UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LJILJANA ZELEN KARADZIC,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 23-cv-1226 (TSC) LISA PALLUCONI, in her official capacity as Acting Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In 2020, Plaintiff Ljiljana Karadzic and her children petitioned the Office of Foreign Assets
Control (“OFAC”) to be removed from its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
List (“SDN List”). In May 2023, they filed this action, claiming that OFAC had unreasonably
delayed adjudicating their delisting request, Compl., ECF No. 1. In October 2023, OFAC denied
their delisting request.
On November 9, 2023, after her children declined to pursue the litigation, Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint, claiming OFAC unreasonably delayed adjudicating her delisting request
(Count I) and unreasonably decided to deny her delisting request (Count II)—both in violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)—and requested attorneys’ fees (Count III). Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 42–53, ECF No. 13.
On September 20, 2024, the court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 19
(“Defs.’ Mot.”), and denied as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16 (“Pl.’s
MSJ”), finding that Count I was rendered moot when OFAC decided Plaintiff’s delisting request.
Karadzic v. Gacki, No. 23-CV-1226 (TSC), 2024 WL 4253132, at *1, *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2024).
Page 1 of 16 Plaintiff now moves for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(1) of Count II.1 Pl.’s Mot. for Recons., ECF No. 31 (“Pl.’s Recons. Mot.”). Because the
court did not address Count II in its Memorandum Opinion, the court will GRANT Plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration. But after re-consideration of the administrative record and the briefs,
the court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on Count II and will GRANT
Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment as to Count II.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background
The court set forth the relevant background in its September 2024 Memorandum Opinion.
Plaintiff is the wife of Radovan Karadzic—a founding member of the Serbian Democratic Party
and former President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Am. Compl. ¶ 8. In
1995, he was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
on two counts of genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity, and four counts of war crimes.
AR77. He was “the subject of a massive international manhunt” until his arrest in Serbia in 2008.
Am. Compl. ¶ 8; see AR74–75. He was ultimately tried, convicted, and sentenced to life
imprisonment. AR77–79; AR93.
B. Statutory & Regulatory Background
In 2003, President Bush issued Executive Order 13304 (“EO 13304”), which both provided
an annex of individuals whose property and interests were blocked by the President and authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to block property and
interests in property of persons they determine “have actively obstructed, or pose [a] significant
1 Because Plaintiff was not the “prevailing party,” she does not dispute the court’s denial of summary judgment on Count III. See Pl.’s Recons. Mot. at 3 n.1.
Page 2 of 16 risk of actively obstructing . . . the Dayton Accords or the Conclusions of the Peace
Implementation Conference” or “have materially assisted in, sponsored, or provided financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of . . . any person listed in
or designated pursuant to this order.” Executive Order 13304: Termination of Emergencies with
Respect to Yugoslavia and Modification of Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001, 68 Fed. Reg.
32315, 32316 (May 28, 2003). Radovan Karadzic was one of the individuals listed in the annex.
Id. at 32319.
The Secretary of the Treasury’s authority under EO 13304 was delegated to OFAC, which
maintains a list of individuals whose assets are blocked, known as the SDN List. 31 C.F.R.
§§ 588.802, 501.807. Anyone on the list may “submit a petition for administrative
reconsideration” of OFAC’s decision. Id. OFAC “conduct[s] a review of the request” and
provides the requesting person with “a written decision.” Id. § 501.807(b)(3).
C. Factual & Procedural Background
While Radovan Karadzic was still at large, Plaintiff and their two children—Aleksandar
and Sonja—were placed on the SDN List because they were “suspected of helping” him “evade
arrest.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10; see Compl. ¶¶ 6–7. In April 2020, they sought to have the decisions
placing them on the list “reconsidered and rescinded” pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 501.807. Am.
Compl. ¶ 15; Compl. ¶ 12. Frustrated with the time it was taking to receive a response from OFAC,
in May 2023, Plaintiff and her children filed this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
requiring OFAC to adjudicate their delisting requests. See Am. Compl. ¶ 28.
In October 2023, OFAC ultimately denied Plaintiff’s request concluding that she “actively
obstructed or poses a significant risk of actively obstructing” the Dayton Accords or the
Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–30; see AR1–3.
Page 3 of 16 Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint without her children, once again challenging
OFAC’s delay in adjudicating her request and the decision denying her request. See Am. Compl.
¶¶ 42–53. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and Defendants moved to dismiss, or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment.
