United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 20-2015 SELCUK KARAMANOGLU,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF YARMOUTH; BRIAN ANDREASEN, individually; DANIEL GALLANT, in his capacity as Chief of Police of the Yarmouth Police Department,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John H. Rich III, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges, and Woodlock,* District Judge.
Tyler J. Smith, with whom Gene R. Libby was on brief, for appellant. Kasia S. Park, with whom Edward R. Benjamin, Jr. was on brief, for appellees.
September 30, 2021
* Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. WOODLOCK, District Judge. What has become this federal
case originated in a domestic relations dispute scenario more
familiar to local police and state courts. A jealous girlfriend
entered the house of her boyfriend while he was sleeping to look
for evidence of infidelity. After she woke him and they engaged
in a heated discussion, the boyfriend told her to leave. She
refused and began hitting him; he responded by violently pushing
her out of the house.
She reported the incident to the police. The officer
assigned that evening interviewed her and then interviewed the
boyfriend, whom he thereupon arrested for domestic abuse assault.
When the charges were dropped and the boyfriend no longer
faced the potential for an adverse criminal judgment, he sued the
assigned police officer, the police chief, and the town in federal
court for violating his federal and state civil rights by arresting
him without probable cause. He contended that he had used
justifiable force under state law to defend himself and his
property during his encounter with the girlfriend.
On the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the
district court dismissed the case, finding that the officer had
probable cause to arrest the boyfriend. As we will explain, on de
novo review, we agree.
- 2 - I.
A. Factual Background
On the evening of Saturday, June 15, 2018, Rose Heikkinen
— a girlfriend and sexual partner of Plaintiff Selcuk Karamanoglu,
who had been staying with him every weekend — used a garage door
opener in her possession to enter Mr. Karamanoglu’s Yarmouth,
Maine home. She searched unsuccessfully for his phone while he
slept, woke him to demand the phone, and ultimately confronted him
about a message he had received from an ex-girlfriend. As a result
of that questioning, she hit Mr. Karamanoglu with the garage door
opener and the phone, causing physical injuries to him. After she
then smashed the garage door opener on the floor and lifted the
phone into the air, Mr. Karamanoglu grabbed her wrists to stop her
from hitting him and told her to leave his house.
Ms. Heikkinen continued to try to hit Mr. Karamanoglu as
he pushed her toward the doorway, and at one point she pushed him
to the ground. According to Ms. Heikkinen, Mr. Karamanoglu
grabbed her neck while pushing her out of the house and eventually
pushed her down “two or three” stairs onto the garage floor.
Ms. Heikkinen went to the Yarmouth police station, where
she presented her account of the incident orally to Officer Brian
Andreasen, who was called into the station that evening to
investigate the complaint. In addition to eliciting oral
statements from Ms. Heikkinen, Officer Andreasen also obtained a
- 3 - written statement from her. In relaying her account to Officer
Andreasen orally, Ms. Heikkinen characterized herself as “more
aggressive” than Mr. Karamanoglu throughout the interaction.
Officer Andreasen observed blood on her clothing, marks on her
neck, and that she was holding her ribcage while complaining of
pain there.
Officer Andreasen next went to Mr. Karamanoglu’s house
to hear his account, bringing along Joshua Robinson, another
officer on duty that night. Mr. Karamanoglu told the officers
that Ms. Heikkinen attacked him and that he was pushing her to try
to remove her from his home. Mr. Karamanoglu says he showed
Officer Andreasen wounds on his arm, hand, and chest.1
Officer Andreasen then arrested Mr. Karamanoglu for
domestic violence assault. In his deposition, Officer Andreasen
testified that all of Mr. Karamanoglu’s use of force could be
justified except for the grab of Ms. Heikkinen’s neck.
