “inherent risk” under the PSRA and stated, “Jones could proceed with her case because the injury she suffered from the batted ball in an interior concourse was not an inherent feature of the spectator sport of baseball but, instead, resulted from the particular architectural design of the facility.” Hughes, 762 A.2d at 344. 7 Appellant Br. 35–36. 8 JA281. 4 side of the trail; [and] improper placement of a course gate.” Id. In Bjorgung, we

concluded that a ski resort had no duty to “fix a race course in a way that minimizes the

potential for the competitors to lose control.” Id. Here, Appellants also argue that the

design of a jump directed G.B. off-trail and “caused [him] to lose control. . . and violently

crash.”9 But according to Bjorgung, a ski resort has no duty to place a jump “in a way that

minimizes the potential for [snowboarders] to lose control.” Bjorgung, 550 F.3d at 269.

Because the risk was inherent to the activity, the District Court did not err in concluding

that the PSRA barred Appellants’ claim. See Hughes, 762 A.2d at 344–45.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s order.

9 Appellant Br. 32. 5