Karriem v. Extended Stay America Inc

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided June 29, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-00942·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA *** LAMONT GARNER KARRIEM, Case No. 2:20-cv-00942-RFB-VCF Plaintiff, vs. ORDER EXTENDED STAY AMERICA INC., et al., Defendants.

A P NA OP UP . L 1P -I E 1C R )A IST I (O EFN C T NO O P .R 1O ); C CE OE MD P I LN A F IO NR TM (EA C F

Before the Court are pro se plaintiff Lamont Garner Karriem’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) and complaint (ECF No. 1-1). Karriem’s (1) in forma pauperis application is granted; (2) his complaint is dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend. Karriem’s filings present two questions: (1) whether Karriem may proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and (2) whether Karriem’s complaint states a plausible claim for relief. I. Whether Karriem May Proceed In Forma Pauperis Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), a plaintiff may bring a civil action “without prepayment of fees or security thereof” if the plaintiff submits a financial affidavit that demonstrates the plaintiff “is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis includes a declaration under penalty of perjury that plaintiff is unable to pay the costs of these proceedings. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s affidavit states that he has no wages and no assets. (Id.) Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. // II. Whether Karriem’s Complaint States a Plausible Claim a. Legal Standard Because the Court grants Karriem’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, it must review Karriem’s complaint to determine whether the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a plausible claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” The Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal states that to satisfy Rule 8’s requirements, a complaint’s allegations must cross “the line from conceivable to plausible.” 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, (2007)). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) "if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief." Buckey v. Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). If the Court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). b. Plaintiff’s Complaint Karriem brings claims for invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, and breach of contract against Extended Stay America, Inc., ESH Hospitality, Inc., and Elix Nunez because it 2 allegedly cooperated with law enforcement prior to his October 2018 arrest. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2). On May 15, 2020, plaintiff brought similar claims in another case, Karriem v. Cellco Partnership Inc., d/b/a Verizon Wireless Inc., 2:20-cv-00884-JAD-VCF (“Karriem I”) against Verizon Wireless for allegedly cooperating with law enforcement prior to the same October 2018 arrest. Plaintiff initiated the instant case (“Karriem II”) on May 26, 2020. a. The First to File Rule and Claim Splitting “[T]he "first-to-file" rule (also called the "first-filed" or the "prior pending action" rule) dictates that, in the absence of "exceptional circumstances," the later-filed action should be stayed, transferred or dismissed[ ].” Colortyme Fin. Servs. v. Kivalina Corp., 940 F. Supp. 269, 272 (D. Haw. 1996), citing to Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1982). “Dismissal of the duplicative lawsuit, more so than the issuance of a stay or the enjoinment of proceedings, promotes judicial economy and the ‘comprehensive disposition of litigation.’” Adams v. Cal. Dep't of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2007); citing to Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 184, 72 S. Ct. 219, 221 (1952). “In a situation such as here, where one district court had duplicative suits contemporaneously pending on its docket, we conclude, as did the Supreme Court in an analogous situation, that "[n]ecessarily, an ample degree of discretion, appropriate for disciplined and experienced judges, must be left to the lower court[ ].” Adams, 487 F.3d at 692 citing to Kerotest Mfg. Co., 342 U.S. at 184. The first-filed rule should not be departed from except in cases of, “rare or extraordinary circumstances, inequitable conduct, bad faith, or forum shopping.” EEOC v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir. 1988). “The prior pending action doctrine is one of federal judicial efficiency to avoid placing an unnecessary burden on the federal judiciary, and to avoid the embarrassment of conflicting judgments, and provides that where there are two competing lawsuits, the first suit should 3 have priority[.]” Curcio v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., 472 F. Supp. 2d 239, 241 (D. Conn. 2007). “A plaintiff is required to bring at one time all of the claims against a party or privies relating to the same transaction or event.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 686. A related legal doctrine, called claim-splitting, is a "sub-species" of res judicata. MLC Intellectual Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. 19-cv-03345-EMC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174870, at 10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2019). The doctrine provides that a party may not split a cause of action into separate grounds of recovery and raise the separate grounds in successive lawsuits. In re PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56804, at 49 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2019). Claim splitting differs from res judicata because it does not require that there be a final judgment. Adams at 487 F.3d at 692 (In considering whether a second action is duplicative for purposes of claim splitting, a court borrows from the test for res judicata and analyzes, “whether, assuming that the first suit were already final, the second suit could be precluded pursuant to claim preclusion”) “Plaintiffs generally have no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against

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