Judgment rendered February 26, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 56,113-CA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
KARL PENTECOST Plaintiff-Appellant
versus
JOSEPH W. GRASSI, Defendants-Appellees McKEITHEN, RYLAND, & CHAMPAGNE
Appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana Trial Court No. 2019-2913
Honorable Jefferson B. Joyce, Judge
KARL PENTECOST In Proper Person
GIBSON LAW PARTNERS, LLC Counsel for Appellees, By: James H. Gibson Joseph W. Grassi; Marc D. Moroux McKeithen, Ryland & Champagne; and The Law Firm of Louis V. Champagne, APC
Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and ROBINSON, JJ. STEPHENS, J.,
This civil appeal arises from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish
of Ouachita, the Honorable Jefferson B. Joyce, Judge, presiding. The
plaintiff, Karl Pentecost, appeals from the trial court’s judgment granting
exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action filed by the defendants,
Joseph W. Grassi and the law firm of McKeithen, Ryland, and Champagne.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Karl Pentecost (“Mr. Pentecost”) was the sole proprietor of Ouachita
Truck and Trailer, a truck repair company. Mr. Pentecost d/b/a Ouachita
Truck and Trailer was joined in a lawsuit originally instituted by the
Louisiana Safety Association of Timbermen (“LSAT”) against another
company owned by Mr. Pentecost, Will Transport L.L.C., for alleged unpaid
workers’ compensation insurance premiums. See, Louisiana Safety Ass’n of
Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Will Transp., L.L.C., 51,798 (La. App. 2
Cir. 2/28/18), 245 So. 3d 1194, writs denied sub nom. Louisiana Safety
Ass’n of Timbermen- Self Insurers Fund v. Will Transp., L.L.C., 18-0734,
18-0731 (La. 9/14/18), 252 So. 3d 480, 485. Joseph Grassi (“Mr. Grassi”) of
McKeithen, Ryland, & Champagne (“the law firm”) represented Mr.
Pentecost and both of his companies.
At the bench trial, Mr. Grassi moved for an involuntary dismissal and
prevailed; therefore, he did not present a defense. Although the trial court
found that Will Transport was the only party responsible for payment of the
premiums to LSAT, this Court reversed the dismissal of Mr. Pentecost’s
companies and rendered judgment that both of his companies were solidarily
liable with a third company for the unpaid insurance premiums. This Court did not remand the case for Mr. Pentecost and his companies to present their
case. Although Mr. Pentecost requested a rehearing, this Court denied his
request. Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Mr. Pentecost’s
writ application. See, Louisiana Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers
Fund, supra.
On September 13, 2019, Mr. Pentecost, a self-represented litigant at
the time, filed a petition against Mr. Grassi and his law firm alleging that
they committed legal malpractice in their representation of him and his
companies in the LSAT case. More specifically, Mr. Pentecost listed in his
petition the following:
1. Mr. Grassi failed to object to evidence that was not a part of the contracts or agreements related to the insurance coverage.
2. Mr. Grassi failed to request cross examination of certain documents.
3. Mr. Grassi did not cross-examine Mr. Pentecost to establish that he had no employees which relieved Mr. Pentecost of workers compensation requirements.
4. Mr. Grassi failed to advise, offer, or file for Mr. Pentecost relief under La. C.C.P. art. 2002-2004.
Mr. Pentecost argued that he suffered damages in excess of $748,930.44
plus attorney fees, and he requested $500,000.00 in general damages. On
September 15, 2021, after retaining counsel, Mr. Pentecost filed an amended
petition alleging the following:
• Defendants failed to file an answer to the appeal filed by LSAT, the plaintiff in the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal proceeding, pursuant to La. C.C.P. Art. 2133 to allege, alternatively and only in the event that the Court of Appeal reversed the grant of involuntary dismissal, that the case should be remanded so that Mr. Pentecost and KP Trucking could present a defense on the merits.
• Mr. Grassi failed to timely file Mr. Pentecost’s brief in the Second Circuit Court of Appeal proceeding, failed to appear for oral argument, failed to contact opposing counsel to ask for 2 their brief, nor did he file a motion to reinstate oral argument with the Second Circuit Court of Appeal. Foreseeably, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Plaintiff (Karl Pentecost, d/b/a OT&T) and K.P. Trucking as co-defendants.
Following the amendment to the petition as well as answers filed by the
defendants, Mr. Grassi and his firm filed an exception of peremption on
December 9, 2021. In the exception, the defendants alleged that Mr.
Pentecost had one year from the date of discovery of the actions giving rise
to the claim to file the malpractice suit. According to the defendants, Mr.