On September 20, 2024, the court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that
Count I was rendered moot when OFAC decided Plaintiff’s delisting request after this lawsuit was
filed and dismissed Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as moot. Six days later, on
September 26, 2024, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(1), arguing that the court failed to address Count II in its Memorandum Opinion.
Pl.’s Recons. Mot. at 1. Defendants respond that the court “reached the correct result in dismissing
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,” but agree that Count II remains ripe for adjudication on the
merits and thus do not oppose Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Recons.
Mot. at 2, ECF No. 32. Plaintiff also proposed minor factual corrections, which Defendants did
not oppose and which are incorporated into this Memorandum Opinion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion for Reconsideration
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a “court may relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment” because of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1), as well as “any other reason that justifies relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). District courts
have discretion over whether to grant Rule 60(b) motions. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974
Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that a party may move to “alter or amend a
judgment . . . no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). “A
Page 4 of 16 Rule 59(e) motion is discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there
is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct
a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts will treat a motion for reconsideration under
Rule 60(b) as a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) if it has been filed within 28 days of
the order at issue. Li v. Blinken, No. 22-CV-2331 (TSC), 2024 WL 5044581, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept.
23, 2024).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs reconsideration of orders that are not final
judgments. See Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 n. 8 (D.D.C. 2002) (Rule
54(b) “addresses interlocutory judgments”); Moore v. Hartman, 332 F. Supp. 2d 252, 256 (D.D.C.
2004) (finding an order was “interlocutory because it denied a motion for summary judgment and
did not dispose of the entire case on the merits”); APCC Servs., 281 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (explaining
that Rule 54(b) governs the disposition of requests for reconsideration of interlocutory orders).
Rule 54(b) provides that:
any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Courts have more flexibility in applying Rule 54(b) than in determining whether
reconsideration is appropriate under Rule 59(e) and 60(b). Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531,
539 (D.D.C. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts in this district have
held that Rule 54(b) reconsideration may be granted “as justice requires.” Id. (collecting cases).
Page 5 of 16 B. Summary Judgment
Although styled as cross-motions for summary judgment, the submissions in this case seek
review of an administrative decision. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), which typically
supplies the legal standard on summary judgment, does not apply to motions for summary
judgment seeking APA review “because of the court’s limited role in reviewing the administrative
record.” Coe v. McHugh, 968 F. Supp. 2d 237, 239 (D.D.C. 2013). In an APA case, the court
“sits as an appellate tribunal” for the agency when evaluating a motion for summary judgment,
rather than deciding whether there are genuine disputes of material fact. Am. Bioscience Inc., v.
Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Instead, the court must decide as a matter of law “whether the agency action is supported
by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” McHugh,
968 F. Supp. 2d at 240. “The entire case on review is a question of law,” and the court should only
consider “arguments about the legal conclusion to be drawn about the agency action.” Marshall
Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiff filed an unopposed Motion for Reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). Pl.’s Recons. Mot. at 1. Given that the court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order
“adjudicates fewer than all the claims” in this case, the court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to address Count II of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and
“so that the parties may benefit from a clearer understanding of the [c]ourt’s reasoning.” Defs.’
Resp. to Pl.’s Recons. Mot. at 2; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Page 6 of 16 B. APA Review
i. Legal Framework
Plaintiff alleges that OFAC’s decision to deny her delisting request was arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the APA. Under the APA, a court will set aside an agency decision if it
is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, [] otherwise not in accordance with law,” contrary
to statute, or unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In an arbitrary and
capricious challenge, the central question is whether the agency’s decision was “the product of
reasoned decisionmaking.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.,
463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983).
An agency action is arbitrary or capricious if the agency relied on factors which Congress
did not intend it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before it, or is so implausible that
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. Id. at 43. In
addition, “agency action may be set aside as arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to ‘comply
with its own regulations.’” Nat’l Env’t. Dev. Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752 F.3d 999,
1009 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Environmentel, LLC v. FCC, 661 F.3d 80, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
Judicial review of agency action is “highly deferential . . . the court presumes the validity
of agency action” and must affirm the agency action unless it “failed to consider relevant factors
or made a clear error in judgment.” Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC, 983 F.3d 498, 507 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (quoting Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d 88, 93–94 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
The court’s review is even more deferential where, as here, matters of foreign policy and
national security are concerned. Olenga v. Gacki, 507 F. Supp. 3d 260, 280 (D.D.C. 2020). The
D.C. Circuit has urged courts to be “extremely deferential” to executive blocking orders, and
Page 7 of 16 decisions “at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and administrative law.” Islamic
Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Olivares v. TSA, 819
F.3d 454, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e defer to the informed judgment of agency officials whose
obligation it is to assess risks to national security.”).
ii. OFAC’s Decision Was Not Arbitrary or Capricious
Plaintiff challenges OFAC’s determination that she continues to meet the criteria for
designation pursuant to EO 13304 and the resulting denial of her delisting request, arguing that
OFAC’s decision “was unreasonable, and therefore arbitrary and capricious.” Pl.’s MSJ at 32. As
discussed below, based on the record evidence, and applying the highly deferential standard of
agency action review for this case, the court finds that OFAC’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s
delisting request was neither arbitrary nor capricious and based on substantial evidence.
