F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 1 1997 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
USHA KATARIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-5050 (D.C. No. 95-CV-730) JOHN J. CALLAHAN, Acting (N.D. Okla.) Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), John J. Callahan, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, as the defendant in this action. ** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Claimant Usha Kataria appeals from an order of the district court affirming
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application
for supplemental security income benefits. We review the Commissioner's
decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether
the correct legal standards were applied. See Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d
1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). The Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is
adequate relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion, see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
In her application for benefits filed in March 1993, claimant contended that
she was disabled due to a variety of ailments including bone spurs in her heels,
goiter, hypertension and ulcer disease. Subsequently she was diagnosed as having
diabetes. Relying on the opinion of a medical expert who had reviewed
claimant’s medical records, the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the
goiter, hypertension, ulcer disease and diabetes were adequately controlled
through medication and thus were not severe impairments. He found her bone
spurs to be severe impairments, but also found they did not prevent her from
performing the full range of sedentary work. Because claimant had no past
relevant work, the case proceeded to step five of the five-part sequential process
for determining disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Relying on the Medical-
-2- Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, the ALJ determined
that claimant was not disabled and denied her application for benefits. The
Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s determination the final
decision of the Commissioner.
On appeal, claimant contends that the ALJ’s finding that her goiter,
hypertension, ulcer disease, and diabetes were not severe impairments because
they were well controlled with medication is not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ failed to consider the fact that claimant could not
afford and therefore was not taking the medication necessary to control these
ailments. She further contends that because this case reached step five, the
burden was on the Commissioner to show that the impairments were adequately
controlled.
Ordinarily, a claimant cannot be found disabled when her impairment can
be controlled through medical treatment and she unjustifiably refuses to undergo
that treatment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.930; Teter v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1107
(10th Cir. 1985). Claimant does not question the ALJ’s conclusion that her
impairments can be readily controlled through use of prescribed medications. She
contends instead that (1) she did not take the medications, and (2) the reason she
did not take them was because she could not afford them, which may be a
justifiable excuse, see id.
-3- There is evidence in the record that claimant was at least delayed in
obtaining, and maybe never did obtain, certain medical procedures, such as X-rays
and a thyroid scan that apparently were not available from free clinics. However,
there is no medical evidence that she could not or did not obtain prescribed
medications or that her condition deteriorated or was not controlled because of a
failure to take prescribed medications. It is clear that at least until October 1993,
nine months prior to her hearing before the ALJ, she was taking her prescribed
medications. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 129 (claimant’s statement listing
medications she was then taking, including zantac for her ulcer,
hyydrochlorathizide for hypertension, and synthroid for her goiter). She
apparently obtained these medications from the Morton Clinic, which claimant
describes as a clinic for the homeless that apparently provides, at no cost,
medications and certain medical services. See, e.g, Appellant’s Br. at 4-5
(describing numerous doctor visits to Morton and Neighbor for Neighbor clinics
and noting that “Ms. Kataria returned each month [to the Morton Clinic] for her
medication”).
There is some evidence indicating that at some point claimant may have
been unable to obtain her medications and was not taking them. At her hearing
before the ALJ on July 1, 1994, claimant stated that the doctor had given her
medicine for her thyroid problem, but that it did not help much. Appellant’s App.
-4- Vol. II at 40. Later, in response to a question from her representative concerning
why she needed benefits, she stated:
I don’t have money to pay the bills. I don’t have any doctor. My sickness, my disease, this thyroid problem, knee pain, I just need some medicine, some medication, some treatment. I can not go to any doctor, they always refuse to do my treatment.
Id. at 56-57. There were no followup questions or other discussion at the hearing
concerning claimant’s failure to take and/or inability to obtain her prescribed
medications. The only other indication in the record that she might not be taking
her medications is a January 1995 notation in the records from the Neighbor for
Neighbor Clinic, where claimant went for treatment for her diabetes, stating that
the University of Oklahoma Adult Medicine Clinic “turned pt over to collections--
so pt. discontinued treatment & has not been going any where for care since
then.” Id. at 236. However, claimant apparently obtained medication for her
diabetes from the Neighbor for Neighbor Clinic “to last until Morton appt.” Id. at
235.