The case against Mr. Karamanoglu was dropped in state
1 Officer Andreasen testified in his deposition and by affidavit that he did not see (or at least did not remember seeing) any visible injuries on Mr. Karamanoglu. For his part, Mr. Karamanoglu alleges that “Andreasen did not want to listen to what [he] the plaintiff was saying.” The blood observed on Ms. Heikkinen’s clothing was consistent with Mr. Karamanoglu’s testimony concerning his visible injuries. Thus, treating the evidence of record in the light most favorable to Mr. Karamanoglu, we find the record sufficient to establish that when Officer Andreasen interviewed Mr. Karamanoglu, he displayed visible injuries that had been inflicted by Ms. Heikkinen, as corroborated by blood on her clothing.
- 4 - court on June 21, 2018 — less than a week after the arrest. An
assistant district attorney gave the following oral explanation to
the court:
By victim’s, Rose['s], own admission, she went to Selcuk’s home at night while he was sleeping, entered without his permission, woke him up. She was angry because she thought he had been seeing someone else. He told her repeatedly to leave. She refused repeatedly. She was committing a criminal trespass and he was justified in using reasonable force to remove her from his home. The force he used was reasonable and she used force against him in return including grabbing him by his testicles,[2] thereby escalating the violence. No likelihood of successful prosecution.
B. Procedural History
Some six months after the case against him was dismissed,
Mr. Karamanoglu sued the Town of Yarmouth, Officer Andreasen and
the Chief of the Yarmouth Police Department, on January 14, 2019
in the United States District Court for the District of Maine.
Karamanoglu claimed that he was arrested without probable cause
and sought relief under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Maine Civil
Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4681, et seq. The
parties thereafter agreed that, for summary judgment purposes,
resolution of the federal claim would control the outcome of the
2 That Ms. Heikkinen grabbed Mr. Karamanoglu by his testicles was apparently a fact unknown to Officer Andreasen at the time of arrest. As a consequence, we do not consider that allegation part of the body of information upon which Officer Andreasen could have relied in making his determination of whom, if anyone, to arrest.
- 5 - state law claim. The case proceeded upon consent before Magistrate
Judge Rich, who granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
concluding that (i) Officer Andreasen had probable cause for his
arrest of Mr. Karamanoglu, (ii) even if he did not, he was entitled
to qualified immunity in his decision to make the arrest,
(iii) without a constitutional violation by Officer Andreasen, any
municipal and supervisory liability claims against the Town of
Yarmouth and its Chief of Police failed, and (iv) even if there
were an underlying constitutional violation by Officer Andreasen,
Mr. Karamanoglu did not adequately allege that the Town of Yarmouth
acted with deliberate indifference.
Mr. Karamanoglu has appealed the grant of summary
judgment, arguing that Officer Andreasen lacked probable cause to
arrest him.
II.
As explained, Mr. Karamanoglu brings a federal cause of
action alleging that his arrest was unlawful because Officer
Andreasen lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Karamanoglu for
domestic violence assault. To evaluate this claim, we first
consider the elements of domestic violence assault under Maine
law. We then look to federal law to determine whether Officer
Andreasen had probable cause to believe Mr. Karamanoglu had
committed the state-law offense.
- 6 - A.
We set the stage by describing the relevant elements of
the crime for which Mr. Karamanoglu was arrested. In Maine, a
person has committed the crime of domestic violence assault if he
or she has intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily
injury or offensive physical contact to a family or household
member. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, §§ 207, 207-A. Family or
household members in this context include individuals “who are or
were sexual partners.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 4002(4).
Under Maine law, “a law enforcement officer may arrest without a
warrant . . . [a]ny person who the officer has probable cause to
believe has committed . . . [d]omestic violence assault.” Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 15(1)(A)(5-B).
Maine criminal law recognizes “three broad categories of
criminal defenses,” including justifications for what would
otherwise be an assault. State v. Ouellette, 37 A.3d 921, 925
(Me. 2012).3 Two such justifications are relevant here.
Maine law provides that a “reasonable degree of
3 In Ouellette, Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court reiterated its enumeration of “the three broad categories of criminal defenses — a failure of the State’s proof, an affirmative defense, and a justification or excuse” — noting that they “differ primarily based on the allocation of the parties’ respective burdens.” 37 A.3d at 925 (citing State v. LaVallee-Davidson, 26 A.3d 828, 832–33 (Me. 2011)). Under Maine criminal law “a justification places on the defendant a burden of production to generate an issue with sufficient evidence, and then imposes on the State the burden of persuasion to disprove the defense.” Id. (citation omitted).
