WIGGINS, J.
*1187*674¶1 Far from the lawyers of old, who toiled "alone in a solitary office ... unhallowed by humanizing domestic associations,"1 today's attorneys often work together *675with lawyers and nonlawyers alike, for clients ranging from nonprofits and government agencies to massive, multijurisdictional corporations. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Model Rule 5.7 and Lawyers in Government Jobs-How Can They Ever Be "Non-Lawyers"?, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 47 (2017) ("An increasing number of law graduates with licenses to practice are not engaged in traditional legal jobs."); Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties within Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV . 1245, 1262 (2009) (in-house attorneys have "administrative, managerial, and compliance responsibilities that are outside the direct scope of their legal roles"); Grace M. Giesel, The Ethics or Employment Dilemma of In-House Counsel, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535, 544 (1992) (explaining that in-house counsel are considered "an essential component of the management team" by corporations and that these "attorneys affect the full range of corporate decisions"). The evolution in legal practice has uniquely affected the in-house attorney employee and generated unique legal and ethical questions unlike anything contemplated by our Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs).
¶2 The case before us today presents just such a question: we must decide whether modern in-house employee attorneys should be treated differently from traditional private practice lawyers under our RPCs. We conclude that they should.
¶3 Solely in the narrow context of in-house employee attorneys, contract and wrongful discharge suits are available, provided these suits can be brought without violence to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. Accordingly, we hold that Jared Karstetter alleged legally cognizable claims and pleaded sufficient facts to overcome a CR 12(b)(6) motion of dismissal. We reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling dismissing Karstetter's claims and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
*676Facts and Procedural History
¶4 Karstetter worked for labor organizations representing King County corrections officers for over 20 years. In 1987, Karstetter began working directly for the King County Corrections Officers Guild (Guild). Throughout his employment with the Guild, Karstetter operated under successive 5-year contracts that provided for just cause termination. This termination clause states,
Consistent with the rights and expectations of the members that the GUILD represents ATTORNEY may be terminated for just cause. The definition of Just Cause shall be the same definition that is currently contained in the Collective Bargaining Agreement for GUILD members. In the event that the GUILD wishes to exercise this provision, due notice shall be provided to ATTORNEY and an opportunity to correct any behavior that GUILD deems inappropriate. ATTORNEY shall be afforded fundamental due process and an opportunity to answer to any and all *1188charges. Termination of this Agreement shall be reserved as a final option.
CP at 13 (employment contract).2
¶5 Eventually, Karstetter formed his own law firm and worked primarily for the Guild. He offered services to at least one other client. His employment contracts remained substantially the same. Karstetter's wife also worked for the Guild as Karstetter's office assistant.
¶6 In 2016, the King County ombudsman's office contacted Karstetter regarding a whistle-blower complaint concerning parking reimbursements to Guild members. The Guild's vice-president directed Karstetter to cooperate with the investigation. The Guild sought advice from an outside *677law firm, which advised the Guild to immediately terminate Karstetter. In April 2016, the Guild took this advice and, without providing the remedial options listed in his contract, fired Karstetter.
¶7 In response, Karstetter and his wife filed suit against the Guild, alleging, among other things, breach of contract and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The Guild moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim. The trial court partially granted the motion but allowed Karstetter's claims for breach of contract and wrongful termination to proceed. On interlocutory review, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, directing the trial court to dismiss Karstetter's remaining breach of contract and wrongful termination claims. Karstetter v. King County Corr. Guild, 1 Wash. App. 2d 822, 407 P.3d 384 (2017). Karstetter sought review here, which we granted.
Analysis
¶8 The Guild argues that Karstetter's breach of contract and wrongful discharge claims are precluded by our ethical rules and should have been dismissed. Dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is warranted only if we conclude that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts justifying recovery. Kinney v. Cook, 159 Wash.2d 837, 842, 154 P.3d 206 (2007) (quoting Tenore v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 136 Wash.2d 322, 330, 962 P.2d 104 (1998) ). All facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, and we may consider hypothetical facts supporting the plaintiff's claim. Id. Whether Karstetter has alleged legally cognizable claims is a question of law that we review de novo. Hoffer v. State, 110 Wash.2d 415, 420, 755 P.2d 781 (1988), adhered to on recons., 113 Wash.2d 148, 776 P.2d 963 (1989).
