NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
Nos. 26-1219 & 26-1220 (consolidated) __________
KASON JAMISON, Appellant
v.
CHRISLYN MORGAN; MICHELLE PERRY-THOMPSON ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-16298) District Judge: Honorable Edward S. Kiel ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 7, 2026 Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 23, 2026) ___________
OPINION * ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se Appellant Kason Jamison appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and its denial of his motion to extend the time
to file a notice of appeal. We will affirm the District Court’s judgments.
I.
Jamison initiated a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against New Jersey Superior Court
Judge Michelle Perry-Thompson, in her individual and official capacities, and his child’s
mother. Jamison alleged that the defendants and other government actors violated his
constitutional rights during child support and custody proceedings in New Jersey state
court. 1 Jamison sought damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
The District Court granted Jamison leave to proceed in forma pauperis for the
purpose of screening his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The District
Court emphasized that Jamison had previously sought to challenge his child support
obligations in three other District Court matters. It explained that, to the extent Jamison
challenged ongoing state proceedings, Younger abstention was appropriate, and that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review already-entered state court orders pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The District Court dismissed the complaint and determined
that an amendment would be futile.
1 Jamison’s complaint also purported to raise state law claims. But he did not sufficiently raise any argument regarding the dismissal of those claims in his appellate brief. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that claims not developed in the opening brief are forfeited). 2 Jamison filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, which we construed as a timely
notice of appeal. Jamison also moved in the District Court for an extension of time to file
a notice of appeal. The District Court denied Jamison’s motion for an extension of time,
and Jamison appealed that decision. We subsequently consolidated the two appeals. 2
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
dismissal order de novo. See In re Adams, 151 F.4th 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2025)
(Rooker-Feldman); Borowski v. Kean Univ., 68 F.4th 844, 846 (3d Cir. 2023) (Younger).
We may affirm the judgment on any basis supported by the record. See Murray v.
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Jamison primarily argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his entire case
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines. Although much of
Jamison’s complaint amounts to challenges to the validity of state court decisions,
Jamison now claims that he does not seek review or reversal of any state court decision,
but rather he seeks to remedy the constitutional violations that have occurred during the
state proceedings. Particularly, he wants to proceed further in the District Court on his
allegations that state actors “repeatedly refused to enforce a valid state court order
granting him the right to obtain a passport.” But Jamison’s complaint cannot survive
2 Jamison’s appellate brief does not challenge the District Court’s denial of his motion for an extension of time to appeal. See Wettach, 811 F.3d at 115. In any event, an extension of time was unnecessary because we treated Jamison’s mandamus petition as a timely notice of appeal. 3 dismissal because, even assuming his claim about the passport is the sort of
“independent” claim not barred by Rooker-Feldman, see Great W. Mining & Mineral Co.
v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167–69 (3d Cir. 2010), the complaint is plainly
defective on the merits. 3
First, Jamison could not bring any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his
child’s mother, who is a private actor. See Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d
165, 169–71 (3d Cir. 2004). Jamison offered no facts, either in his complaint or in his
appellate brief, plausibly suggesting that his child’s mother acted under color of state law.
Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 195–96 (2024).
Second, Jamison was not entitled to any relief against Judge Perry-Thompson in
her individual capacity. Jamison’s constitutional claims against Judge Perry-Thompson
stem from her conduct during a hearing on Jamison’s child support challenges.
According to Jamison, Judge Perry-Thompson denied his request to attend the hearing
remotely, declined to adjudicate several issues he raised, including those pertaining to his
passport, attacked his credibility, and mischaracterized his filings. Judicial immunity
barred Jamison’s claims for damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991)
(per curiam). Jamison offered no factual allegations that could show that Judge
3 “[W]e may assume hypothetical statutory jurisdiction in order to resolve this appeal on the merits because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not implicate Article III jurisdiction.” Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Jordon v. Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 325 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998), requires us to answer only Article III jurisdiction questions before reaching other questions). 4 Perry-Thompson engaged in nonjudicial acts or acted “in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Id. Jamison’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief were also
unavailing. See Allen v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
Nos. 26-1219 & 26-1220 (consolidated) __________
KASON JAMISON, Appellant
v.
CHRISLYN MORGAN; MICHELLE PERRY-THOMPSON ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-16298) District Judge: Honorable Edward S. Kiel ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) July 7, 2026 Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 23, 2026) ___________
OPINION * ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se Appellant Kason Jamison appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and its denial of his motion to extend the time
to file a notice of appeal. We will affirm the District Court’s judgments.
I.