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 1 1997 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
USHA KATARIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-5050 (D.C. No. 95-CV-730) JOHN J. CALLAHAN, Acting (N.D. Okla.) Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), John J. Callahan, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, as the defendant in this action. ** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Claimant Usha Kataria appeals from an order of the district court affirming
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application
for supplemental security income benefits. We review the Commissioner's
decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether
the correct legal standards were applied. See Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d
1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). The Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is
adequate relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion, see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
In her application for benefits filed in March 1993, claimant contended that
she was disabled due to a variety of ailments including bone spurs in her heels,
goiter, hypertension and ulcer disease. Subsequently she was diagnosed as having
diabetes. Relying on the opinion of a medical expert who had reviewed
claimant’s medical records, the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the
goiter, hypertension, ulcer disease and diabetes were adequately controlled
through medication and thus were not severe impairments. He found her bone
spurs to be severe impairments, but also found they did not prevent her from
performing the full range of sedentary work. Because claimant had no past
relevant work, the case proceeded to step five of the five-part sequential process
for determining disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Relying on the Medical-
-2- Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, the ALJ determined
that claimant was not disabled and denied her application for benefits. The
Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s determination the final
decision of the Commissioner.
On appeal, claimant contends that the ALJ’s finding that her goiter,
hypertension, ulcer disease, and diabetes were not severe impairments because
they were well controlled with medication is not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ failed to consider the fact that claimant could not
afford and therefore was not taking the medication necessary to control these
ailments. She further contends that because this case reached step five, the
burden was on the Commissioner to show that the impairments were adequately
controlled.
Ordinarily, a claimant cannot be found disabled when her impairment can
be controlled through medical treatment and she unjustifiably refuses to undergo
that treatment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.930; Teter v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1107
(10th Cir. 1985). Claimant does not question the ALJ’s conclusion that her
impairments can be readily controlled through use of prescribed medications. She
contends instead that (1) she did not take the medications, and (2) the reason she
did not take them was because she could not afford them, which may be a
justifiable excuse, see id.
-3- There is evidence in the record that claimant was at least delayed in
obtaining, and maybe never did obtain, certain medical procedures, such as X-rays
and a thyroid scan that apparently were not available from free clinics. However,
there is no medical evidence that she could not or did not obtain prescribed
medications or that her condition deteriorated or was not controlled because of a
failure to take prescribed medications. It is clear that at least until October 1993,
nine months prior to her hearing before the ALJ, she was taking her prescribed
medications. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 129 (claimant’s statement listing
medications she was then taking, including zantac for her ulcer,
hyydrochlorathizide for hypertension, and synthroid for her goiter). She
apparently obtained these medications from the Morton Clinic, which claimant
describes as a clinic for the homeless that apparently provides, at no cost,
medications and certain medical services. See, e.g, Appellant’s Br. at 4-5
(describing numerous doctor visits to Morton and Neighbor for Neighbor clinics
and noting that “Ms. Kataria returned each month [to the Morton Clinic] for her
medication”).
There is some evidence indicating that at some point claimant may have
been unable to obtain her medications and was not taking them. At her hearing
before the ALJ on July 1, 1994, claimant stated that the doctor had given her
medicine for her thyroid problem, but that it did not help much. Appellant’s App.
-4- Vol. II at 40. Later, in response to a question from her representative concerning
why she needed benefits, she stated:
I don’t have money to pay the bills. I don’t have any doctor. My sickness, my disease, this thyroid problem, knee pain, I just need some medicine, some medication, some treatment. I can not go to any doctor, they always refuse to do my treatment.
Id. at 56-57. There were no followup questions or other discussion at the hearing
concerning claimant’s failure to take and/or inability to obtain her prescribed
medications. The only other indication in the record that she might not be taking
her medications is a January 1995 notation in the records from the Neighbor for
Neighbor Clinic, where claimant went for treatment for her diabetes, stating that
the University of Oklahoma Adult Medicine Clinic “turned pt over to collections--
so pt. discontinued treatment & has not been going any where for care since
then.” Id. at 236. However, claimant apparently obtained medication for her
diabetes from the Neighbor for Neighbor Clinic “to last until Morton appt.” Id. at
235.
The ALJ found that
[t]he claimant has medically-determinable impairments of hypothyroidism and goiter, hypertension, ulcer disease, and diabetes, but the medical evidence shows that these conditions are well controlled with medication. The Administrative Law Judge finds that these impairments are not severe and would no more than minimally affect her ability to engage in substantial gainful activity.
-5- Id. at 14. The ALJ did not address whether claimant was continuing to take her
medications, nor whether she failed to take them because she could not afford
them.
The evidence is at best inconclusive whether claimant in fact failed to take
her prescribed medications, and whether if she did not take them, it was because
she could not afford them, particularly in light of their apparent availability from
free clinics. We disagree with claimant’s contention that the absence of evidence
from October 1993 to January 1995 showing that she did take her medications
necessarily means that she did not take them, that the reason she did not take them
was because of her poverty, or even that she continued to experience symptoms.
Moreover, her contention that the lack of treatment for her thyroid disorder
caused her diabetes is not supported by any medical evidence. We conclude that
the ALJ did not commit reversible error in finding that claimant’s goiter,
hypertension, ulcer disease and diabetes were well controlled by medications.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge
-6-