Kalter v. Keyfactor, Inc.

District Court, S.D. California·Decided November 16, 2022·No. 3:21-cv-01707·Unknown

Opinion

JACQUELINE KALTER, an individual, Case No.: 21-cv-1707-L-DDL

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT KEYFACTOR INC.’S MOTION TO KEYFACTOR, INC., et al., COMPEL SUPPLEMENTAL Defendants. DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION, AND TANGIBLE THINGS

[Dkt. No. 51]

Before the Court is Defendant Keyfactor, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Supplemental Discovery Responses and Production of Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Tangible Things from Plaintiff Jacqueline Kalter in response to Defendant’s various discovery requests. Dkt. No. 51. Specifically, Defendant seeks an order compelling Plaintiff to produce supplemental responses to its Requests for Production of Documents, Set One; Special Interrogatories, Sets One and Two; and Requests for Admission, Set One. For reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part. / / / I. Plaintiff alleges that she was employed by Defendant as a District Sales Director and that she was unlawfully terminated due to her age when Defendant sought to remake itself as a “vibrant, young company.” See Dkt. No. 1-2. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges causes of action for age discrimination, breach of contract and related wage and hour violations. Id. II. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a broad scope of discovery: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “If the party requesting discovery is dissatisfied with any of the responses, the party may move to compel further responses by informing the court which discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel, and, for each disputed response, inform the court why the information sought is relevant and why the opposing party’s objections are not justified.” Heilman v. Cook, No. 14-CV-01412-JLS-AGS, 2017 WL 491737, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017) (citation omitted). “The party seeking to compel discovery has the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the relevance requirement of Rule 26.” FlowRider Surf, Ltd. v. Pacific Surf Designs, Inc., No. 15-cv-1879-BEN-BLM, 2016 WL 6522807, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016). “Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, explaining, and supporting its objections.” Id. (citations omitted). / / / / / / Defendant moves to compel responses to its Requests for Production of Documents (“RFP”), Special Interrogatories, and Requests for Admission (“RFA”). The parties group the discovery requests by topic, and the Court does the same. A. Plaintiff’s Job Performance (RFA No. 55) Defendant’s RFA No. 55 provides: “Admit that YOU never refused to perform any activity requested of YOU by DEFENDANT.” It is not readily apparent how this RFA – which asks plaintiff to admit that she “never refused” (i.e., always agreed) to do what Defendant told her – is relevant to any claim or defense in this age discrimination case. Defendant contends the RFA seeks information that is “highly relevant, as Keyfactor terminated Plaintiff due to her poor job performance, e.g., failure to meet sales expectations . . . .” See Dkt. No. 51 at 10. But Defendant does not explain how an admission by Plaintiff that she “never refused” to perform unspecified requested activities is relevant to her allegedly sub-par job performance that Defendant asserts was the basis for her termination. Defendant cites a case for the proposition that an employee’s “history of insubordination” may be relevant, but in prior discovery conferences Defendant has taken the position that Plaintiff was terminated for not making sales, and Defendant’s motion does not argue that insubordination was the cause for Plaintiff’s termination. Defendant has failed to make a threshold showing that the information sought is relevant to a claim or defense, and the Court DENIES the Motion to Compel as to RFA No. 55. B. Witness Information (RFP No. 138; Special Interrogatory No. 4) Defendant’s RFP No. 138 and Special Interrogatory No. 4 seek information and documents regarding the identity and contact information of Plaintiff’s witnesses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(i). See Dkt. No. 51 at 10. Plaintiff objects on the grounds that the information is not only equally available to Defendant, but “more easily available and less expensive for Keyfactor to obtain.” See Dkt. No. 54 at 12. Plaintiff further states that she is willing to provide the addresses and telephone numbers for those witnesses whose contact information Defendant does not already have or cannot access. Id. As a general matter, a party may not decline to respond to discovery requests on the ground that the information sought is equally available to the propounding party. See Pangborn v. Los Angeles Cty. Deputy Sheriffs Lt. Baudino, No. CV 15-6812 AB(JC), 2018 WL 6265055, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2018) (collecting cases); see also Myhre v. Seventh- Day Adventist Church Reform Movement Am. Union Int’l. Missionary Soc’y, 298 F.R.D. 633, 646-47 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (overruling equally available objection to interrogatory). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)(i) limits the duty to produce discoverable information when it is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,” Plaintiff has not provided any basis to support a finding that convenience, undue burden, or expense are legitimate concerns here such that her duty to produce otherwise discoverable information should be limited. She merely makes a conclusory argument that it is “more easily available and less expensive” if Defendant obtains the witness information it seeks. Moreover, Plaintiff has not indicated how she would determine which witnesses’ contact information Defendant already has or cannot access. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Compel as to RFP No. 138 and Special Interrogatory No. 4. Plaintiff shall provide supplemental responses and any responsive documents on or before November 30, 2022. C. Information Regarding The Attorney-Client Relationship (RFP No. 64) Defendant’s RFP No. 64 seeks “all documents evidencing who contacted whom first and when that contact occurred” between Plaintiff and her counsel. Defendant believes that documents showing “the sequence and timing predating the attorney-client relationship” may be relevant to show whether Plaintiff’s counsel recruited her to bring the instant action against Keyfactor and whether Plaintiff and her counsel “colluded” with another former Keyfactor employee, John Polcari, whom Plaintiff’s counsel previously represented in a separate employment action. Dkt. No. 51 at 14. Defendant has failed to show how information regarding the inception of the attorney-client relationship between Plaintiff and her counsel or communications between Plaintiff and Mr. Polcari are relevant to any claim or defense in this matter. Moreover, in a supplemental response to Defenda

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