Pentecost knew of the alleged malpractice action in the LSAT case as early
as the trial in October 2016 but failed to file his petition until September 29,
2019.
On January 13, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the exception of
peremption and issued its ruling granting the exception in open court on
February 23, 2022. According to this Court’s opinion, the trial court
determined that by April 2018, Mr. Pentecost knew or should have known
that matters were adverse to him. See, Pentecost v. Grassi, 54,836 (La. App.
2 Cir. 3/1/23), 357 So. 3d 588, writ denied, 23-00476 (La. 5/23/23), 360 So.
3d 1258. The trial court detailed that this time frame was reasonable
because Mr. Pentecost alleged malpractice acts in this petition that not only
involved the trial held in October 2016, but also acts that occurred during the
appeal process for the LSAT case. Once this Court denied Mr. Pentecost’s
rehearing request, the trial court determined that Mr. Pentecost knew or
should have known that matters were adverse to him. Consequently, his
September 2019 petition was not filed within the one-year period set forth in
La. R.S. 9:5605(A). The trial court ultimately dismissed Mr. Pentecost’s
suit and all the claims against the defendants. 3 Mr. Pentecost appealed the decision of the trial court, but this Court
agreed with the trial court that Mr. Pentecost should have had knowledge of
any alleged malpractice by Mr. Grassi in February 2018 during the LSAT
case when this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and denied
rehearing in April 2018. Similarly, Mr. Pentecost attempted to argue for the
first time on appeal that Mr. Grassi committed a fraudulent act of
malpractice and a post-malpractice fraudulent concealment of the act.
Because this claim was not asserted before the trial court, this Court did not
address that claim. Ultimately, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment
granting the exception of peremption, and the Louisiana Supreme Court
denied Mr. Pentecost’s writ application on May 23, 2023. See, Pentecost v.
Grassi, supra.
On July 17, 2023, Mr. Pentecost, as a self-represented litigant, filed a
“Petition to Nullification of Final Judgment” pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.
2004 requesting that the court annul the judgment on the exception of
peremption for fraud and ill practices. In this petition, Mr. Pentecost again
named as defendants Mr. Grassi and McKeithen, Ryland, & Champagne.
He alleged that Mr. Grassi committed fraud and ill practices when he
concealed the fact that he failed to appear at oral arguments on the LSAT
appeal. Mr. Pentecost also asserted that Mr. Grassi did not obtain Mr.
Pentecost’s informed consent before requesting an involuntary dismissal at
the trial court level in the LSAT case. On August 25, 2023, the defendants
filed exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action. Mr. Pentecost filed
an amended petition on January 3, 2024, and the defendants filed exceptions
of res judicata and no cause of action in response to the amendment on
January 22, 2024. 4 On February 7, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on these
exceptions. Concerning the res judicata exception, the defendants argued
that no new arguments were raised in Mr. Pentecost’s new petition.
Although Mr. Pentecost attempted to raise the fraud issues on appeal in the
previous lawsuit, this Court, according to the defendants, ruled that Mr.
Pentecost could not raise the fraud claims on appeal for the first time and
found that the fraud claims should have been raised prior to the appeal. The
defendants alleged that all five factors of res judicata were met as
everything, including the parties, facts, and circumstances, was the same as
in the previous malpractice lawsuit which ended in a final judgment.
In response, Mr. Pentecost argued that if not for fraud or concealment,
he would have asserted his arguments in the first malpractice lawsuit. The
court questioned Mr. Pentecost about when he learned of the fraud, and Mr.
Pentecost explained that he discovered it when he was researching for his
appeal in the previous malpractice matter. Mr. Pentecost stated that Mr.
Grassi failed to appear in court, did not advise him that he failed to appear in
court, and continued to hide his lack of appearance from Mr. Pentecost
during the LSAT litigation. Mr. Pentecost reiterated throughout his
arguments that fraud had not been and was still not an adjudicated issue.
With regard to the exception of no cause of action, the defendants
argued that the conduct related to the ill practices claim occurred prior to the
final judgment in the previous malpractice suit. In order for a cause of
action for an annulment to occur, the alleged conduct relating to the fraud
and ill practice had to occur after the judgment in the previous malpractice
matter. Because the conduct occurred prior to the final judgment in the
malpractice action, the defendants maintained that an action for nullity of the 5 judgment was not possible. Mr. Pentecost responded and urged that
discovery, not the act, is important in determining whether a previous
judgment may be annulled. The trial court ultimately granted the exceptions
of res judicata and no cause of action, finding that all requirements were met
for both exceptions. Mr. Pentecost now appeals the trial court’s ruling on
these exceptions.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Pentecost first asserts that the trial court committed
legal and manifest error in not finding a cause or causes of action within the
four corners and on the facts of the nullity petition. In his second
assignment of error, Mr. Pentecost maintains that the trial court committed
legal or manifest error in granting the exception of res judicata. Although
Mr. Pentecost’s brief is not compliant with the URCA, this Court reads pro
se filings indulgently and will attempt to discern the thrust of the plaintiff’s
position on appeal and the relief he seeks. Linn v. Ouachita Parish Police
Jury, 55,480 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), 383 So. 3d 1171; Fobbs v.
