No. 1-24-0530
2025 IL App (1st) 240530 SIXTH DIVISION August 15, 2025
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
JAMIE KAIPUST, as Special Administrator of the Estate ) Appeal from the Circuit of Mark S. Kaipust, Deceased, and Special Administrator ) Court of Cook County. of the Estate of Taylor R. Kaipust, Deceased, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) No. 22 L 10688 v. ) ) ECHO GLOBAL LOGISTICS, INC., ) Honorable ) Scott D. McKenna, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Tailor and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In this personal injury suit, the circuit court denied defendant Echo Global Logistics, Inc.’s
(Echo), motion to dismiss negligence claims brought by Jamie Kaipust, as special administrator of the
estates of Mark S. Kaipust (Jamie’s husband) and Taylor R. Kaipust (her child), on the basis of federal
preemption, but granted Echo’s motion to certify two questions on interlocutory appeal per Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). The certified questions ask this court to determine whether
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the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (Act) (Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat.
1569) preempts state law negligent selection claims against trucking brokers, an issue over which there
is currently a circuit split among the United States Courts of Appeals. For the reasons below, we hold
that the Act preempts negligent selection claims against trucking brokers, but such claims are saved
by the statutory exception for laws implicating the “safety regulatory authority of a State with respect
to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) (2024).
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Jamie filed a complaint on December 1, 2022, alleging in relevant part that Mark and Taylor
died when their vehicle collided with a semi-tractor and trailer driven by Yorkwind Crawford on
September 4, 2021, in Lincoln, Nebraska. Jamie alleged the trailer was owned by Critical Supply
Solutions (CSS), “an authorized interstate motor carrier” and Crawford’s employer. Jamie further
alleged Echo was “an authorized transportation broker” who had “contracted with CSS to transport the
load” in a CSS truck driven by Crawford on that day from Iowa to California. Jamie titled her claim
“negligent selection of an independent contractor.”
¶4 Echo moved to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2022)), arguing that Jamie’s state law negligence claims were preempted by the
Act. Specifically, Echo cited 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (hereinafter the preemption clause), which
states in relevant part that a State may not “enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision
having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier *** or any
motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” Echo
contended that because the negligent selection claims constituted state enforcement of a law that was
“related to” its “service,” the Act expressly preempted the claim.
¶5 Jamie responded to Echo’s motion, arguing her claims were not preempted because the
preemption clause applied only to economic regulations, personal injury liability did not “significantly
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affect a broker’s services,” and a statutory exception in the Act permitted states to enforce laws that
implicated the “safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” See id.
§ 14501(c)(2)(a) (hereinafter the safety exception). Jamie cited Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide,
Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020), as a “watershed” case where the Ninth Circuit ruled negligent
selection claims were saved from preemption by the safety exception.
¶6 In Echo’s reply, it cited Aspen American Insurance Co. v Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261
(11th Cir. 2023), from the Eleventh Circuit, which found negligent selection claims were covered by
the preemption clause but not rescued by the safety exception. Echo later cited Ying Ye v. GlobalTranz
Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023), where the Seventh Circuit arrived at the same
conclusion. 1
¶7 On November 13, 2023, the circuit court denied Echo’s motion to dismiss. The court explained
that based on Ye and Miller, “negligent hiring claims do fall within the purview of [Act] preemption,”
but the safety exception applied, meaning the Act did not preempt Jamie’s negligent selection claim.
The court believed that Miller was “better reasoned” than Ye, and challenged the Ye court’s conclusion
that the relationship between trucking broker’s services and motor vehicle safety was “indirect,”
contending the proposition did “not make sense” because the “entire purpose of a broker is to arrange
for the carriage of goods by motor vehicles,” and the Ye court interpreted the phrase “with respect to
motor vehicles” too narrowly.
¶8 Echo moved for reconsideration or to certify questions for interlocutory appeal pursuant to
Rule 308. Jamie opposed the motion.
¶9 On February 13, 2024, the circuit court denied Echo’s motion to reconsider, but granted its
motion to certify the following questions: (1) “Does the Federal Aviation Administration
1 This court need not defer to the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Ye. See State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 113836, ¶¶ 53-54. 3 No. 1-24-0530
Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1), pre-empt claims for negligent hiring/selection against a
broker in a common-law personal injury suit?” and (2) “If the answer to [1] is in the affirmative,
does the “safety exception” in 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(2) apply to negligent hiring/selection claims
against a broker in a common-law personal injury suit?”
¶ 10 Echo then filed an application for leave to appeal, which this court granted on May 8, 2024.
¶ 11 JURISDICTION
¶ 12 The circuit court granted Echo’s motion to certify questions, and this court subsequently
granted Echo’s petition for leave to appeal, giving this court jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 308 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).
