Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before Aug 29 2014, 9:36 am any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JEFFREY L. SANFORD GREGORY F. ZOELLER South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
KALAN MURPHY, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 71A03-1311-CR-433 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable J. Jerome Frese, Judge Cause No. 71D03-1305-FC-108
August 29, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
PYLE, Judge STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Kalan Murphy (“Murphy”) appeals his conviction, after a jury trial, for Class C
felony battery with a deadly weapon.1 On appeal, Murphy claims that the evidence was
insufficient, arguing that once the jury acquitted him of one count of battery, the
culpability no longer existed to convict him of a second count of battery under the theory
of transferred intent. Finding that the evidence was sufficient to convict Murphy, we
affirm his conviction.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Whether sufficient evidence supports Murphy’s conviction.
FACTS
On May 14, 2013, Murphy was at the home of his aunt, Verda Bailey (“Bailey”).
Murphy’s mother, Cynthia Thomas (“Thomas”), his brother, Kyle Henderson
(“Henderson”), and his grandfather, Eddie Bailey (“Eddie”), were also in the home.
Murphy and Thomas were arguing in the kitchen because Thomas would not let Murphy
drive a car that essentially belonged to Murphy but was registered to Thomas. Thomas
would not let Murphy drive the car because he did not have a valid driver’s license.
Murphy got angry and began yelling and cursing at Thomas. Henderson heard Murphy
yelling at their mother and went to the kitchen to confront Murphy. Henderson and
Murphy began to fight, and Bailey called 911.
1 IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1(a)(3) (2012). 2 Henderson pushed Murphy into a counter that had a dish rack. Murphy took a
knife from the dish rack and attacked Henderson. Eddie tried to get between the two of
them and separate them. When he intervened, Eddie put his hands up so that he would
not get hit in the face. Murphy then chased Henderson out of the kitchen. Eddie tried to
restrain Murphy and ended up holding Murphy around his legs. Murphy eventually left
the home, and Eddie realized that his arm had been cut. Bailey called 911 again to
request an ambulance for Eddie.
When officers arrived at the home, Murphy had come back to the scene, and
Henderson identified Murphy as the person who had the knife. Officer Joseph Stitsworth
(“Officer Stitsworth”) observed a small cut on Henderson’s left palm, and paramedics
putting a bandage around Eddie’s arm. Officer Stitsworth also observed a substantial
amount of blood on Murphy’s shorts. Officer Stitsworth handcuffed Murphy and placed
him in the back of Officer Alexander Gutierrez’s (“Officer Gutierrez”) police car.
Officer Gutierrez then drove Murphy to the county jail.
Officer Gutierrez’s car was equipped with a video recording system. During the
drive to the county jail, Murphy asked Officer Gutierrez if Eddie was “cool.” (Ex. 2 at
1:32). Officer Gutierrez told him that Eddie was okay but would need some stitches.
Without any questions posed by Officer Gutierrez, Murphy told the officer that he had
the knife in his hand and was trying to hurt Henderson but not Eddie. Once they arrived
at the jail, Murphy was placed in a room, and Detective Will Johnson (“Detective
Johnson”) interviewed him. Murphy admitted again that he had picked up a knife during
the fight and chased Henderson.
3 On May 15, 2013, the State charged Murphy with two counts of Class C felony
battery with a deadly weapon alleging that Murphy had cut Henderson and Eddie with a
knife. The trial court held a jury trial on July 30, 2013. The State argued that Murphy
was guilty of battering Eddie under the theory of transferred intent. The jury acquitted
Murphy of battering Henderson, but convicted him of battering Eddie.
On August 7, 2013, Murphy moved to set aside the conviction, claiming that the
jury’s verdicts were inconsistent. The State filed its written response on August 12,
2013. The court conducted a hearing on August 14, 2013, and denied the motion to set
aside the conviction. Murphy now appeals. We will provide additional facts as
necessary.
