Kasali v. Kobayashi

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 25, 2023
Docket4:22-cv-01078
StatusUnknown

This text of Kasali v. Kobayashi (Kasali v. Kobayashi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kasali v. Kobayashi, (S.D. Tex. 2023).

Opinion

Southern District of Texas ENTERED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT January 25, 2023 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS □□□ HOUSTON DIVISION LOLA SHALEWA BARBARA § KASALI, BOP #18011-579, § § Petitioner, § § V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-22-1078 § HIROMICHI KOBAYASHI, § § Respondent. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Petitioner, a federal prisoner incarcerated at FDC Houston at the time of filing, filed this pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, and served petitioner a copy at her current location at FCI Aliceville on October 4, 2022.' (Docket Entries No. 9, 18.) Petitioner did not respond to the motion or seek an extension of time to respond. Nevertheless, petitioner filed a motion seeking appointment of counsel or transfer to a different facility on December 12, 2021. (Docket Entry No. 21.) The Court denied the motion. While not a timely or designated response to respondent’s motion, petitioner’s motion sets forth some allegations and arguments regarding the merits of her habeas claims. In the interest of justice, the Court has reviewed her motion in light of respondent’s motion.

'Petitioner states that she arrived at FCI Aliceville on September 29, 2022. (Docket Entry No. 21, p. 1.) The Court received her notice of change of address on December 2, 2022. (Docket Entry No. 19.) Petitioner acknowledges that she received respondent’s motion. (Docket Entry No. 21, pp. 1-2.)

Having considered respondent’s motion, the pleadings, petitioner’s motion for counsel, matters of public court record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment and DISMISSES this lawsuit for the

reasons shown below. I. BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS A jury found petitioner guilty of two counts of false statements to a financial institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, and two counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, arising from her fraudulent applications for federal relief money during the COVID-19 pandemic. She was sentenced on April 8, 2022, to 70 months in prison, followed by a five-year term of supervised release. She was initially sent to Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) FDC Houston, and is currently housed at FCI Aliceville in Aliceville, Alabama. In this habeas petition, petitioner challenges five BOP disciplinary convictions and, in a separate claim, contends she was arrested in her criminal prosecution without probable cause and denied a preliminary hearing. Petitioner also raises civil claims regarding her housing and conditions of confinement. Il. LEGAL STANDARDS A. — ERCP 12(b)(6) Defendants seek dismissal of petitioner’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6) for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief.

Motions to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim are appropriate where the defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a cognizable claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim where it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Grisham v. United States, 103 F.3d 24, 25-26 (Sth Cir. 1997). Such dismissal is also appropriate where the plaintiffs allegations are conclusory or where the complaint shows that relief is barred by an affirmative defense. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (Sth Cir. 1982). B. FRCP 56 Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As a procedural vehicle for disposing of deficient claims, summary Judgment is not a “disfavored procedural shortcut,” but rather represents an important procedure “designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). To show there is no genuine dispute as to facts, the movant must cite specific parts of the summary judgment materials, or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). When the movant has carried its

burden under FRCP 56(a), the nonmovant must demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact and not merely allege that there is a factual dispute. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The nonmovant must also articulate the precise manner in which the evidence sets forth or supports his claims. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (Sth Cir. 1994). If the nonmovant seeks denial of summary judgment on factual grounds, the nonmovant must “‘cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record. . .” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). II. ANALYSIS A. Proper Respondent The proper respondent to a section 2241 habeas petition is the warden of the facility where the petitioner is being held. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004). Hiromichi Kobayashi is Warden of FDC Houston where petitioner was housed at the time of filing the instant suit, and is the proper respondent. Accordingly, the other respondents named by petitioner - Michael Carvajal, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the United States Attorney, and the U.S. Marshals Service — are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. B. Conditions of Confinement Claims Petitioner complains that she was housed by BOP officials in a special housing unit at FDC Houston for a prolonged period of time without justification and in retaliation for her complaints against prison staff. She contends that, because of her housing, she was unable

to ask other inmates for help with her litigation. She further complains of unsafe conditions of confinement while housed in pretrial custody. In determining when a prisoner may bring a claim via habeas, as opposed to filing a civil rights lawsuit, the instructive principle is that “challenges to the fact or duration of confinement are properly brought under habeas, while challenges to the conditions of confinement are properly brought [as civil rights actions.” Poree v. Collins, 866 F.3d 235, 243 (Sth Cir. 2017).

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Related

Forsyth v. Barr
19 F.3d 1527 (Fifth Circuit, 1994)
Brady Hicks, Jr. v. Tarrant County Texas
372 F. App'x 557 (Fifth Circuit, 2010)
Conley v. Gibson
355 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1957)
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.
459 U.S. 56 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Rumsfeld v. Padilla
542 U.S. 426 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Scott v. Harris
550 U.S. 372 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Carlos Poree v. Kandy Collins
866 F.3d 235 (Fifth Circuit, 2017)

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Kasali v. Kobayashi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kasali-v-kobayashi-txsd-2023.