¶ 13 ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On this appeal, we consider only the two certified questions. The first question is a threshold
issue, meaning if we answer in the negative, we do not reach the second. Certified question review
under Rule 308 exclusively involves questions of law, so our review is de novo. Rozsavolgyi v. City
of Aurora, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21.
¶ 15 Question 1: Does the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act,
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2024), Preempt Claims for Negligent Hiring/
Selection Against a Broker in a Common-Law Personal Injury Suit?
¶ 16 The preemption doctrine stems from the supremacy clause of United States Constitution, which
states that federal law “ ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land ***, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ ” Haage v. Zavala, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2). There are three circumstances where federal law will preempt state law, with
the one at issue here known as “express preemption.” In re Marriage of Tronsrue, 2025 IL 130596,
¶ 39. In express preemption cases, “Congress has superseded state legislation by statute,” and the
reviewing courts task is to identify the scope of that preemption. Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,
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569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013).
¶ 17 Illinois courts interpret the intended scope of a federal statute’s express preemption clause
consistent with the general rules of statutory interpretation, meaning the court will “ ‘in the first
instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress’ pre-emptive intent.’ ” Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72 (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v.
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). When the legislature’s intent is clear from the plain language
of a provision, given its ordinary meaning, a court has no occasion to resort to the tools of statutory
construction and will apply the statute as written. Miller v. Department of Agriculture, 2024 IL 128508,
¶ 29.
¶ 18 The Act states in relevant part, “a State *** may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier
*** or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of
property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). In this context, “related to” means the state law has a connection
with or reference to a service, and the law may have just an indirect effect on the service. Ye, 74 F.4th
at 458 (citing Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008)).
¶ 19 We hold that the preemption clause, given its plain and ordinary meaning, preempts state law
negligence claims for negligent selection against trucking broker services. The primary “service” a
trucking broker provides is the selection of a trucking company to transport the load at issue. Thus,
claims based on how the broker performed that task are necessarily “related to” the “service” of a
trucking broker. See id. Beyond having a “connection” or “reference” to a service, or an “indirect
effect[ ]” thereon, negligent selection claims arise directly from a broker’s service, bringing such claims
“comfortably” under the preemption clause. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ye, 74 F.4th at 458-59
(citing Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370, and Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 281-82 (2014)). We note
that while not binding on this court, the three United States Courts of Appeals that have considered this
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issue have all reached the same conclusion. See Miller, 976 F.3d at 1024; Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1267-68;
Ye, 74 F.4th at 459.
¶ 20 Jamie argues the Act’s legislative history reveals the underlying intent of Congress was to only
preempt inconsistent economic regulations from state to state, not safety-related state laws like
negligence claims. See Miller, 976 F.3d at 1026. This argument is unavailing, however, because the
statutory language of the preemption clause is clear on its face that it applies to a trucking broker’s
services. In such a scenario, the reviewing court has no occasion to consider the legislative history or
other tools of statutory construction and instead must apply the language as written. See State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 580 U.S. 26, 36-37 (2016); Miller, 2024 IL
128508, ¶ 29. Accordingly, though Jamie’s characterization of the Act’s general legislative history
may be accurate, it does not affect the resolution of the first certified question.
¶ 21 Next, Jamie argues that this court should apply the general presumption against preemption to
hold that negligence claims are not preempted by the Act, citing City of Columbus v. Ours Garage &
Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 432 (2002). This argument also does not apply in this context,
however, as the general presumption against preemption is only at issue in the absence of an express
preemption clause. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 579 U.S.
115, 125 (2016) (when a statute contains an express preemption clause, the court does “not invoke any
presumption against preemption”).
¶ 22 Jamie also argues that the exercise of reasonable care should not be considered a “service,” and
thus state negligence law, and its requirement that actors conduct themselves with reasonable care, is
distinct from any “service” referenced in the preemption clause. This argument fails because the
exercise of reasonable care is not a distinct behavior separate from a defendant’s complained-of
conduct in a negligence case. Instead, whether a defendant exercised reasonable care is a factual issue
a fact finder must determine in analyzing how the defendant performed the complained-of conduct.
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Here, that conduct is a trucking broker’s core service—the manner in which it paired a motor carrier
with a shipper’s load. Thus, the state’s common law as applied in negligent selection claims
necessarily seeks to regulate a trucking broker’s service, and the preemption clause applies.
¶ 23 Before turning to the second question, we acknowledge Jamie’s citation of the Third Circuit
case of Bedoya v. American Eagle Express Inc., 914 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 2019), which she claims
provides a seven-factor test for determining if a state law is “related to” a broker’s service that this court
should apply because the “general common law of negligence” does not expressly refer to brokers.