DECISION
Murphy argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
Specifically, he claims that once the jury acquitted him of battering Henderson, the
culpability no longer existed to convict him of battering Eddie under the theory of
transferred intent.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court is ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.
4 Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
To convict Murphy of battery as charged, the State had to prove that he
knowingly, by means of a deadly weapon, touched Eddie in a rude, insolent, or angry
manner. IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1(a)(3) (2012). A person engages in conduct “knowingly”
if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.
IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2.
Transferred intent is a doctrine where a defendant’s intent to commit the charged
crime is taken from the originally intended wrongful act and applied to the crime that was
actually committed. See D.H. v. State, 932 N.E.2d 236, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “It has
long been held that ‘[t]he fact that [the defendant] did not strike his intended victim but
instead injured another is not a defense. We have found in similar cases that the
defendant’s intent is transferred from the person against whom it was directed to the
person actually injured.” Id. (quoting Tucker v. State, 443 N.E.2d 840, 842 (Ind. 1983)).
Murphy’s argument to overturn his conviction fails because he misapplies the
theory of transferred intent. Murphy contends that:
[T]o convict [him] of battery against [Eddie] under the theory of transferred intent, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] knowingly touched Henderson in a rude[,] insolent[,] and angry manner.
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Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before Aug 29 2014, 9:36 am any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JEFFREY L. SANFORD GREGORY F. ZOELLER South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
KALAN MURPHY, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 71A03-1311-CR-433 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable J. Jerome Frese, Judge Cause No. 71D03-1305-FC-108
August 29, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
PYLE, Judge STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Kalan Murphy (“Murphy”) appeals his conviction, after a jury trial, for Class C
felony battery with a deadly weapon.1 On appeal, Murphy claims that the evidence was
insufficient, arguing that once the jury acquitted him of one count of battery, the
culpability no longer existed to convict him of a second count of battery under the theory
of transferred intent. Finding that the evidence was sufficient to convict Murphy, we
affirm his conviction.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Whether sufficient evidence supports Murphy’s conviction.
FACTS
On May 14, 2013, Murphy was at the home of his aunt, Verda Bailey (“Bailey”).
Murphy’s mother, Cynthia Thomas (“Thomas”), his brother, Kyle Henderson
(“Henderson”), and his grandfather, Eddie Bailey (“Eddie”), were also in the home.
Murphy and Thomas were arguing in the kitchen because Thomas would not let Murphy
drive a car that essentially belonged to Murphy but was registered to Thomas. Thomas
would not let Murphy drive the car because he did not have a valid driver’s license.
Murphy got angry and began yelling and cursing at Thomas. Henderson heard Murphy
yelling at their mother and went to the kitchen to confront Murphy. Henderson and
Murphy began to fight, and Bailey called 911.
1 IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1(a)(3) (2012). 2 Henderson pushed Murphy into a counter that had a dish rack. Murphy took a
knife from the dish rack and attacked Henderson. Eddie tried to get between the two of
them and separate them. When he intervened, Eddie put his hands up so that he would
not get hit in the face. Murphy then chased Henderson out of the kitchen. Eddie tried to
restrain Murphy and ended up holding Murphy around his legs. Murphy eventually left
the home, and Eddie realized that his arm had been cut. Bailey called 911 again to
request an ambulance for Eddie.
When officers arrived at the home, Murphy had come back to the scene, and
Henderson identified Murphy as the person who had the knife. Officer Joseph Stitsworth
(“Officer Stitsworth”) observed a small cut on Henderson’s left palm, and paramedics
putting a bandage around Eddie’s arm. Officer Stitsworth also observed a substantial
amount of blood on Murphy’s shorts. Officer Stitsworth handcuffed Murphy and placed
him in the back of Officer Alexander Gutierrez’s (“Officer Gutierrez”) police car.
Officer Gutierrez then drove Murphy to the county jail.
