Kamaleshkumar Amrutbhai Patel v. Michael Rose, ICE Field Office Director, Philadelphia, Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA KAMALESHKUMAR AMRUTBHAI PATEL, A241 061 068, Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-ev-00299

v. (SAPORITO, J.) MICHAEL ROSE, ICE Field Office Director, Philadelphia, Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al. Respondents, MEMORANDUM On February 6, 2026, the petitioner, appearing through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C, § 2241. Doc. 1. In this petition, Kamaleshkumar Amrutbhai Patel, a native and citizen of India, challenges the legality of his pre-removal-order immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing. At the time of filming, Patel was being held in the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Clinton County Correctional Facility, located in Clinton County, Pennsylvania.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Patel initially entered the United States without inspection at or

near Fort Covington, New York, on or about October 25, 2028. Patel was apprehended by Customs and Border Patrol shortly thereafter and detained briefly. On October 25, 2023, he was released on his own recognizance, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).1 See Pet. Ex. B, Doc. 1-3. At the time of his release, Patel was served with a Notice to Appear, DHS Form [-862, dated October 25, 2023, which declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”2 and which directed him to appear for a hearing before an immigration judge in New York, New York, on February 22, 2024. Pet. Ex. A, Doc. 1-2. After his entry into the United States in October 2023, Patel settled in Pennsylvania, where he was living before his incarceration. On

1 At the time of his initial release, Patel was served with a Notice of Custody Determination, DHS Form [-286, dated October 25, 2023, and prepared by a deportation officer, which ordered him released on his own recognizance pursuant to “section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and part 236 of title 8, Code of Federal Regulations.” Pet. Ex. B, Doe. 1-3. 2 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring him to be an “arriving alien” was not checked. Pet. Ex. A, Doc. 1-2.

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February 3, 2024, Patel timely applied for asylum by filing a Form [-589, Application for Asylum with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). His asylum application has not yet been adjudicated. On February 3, 2026, immigration authorities arrested Patel as he

was walking into his workplace, a food mart. He was transported to Clinton County Correctional Facility, where he remains in civil immigration detention. He has been denied any opportunity to post bond

or to be released on other conditions. II, DISCUSSION Since the United States began _ restricting immigration into this country in the late 19th century, it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking entry into the country and those already residing within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line” who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded to persons inside the United States. But once a noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s borders, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction between noncitizens who have entered and reside in the United States and those who have not yet entered “runs throughout immigration law.” Quijada Cordoba v. Knight, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first quoting Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting

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Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted). Consistent with this distinction, “[t]lwo statutory sections govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and 1226.” Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law

authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission

into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens a/ready in the country pending the

outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added). Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an

‘applicant for admission.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who (A) are arriving in the

United States, see § 1225(b)(1)(A)@) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years

without being admitted or paroled, see § 1225(b)(1)(A)Gii) (the “designation provision”), and (B) are inadmissible either for misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation. See

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A);_ see also § 1182(a)(6)(C) Gnadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) Gnadmissibility for lack of documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)() provides for expedited removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have

3 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, see § 1225(b)1)(a)GD, but the current scope of that designation is “the full scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1). See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025); see also Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf 962 F.3d 612, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)Gi)); Coal for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62-64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same), appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).

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such a fear, until removal. See § 1225(b)(1)(B). See generally Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 618-20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing expedited removal provisions); Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 811 F. Supp. 8d 274, 291-92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same); Coal for Humane

Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59-64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same), appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir, Aug. 11, 2025). Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader... catchall provision” that applies to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the United States.4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary (not expedited) removal proceedings. See § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also id.

§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending. See § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on

4 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not relevant here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).

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land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be

returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather

than be detained); Quijada Cordoba, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1118 (“Section 1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow

humanitarian parole.”). Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of

removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are already present in the United States may be detained pending removal under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c). Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a

warrant issued by the Attorney General,'5) an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain

"6 'This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in the applicable regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2); see also id. §§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).

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pending. Jd. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that

such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the

alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities® are tasked with an initial bond or

custody determination, see id. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge, see id. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); see also § 1003.19 (setting out

procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges). See generally Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (‘Tf the alien is

detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge (both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See 8 U.S.C.

6 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue arrest warrants. See 8 C.ER. §§ 236.1(¢)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).

