Karenna R Lynn v. NTT America, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-09844
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 KARENNA R LYNN, 10 Case No. 25-cv-09844-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 12 DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S NTT AMERICA, INC., MOTION TO DISMISS 13 Defendant. 14

15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Defendant NTT America, Inc. (“NTT”) moves to dismiss each claim in this action brought 17 by former NTT employee Karenna Lynn. Lynn asserts twelve causes of action related to 18 retaliation, gender discrimination, hostile work environment, breach of contract, intentional 19 infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and failure to pay. For the reasons set forth below, 20 Plaintiff’s fourth claim, retaliation for reporting gender discrimination, is dismissed with leave to 21 amend. Defendant’s motion as to the remaining claims is denied.1 22 II. BACKGROUND2 23 Plaintiff worked in sales for NTT, an IT services company, from 2012 to November 2023. 24 Plaintiff alleges that she was a strong performer throughout her time at NTT but that between 25

26 1 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the motion is suitable for disposition without oral argument. 27 2 Unless otherwise stated, this order accepts well-pled factual allegations made in the complaint as 1 2021 and 2022, she experienced concerted efforts to thwart her success, discrimination, 2 harassment, and retaliation based on her gender and reporting of misconduct. This mistreatment 3 included work trips hostile to women, being passed over for promotions, reduced commissions, 4 increased sales quotas, lesser title and pay than her comparable peers, and public humiliation. 5 Then, on November 15, 2023, NTT terminated Plaintiff. On November 14, 2025, Plaintiff 6 filed an administrative charge with the California Civil Rights Department (“CRD”) for violations 7 of the California Fair Employment Housing Act (“FEHA”) and received a Right-to-Sue Notice the 8 same day. This suit followed. 9 Plaintiff filed the original complaint on November 17, 2025. Defendant filed a motion to 10 dismiss the original complaint on March 16, 2026, and on April 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed the First 11 Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In it, she asserts twelve causes of action based on whistleblower 12 retaliation, gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and failure to investigate and failure 13 to prevent harassment, discrimination, wrongful termination, breach of contract/breach of implied 14 covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Equal Pay Act violation, and intentional infliction of 15 emotional distress. Defendant now moves to dismiss each for failure to state a claim. 16 III. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Rule 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A complaint must 18 contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief, Fed. R. 19 Civ. P. 8(a), and “giv[ing] the defendant fair notice of what the… claim is and the grounds upon 20 which it rests,” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 21 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a complaint must have 22 sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 23 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 24 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or 25 on “the absence of sufficient facts alleged” under a cognizable legal theory. UMG Recordings, Inc. 26 v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 27 and citation omitted). When evaluating such a motion, courts “accept all factual allegations in the 1 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 2 party.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 3 In dismissing a complaint, leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear the 4 complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 5 245, 248 (9th Cir.1995). When amendment would be futile, however, dismissal may be 6 ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir.1996). 7 IV. DISCUSSION 8 A. False Claims Act Retaliation 9 Plaintiff’s first claim for relief alleges that Defendant violated the False Claims Act 10 (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). “The FCA imposes significant civil liability on any person who… 11 (A) ‘knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 12 approval,’ (B) ‘knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement 13 material to a false or fraudulent claim,’ or (C) ‘conspires to commit a violation of [the 14 FCA].’ ” Winter ex rel. United States v. Garden Reg'l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 953 F.3d 1108, 15 1114 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)). 16 The FCA contains an anti-retaliation provision which states that “[a]ny employee, 17 contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make that employee, contractor, or 18 agent whole, if that employee, contractor, or agent is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, 19 harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment 20 because of lawful acts done by the employee, contractor, agent or associated others in furtherance 21 of an action under this section or other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of this subchapter.” 