- 7 - nondeadly force” used during a domestic violence assault may be
justified if it was deployed in self-defense — i.e., to defend
against the imminent use of unlawful, nondeadly force by another
— as long as the person using defensive force did not provoke the
use of force by the other person and was not “the initial
aggressor.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 108.1.B.4 A person
Maine criminal law strictly construes statutory justifications. See generally State v. Williams, 433 A.2d 765, 769–70 (Me. 1981) (concluding that “deadly force” does not include a threat to use such force). 4 Section 108.1, in pertinent part, specifically states that: A person is justified in using a reasonable degree of nondeadly force upon another person in order to defend the person or a 3rd person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person, and the person may use a degree of such force that the person reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose. However, such force is not justifiable if:
A. With a purpose to cause physical harm to another person, the person provoked the use of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person; or
B. The person was the initial aggressor, unless after such aggression the person withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person the intent to do so, but the other person notwithstanding continues the use or threat of unlawful, nondeadly force; . . . .
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 108.1.
- 8 - defending against domestic violence assault may, however, only use
the degree of force that the person "reasonably believes to be
necessary" for purposes of self-defense. Id.
On a parallel track, Maine law provides that a person
in control of premises is justified in using nondeadly force on
another person if he "reasonably believes it necessary to prevent
or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass” by that person.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 104.1.5 A person commits a
criminal trespass if she enters a dwelling place knowing that she
is not licensed or privileged to do so or remains in that place
after a lawful order to leave. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A,
§ 402.1(A), (D).
To prevail at trial, the government must disprove any
justification presented beyond a reasonable doubt if evidence of
record raises the issue. See generally State v. Cardilli, 254
A.3d 415, 421–24 (Me. 2021) (discussing deadly force
justifications); State v. Asante, 236 A.3d 464, 469 (Me. 2020)
5 Section 104.1 specifically states that: A person in possession or control of premises or a person who is licensed or privileged to be thereon is justified in using nondeadly force upon another person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 104.1.
- 9 - (discussing deadly force and self-defense); State v. Villacci, 187
A.3d 576, 580–81 (Me. 2018) (discussing justifications for
domestic violence assault); Ouellette, 37 A.3d at 925–30
(discussing categories of criminal defenses). However, as we will
explain, an officer in the field need not disprove a potential
justification beyond a reasonable doubt before making an arrest.
B.
Having examined the state-law offense for which
Mr. Karamanoglu was arrested, we turn to the question of whether
that arrest was unreasonable under federal law.
The elements of a § 1983 unlawful arrest claim are
analogous to the common-law tort of false arrest. See Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). A federal constitutional tort of
false arrest — and thus an unlawful arrest under § 1983 — occurs
when there is detention without probable cause and without legal
process (i.e., without a valid warrant). See id. at 388–89; Jordan
v. Town of Waldoboro, 943 F.3d 532, 551 (1st Cir. 2019);
(Barron, J., concurring). The police response in this case,
involving a warrantless arrest for a contested state-law criminal
violation, must therefore be evaluated against principles of
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Arrests are
- 10 - seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore must be
reasonable. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
Thus, in the case of an arrest for domestic violence assault, the
reasonableness of the arrest depends on whether an officer with
authority to make a warrantless arrest had probable cause to
believe that the person committed the crime of domestic violence
assault. See Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192 (2013).
“[P]robable cause exists when an officer, acting upon apparently
trustworthy information, reasonably can conclude that a crime has
been . . . committed and that the suspect is implicated in its
commission.” United States v. Flores, 888 F.3d 537, 543 (1st Cir.
2018) (quoting Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir.
2009)). Probable cause is defined by federal law, not state law.
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008).
Whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is
determined by viewing the totality of the circumstances from the
perspective of an objectively reasonable officer. Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). Consequently, “[i]n assessing
whether probable cause exists, we consider ‘the whole picture.’”
Jordan, 943 F.3d at 542 (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby,
138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018)). Probable cause is “a fluid concept”
and “not a high bar.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983);
- 11 - Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S.
320, 338 (2014)).
“[U]ncorroborated testimony of a victim or other
percipient witness, standing alone, ordinarily can support a
finding of probable cause.” Acosta v. Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc.,
386 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 2004). Corroboration of a victim’s
account may also provide further support for probable cause. See
Nelson v. Moore, 470 F.2d 1192, 1197 (1st Cir. 1972) (finding
probable cause to arrest petitioner for assault based on victim
statement corroborated by victim’s visible injuries and possession
of key). On the other hand, where a witness account is disputed,
police officers do not have an “unflagging duty” to complete a
full investigation before making a probable cause determination.
Acosta, 386 F.3d at 11; Holder v. Town of Sandown, 585 F.3d 500,
505–06 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding sufficient probable cause for
assault despite different accounts by husband and wife). Town of
Sandown was explicit in its “reliance on Supreme Court precedent,”
for this court’s “reject[ion of] the proposition that a police
officer has a standing obligation to investigate potential
defenses or resolve conflicting accounts prior to making an
arrest.” Id. at 505 (emphasis supplied, citation omitted).
However, an officer may not “treat evidence of innocence
with impunity.” Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 114 (1st Cir. 1999).
Because probable cause is a totality-of-the-circumstances
- 12 - determination, courts will not ignore “facts tending to dissipate
probable cause.” Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012,
1023–24 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Such facts, of course,
are part of the whole picture. See, e.g., Garcia v. Doe, 779 F.3d
84, 93 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that although officers need not
explore every claim of innocence, their deliberate disregard of
known facts may defeat probable cause); Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d
646, 650–51 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding no probable cause when officer
failed to interview eyewitness and did not consider evidence
negating requisite intent for assault); Bigford v. Taylor, 834
F.2d 1213, 1218–20 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that obvious age and
worn condition of vehicle negated finding probable cause that
vehicle had been stolen when no matching vehicle reported stolen).
The relevant inquiry is whether, on balance, the facts
known to the officer at the time of the arrest support probable
cause. See Town of Sandown, 585 F.3d at 504. And because probable
cause “does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities,” Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)), probable cause to believe one
person committed a crime by definition does not foreclose the
possibility that probable cause would also exist to believe another
person committed the same or a parallel crime. When two people are
striking each other, it is certainly possible that probable cause
may exist to arrest either or both of them. In each instance, it
- 13 - depends on whether the "facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent
person . . . in believing . . . that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v.
Defillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).
We have recently observed that “probable cause is not a
creature of certainty and does not require either the level of
proof needed to secure a conviction or even an ‘unusually high
degree of assurance.’” United States v. Centeno-González, 989
F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Clark, 685
F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2012)). Rather, an officer’s conclusion
that probable cause exists requires only objective
reasonableness. Acosta, 386 F.3d at 10–11 (quoting United States
v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 555 (1st Cir. 1999)).
C.
We now consider whether Officer Andreasen's decision to
arrest Mr. Karamanoglu was objectively reasonable. Our review of
the grant of summary judgment by the district court is de novo,
taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as
the non-moving party, see Jordan, 943 F.3d at 536, bearing in mind
that while “only a jury can resolve reasonably disputed issues of
fact, whether a given set of facts constitutes probable cause is
a legal question,” id. at 541.
- 14 - Mr. Karamanoglu contends that his arrest for state
domestic violence assault was not premised on probable cause and
thus violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure because there was at least a genuine issue of
fact whether the facts known to the police officer at the time of
the arrest justified the use of the force Mr. Karamanoglu deployed
against Ms. Heikkinen because she was the initial aggressor and a
trespasser under the Maine justifications for self-defense and
defense of premises.