CompuCom Sys., Inc., 55,173 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So. 3d
1146; Magee v. Williams, 50,726 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So. 3d 265.
In support of his assignments of error, Mr. Pentecost argues that he
only became aware of Mr. Grassi’s conduct during the LSAT appeal when
Mr. Grassi was questioned about his actions during a deposition taken on
November 20, 2020. These actions included failing to file an answer to the
appeal, timely file a brief for the appeal, and appear for oral arguments.
Because Mr. Grassi delayed in revealing his actions related to the LSAT
appeal, Mr. Pentecost suggests that this delay prevented him from filing his
6 original malpractice petition timely and supports this Court nullifying the
judgment in the first malpractice suit.
In response, the defendants claim that La. C.C.P. art. 2004 is not
intended as a substitute for an appeal or second chance but rather is intended
to prevent injustice that cannot be corrected through a new trial or appeal.
Mr. Pentecost, according to the defendants, has made no allegation that his
right to defend himself was denied as Mr. Pentecost was present during the
hearing on the exception of peremption that extinguished the first
malpractice claim. For these reasons, the defendants suggest that the
exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action should be affirmed.
The nullity of a final judgment may be demanded for vices of either
form or substance. La. C.C.P. art. 2001. A final judgment obtained by fraud
or ill practices may be annulled. La. C.C.P. art. 2004(A). An action to
annul a judgment on these grounds must be brought within one year of the
discovery by the plaintiff in the nullity action of the fraud or ill practices.
La. C.C.P. art. 2004(B). The burden of proof is on the party seeking the
nullity to establish that the action was brought within one year of the
discovery of fraud or ill practices. Cariere v. The Kroger Store, 52,846 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19), 276 So. 3d 1150, writ denied, 19-01471 (La. 11/12/19),
282 So. 3d 224; Burkett v. Prop. of Douglas, 575 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1991). The one-year limitation of La. C.C.P. art. 2004(B) is considered a
period of peremption rather than prescription. Id.
The two criteria for determining whether a judgment has been
obtained by fraud or ill practice include: (1) whether the circumstances
under which the judgment was rendered show that the litigant seeking relief
was deprived of legal rights, and (2) whether the enforcement of the 7 judgment would be unconscionable or inequitable. Belle Pass Terminal, Inc.
v. Jolin, Inc., 01-0149 (La. 10/16/01), 800 So. 2d 762; Kem Search, Inc. v.
Sheffield, 434 So. 2d 1067 (La. 1983); Payne v. Glass, 41,232 (La. App. 2
Cir. 8/23/06), 939 So. 2d 526; Yellowbird Investments, L.L.C. v. Barber, 46,
977 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/14/12), 87 So. 3d 970. La. C.C.P. art. 2004 is not
limited to cases of actual fraud or intentional wrongdoing. Rather, it
encompasses situations in which a judgment is rendered through some
improper practice or procedure which operates, even innocently, to deprive
the party cast in judgment of some legal right. Kem Search, supra;
Yellowbird Investments, L.L.C., supra; Lieber v. Caddo Levee Distr. Bd. of
Com’rs, 32,551 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/8/99), 748 So. 2d 587, writ denied, 00-
0561 (La. 4/7/00), 759 So. 2d 763, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 928, 121 S. Ct.
306, 148 L. Ed. 2d 246 (2000). As stated by the supreme court, “Conduct
which prevents an opposing party from having an opportunity to appear or to
assert a defense constitutes a deprivation of his legal rights.” Yellowbird
Investments, supra; Kem Search, supra.
A nullity action under La. C.C.P. art. 2004 is not a substitute for an
appeal from a judgment that may be based on insufficient evidence or a
misinterpretation of substantive law. Rather, the action provided by La.
C.C.P. art. 2004 is “designed to afford relief against a judgment procured by
methods viewed with disdain by the judiciary.” Lieber, supra at
590, citing Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 392 So. 2d 398 (La. 1980).