22 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). An employee must prove three elements in a FCA retaliation claim: (1) the 23 employee engaged in conduct protected under the statute; (2) the employer knew that the 24 employee engaged in protected conduct; and (3) the employer discriminated against the employee 25 because she engaged in protected conduct.” Mooney v. Fife, 118 F.4th 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2024). 26 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation in violation of the FCA 27 because the complaint does not contain sufficient and plausible factual allegations that (1) Plaintiff 1 engaged in activity protected under the statute or (2) a connection between her reporting and any 2 adverse employment action. Both Defendant’s arguments fail. 3 When an employee “alleges [s]he was trying to stop a FCA violation,” “ ‘an employee 4 engages in protected activity where (1) the employee in good faith believes, and (2) a reasonable 5 employee in the same or similar circumstances might believe, that the employer is possibly 6 committing fraud against the government.” Rako v. VMware LLC, No. 25-CV-05142-SVK, 2025 7 WL 3277352, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing Mooney v. Fife, 118 F.4th 1081, 1091 (9th 8 Cir. 2024)).3 The Ninth Circuit has noted that “this test does not set a high bar.” Id. at 1092. 9 Plaintiff alleges that she escalated concerns about NTT bribery of potential government 10 customers which would render fraudulent “certifications that NTT signed attesting that they will 11 not influence or attempt to influence the award of federal funds in this way.” Dkt. 24, FAC, ¶ 55. 12 See also id. ¶¶ 54, 56, 60, 91. This alleged whistleblowing is sufficient at this stage to establish protected activity under the FCA. See Los Angeles Cnty., et al. ex rel. Karen Gluck v. Thomas 13 Shepos, et al., No. CV 19-1773 PA (MAAX), 2026 WL 796905 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2026) (No- 14 bribery certifications supplied a sufficient basis for FCA claims at summary judgment stage.). 15 As for causation, “[i]t suffices at this pleading stage for [Plaintiff] to simply give notice 16 that she believes [NTT] terminated her because of her investigation into the practices she specified 17 in the complaint.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). 18 Plaintiff makes these allegations. See e.g., Dkt. 24, FAC, ¶ 1 (alleging Plaintiff was “wrongfully 19 terminated… in retaliation for whistleblowing”); id. ¶ 100 (alleging that “[i]mmediately following 20 [her] reporting, NTT retaliated against [Plaintiff] by taking adverse employment actions against 21 her and by discriminating and retaliating against her”). Accordingly, her claim for retaliation 22 under the False Claims Act survives. 23

25 3 Defendant inaccurately represents the rule followed by Rako v. VMware LLC: “to allege that she 26 was engaged in ‘protected activity’ under the FCA, Plaintiff must allege she reported that the Company was committing fraud against the government.” Dkt. 25, Mot. to Dismiss, at 11 (citing 27 Rako v. VMware LLC, No. 25-CV-05142- SVK, 2025 WL 3277352, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). B. Retaliation for Reporting Bribery, Misuse of Funds, and Fraud Violative of 1 California Labor Code § 1102.5 2 To establish a prima facie case under California Labor Code § 1102.5, “a plaintiff must 3 show (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) her employer subjected her to an adverse 4 employment action, and (3) there is a causal link between the two.” Patten v. Grant Joint Union 5 High Sch. Dist., 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1384, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 113 (2005), overruled on other 6 grounds by Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc., 12 Cal. 5th 703, 503 P.3d 659 (2022). 7 Protected activity includes “disclos[ing] information… to a person with authority over the 8 employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the 9 violation or noncompliance… if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information 10 discloses a violation of state or federal statute, … rule[,] or regulation[.]” Cal. Lab. Code 11 § 1102.5(b)–(c). By sufficiently alleging whistleblowing of a bribery-based FCA violation, 12 Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong. For the same reasons that her FCA retaliation claim 13 sufficiently alleged a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment 14 action, i.e., termination, the second and third prongs are also sufficiently pleaded at this stage. 15 C. Gender Discrimination Under FEHA 16 Plaintiff’s third claim is for gender discrimination under the California Fair Employment 17 and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a). To establish a prima facie case of 18 discrimination under FEHA, Plaintiff must generally show that (1) she was a member of a 19 protected class, (2) she was performing competently in her position, (3) she suffered an adverse 20 employment action, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. Guz v. 21 Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000). Although this prima facie threshold is an 22 evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement, see Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 23 1136 (9th Cir. 2019), courts routinely look to these elements to decide whether a plaintiff has 24 stated a plausible claim at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Claremont Middle 25 Sch., No. C 12-02639 LB, 2012 WL 5988548, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2012). 