Karina Martinez-Alvarado v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: June 13, 2025
• Docket: 23-1810
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-1810

KARINA LETICIA MARTINEZ-ALVARADO; A.A.F.M.; A.J.C.M.,

Petitioners,

v.

PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted: March 19, 2025 Decided: June 13, 2025

Before NIEMEYER, HEYTENS, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Allison Lukanich, BASHYAM GLOBAL, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Petitioners. Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Sarah A. Byrd, Senior Litigation Counsel, Jennifer R. Khouri, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

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PER CURIAM:

Karina Leticia Martinez-Alvarado and her two minor children, natives and citizens

of Honduras, petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

dismissing their appeal from the immigration judge’s decision denying Martinez-

Alvarado’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal. 1 We deny the petition for

review. 2

Martinez-Alvarado’s lead argument challenges the validity of the Board’s decision.

Specifically, Martinez-Alvarado asserts that the Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge

who ruled on her appeal lacked the authority to act because her initial six-month

appointment had expired, and the Board could not extend that appointment. We recently

considered—and rejected—this precise issue. See Salomon-Guillen v. Garland, 123 F.4th

709 (4th Cir. 2024). Specifically, the question presented there was “whether such

temporary judges’ terms are renewable under the regulatory provision in effect during [the]

administrative appeal[, and this court] agree[d] with the government that the answer is yes.”

Id. at 711-12. Because Salomon-Guillen squarely forecloses Martinez-Alvarado’s

contention that Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge “Brown no longer had authority

1 Martinez-Alvarado’s minor children were riders on her asylum application, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3), and are identified as petitioners in this court by their initials. 2 Martinez-Alvarado has forfeited review of the immigration judge’s denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture, which likewise was not raised in the administrative appeal and similarly is not raised in the brief submitted to this court. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); Ullah v. Garland, 72 F.4th 597, 602 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that a party forfeits appellate review of those issues and claims not raised in the party’s briefs).

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to serve as a temporary BIA member” (Pet’rs’ Br. (ECF No. 24) at 7), we deny the petition

for review as to this issue.

As to the order of removal, we have reviewed the arguments Martinez-Alvarado

advances on appeal in conjunction with the administrative record, including the transcript

of Martinez-Alvarado’s merits hearing and the supporting evidence, and the relevant legal

authorities. We conclude that the record evidence does not compel a ruling contrary to any

of the administrative factual findings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)—including the adverse

credibility finding and the concomitant finding that Martinez-Alvarado’s supporting

evidence did not independently satisfy her burden of proof 3—and that substantial evidence

supports the denial of relief, see I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). See

also Ilunga, 777 F.3d at 207 (explaining that “omissions, inconsistent statements,

contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony are appropriate bases for

making an adverse credibility determination” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In response to Martinez-Alvarado’s arguments related to the adverse credibility

ruling, we do not agree that the immigration judge’s questioning, tone, and advisals

violated the high standards required of immigration judges. Cf. In re Y-S-L-C-, 26 I. & N.

Dec. 688, 690-91 (B.I.A. 2015) (explaining that “a respondent in immigration proceedings

3 We review credibility determinations for substantial evidence, affording broad— though not unlimited—deference to the agency’s credibility findings. Ilunga v. Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2015); Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). We likewise conduct substantial evidence review of the agency’s ruling as to the weight afforded a noncitizen’s corroborating evidence. Hui Pan v. Holder, 737 F.3d 921, 930-31 (4th Cir. 2013).

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should expect dignity, respect, courtesy, and fairness in a hearing before an Immigration

Judge”). We further observe that the Board was free to reject Martinez-Alvarado’s claim

that she was highly anxious and uncomfortable at the merits hearing as an explanation for

the clear and undisputed testimonial discrepancies, omissions, and deficiencies—however

plausible it may have been. See Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2007)

(observing the agency’s authority to reject “a perfectly plausible explanation” for an

identified evidentiary discrepancy).

As to the immigration judge’s adverse corroboration ruling, which the Board

likewise upheld, Martinez-Alvarado first argues that the immigration judge did not

ascertain whether additional corroborating evidence was reasonably available. But as we

have explained, if the immigration judge makes an explicit and whole adverse credibility

ruling—as he did here—then “nothing more is required” in terms of making “findings on

whether corroborative evidence was reasonably available.” Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d

365, 374, 375 (4th Cir. 2020). Finally, Martinez-Alvarado assigns error to the immigration

judge’s failure to allow her to explain why such corroborating evidence was not proffered.

However, the duty to solicit an explanation for the lack of corroboration is only triggered

when the applicant’s credible testimony is held to be insufficient to carry her burden of

proof. See In re L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516, 519 (B.I.A. 2015) (holding that, “[w]here

credible testimony alone is determined to be insufficient,” the noncitizen “bears the burden

to provide reasonably available supporting evidence. . . . If the evidence is unavailable,

the Immigration Judge must afford the applicant an opportunity to explain its unavailability

and ensure that the explanation is included in the record” (citation omitted)); see also

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Zuowei Chen v. Garland, 72 F.4th 563, 570-71 (4th Cir. 2023) (analyzing and applying

Wambura and In re L-A-C- and explaining that, when the immigration judge “seek[s]

additional corroborating evidence for ‘otherwise credible testimony,’” the “applicant is

entitled to an opportunity to explain why he cannot reasonably obtain any evidence sought

by the IJ, and the IJ is required to include that explanation in the record, along with a

finding as to whether the explanation is sufficient”).

In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion in the agency’s dispositive adverse

credibility and adverse corroboration rulings, both of which are supported by substantial

evidence. And Salomon-Guillen clearly forecloses Martinez-Alvarado’s antecedent

challenge to the validity of the Board order. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

See In re Martinez-Alvarado (B.I.A. July 10, 2023). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED