Kaplan v. First Hartford Corp.

603 F. Supp. 2d 195, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24792, 2009 WL 737681
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedMarch 20, 2009
DocketCivil 05-144-B-H
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 603 F. Supp. 2d 195 (Kaplan v. First Hartford Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kaplan v. First Hartford Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d 195, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24792, 2009 WL 737681 (D. Me. 2009).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PART 2: VALUATION 1

D. BROCK HORNBY, District Judge.

The current issue I must decide in this corporate oppression case is a Maine corporation’s value on September 15, 2005. The pertinent Maine statute instructs me to determine “fair value.” 13-C M.R.S.A. § 1434(2)(A). The Maine Law Court has not interpreted that particular provision, but it has interpreted the identical language in Maine’s appraisal rights chapter (title 13-C, chapter 13 of the Maine statutes), available to dissenting shareholders. In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997 (Me.1989); In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54 (Me.1979). I rely on that interpretation, as do the parties.

Under Maine law, “[t]he question for the court becomes simple and direct: What is the best price a single buyer could reasonably be expected to pay for the firm as an entirety?” McLoon, 565 A.2d at 1004. The Maine Law Court instructs that there is to be no discount for minority shares, or for lack of marketability. Id. at 1003. The Law Court also has specified that the determination of value is not subject to “hard and fast rules.” Libby, 406 A.2d at 60. 2

*197 The company here, First Hartford Corporation (“First Hartford” or “FHC”) manages real estate development properties, primarily neighborhood or strip malls, through a number of subsidiaries. First Hartford Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 15, 2005) (PI. Ex. 59). It owns both entire and partial interests in such developments. Id. at 3-4. Through its subsidiaries it holds and manages most of its properties for their income potential. Id. at 2. But some it purchases and/or develops with a view to income and/or sale. Id. Although it is a publicly held corporation, it is traded only thinly on the Pink Sheets, 3 and in some respects it behaves much like a closely held corporation. 4 Although it has some similarities to a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT), there are also many differences (e.g., structure; tax status; requirements as to distributing profits; more focus on developing properties for sale). In a word, this is a difficult business to value.

At a bench trial, the parties presented opinion evidence on fair value from three experts. Not surprisingly, the three experts disagreed with each other’s opinions and/or methodologies. 5 The defendants challenged the plaintiffs expert witness altogether under Daubert, 6 Defs.’ Valuation Post-Hr’g Br. at 18 (Docket Item 182). I reject the Daubert challenge to both the testimony and the associated exhibits. This is not the stuff of ordinary expert testimony, involving physics, engineering or medicine. According to the Maine Law Court, the determination of fair value is “more akin to an artistic composition than to a scientific process.” Libby, 406 A.2d at 60. My search here is for what a third party would pay for this entire company. McLoon, 565 A.2d at 1004. Each of these witnesses has the credentials and experience to speak to that issue, the plaintiffs witness through practical experience (both as a lender to, and purchaser of, businesses involving real estate), and the defendants’ witnesses through study, training, writing and prior expert testimony. Moreover, I sit here as a judge, not a jury. Mistakes, omissions, inconsistencies or failure to follow appropriate methodology (and there are some) will affect the weight I give to their respective analyses and conclusions.

I do not decide the corporation’s fair value based upon burden of proof or fail *198 ure to meet the burden. 7 I emphasize, however, that I do not have a roving commission to make an ideal determination of First Hartford’s fair value. Instead, I am bound by the record that the parties have presented me and the inadequacies it contains. See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 Duke L.J. 613, 629 (1998). On that record, I must determine fair value, and my decision will affect all the shareholders of this corporation for good or ill, including those who are not parties.

The Experts’ Testimony

According to one commentator, in disputes like these:

[T]he expert retained by the dissenting shareholder invariably concludes that the corporation has a very high fair value, while the corporation’s expert determines that the fair value of the corporation is much lower. It is not unusual for the opinions of the experts to differ by a factor of ten. It is, therefore, not surprising that courts have evidenced frustration with this process.

Id. at 630-31. 8 Accordingly, perhaps I should consider myself fortunate, since the experts in this case vary by a factor of only about five ($9 million at bottom; $48 million at top). Guilliaem Aertsen, aggrieved shareholder Kaplan’s expert, valued the business at $48.3 million. Nancy Fannon, First Hartford’s expert, valued it at $9.3 million. Timothy Riddiough, First Hartford’s other expert, valued it at $9.8 million (which, reversing his express or implied 25% minority discount, I correct to $13.1 million). 9 Although terminology varies, they calculated value in three basic categories — market, 10 investment (or income-based 11 ), and asset value. Then they weighed or ignored the results as they deemed appropriate. I summarize their respective credentials and analyses.

Guilliaem Aertsen

Aertsen is the chief executive officer of a private venture capital firm that buys or *199 co-invests in early stage companies engaged in technology, real estate and distressed financial assets. Valuation Hr’g Tr. 51:11-13, July 24, 2008 (“July 24 Valuation Hr’g Tr.”) (Docket Item 162); Curriculum Vitae of Guilliaem Aertsen (“Aertsen C.V.”) (Docket Item 90-3). He is also co-chair of a Boston based real estate investment and advisory firm, Aertsen C.V.; in this role, he advises property owners on whether to hold or sell their properties, July 24 Valuation Hr’g Tr. 53:10-15. Aertsen is also chair of the audit committee of the board of a realty company that owns and operates residential and commercial properties in New England. Aert-sen C.V.

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Related

Brooks v. Brooks Furniture Mfgrs., Inc.
325 S.W.3d 904 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 2010)
Kaplan v. First Hartford Corp.
716 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D. Maine, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
603 F. Supp. 2d 195, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24792, 2009 WL 737681, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kaplan-v-first-hartford-corp-med-2009.