26 Defendant argues without success that Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish adverse 27 employment action that is causally connected to her gender. Adverse employment action means 1 explicit “changes in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; that is, changes involving 2 some official action taken by the employer.” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal.4th 686, 706 3 (2009) (cleaned up). Official action with respect to the employee often includes “firing, failing to 4 promote, adverse job assignment, significant change in compensation or benefits, or official 5 disciplinary action.” Id. Plaintiff avers adverse employment action by alleging NTT increased her 6 sales quotas but not those of her male counterparts. Dkt. 24, FAC, ¶ 46. “[A]ssigning more, or 7 more burdensome, work responsibilities, is an adverse employment action.” Davis v. Team Elec. 8 Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Sangster v. Hewlett Packard Enter. Co., No. 9 23-CV-05438-HSG, 2024 WL 3408216, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2024) (Setting higher sales 10 goals for plaintiff than male colleagues was sufficient for a FEHA discrimination suit.). Plaintiff 11 also alleges she was passed over for jobs in favor of less qualified men and not given the same job 12 title or pay as her male counterparts. Dkt. 24, FAC, ¶¶ 28, 30–35. Plaintiff’s allegations may 13 establish other adverse actions, but at this stage these are sufficient. 14 Plaintiff also pleads other circumstances suggesting discriminatory motive. She alleges 15 gender-hostile work environments on male-dominated sales trips, id. ¶ 49, humiliating comments 16 encouraging her to smile more, id. ¶ 43, and adverse action against other similarly situated women 17 but not men, id. ¶ 51–52. At this stage, that is sufficient. 18 D. Retaliation for Reporting Discrimination and Harassment Under FEHA, California Labor Code § 1102.5, and Title VII 19 Plaintiff must show that her reporting of discrimination and harassment was a protected 20 activity under FEHA and California Labor Code § 1102.5 and is causally related to an adverse 21 employment action. See Patten, 134 Cal.App.4th at 1384 (section 1102.5); Passantino v. Johnson 22 & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000) (Title VII). Under FEHA, 23 Plaintiff must make the same showing and additionally must demonstrate that “the protected 24 activity was a motivating reason for the adverse action,” and “the employer’s conduct caused harm 25 to the plaintiff.” Lewis v. City of Benicia, 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 794, 808 (Ct. App. 2014). 26 Plaintiff alleges that after a humiliating meeting in June 2022, she was prevented from 27 hiring to bring her team up to normal staffing levels and she was singled out for an increased sales 1 quota. She alleges she reported both forms of mistreatment “repeatedly,” “directly” and 2 “regularly” to her superiors, including to Charles Honeycutt and Jonathan Sellers. Dkt. 24, FAC, 3 ¶¶ 45–46. She also alleges that she sent an email to NTT superiors Leigh Juul, Honeycutt, and 4 Richard Harper in June 2023 documenting attempts to harm her ability to do her job and sent 5 follow-ups about abusive behavior to other female employees that “was a symptom of a large 6 problem at NTT.” Id. ¶ 62. In September 2023, Plaintiff escalated complaints about another 7 woman who was singled out for increased sales quotas. 8 Defendant argues that these allegations are insufficient because it is not clear to whom 9 Plaintiff made each of her alleged reports and because Plaintiff “does not allege that she suggested 10 [in her reports] the ‘abusive behavior’ was because of these employees’ genders.” Dkt. 25, MTD, 11 at 18. However, in the same sentence that she alleges she was “improperly singled out for 12 increased quotas” and in the same paragraph she alleges she “complained about this conduct to her 13 supervisors directly and regularly,” Plaintiff alleges “[n]o similar tactics were taken as to her male 14 coworkers.” Id. ¶ 46. In other words, “[t]his conduct” that Plaintiff reported encompasses her 15 being singled out compared to her male peers. It is clear in context that Plaintiff’s complaints 16 discussed disparate treatment of herself and her female colleagues and included concern about 17 gender discrimination. See e.g., id. ¶ 50 (Plaintiff “regularly complained about this conduct and 18 later gender discrimination…including to her direct supervisors.”). 19 However, the allegations do not establish sufficiently that the reporting of gender 20 discrimination was a cause or motivating factor of the adverse employment action. Plaintiff alleges 21 that after she “complained and blew the whistle on illegal activity, she became persona non 22 grata.” Id. ¶ 68. However, in context the reported illegal activity spurring NTT’s retaliation is bribery, not gender discrimination. Plaintiff’s other allegations of retaliation also fail because they 23 either similarly indicate that the reporting pertained to bribery or they are conclusory. See e.g., id. 24 ¶ 88 (“[H]er termination was malicious… in retaliation for her reporting of illegal conduct.”); id. ¶ 25 1 (She was “terminated… in retaliation for whistleblowing[.]”); id. ¶ 120 (“Lynn’s protected 26 activity [of reporting gender discrimination] was a motivating factor for the adverse employment 27 1 was the cause of adverse employment action, Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief fails. 2 E. Hostile Work Environment Claim 3 To establish a claim for harassment under FEHA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she 4 is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to harassment because she belonged to 5 this group; and (3) the alleged harassment was so severe that it created a hostile work 6 environment. Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff 7 must also file an administrative claim within one year of the events giving rise to the charge if the 8 events took place prior to 2020 and within three years if the events took place after 2020. Cal. 9 Gov’t Code § 12960(d) (2018); Cal. Gov't Code § 12960(e) (2020). A hostile work environment is 10 present “when the harassing conduct sufficiently offends, humiliates, distresses, or intrudes upon 11 its victim, so as to disrupt the victim's emotional tranquility in the workplace, affect the victim's 12 ability to perform the job as usual, or otherwise interfere with and undermine the victim's personal 13 sense of well-being.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923(a). 14 Harassment requires a “ ‘concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a 15 generalized nature,’ ” Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 16 Cal.4th 121, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 980 P.2d 846, 851 (1999)), that falls “outside the scope of 17 necessary job performance,” Janken v. GM Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th. 55, 63 (1996), and 18 “commonly necessary personnel management actions such as hiring and firing,” Reno v. Baird, 18 19 Cal. 4th 640, 646–47 (1998) (citations omitted). Rarely, “official employment actions” will 20 constitute harassment and only where they “communicat[e] a hostile message” and are so “severe 21 or pervasive as to alter the working conditions.” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 708–9 22 (2009), as modified (Feb. 10, 2010). The objective severity of harassment should be judged from 23 the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances. 24 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 25 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred. A plaintiff must file an 26 administrative claim within one year of the events giving rise to the charge if the events took place 27 prior to 2020 and within three years if the events took place after 2020. Cal. Gov’t Code 1 § 12960(d) (2018); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960(e) (2020). Here, Plaintiff filed an administrative 2 claim in November 2025; therefore, conduct after November 2022 is actionable.4 Plaintiff alleges 3 she complained about gender discrimination throughout the later part of her time at NTT between 4 2018 and 2023, including making a report in March 2023 after being publicly berated by a male 5 coworker. She also alleges that a colleague asked if she believed she was experiencing gender 6 discrimination in August and October 2023, indicating harassing conduct was occurring at that 7 time. In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations establish at least some pattern of conduct that is not time- 8 barred. 9 Defendant also argues that the alleged conduct is not sufficiently severe or pervasive. 10 Plaintiff, however, has alleged that because of her gender, she was singled out for quota increases, 11 she was berated, male colleagues attempted to sabotage her major sales and take over accounts, 12 and client trips created a highly uncomfortable environment. She also alleges that another female 13 colleague, Michelle Campnell, experienced similar treatment around September 2023: e.g., 14 unattainable quotas, berating, exclusion from important business opportunities. This is sufficient 15 to plead a severe and pervasive hostile work environment. 16 F. Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination, Retaliation and Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy 17 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s sixth claim for failure to prevent harassment, 18 discrimination, and retaliation must fail because it is derivative of Plaintiff’s FEHA claims. 19 However, as discussed, Plaintiff’s gender discrimination FEHA claim survives. So too does her 20 sixth claim. 21

22 4 Conduct that was part of a continuing violation per the continuing violation doctrine may also be 23 considered. See Hoglund v. Sierra Nev. Memorial-Miners Hosp., 102 Cal.App.5th 56, 71 (May 17, 2024). The continuing violation inquiry should be made with regard to specific types of conduct 24 and requires a sufficiently similar factual context between the earlier and later conduct as well as reasonable frequency of the conduct. See Bois v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. 23-CV-02772-TLT, 25 2024 WL 4004980, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2024). The doctrine does not apply if the conduct had become permanent during the earlier time-barred period. Permanence is reached “when the 26 employee is on notice that further efforts to end the unlawful conduct will be in vain.” Richards, 26 Cal. 4th at 823. It is not necessary at this juncture to determine whether the continuing violation 27 doctrine applies to some of Plaintiff’s claims. The post-November 2022 conduct is sufficient at this stage. 1 Defendant similarly argues that Plaintiff’s seventh claim for wrongful termination against 2 public policy must fail because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficiently that she was terminated as a 3 result of reporting activity. Although Plaintiff has not shown she was terminated for reporting 4 gender discrimination, she has alleged properly that she was terminated for reporting bribery. Her 5 seventh claim accordingly survives. 6 G. Breach of Contract and Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 7 To state a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege, the “(1) existence of the 8 contract; (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) 9 damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach.” CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado, 158 Cal. App. 4th 10 1226, 1239 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Every contract also includes an implied covenant of good faith 11 and fair dealing “that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to 12 receive the benefits of the agreement.” Carson v. Mercury Ins. Co., 210 Cal. App. 4th 409, 429 13 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of the covenant is to “mak[e] effective the 14 agreement’s promises.” Id. 15 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not identified any contract, let alone one that bars NTT 16 from interfering with or reassigning Plaintiff’s clients and deals, revising her quotas, and 17 terminating her employment in bad faith and without good cause or that requires NTT timely 18 allocate equity distributions. However, both Defendant and Plaintiff agree that Plaintiff was at 19 least employed at-will by NTT, meaning they do not dispute the existence of an employment 20 agreement. Moreover, Plaintiff specifically discusses an employment agreement entered into when 21 she accepted the new Area Sales Director, Public Sector position in November 2012. 22 Plaintiff does not identify specific provisions regarding obligations reflected in that offer 23 letter or other employment agreements in place prohibiting NTT from reassigning Plaintiff’s 24 clients, revising her quotas, or failing to distribute equity. However, breach of the implied 25 covenant of good faith and fair dealing is pleaded sufficiently without more contractual details. 26 Plaintiff alleges NTT was frustrating her ability to perform her job and terminated her in 27 retaliation for reporting illegal activity, both of which establish a claim for breach of the implied 1 covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment agreement. 2 H. Equal Pay Act 3 The California Equal Pay Act provides that no employer shall discriminate by paying 4 different wages to employees of opposite sexes within an establishment for jobs that require 5 substantially equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 6 conditions. Green v. Par Pools Inc., 111 Cal. App. 4th 620, 623 (2003) (citing Cal. Lab. Code 7 § 1197.5) (The California Equal Pay Act is nearly identical to the federal statute and subject to the 8 same analysis.); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (federal Equal Pay Act standard); E.E.O.C. v. Maricopa 9 Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 736 F.2d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1984) (federal Equal Pay Act standard). 10 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s ninth claim based on violations of the California Equal Pay Act 11 fail because Plaintiff has not alleged adequately that her job and those of her higher-paid male 12 coworkers Jason Green, Joey Paul, and Jess Kwiatkowski required the same duties and skill. 13 However, Defendant admits that, “[a]s to all three men, Plaintiff alleges… that they were 14 ‘responsible for the same job responsibilities as [Plaintiff], with the same team on the same scale, 15 but for different geographical areas.’ ” Dkt. 25, Mot. to Dismiss, at 24 (quoting Dkt. 24, FAC, 16 ¶ 32). At this stage, that is sufficient. 17 I. Retaliation for Disclosing Workplace Misconduct 18 Plaintiff’s tenth claim is for retaliation for disclosing workplace misconduct in violation of 19 California Labor Code § 232.5. Under Section 232.5(c), “[n]o employer may ... [d]ischarge, 20 formally discipline, or otherwise discriminate against an employee who discloses information 21 about the employer’s working conditions.” Although the statute does not define “working 22 conditions,” Defendant argues it does not include the gifts to public officials and efforts to quash 23 her contracts that Plaintiff alleges she reported. Plaintiff, however, has described working 24 conditions: she alleges tacit acceptance of bribery, reporting fraud, and gender discrimination was 25 a requirement to keep her job. This claim survives. 26 J. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 27 Plaintiff’s eleventh claim is for intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of 1 California Civil Code (§) 3294. To establish an IIED claim in California, a plaintiff must allege: 2 “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless 3 disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or 4 extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the 5 defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009) (quoting Potter 6 v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993)). “Extreme and outrageous conduct” 7 means conduct “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized 8 community,” and it must be “intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that 9 injury will result.” Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001. Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s IIED claim on two 10 grounds: any IIED claim against NTT is barred by the California Workers’ Compensation Act 11 (“WCA”) and Plaintiff does not state sufficient facts to show NTT engaged in “extreme and 12 outrageous conduct.” 13 WCA provides the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained in connection with “actions that 14 are a normal part of the employment relationship.” Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc., 186 15 Cal.App.4th 338, 367 (2010) (citing Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District, 43 Cal.3d 148, 16 160, 233 Cal.Rptr. 308, 729 P.2d 743 (1987)). These actions include “demotions, promotions, [and] criticism of work practices,” Cole, 43 Cal.3d at 160, and do not exclude even actions that are 17 “manifestly unfair, outrageous, harassment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance,” Singh, 18 186 Cal.App.4th at 367 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, WCA 19 exclusivity does not apply when the conduct contravenes public policy. See Gibbs v. American 20 Airlines, 74 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 (1999); Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 1 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1085 21 (1992). The California Court of Appeal has explained that plaintiffs may pursue their claims 22 “where the conduct at issue violates FEHA and also satisfies the elements of the [IIED] claim,” 23 because such “unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA falls outside the 24 compensation bargain,” and therefore outside the ambit of “worker’s compensation exclusivity.” 25 Light v. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 14 Cal. App. 5th 75, 101 (2017). See also Miller v. Walmart 26 Inc., No. 22-CV-03878-RS, 2022 WL 4287161, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2022). Here, Plaintiff 27 has pled successfully violations of FEHA. Accordingly, WCA exclusivity does not apply to the 1 conduct underlying those claims. 2 As to Defendant’s second argument, that Plaintiff has not alleged extreme and outrageous 3 conduct, under California law properly pled allegations of discrimination, harassment, and 4 retaliation based on protected class can satisfy the elements of IIED. See e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 618 (Ct. App. 1989) (“[I]f properly pled, sexual 5 harassment will constitute the outrageous behavior element of a cause of action for intentional 6 infliction of emotional distress.”); Wason v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., No. 09CV2752-LAB CAB, 2010 7 WL 1881067, at *8 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2010) (Allegations of supervisor’s interference with receipt 8 of disability benefits was sufficient to establish supervisor, against whom IIED and NIED claims 9 were brought, was not a sham defendant.). Plaintiff has properly pled discrimination, harassment, 10 and retaliation as discussed. Specifically, she alleges she was subject to “bullying, strong-arming, 11 and harassing,” Dkt. 24, FAC, ¶ 63, “publicly berated,” id. ¶ 50, and sales environments that “led 12 to unwanted sexual comments and attention form customers,” id. ¶ 49. In sum, Plaintiff has pled a 13 claim for IIED. 14 K. Failure to Pay Earned Wages 15 Plaintiff’s final claim is based on failure to pay earned wages under California Labor Code 16 § 201, 203. Section 201 provides for immediate payment of earned and unpaid wages at the time 17 of discharge, and Section 203 authorizes recovery of up to 30 days of wages “as a penalty” where 18 an employer willfully fails to pay wages when an employee is discharged or resigns. Cal. Lab. 19 Code §§ 201(a), 203(a). 20 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim must fail because she has not alleged her stock 21 shares were vested, earned, or payable at the time of separation. Plaintiff alleges she “was entitled 22 to equity in NTT in the amount of 26,000 shares of stock, with quarterly dividends,” compensation 23 which was “standard to employees of Lynn’s position in NTT” and was “timely paid to [her] male 24 counterparts,” but which she was not paid. Dkt. 24, FAC, ¶ 180. 25 Whether Plaintiff is correct that she was entitled to the equity or Defendant is correct that 26 she was not, the issue is “disputed” just as Defendant admits, Dkt. 25, Mot. to Dismiss, at 27, and 27 thus better resolved at the summary judgement stage. At this stage, Plaintiff’s “[a]llegations that 1 [her] employer failed to pay earned wages owed at separation are sufficient to place [NTT] on 2 || notice of the claim[.]” See Jravanian v. TransPerfect Translations Int'l, Inc., No. 22-CV-09157- 3 JST, 2026 WL 747458, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2026), opinion vacated in part on 4 || reconsideration sub nom. HANIEH IRAVANIAN, Plaintiff, v. TRANSPERFECT TRANSLATIONS 5 || INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant., No. 22-CV-09157-JST, 2026 WL 1486575 (N.D. Cal. May 6 27, 2026) (citing Bruno v. U.S. Renal Care, Inc., No. 21-cv-04617-FLA-MRW, 2022 WL 7 2439525, at *4—-5 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2022) (rejecting argument that plaintiff was required to plead g dates of termination, amounts of final paycheck, or specific unpaid sums); Bernstein v. Vocus, 9 Inc., No. 14-CV-01561-TEH, 2014 WL 3673307, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2014) (“Plaintiff's 10 allegations that Defendants failed to pay him salary, bonus, and stock is sufficient to state a claim under Labor Code section 203.”)). Plaintiffs twelfth claim survives. 1] V. CONCLUSION a 12 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in 13 3 part. Plaintiffs fourth claim for retaliation for reporting gender discrimination is dismissed with 14 leave to amend. Defendant’s motion is denied as to the rest of Plaintiffs claims. 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Z 18 Dated: June 2, 2026 19 “ 20 CHARD SEEBORG 1 Chief United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CASE No. 25-cv-09844-RS