1. RPC 1.16 does not necessarily prohibit in-house attorney employment claims
¶9 RPC 1.16(a)(3) states that "a lawyer shall not represent a client ... if ... the lawyer is discharged." This *678rule robustly protects a client's right to terminate an attorney at any time, for any reason. RPC 1.16 cmt. 4; Belli v. Shaw, 98 Wash.2d 569, 577, 657 P.2d 315 (1983). Clients must trust their lawyers. When a client loses confidence in his or her attorney, the trust relationship is fractured, and a client must be allowed to discharge that attorney in order to engage another, better-suited advocate. In this traditional attorney-client relationship, RPC 1.16 would almost certainly prohibit a lawyer from bringing employment claims against a client. But such an interpretation of RPC 1.16 is neither required nor reasonable in the nontraditional circumstances of in-house attorney employees.
¶10 The Guild asserts that to protect individual clients and the public generally, RPC 1.16 applies to all attorneys without exception. But in and of itself, RPC 1.16 does not stand for this proposition. The rule simply states that clients may discharge their attorneys. RPC 1.16(a)(3). The rule specifies no reasons or requirements a client must meet to discharge an attorney-termination is allowed "at any time, with or without cause." RPC 1.16 cmt. 4. Importantly, however, RPC 1.16 does not recognize, let alone discuss, the nontraditional circumstances surrounding in-house *1189attorneys and whether the rule does or should apply in that context. We have not "set out any all-encompassing rule for how violation of any RPC in connection with a contract might affect that contract's enforceability." LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC, 181 Wash.2d 48, 89, 331 P.3d 1147 (2014). Nor have we interpreted our ethical rules as providing absolute insulation from attorney-client litigation. See Kimball v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Douglas County, 64 Wash.2d 252, 258, 391 P.2d 205 (1964) (discharged counsel may seek recovery for unjust enrichment).3 Indeed, *679our professional rules themselves "do not apply uniformly to all lawyers." Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 193 Wash. App. 818, 839, 374 P.3d 193 (2016) (citing RPC 1.11 (concerning only government lawyers)). RPC 1.16 does not expressly prohibit Karstetter's claims.
2. In-house attorneys face unique employment expectations and should not always be treated the same as private practice lawyers under the RPCs
¶11 The unique employment status of and demands on in-house attorneys counsel against a rigid interpretation of RPC 1.16. Today's legal employees operate differently from private sector attorneys. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 4th 1164, 1171-73, 876 P.2d 487, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1994). Economic success for in-house attorneys, unlike a law firm partner, "is tied directly to a single employer, at whose sufferance they serve." Id. at 1172, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 876 P.2d 487 ; Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int'I, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 860-61 (Tenn. 2002). The professional relationship between corporate counsel and a client employer is similarly distinct. The duties of today's corporate attorneys have grown increasingly complex, often including advisory and compliance roles as well as the more general aim of ensuring a successful business. See Gen. Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1172, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487 ; Lobel, supra, at 1262.
¶12 The expectations for in-house attorneys are distinct from outside lawyers. The expansion of an employee attorney's duties coupled with the professional and financial dependence on a single client employer "can easily subject [that] attorney to unusual pressures to conform to organizational goals, pressures that are qualitatively different from those imposed on the outside lawyer." Gen. Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1172, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487. While an outside lawyer enjoys distance and economic independence from the financial *680success of his or her client, an in-house attorney is dependent on the "good will and confidence of a single employer to provide livelihood and career success." Id. at 1182, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487. And unlike outside counsel, for in-house attorneys with only one client-an employer-the "withdrawal 'remedy' fails to confront seriously the extraordinarily high cost that resignation entails." Id. at 1188, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 876 P.2d 487 ; see also Peter D. Banick, Case Note, The In-House" Whistleblower: Walking the Line between "Good Cop, Bad Cop," 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV . 1868, 1884 (2011) (noting that in-house attorneys often "cannot simply withdraw from a case or refuse to represent a particular client and forego some attorney's fees"); John Jacob Kabus, Jr., Establishing Corporate Counsel's Right To Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1343, 1378 (1995). Thus, the relationship between corporate counsel and the employer client "cannot be characterized solely as an attorney-client relationship"; it must be "viewed as an employer-employee relationship as well." Banick, supra, at 1908 ; Gen. Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1171-72, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487.