Officer Gutierrez’s car was equipped with a video recording system. During the
drive to the county jail, Murphy asked Officer Gutierrez if Eddie was “cool.” (Ex. 2 at
1:32). Officer Gutierrez told him that Eddie was okay but would need some stitches.
Without any questions posed by Officer Gutierrez, Murphy told the officer that he had
the knife in his hand and was trying to hurt Henderson but not Eddie. Once they arrived
at the jail, Murphy was placed in a room, and Detective Will Johnson (“Detective
Johnson”) interviewed him. Murphy admitted again that he had picked up a knife during
the fight and chased Henderson.
3 On May 15, 2013, the State charged Murphy with two counts of Class C felony
battery with a deadly weapon alleging that Murphy had cut Henderson and Eddie with a
knife. The trial court held a jury trial on July 30, 2013. The State argued that Murphy
was guilty of battering Eddie under the theory of transferred intent. The jury acquitted
Murphy of battering Henderson, but convicted him of battering Eddie.
On August 7, 2013, Murphy moved to set aside the conviction, claiming that the
jury’s verdicts were inconsistent. The State filed its written response on August 12,
2013. The court conducted a hearing on August 14, 2013, and denied the motion to set
aside the conviction. Murphy now appeals. We will provide additional facts as
necessary.
DECISION
Murphy argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
Specifically, he claims that once the jury acquitted him of battering Henderson, the
culpability no longer existed to convict him of battering Eddie under the theory of
transferred intent.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court is ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.
4 Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
To convict Murphy of battery as charged, the State had to prove that he
knowingly, by means of a deadly weapon, touched Eddie in a rude, insolent, or angry
manner. IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1(a)(3) (2012). A person engages in conduct “knowingly”
if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.
IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2.
Transferred intent is a doctrine where a defendant’s intent to commit the charged
crime is taken from the originally intended wrongful act and applied to the crime that was
actually committed. See D.H. v. State, 932 N.E.2d 236, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “It has
long been held that ‘[t]he fact that [the defendant] did not strike his intended victim but
instead injured another is not a defense. We have found in similar cases that the
defendant’s intent is transferred from the person against whom it was directed to the
person actually injured.” Id. (quoting Tucker v. State, 443 N.E.2d 840, 842 (Ind. 1983)).
Murphy’s argument to overturn his conviction fails because he misapplies the
theory of transferred intent. Murphy contends that:
[T]o convict [him] of battery against [Eddie] under the theory of transferred intent, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] knowingly touched Henderson in a rude[,] insolent[,] and angry manner. In as much as the jury acquitted [Murphy] of [count I], the very same crime charged in [count II], the culpability necessary to convict the defendant on [count I] cannot be transferred to [count II].
(Murphy’s Br. 13). This is incorrect. The theory of transferred intent required the State
to prove that Murphy directed his attack at Henderson, but actually injured his
5 grandfather. See id. Regardless of Murphy’s acquittal for battering Henderson, the
State’s evidence established Murphy’s guilt under the theory of transferred intent.
Murphy admitted multiple times that he had a knife and specifically told Officer
Gutierrez that he was trying to “beat the fuck” out of his little brother, but not harm his
grandfather. (Ex. 2 at 2:03). Eddie testified that he was trying to get in between Murphy
and Henderson, and that he had put his hands up so that he would not get hit in the face.
A reasonable inference arises from the evidence that Murphy cut Eddie’s arm with the
knife when he intervened in the fight and that Eddie bled on Murphy’s shorts while trying
to restrain him. Arguing that Murphy’s culpability for battering Eddie disappeared
because the jury acquitted him of battering Henderson is tantamount to arguing that the
jury’s verdicts are inconsistent, a claim Murphy concedes he cannot make on appeal.2
Accordingly, we affirm Murphy’s Class C felony battery conviction.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
2 Our Supreme Court has held, “Jury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable.” Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). 6