We review the facts not in dispute that can be said on
the record before us to have been known to Officer Andreasen when
the arrest was made and conclude that the record establishes there
was probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to arrest
Mr. Karamanoglu on the night in question. Upon that review we
find that Mr. Karamanoglu’s lawsuit does not surmount the
threshold for a federal constitutional violation and that judgment
for the Defendant-Appellees is appropriate.
Ms. Heikkinen told Officer Andreasen that she and
Mr. Karamanoglu had been dating on and off for approximately three
years and that they had a sexual relationship. Officer Andreasen’s
conversation with Mr. Karamanoglu did not reveal any contradictory
information as to the nature of their relationship. Officer
Andreasen therefore had probable cause to believe that
Mr. Karamanoglu and Ms. Heikkinen were family or household members
- 15 - for purposes of Maine domestic violence assault law, which includes
current or former sexual partners within its ambit. Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 19-A, § 4002(4).
According to Ms. Heikkinen’s statement, she initiated
the physical confrontation by hitting Mr. Karamanoglu, to which he
responded by attempting to push her out of the house. As reported
in Ms. Heikkinen’s oral and written accounts, Mr. Karamanoglu
grabbed her neck at some point during this altercation. Officer
Andreasen observed marks on Ms. Heikkinen’s neck that were
consistent with this account. Ms. Heikkinen also stated in writing
that Mr. Karamanoglu pushed her “down the steps into the garage”
and onto the garage floor, conceding that she “pushed him to the
ground too.”
When Officers Andreasen and Robinson arrived at the
home, Mr. Karamanoglu confirmed that he pushed Ms. Heikkinen out
of the house. Ms. Heikkinen had asserted to the officer that she
believed it was during this shove and fall when she hurt her ribs,
and Officer Andreasen noticed that she was holding the right side
of her ribs. That information, obtained from a percipient witness
and corroborated by officer observations, was sufficient for an
objectively reasonable officer to conclude that Mr. Karamanoglu
“intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury” to
- 16 - Ms. Heikkinen.6 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, §§ 207, 207-A. It
also was sufficient for an objectively reasonable officer to
conclude Ms. Heikkinen caused such injury to Mr. Karamanoglu.
As part of our evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances and consideration of the whole picture, we tighten
the frame to focus specifically on Mr. Karamanoglu’s claims of
self-defense and defense of premises.
With respect to self-defense, Ms. Heikkinen told Officer
Andreasen that she was the “more aggressive” party and began the
physical encounter. In her written statement, Ms. Heikkinen made
clear that she “hit [Mr. Karamanoglu] on the chest” and repeatedly
pushed him, including pushing him to the ground. While Officer
Andreasen asserts that he did not see any visible injuries on
Mr. Karamanoglu, in the posture of summary judgment practice, we
accept Mr. Karamanoglu’s testimony that he showed both officers
injuries on his arm, hand, and chest.7 We treat that dispute in
6 The parties dispute whether Officer Andreasen had knowledge of prior domestic abuse incidents involving Mr. Karamanoglu at the time of the arrest. The District Court in finding that there was probable cause did not rely on any knowledge by Officer Andreasen of such prior incidents. We take the same approach, reading the record before us in the light most favorable to Mr. Karamanoglu. 7 The district court struck certain materials from the record — including photographs showing Mr. Karamanoglu’s injuries taken after he was released on bail — because the observations they permitted were developed after Officer Andreasen made his probable cause determination. Mr. Karamanoglu challenges this determination. We need not decide the point because, on de novo review, our conclusion remains the same whether the photos are considered or not. As to the stricken materials regarding a
- 17 - the light most favorable to Mr. Karamanoglu.
Regarding defense of premises, the facts known to
Officer Andreasen at the time of the arrest do not unequivocally
support a finding that Ms. Heikkinen was engaged in a criminal
trespass. To be sure, Ms. Heikkinen referred to the house as
“Selcuk’s house” in her written statement, and she stated that she
entered the house without his knowledge and that he ordered her to
“get out!” However, she entered using a garage door opener given
to her by Mr. Karamanoglu,8 her car was registered to the address
of the home, and her driver’s license was also listed at that
address. We need not decide the question because the degree of
force Mr. Karamanoglu used as reflected in the record, even when
read in the light most favorable to him, could be viewed as
unreasonable despite the fact that some force may have been
justified.