The law on res judicata is set forth in La. R.S. 13:4231 as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
8 (1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
Under the res judicata statute, a second action is precluded when the
following are satisfied: (1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final;
(3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the
second suit existed at the time of the final judgment in the first suit; and (5)
the cause or causes of action in the second suit arose out of the same
transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation.
Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 14-0808 (La. 12/9/14), 158 So. 3d 761;
Barnett v. Louisiana Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 51,908 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18),
248 So. 3d 594, writ denied, 18-0944 (La. 9/28/18), 253 So. 3d 154; Alpine
Meadows, L.C. v. Winkler, 49,490 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/14),154 So. 3d
747, writ denied, 15-0292 (La. 4/24/15), 169 So. 3d 357; Bankers Ins. Co. v.
State, 53,140 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/19), 285 So. 3d 59.
The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to promote judicial
efficiency and the final resolution of disputes. Rogers v. Caddo Par. Sch.
Bd., 54,239 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/13/22), 342 So. 3d 1151; Ave. Plaza, LLC v.
Falgoust, 96-0173 (La. 7/2/96), 676 So. 2d 1077; Hines v. Smith, 44,285
(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/12/09), 16 So. 3d 1234, writ denied, 09-2001 (La. 9 12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 922. Res judicata forecloses both the relitigation of
matters that have not been litigated but should have been raised in the earlier
suit (claim preclusion) and matters previously litigated and decided (issue
preclusion). Alpine Meadows, L.C., supra; Hudson v. City of
Bossier, 33,620 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/25/00), 766 So. 2d 738, writ denied, 00-
2687 (La. 11/27/00), 775 So. 2d 450.
The doctrine of res judicata is stricti juris, and any doubt concerning
application of the principle of res judicata must be resolved against its
application. Rogers, supra; Kelty v. Brumfield, 93-1142 (La. 2/25/94), 633
So. 2d 1210; Hines, supra. The party who urges the exception
of res judicata bears the burden of proving its essential elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. If there is any doubt as to its applicability,
the exception must be overruled. Rogers, supra; Hines, supra.
The standard of review of a ruling on an exception of res judicata is
manifest error when the exception is raised before the case is submitted and
evidence is received from both sides. Rogers, supra; Barnett v. Louisiana
Med. Mutual Ins. Co., 51,908 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So. 3d 594, writ
denied, 18-0944 (La. 9/28/18), 253 So. 3d 154. The res judicata effect of a
prior judgment is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal.
Rogers, supra; Penton v. Castellano, 49,843 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/15), 169
So. 3d 739.
The peremptory exception of no cause of action tests the legal
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s petition by determining whether the law affords
a remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. Scheffler v. Adams and Reese,
LLP, 06-1774 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So. 2d 641; Gipson v. Fortune, 45,021 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 1/27/10), 30 So. 3d 1076, writ denied, 10-0432 (La. 4/30/10), 34 10 So. 3d 298; Blanche v. Varner, 52,659 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So. 3d
620. A “cause of action,” when used in the context of the peremptory
exception of no cause of action, refers to the operative facts that give rise to
the plaintiff's right to judicially assert the action against the defendant. White
v. St. Elizabeth B.C. Bd. of Directors, 45,213 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/2/10), 37 So.
3d 1139; Blanche, supra. The purpose of the exception of no cause of action
is not to determine whether the plaintiff will prevail at trial, but is to
ascertain if a cause of action exists. Bogues v. Louisiana Energy
Consultants, Inc., 46,434 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11), 71 So. 3d 1128;
Blanche, supra. The exception is triable on the face of the petition, and for
the purpose of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-
pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true. Fink v. Bryant, 01-
0987 (La. 11/28/01), 801 So. 2d 346; Blanche, supra.
An appellate court's review of a trial court's ruling sustaining an
exception of no cause of action is de novo because the exception raises a
question of law, and the trial court's decision is based only on the sufficiency
of the petition. Fink, supra; Blanche, supra. The essential question is
whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt
resolved in plaintiff's favor, the petition states any valid cause of action for
relief. Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light, 06-1181 (La. 3/9/07), 951 So. 2d
1058; Scheffler, supra; Blanche, supra.
In 2015, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that an attorney’s
post-malpractice actions consisting of fraudulent concealment can amount to
fraud and thus bar application of three-year peremptive period for legal
malpractice. Lomont v. Bennett, 14-2483 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So. 3d 620.