In its October 2023 denial decision, OFAC concluded that pursuant to EO 13304, Plaintiff
“has actively obstructed or poses a significant risk of actively obstructing the Dayton Accords or
the Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference . . . , including the decisions or
conclusions of the High Representative, the Peace Implementation Council or its Steering Board,”
relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina.2 AR2, 21–26. In its determination, OFAC relied on a variety
of evidence, including classified information, materials Plaintiff submitted, and foreign policy
guidance provided by the Department of State, and came to its conclusion after engaging in
interagency consultation. AR1–3.
2 For example, OFAC also found that Plaintiff “materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, Radovan Karadzic,” but Plaintiff does not challenge that determination here. See generally AR1–3; Pl.’s MSJ at 31–37.
Page 8 of 16 To begin, Plaintiff first argues that sanctioning her “for her mere presence at two events in
2016 and 2018 at which her husband was honored and praised” was unreasonable because she
“didn’t say a word” at these events and the honoree at these events “was her husband, not some
public figure she chose to admire and associate with.” Pl.’s MSJ at 31–33.
Plaintiff’s focus on these two events ignores the other plentiful evidence that OFAC
considered in deciding to deny her delisting request. While OFAC did rely on her “attendance at
public events glorifying [her husband’s] crimes and legacy,” AR21–23, 344–45, 408, 421—
including an event where the ICTY’s legitimacy was challenged—OFAC also relied on evidence
including Plaintiff’s statements publicly defending Radovan or distorting facts about the Bosnian
war, AR21–23, 158, 203, 276, 303, her public criticisms of the ICTY, AR2, 21–24, 162, 206—
including publicly characterizing the ICTY as “illegal” and a “malignant cancer,” AR22–23, 162,
206—and her refusal to cooperate with the ICTY’s efforts to apprehend Radovan. AR21–23, 159,
182. OFAC also pointed to Plaintiff’s in-person contact and correspondence with Radovan,
including when she urged her husband to never surrender to authorities. AR17–22. In its denial
letter, OFAC explained that “[t]hese actions undermine the credibility of international institutions
that contribute to regional stability and are in direct conflict with the goals of the Dayton Accords,
as well as the decisions of the High Representative, the Peace Implementation Council or its
Steering Board,” relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina. AR2.
OFAC also appropriately relied on the State Department’s guidance, which advised that
removing Plaintiff from the SDN List would be inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy interests in
the region. AR26–32, 332–42; see Pejcic v Gacki, No. 19-cv-02437 (APM), 2021 WL 1209299
(D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2021), at *8 (“By relying on the opinion of a subject-matter expert like the State
Department, OFAC marshaled sufficient support for its determination.”); Karadzic v. Gacki, 602
Page 9 of 16 F. Supp. 3d 103, 114 (D.D.C. 2022) (finding OFAC did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in its
denial determination where some of its decision relied, in part, on a State Department advisory
memorandum).
Considering the evidence described above, and even based on the unclassified
administrative record alone, the court finds that OFAC considered substantial information, and its
ultimate decision was “the product of reasoned decisionmaking.” Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 52;
see Olenga, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 280 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Even based on the unclassified administrative
record alone, OFAC considered substantial information suggesting that ‘[plaintiff] is responsible
for or complicit in, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that undermine
democratic processes or institutions.’”). OFAC weighed the evidence before it, considered the
relevant data, and articulated an explanation establishing “a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made.” Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626 (1986) (internal
quotations marks omitted) (collecting authorities).
Next, Plaintiff distinguishes her case from two cases in which OFAC denied delisting
requests from people suspected of helping Radovan Karadzic to evade arrest. In Pejcic v Gacki,
plaintiff Pejcic—who was part of Radovan’s “influential inner circle and a significant part of his
core support network”—similarly sought judicial review of OFAC’s decision denying his delisting
request. Pejcic, 2021 WL 1209299, at *3. The court ultimately denied his APA claim, finding
that OFAC made a reasonable analysis of the evidence before it when it denied Pejcic’s request.