In her written statement, Ms. Heikkinen also admitted
that Mr. Karamanoglu told her to leave before he began using force.
On these facts an objective officer should have concluded that
subsequent police internal investigation, we do not disturb the district court’s finding because the materials were offered to contest the issue of municipal liability, a matter we do not reach. 8 The parties dispute the circumstances under which Ms. Heikkinen had the garage door opener that evening. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the arresting officer knew the garage door opener was in her vehicle, apparently giving her authorized access to Mr. Karamanoglu’s house on the night in question.
- 18 - Mr. Karamanoglu was justified in using some force to defend himself
against an attack that he did not initiate or provoke, or to defend
his home against a no-longer-welcome guest he had directed to leave
the premises. But how much force had been necessary was a matter
of judgment and we conclude that Officer Andreasen’s exercise of
implicit judgment in this regard — that the force used by
Mr. Karamanoglu was not necessary, but rather was disproportionate
— was objectively reasonable.
An objectively reasonable officer evaluating the
circumstances here could have concluded that grabbing
Ms. Heikkinen’s neck during a domestic scrum that ended with
Mr. Karamanoglu pushing her down the stairs onto a garage floor
was unreasonable and disproportionate under the circumstances.
The narratives of both parties and Ms. Heikkinen’s apparent
injuries support that conclusion.
For federal constitutional purposes, we ask only whether
there was probable cause to arrest for the crime identified. Here,
where the prima facie elements of domestic violence assault were
indisputably satisfied as to Mr. Karamanoglu and an objectively
reasonable officer could conclude based on facts known at the time
that an unreasonable amount of force was used by Mr. Karamanoglu
against Ms. Heikkinen, we answer in the affirmative.9
9 Because the case law in this setting is inherently fact- specific, a number of relevant written opinions have been
- 19 - III.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was
probable cause under federal common law supporting the arrest of
Mr. Karamanoglu for domestic violence assault. There was no
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and the district court’s
grant of summary judgment against him was proper. Because there
was no underlying federal constitutional violation in this case,
designated as non-precedential. Nevertheless, a review of both appellate and trial court decisions, particularly in the Second Circuit, confirms our conclusion. See, e.g., Iocovello v. City of New York, 701 F. App’x 71, 71–73 (2d Cir. 2017) (mem.) (finding probable cause to arrest assault victim when officer arrested both victim and perpetrator after listening to statements and observing injuries); Rhodes v. Pittard, 485 F. App’x 113, 115–16 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (finding probable cause to arrest homeowner for assault of trespasser despite homeowner’s claims of defense of premises, when homeowner admitted to pushing trespasser); Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 69–70 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding probable cause to arrest plaintiff after barfight despite conflicting accounts from him and other participants, when plaintiff admitted striking the victim and alleged victim had visible injuries; observing that “[a]lthough a better procedure may have been for the officers to investigate plaintiff’s version of events more completely, the arresting officer does not have to prove plaintiff’s version wrong before arresting him”); Thompson v. Kline, 504 F. Supp. 3d 200, 208–09 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding probable cause to arrest boyfriend when both boyfriend and girlfriend reported domestic incident, boyfriend claimed self- defense, officer observed girlfriend to have more serious visible injuries, and boyfriend admitted pushing her); Moscoso v. City of New York, 92 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding probable cause to arrest plaintiff when plaintiff admitted assault but claimed self-defense justification); Ray v. City of Lacey, No. C09-5636RJB, 2010 WL 3220108, at *11–13 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2010) (finding probable cause to arrest husband after domestic dispute where wife admitted to instigating physical fight, but officers determined husband was primary aggressor after observing both parties’ visible injuries).
- 20 - we do not reach the qualified immunity and municipal liability
contentions also addressed in the parties’ briefing.
AFFIRMED.
- 21 -