¶13 A rigid application of RPC 1.16 to all lawyers, including in-house employee attorneys, not only ignores these abstract and practical distinctions but also overlooks that *1190the RPCs were written when few lawyers worked outside the traditional private law firm practice model. See John M. Burman, Ethical Considerations When Representing Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 581, 582 (2003) (the Model Rules "grew out of the traditional lawyer-client relationship" (citing C.W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6 (1986))); Gen. Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1171-72, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487 ("The growth in the number and role of in-house counsel has brought with it a widening recognition of the descriptive inadequacy of the nineteenth century model of the lawyer's place and role in society-one based predominantly on the small- to middle-sized firm."). Today, increasing numbers of attorneys work not in law firms but for governments, agencies, and nonprofits; in human resources, as lobbyists and corporate counsel. See, e.g., Spitzer, supra, at 47 & nn.1-4 (noting *681the rise in law graduates working in nontraditional jobs such as government and business); Alternative Careers, COLO . L. (listing nonlegal public and private sector careers for law graduates in business and finance, human resources, nonprofit administration, technology, etc.), https://www.colorado.edu/law/careers/career-paths/alternative-careers [https://perma.cc/JE8R-8458]; Alexandra Levit, Rethinking the Law, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2010) (discussing strategies for attorneys seeking nonlegal employment), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB126489547645038023 [https://perma.cc/6Z8T-TAEL].
¶14 Despite numerous amendments over the years, our rules have not evolved with the profession. They are still fundamentally influenced by "traditional" notions of lawyer-client relationships. See RPC Scope cmt. 23 ("The structure of these Rules generally parallels the structure of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct."); Gen. Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1171-72, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487. These traditional undercurrents pose little problem when applying the RPCs to traditional lawyer-client relationships. We are mindful, however, of the limitations of this traditional influence when determining whether and how our ethical rules should apply to attorneys working in nontraditional positions for nontraditional employer clients. See Gen. Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1185, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487 (noting criticism of cases rejecting in-house attorney wrongful discharge claims based on rules of professional conduct as reflecting "an unspoken adherence to an anachronistic model of the attorney's place and role in contemporary society" as well as "an inverted view of the consequences of the in-house attorney's essential professional role").
¶15 Given the many changes in legal practice since the RPCs were adopted, we decline to elevate RPC 1.16 against all competing interests. Concluding otherwise easily leads to unjust results. For instance, in-house attorneys would lose their jobs without the recourse afforded to their nonlawyer colleagues. Gen. Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1188, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487 ("Courts *682do not require nonlawyer employees to quietly surrender their jobs rather than 'go along' with an employer's unlawful demands."); Banick, supra, at 1884. An in-house attorney could be hired by a corporation with an employment contract and could agree to a scope of work, salary, and termination for cause. The in-house attorney begins work, performing both legal and nonlegal duties as needed by the employer. The in-house attorney is then summarily fired for reasons not specified in the contract, perhaps related to legal work, perhaps to nonlegal work.
¶16 Immunizing an employer in this situation from all consequence ignores the realities of modern legal work and risks creating unconscionable results. We will not instruct in-house attorneys that our ethical rules allow employers to take away their livelihood and then also leave them without any legal recourse under the facts before us today.
¶17 We have repeatedly held that violations of the RPCs in the formation of a contract may render that contract unenforceable as violative of public policy. LK Operating, 181 Wash.2d at 85, 331 P.3d 1147. Because RPC 1.16 is not a uniform and *1191unequivocal ban on attorney employment claims, Karstetter's suit does not violate this rule.4
¶18 We therefore hold that in the narrow context of in-house attorneys, contract and wrongful discharge suits are available, provided these suits can be brought "without violence to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship." Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn. 1991). In so doing, we join other states whose rules better fit the modern legal world. E.g., Gen. Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1178-79, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487 ; Burkhart v. Semitool, Inc., 2000 MT 201, 300 Mont. 480, 5 P.3d 1031 (holding the right to terminate attorney without consequences does not apply to attorney-client relationships where an attorney is a client's *683employee); GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 421 Mass. 22, 653 N.E.2d 161 (1995) (concluding that an in-house attorney may bring an action for retaliatory discharge against an employer); Parker v. M&T Chems., Inc., 236 N.J. Super. 451, 566 A.2d 215 (1989) (same); cf. Balia v. Gambro, Inc., 145 III. 2d 492, 584 N.E.2d 104, 164 III. Dec. 892 (1991).5
¶19 Considering our reexamination and application of RPC 1.16 to in-house attorney employees, we hold that Karstetter's claims under CR 12(b)(6) should not have been dismissed. Karstetter sufficiently alleged that he was " 'an employee' " to overcome a CR 12(b)(6) dismissal, CP at 5, 14-16 (2006 "Employee Agreement" between Karstetter and the Guild), and his employment contract acknowledged the unique financial benefits and drawbacks of his employment situation: "It is understood that [Karstetter's salary] is substantially below market rates and is in consideration for the permanent employment relationship enjoyed by ATTORNEY as well as the unfettered access that the GUILD has to ATTORNEY Which is essentially 24-hours a day, 7-days a week." CP at 12. Karstetter refrained from taking on clients that would conflict with his "full-time services to the Guild" and "severely limited his acceptance of private clients." CP at 6. Karstetter's just cause termination clause was "the same definition" as contained in the collective bargaining agreement for nonattorney Guild members. CP at 13. Like other in-house attorneys, Karstetter's economic and professional success depended exclusively on the Guild's goodwill and confidence. See Gen. Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1182, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487. And, unlike private practice attorneys who *684enjoy some professional and economic distance from their clients, Karstetter's professional existence was intricately linked to the Guild.