The defendant in Lomont failed to record a community property agreement 11 in the mortgage and conveyance records for the plaintiff. Lomont, 14-2483,
p. 2, 172 So. 3d at 623-24. Two years later in 2010, the defendant filed the
agreement after the plaintiff notified the defendant that she was unable to
refinance her mortgage on the property. Id. Following the discovery of a
lien on the property in December 2010, the defendant alleged that she
reported the malpractice to the plaintiff but the defendant continued
representing the plaintiff to attempt to remedy the lien. Id. It was not until
March 2012 that the defendant revealed to the plaintiff that the defendant
had a conflict of interest and could no longer represent the plaintiff in an
effort to remove the lien. Id. After meeting with another attorney on June 8,
2012, the plaintiff filed a malpractice action on July 12, 2012, in which she
claimed the defendant committed legal malpractice by failing to record the
community property settlement. The plaintiff later supplemented and
amended her petition alleging that the defendant acted fraudulently in
mispresenting and/or suppressing the truth regarding the malpractice the
defendant committed. Id., 14-2483, pp. 3-5, 172 So. 3d at 624-25. The
defendant filed an exception of peremption which the trial court granted and
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. Id., 14-2483, pp. 5-6, 172 So. 3d
at 625-26.
Ultimately in Lomont, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the
decisions of the lower courts, finding that the facts and circumstances
constituted fraud. Given this finding of fraud committed within the meaning
of La. R.S. 9:5605(E), the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that a legal
malpractice claim is governed by the one-year prescriptive period set forth in
La. C.C. art. 3492, versus the peremptive periods set forth in La. R.S.
9:5605(A). Id., 14-2483, pp. 22-24, 172 So. 3d at 636-37. The Supreme 12 Court reasoned that since the defendant “effectively hid her malpractice,”
the one-year prescriptive period began to run on June 28, 2012, making the
plaintiff’s suit timely as it was filed on July 12, 2012. Id., 14-2483, pp. 24-
27, 172 So. 3d at 637-39.
At first glance, Mr. Pentecost’s circumstances are comparable to the
plaintiff’s circumstances in Lomont. Mr. Pentecost alleged that Mr. Grassi
concealed the actions he took relating to the LSAT appeal and failed to
reveal these actions until a malpractice suit would be considered perempted.
However, a significant distinction must be highlighted. Whereas the
plaintiff in Lomont amended her petition to include transactions or
occurrences related to fraudulently mispresenting and/or suppressing the
truth, Mr. Pentecost failed to amend his petition and assert his claims related
to Mr. Grassi concealing his actions related to the LSAT appeal. Instead, he
classified Mr. Grassi’s behavior relating to the appellate work as malpractice
and failed to articulate in the petition Mr. Grassi’s concealment of fact that
Mr. Grassi failed to file an answer to the appeal, failed to timely file a brief,
and failed to appear for the oral argument.
The Code of Civil Procedure requires that a petition “shall contain a
short, clear, and concise statement of all causes of action arising out of, and
of the material facts of, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the litigation.” La. C.C.P. art. 891. The 1990 comment to this
article further clarifies that the plaintiff is required to set forth the facts of
the transaction or occurrence and not merely the facts supporting the cause
of action asserted because “all causes of action arising out of that transaction
or occurrence are considered to have been submitted for adjudication and
will be barred or merged in the judgment.” 13 By failing to include the fraud allegations when he amended his
malpractice petition, Mr. Pentecost is precluded from alleging the fraud
claims in his nullity petition. See Alpine Meadows, supra. Although Mr.
Pentecost attempts to nullify the final judgment in the first malpractice suit
by filing a “nullity petition,” res judicata bars him from using the
fraud/concealment claims to justify the annulment petition. La. C.C.P. art.
891 further supports this as the article requires a plaintiff to assert all causes
of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the litigation. Mr. Pentecost’s cause of action in his nullity petition
arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of
the first malpractice suit. Similarly, the other requirements for res judicata
are met in this matter. Mr. Pentecost’s first malpractice suit resulted in a
valid, final judgment, and the parties in the first malpractice lawsuit and this
lawsuit are the same: Mr. Pentecost, Mr. Grassi, and the law firm. Lastly,
Mr. Pentecost’s cause of action alleged in the nullity action existed at the
time of the first malpractice suit. For these reasons, the record supports the
trial court’s ruling granting the defendants’ exception of res judicata.
Consequently, because res judicata is applicable to the claims made in
Mr. Pentecost’s nullity petition, his petition does not allege facts that are
legally sufficient for the law to afford him a remedy. According to the
record, Mr. Pentecost is unable to prove a set of facts supporting a claim
which would entitle him to relief. Therefore, the trial court properly granted
the defendants’ exception of no cause of action. Considering the trial court
properly granted both the exception of res judicata and exception of no
cause of action, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Pentecost’s
claims. 14 CONCLUSION
Given the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment granting the
defendants’ exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action is affirmed.
The costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff, Karl Pentecost.
AFFIRMED.