Id. at *8. Similarly, in Karadzic v. Gacki, 602 F. Supp. 3d 103 (D.D.C. 2022)—a case brought by
Radovan’s brother, Luka—the court found that Luka’s statements calling the ICTY an
“illegitimate and illegal” court and statements calling Radovan’s conviction an “awful and huge
Page 10 of 16 injustice” were a sufficient basis, among other things, for OFAC to continue the sanctions against
him. Id. at 115.
Plaintiff claims that compared to those cases, her “case represents the thinnest reed yet on
which OFAC has attempted to justify its continuing sanctions.” Pl.’s MSJ at 32. She argues that,
unlike Pejcic, she held no leadership position in any organizations, and unlike Luka, she made no
public statements. Id. She, again, claims that her “only sin was to be present at the dedication of
a plaque to her husband and a political party meeting at which a candidate gratuitously asked her
to give his regards to her husband.” Id.
Plaintiff’s attempt to differentiate her case from Pejcic and Gacki is unavailing. In those
cases, as here, OFAC did not rely solely on one piece of evidence to reach its conclusion—Pejcic’s
petition was not denied solely because of his leadership position, and Luka’s petition was not
denied on the basis of his public statements alone.
In Pejcic, OFAC also relied, in part, on a State Department memorandum that found Pejcic
“had failed to distance himself from the legacy of wartime Serbian Democratic Party leaders and
continued to lionize them and members of the Janja Detachment in which he served,” including
by “praising the detachment in speeches at commemoration events in 2015 and 2016.” Pejcic,
2021 WL 1209299, at *7 (alterations adopted). And though the State Department did note Pejcic’s
current leadership role in a veterans’ organization that “promot[es] an alternative narrative
regarding the Serb takeover of” Bijeljina, OFAC credited not just his role but the State
Department’s conclusion that “alternative narratives,” such as those espoused by Pejcic, “risk a
resurgence that undermines the international community’s work to advance the rule of law in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Id.
Page 11 of 16 In this case, and as discussed above, OFAC similarly relied on events that Plaintiff
attended, public statements she made, and her in-person contact and correspondence with
Radovan—actions that OFAC found collectively “undermine the credibility of international
institutions that contribute to regional stability and are in direct conflict with the goals of the
Dayton Accords, as well as the decisions of the High Representative, the Peace Implementation
Council or its Steering Board,” relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina. AR2. As Defendants point
out, Pejcic and Plaintiff both failed to distance themselves from their past support of Radovan and
both made statements promoting alternative narratives about the Bosnian war and undermining the
legitimacy of international courts. Pejcic, 2021 WL 1209299, at *3, *7; AR21–26; Defs.’ Mot. at
43–44. The court also notes that though Plaintiff claims she did not hold a leadership position,
OFAC found that Plaintiff “maintained influence over at least one entity associated with providing
support to Radovan.” AR1.
As to her Gacki comparison, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the record indicates that
Plaintiff made public statements, as did Luka. AR21–23. There, as here, OFAC also relied on
evidence that “Luka and Radovan were in communication during Radovan’s time in hiding” and
pointed to Luka’s criticism of the Hague Tribunal that indicted his brother—actions that OFAC
found “undermined the delicate balance of peace in the region.” Gacki, 602 F. Supp. 3d at 113–
14.
In assessing an APA challenge, a court should not “reweigh the evidence and come to [its]
own conclusion” but should “assess the reasonableness of [the agency]’s conclusion.” Pub. Citizen
Health Rsch. Grp. v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Ind. Mun. Power
Agency v. F.E.R.C., 56 F.3d 247, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that a reviewing court shall not
“reweigh the conflicting evidence or otherwise to substitute [its] judgment for that of the
Page 12 of 16 [agency].”). Having considered the record, the court finds that OFAC sufficiently weighed the
evidence before it and reasonably relied on it, and its ultimate decision refusing to delist Plaintiff
was based on substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court finds that OFAC did not act arbitrarily
and capriciously in its decision.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that OFAC is not justified in maintaining sanctions against her
because these events occurred “more than 20 years ago.” Pl.’s MSJ at 34. She argues that although
EO 13304 uses the past tense when authorizing sanctions on persons, see EO 13304 (authorizing
sanctions against persons determined “to have actively obstructed, or pose a significant risk of
actively obstructing. . . the Dayton Accords”) (emphasis added), OFAC’s regulations allow people
to “seek administrative reconsideration of their . . . designation or . . . assert that the circumstances
resulting in the designation no longer apply” when requesting that the agency rescind their
designation. 31 C.F.R. § 501.807 (cleaned up); Pl.’s MSJ at 34. Ultimately, Plaintiff interprets
§ 501.807 to mean that “where the circumstances resulting in the designation no longer apply,
OFAC must justify the continued sanctions on other facts.” Pl.’s MSJ at 36–37. Thus, according
to Plaintiff, even if she did help her husband avoid arrest over 20 years ago, based on its own
regulations, “OFAC must nevertheless justify how the circumstances resulting in her 2003
designation continued to apply more than 15 years after Radovan’s arrest and 8 years after his
conviction”—both of which “amount to a dramatic change in circumstances in a case in which
sanctions were imposed solely for helping him evade arrest.” Id. at 34.