Jamison initiated a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against New Jersey Superior Court
Judge Michelle Perry-Thompson, in her individual and official capacities, and his child’s
mother. Jamison alleged that the defendants and other government actors violated his
constitutional rights during child support and custody proceedings in New Jersey state
court. 1 Jamison sought damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
The District Court granted Jamison leave to proceed in forma pauperis for the
purpose of screening his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The District
Court emphasized that Jamison had previously sought to challenge his child support
obligations in three other District Court matters. It explained that, to the extent Jamison
challenged ongoing state proceedings, Younger abstention was appropriate, and that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review already-entered state court orders pursuant to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The District Court dismissed the complaint and determined
that an amendment would be futile.
1 Jamison’s complaint also purported to raise state law claims. But he did not sufficiently raise any argument regarding the dismissal of those claims in his appellate brief. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that claims not developed in the opening brief are forfeited). 2 Jamison filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, which we construed as a timely
notice of appeal. Jamison also moved in the District Court for an extension of time to file
a notice of appeal. The District Court denied Jamison’s motion for an extension of time,
and Jamison appealed that decision. We subsequently consolidated the two appeals. 2
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
dismissal order de novo. See In re Adams, 151 F.4th 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2025)
(Rooker-Feldman); Borowski v. Kean Univ., 68 F.4th 844, 846 (3d Cir. 2023) (Younger).
We may affirm the judgment on any basis supported by the record. See Murray v.
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Jamison primarily argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his entire case
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines. Although much of
Jamison’s complaint amounts to challenges to the validity of state court decisions,
Jamison now claims that he does not seek review or reversal of any state court decision,
but rather he seeks to remedy the constitutional violations that have occurred during the
state proceedings. Particularly, he wants to proceed further in the District Court on his
allegations that state actors “repeatedly refused to enforce a valid state court order
granting him the right to obtain a passport.” But Jamison’s complaint cannot survive
2 Jamison’s appellate brief does not challenge the District Court’s denial of his motion for an extension of time to appeal. See Wettach, 811 F.3d at 115. In any event, an extension of time was unnecessary because we treated Jamison’s mandamus petition as a timely notice of appeal. 3 dismissal because, even assuming his claim about the passport is the sort of
“independent” claim not barred by Rooker-Feldman, see Great W. Mining & Mineral Co.
v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167–69 (3d Cir. 2010), the complaint is plainly
defective on the merits. 3
First, Jamison could not bring any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against his
child’s mother, who is a private actor. See Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d
165, 169–71 (3d Cir. 2004). Jamison offered no facts, either in his complaint or in his
appellate brief, plausibly suggesting that his child’s mother acted under color of state law.
Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 195–96 (2024).
Second, Jamison was not entitled to any relief against Judge Perry-Thompson in
her individual capacity. Jamison’s constitutional claims against Judge Perry-Thompson
stem from her conduct during a hearing on Jamison’s child support challenges.
According to Jamison, Judge Perry-Thompson denied his request to attend the hearing
remotely, declined to adjudicate several issues he raised, including those pertaining to his
passport, attacked his credibility, and mischaracterized his filings. Judicial immunity
barred Jamison’s claims for damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991)
(per curiam). Jamison offered no factual allegations that could show that Judge
3 “[W]e may assume hypothetical statutory jurisdiction in order to resolve this appeal on the merits because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not implicate Article III jurisdiction.” Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Jordon v. Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 325 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998), requires us to answer only Article III jurisdiction questions before reaching other questions). 4 Perry-Thompson engaged in nonjudicial acts or acted “in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Id. Jamison’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief were also
unavailing. See Allen v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433, 439–42 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining the
impropriety of declaratory or injunctive relief in a § 1983 suit against a judge where the
judge acts in an adjudicatory capacity).
Third, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the District Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over Jamison’s damage claims against Judge Perry-Thompson in her
official capacity. See Benn v. First Jud. Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 238–39 (3d Cir.
2005); Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 2001). Sovereign immunity
also barred Jamison’s requests for declarations that Judge Perry-Thompson acted
unlawfully because Jamison did not seek relief that could “be properly characterized as
prospective.” See Merritts v. Richards, 62 F.4th 764, 771 (3d Cir. 2023); see also Collins
v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1316 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (explaining that the
Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity “may not be used to obtain a
declaration that a state officer has violated a plaintiff’s federal rights in the past”). To the
extent that Jamison sought an injunction to cure past injuries based on Judge
Perry-Thompson’s decisions, sovereign immunity barred Jamison’s claims, see Merritts,
62 F.4th at 772, and to the extent that Jamison sought to enjoin future child support
enforcement and custody proceedings, the Anti-Injunction Act barred Jamison’s claims,
see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Prac. Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 364 (3d Cir. 2001).
Thus, the District Court’s dismissal of Jamison’s complaint was appropriate.
5 But because a dismissal based on sovereign immunity should be without prejudice,
we modify the District Court’s judgment to reflect that the constitutional claims for
damages and retrospective declaratory and injunctive relief against Judge
Perry-Thompson in her official capacity are dismissed without prejudice. See Merritts, 62
F.4th at 772.
III.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgments as modified.