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§§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3). See generally Borbot v, Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (8d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a) bond procedures). Finally, “Section 1226(c)... carves out a statutory category of

aliens who may not be released under § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond

hearing under § 1226(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a

determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community. See id. § 1226(c)(4); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. The petitioner in this case, Kamaleshkumar Amrutbhai Patel, has

been detained by immigration authorities without a bond determination pending disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.’ In his

7 The parties appear to agree that the petitioner has been putatively detained without an opportunity for a bond determination pursuant to § 1225(b)(2). The respondent has identified no other basis for his detention. Moreover, the petitioner has not been placed in expedited (continued on next page)

petition, Patel argues that, because he was detained within the interior

of the United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre- removal-order detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that he

may only be properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that he

be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Patel further

asserts a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) based

on the agency’s failure to follow its own bond regulations. In addition to

these statutory arguments, Patel argues that his pre-removal detention

without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond violates his

Fifth Amendment due process rights.® The respondent, on the other hand, argues that § 1225(b)(2) does

removal proceedings, as would be expected for a § 1225(b)(1) detainee, he has no criminal record to qualify him for mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and immigration officials have refused to give him a bond hearing, as required under § 1226(a). 8 Having granted relief on the basis of the petitioner’s primary statutory claim—that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b)(2)—-we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative argument that his detention violates the APA. ® Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for relief. See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”).

properly apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory detention. The respondent further argues that applying § 1225(b)(2) here comports with due process.!! The respondent purports to have detained Patel pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides for mandatory detention without the

opportunity for release on bond. The petitioner, however, contends that

he could only be properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and under

that statute, he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. “(Flor section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be

met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine

that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking admission’ and (8) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)), appeal dismissed, No. 25-1902 (ist Cir.

Dec. 23, 2025); see also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (citing Martinez); Ramirez-Montoya v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL

3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (citing Martinez Kashranov):

10 We note that the respondent’s answer does not engage with the petitioner’s APA claim at all. In any event, see supra note 8. 1 See supra note 9.

Carrero Romero v. Lowe, No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing Ramirez-Montoya). Significantly, “Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is both an applicant for

admission and ‘seeking admission.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (emphasis in original); see also Ramivez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at

*4 (citing Kashranov and Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, 406 (D.N.J. 2025)); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Ramirez-Montoya). Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[aln alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives

in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase “seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit

have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe

“active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the

United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” Kashranov, 2025

WL 3188399, at *6; see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WIL 3709045, at *4 (citing Kashranov); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing Ramirez-Montoya). “This reading preserves the distinction between ‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’

ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting Kashranov); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Ramirez-Montoya). It also comports with the Supreme Court’s

finding in Jennings that “§ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297; Aamurez- Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting Jennings); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Jennings and Ramirez-Montoya). “In

sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to

individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those

already within the country.” Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4; see

also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”). By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized, “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303; see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Jennings). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants

for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it

“permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303; see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Jennings); Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (‘Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[U]nder Section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, [an alien discretionarily detained pending removal proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence

that he poses a danger to the communityl] or... that he is a flight risk, if it seeks to continue detaining him.” Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d

265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);!2 see also Y-Z. v. Soto, 812 F. Supp. 3d 459, 462—

12 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the Gomes court stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See Gomes, 804 □□ Supp. 3d at 277 (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F4th 19, 41 (st Cir. 2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must prove either dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. See German Santos v. Warden, 965 F.3d 203, 218-14 (8d Cir. 2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (8d Cir. 2021) (lt is (continued on next page)

63 (D.N.J. 2025) (““Noncitizens who are arrested after having lived in the

United States for a while do not generally have to be detained. They are instead entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration court.” (citing Gomes) (citations and footnote omitted)). See generally Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (“[I]f an individual is detained attempting to enter

the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for

inspection and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225. If they are arrested after having already entered the country, they are subject to detention under § 1226 and are entitled to a bond hearing.”). Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to the detention of

Patel. We find that Patel is no longer seeking admission into the United

States—at the time of his arrest and detention, he was not actively attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the United States for

an extended period of time. See Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1

a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even temporarily, we hold the Government’ to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard in the context of civil detention ... .”) (quoting German Santos); Luciano-Jimenez v. Doll, 547 F Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting German Santos).

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(finding that petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two

years was not “seeking admission” but “already here”); Ramirez-

Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (citing Kashranov). Thus, Patel may only be properly detaimed pursuant to § 1226(a), and therefore he is

entitled to a bond hearing. See Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *5.

See generally Patel v, O’Neill, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) “The overwhelming majority of federal district

courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find

that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously entered the United States and are currently residing in the United States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary detention

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.”); id. at *4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court cases).13

18 Accord Cunha v. Freden, ____ F. Ath , 2026 WL 1146044, at *5, 6 (2d Cir, Apr. 28, 2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible for entering the country without inspection and admission. □□□ Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.”); Castafion-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland (continued on next page)

Ill. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. Accordingly, the petition will be granted, and the government will be ordered to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing within twenty-one days or to release him from custody. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: May 8 __, 2026 : JOSEPH F. SAPOBRITO, JR: United States District Judge

Sec, __ F4th , 2026 WL 1223250, at *21 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026) (“[Tlhe text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing Executive practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants for admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, F.4th , 2026 WL 1243895, at *1 (11th Cir. May, 6, 2026) (‘The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional purpose in passing ITRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-bond detention generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country, and not to aliens who are simply present here.”).

_ tyr.