¶20 For the reasons discussed above, we hold that in-house attorneys may pursue wrongful discharge and breach of contract claims against their client employers. We further hold that Karstetter has pleaded facts sufficient to bring these claims against the Guild as an in-house attorney employee. See FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180 Wash.2d 954, 962-63, 331 P.3d 29 (2014) (dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is warranted only if the plaintiff cannot prove " 'any set of facts which would justify recovery' " (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kinney, 159 Wash.2d at 842, 154 P.3d 206 )); Kinney, 159 Wash.2d at 842, 154 P.3d 206 (all facts alleged in a complaint are taken as true and we may consider hypothetical facts supporting the plaintiff's claim). Provided Karstetter's *1192suit does not violate the integrity of the attorney-client relationship, it may proceed.6
3. Karstetter sufficiently pleaded whistle-blower protection
¶21 The Guild also contends that even if Karstetter could bring a wrongful discharge claim, he fails *685to plead that he was a whistle-blower. Dicomes v. State established four categories of protected behavior for wrongful discharge claims: (1) refusing to commit an illegal act, (2) performing a public duty or obligation, (3) exercising a legal right or privilege, or (4) whistle-blowing. 113 Wash.2d 612, 618, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989). The Guild argues that because Karstetter did not "desire[ ] to further the public good" when he provided the requested information (after obtaining permission to do so from his employer), he is not entitled to whistle-blower protection. We disagree.
¶22 The Guild's argument undercuts the fundamental purpose of our whistle-blower statutes. Washington's whistle-blower provisions are intended to encourage those with knowledge of institutional wrongs to come forward in order to safeguard the public. See, e.g., RCW 42.40.010, .020(2). Such protection is based on, among other things, the commonsense notion that employers should abide by the law and the intrinsic importance of fairness and justice in protecting individuals trying to "do the right thing." Banick, supra, at 1874-77; see Farnam v. CRISTA Ministries, 116 Wash.2d 659, 671, 807 P.2d 830 (1991) (stating that Diocomes' whistle-blowing protection focuses on the employer's wrongdoing, not the employee's actions). Protecting only those who directly reveal information while sacrificing others who assist them would unjustly narrow the scope of whistle-blower statutes and caution future whistle-blowers to think twice before helping other whistle-blowers.
¶23 Here, Karstetter pleaded that he assisted the investigation of a whistle-blower complaint and alleged that he was fired for doing so. Karstetter's complaint satisfied the notice pleading rule by containing a short, plain statement of the claims and demand for judgment sufficient to survive a CR 12(b)(6) challenge on this ground. CR 8.7 Even assuming *686a positive statement of subjective intent to further the public good is required, we construe pleadings to do substantial justice, and parties may clarify initial *1193pleadings in the course of summary judgment proceedings. See State v. Adams, 107 Wash.2d 611, 620, 732 P.2d 149 (1987).
4. Karstetter's request for attorney fees is premature
¶24 Karstetter sought attorney fees and costs at the Court of Appeals and renews his request before this court. RCW 49.48.030 ; RAP 18.1. RCW 49.48.030 awards reasonable attorney fees to a person "successful in recovering judgment for wages or salary owed to him or her." But, as the Guild correctly points out, Karstetter has not recovered any judgment for wages or salary owed to him. Karstetter's request for attorney fees is premature. Mount Adams Sch. Dist. v. Cook, 150 Wash.2d 716, 726-27, 81 P.3d 111 (2003) ; accord Brundridge v. Fluor Fed. Svcs., Inc., 109 Wash. App. 347, 361, 35 P.3d 389 (2001) (holding pipe fitters' request for attorney fees arising from their wrongful termination claim was premature where pipe fitters had not yet obtained judgment for lost wages). We therefore deny his request for attorney fees.
Conclusion
¶25 Our rules of professional conduct do not foreclose an in-house attorney employee from bringing breach of contract and wrongful discharge claims against an employer-client.
*687We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that in the narrow context of in-house attorneys, contract and wrongful discharge suits are available, provided these suits can be brought without violence to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. We remand Karstetter's suit to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR.
Fairhurst, C.J.
Madsen, J.
Stephens, J.
González, J.
Yu, J.