The court disagrees with Plaintiff’s interpretation of the relevant regulations—an
interpretation that other courts in this district have already rejected. For example, in Gacki, the
court explained that “the regulations do not say that OFAC must delist an individual when the
original circumstances for the designation have changed,” instead, “the regulations say that a
Page 13 of 16 designated individual may petition OFAC to remove the designation.” Gacki, 602 F. Supp. 3d at
114 (emphasis added). “This language does not conflict with EO 13304.” Id.
Plaintiff acknowledges that other courts have rejected this argument, see Pl.’s MSJ at 36,
and have found that past conduct can be considered when evaluating whether the circumstances
resulting in a designation continue to apply. See, e.g., Basengezi v. Smith, No. CV 23-1249 (JEB),
2024 WL 1050340, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2024), aff’d, No. 24-5130, 2025 WL 457687 (D.C. Cir.
Feb. 11, 2025) (similarly noting that “nothing in the regulations compels OFAC to delist an
individual who has ceased to engage in previous sanctionable conduct”); Olenga, 507 F. Supp. 3d
at 281 (holding that a similar provision that empowered OFAC to designate individuals as
sanctionable authorized OFAC to designate individuals based on “an action they took in the past”);
Pejcic, 2021 WL 1209299, at *6–8 (same under E.O. with analogous language). OFAC’s
conclusion that Plaintiff “engaged in sanctionable conduct in the past is thus sufficient.”
Basengezi, 2024 WL 1050340, at *7.
The court also disagrees with Plaintiff’s interpretation of the relevant evidence on which
OFAC relied. As the court described above, see supra § III.B.ii, OFAC did not rely “solely on
[Plaintiff’s] 20-year-old conduct in helping her husband evade arrest.” Pl.’s MSJ at 37. It
appropriately considered other past conduct, as well as more recent actions, in reaching its
conclusion. Among the more recent actions is Plaintiff submitting false or misleading information
concerning her contacts with Radovan while he was in hiding. AR2, 17, 62, 66. In the delisting
process, a SDN “bears the burden of showing that changed circumstances warrant withdrawing
[her] designation.” Joumaa v. Mnuchin, 798 F. App’x 667, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citing 31 C.F.R.
§ 501.807). “OFAC’s findings that [Plaintiff] provided demonstrably false and misleading
Page 14 of 16 information . . . are relevant to the conclusion that [she] failed to carry [her] burden.” Id. (citations
omitted).
In sum, OFAC complied with its procedures when it granted and adjudicated Plaintiff’s
delisting request and made a decision that was reasonable and well-supported by the record. The
court finds no reason to disturb the agency’s conclusion.
C. The Court Will Deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Mediation
Finally, while the instant motion was pending, on June 1, 2025, Plaintiff moved for
mediation under Local Rule 84.4, to which Defendants object. See Pl.’s Mot. for Referral to
Mediation Program, ECF No. 33. Plaintiff argues that “[m]ediation would give the Trump
Administration the opportunity to weigh in on whether it wishes to continue to take the position
adhered to by the former administration” and allow the parties “to see if there are remedial steps
that [Plaintiff] can take” to address any ongoing sanctions concerns. Id. at 2. Defendants object
because they seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s case and contend that mediation would not be productive.
See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Referral to Mediation Program, ECF No. 35. Although the court
may, in its discretion, require the parties to participate in mediation, see LCvR 84.4(a)(2), it
declines to do so here. Konarski v. Donovan, 763 F. Supp. 2d 128, 137 (D.D.C. 2011) (quotation
marks omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court will GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration but will
DENY Count II of Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and will GRANT Defendants’ cross-
Page 15 of 16 motion for summary judgment as to Count II. An Order will accompany this Memorandum
Opinion.
Date: July 28, 2025
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge
Page 16 of 16