We have no occasion to engage in this exercise, even conceding Jamie’s reading of Bedoya, because
Jamie’s argument is based on a flawed premise. While the general common law of negligence may not
expressly refer to a trucking broker’s service, the claim at issue—negligent selection of a trucking
company by a trucking broker—most assuredly does.
¶ 24 Based on the above, we conclude that the Act is clear on its face that negligent selection claims
against trucking brokers are preempted under the plain language of 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), given its
ordinary meaning, and thus answer the first certified question in the affirmative.
¶ 25 Question 2: Does the “Safety Exception” in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)
(2024) Apply to Negligent Hiring/Selection Claims Against a
Broker in a Common-Law Personal Injury Suit?
¶ 26 Having answered the first question in the affirmative, we turn to the second certified question
on appeal—are state negligence claims for negligent selection, though preempted, nonetheless
cognizable because they fall under the “safety exception” of the Act? The statute reads in relevant part
that the preemption clause:
“[S]hall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,
the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or
weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to
7 No. 1-24-0530
regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating
to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization[.]” Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A).
¶ 27 The Eleventh Circuit in Aspen and Seventh Circuit in Ye both found the safety exception does
not cover negligent brokering claims. The Aspen court found that Florida’s negligence law was part
of its safety regulatory authority, but the exercise in this context was not “ ‘with respect to motor
vehicles,’ ” splitting the safety exception language into two separate requirements Aspen, 65 F.4th at
1268 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A)). It explained, “the phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’
limits the safety exception’s application to state laws that have a direct relationship to motor vehicles,”
and so “a claim against a broker is necessarily one step removed from a ‘motor vehicle’ because the
‘definitions make clear that…a broker…and the services it provides have no direct connection to motor
vehicles.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 1271-72 (quoting Miller, 976 F.3d at 1031 (Fernandez, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
¶ 28 The Ye court reached the same conclusion, explaining, “we conclude that Ye’s claim fails to
satisfy the second half of the safety exception’s text” because it is not “with respect to motor vehicles.”
Ye, 74 F.4th at 460. It continued, “the exception requires a direct link between a state’s law and motor
vehicle safety. And we see no such direct link between negligent hiring claims against brokers and
motor vehicle safety.” Id. It emphasized that the safety exception makes no explicit mention of brokers
or broker services, and the language following the safety exception, which references route controls
and insurance, suggests the safety exception should be read with a high degree of specificity. Id. at
461.
¶ 29 The Ninth Circuit in Miller, conversely, held that the phrase “with respect to” was
“synonymous” with “relating to,” and therefore, the safety exception exempted safety regulations that
had either a direct or indirect connection to motor vehicles. Miller, 976 F.3d at 1030. In so holding,
the court explained that negligent selection claims were “genuinely responsive” to vehicle safety
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because though such claims did not “directly regulate[ ] motor vehicles,” they did “promote safety on
the road.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 30 As acknowledged to this court by the litigants during briefing, surveys of the decisions across
the federal district courts reveal no consensus has emerged in either direction. We find no precedential
decision in Illinois exists that this court must follow.
¶ 31 We hold the safety exception applies to negligent selection claims against a trucking broker and
thus such claims are saved from preemption. Unlike the first certified question, the statutory language
is not clear on its face as to the intent of Congress on this issue. The safety exception does not explain
whether it covers state negligence law. We may therefore rely on the tools of statutory construction in
determining Congressional intent. See State ex rel. Raoul v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 2024 IL 128763, ¶ 33.
Using these tools, we conclude Congress intended to preserve a state’s ability to provide for safety on
its roadways by maintaining an individual’s access to the remedy of a common-law negligence claim
following a motor vehicle collision.
¶ 32 First, both the United States Supreme Court and many other courts, including the Illinois
Supreme Court, have explained that absent express language in the statute, a court will not interpret a
law to extend preemption to infringe a state’s police power (which Echo does not contest encompasses
common-law negligence claims). See Columbus, 536 U.S. at 438; Haage, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 72. Echo
again complains that the circuit court and Miller both invoked the general presumption against
preemption, which was improper in this case where there is an express preemption clause. See
Franklin, 579 U.S. at 125. But while the general presumption may not apply here, Franklin did not
address, let alone reverse, long-standing precedent that courts must still interpret express preemption
clauses subject to the well-accepted maxim that a court will not find a federal law preempts a state’s
traditional ability to provide for public safety absent clear statutory directive from Congress. See
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1996). There is no doubt that the preemption clause by
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its express language applies to many areas that do not implicate state police powers, like attempted
regulation of the prices brokers charge. But it contains no corresponding directive to preempt
provisions for the public safety, and given that absence, courts should defer to the presumption that
Congress did not intend such displacement of state law in this area.
¶ 33 Second, it is highly unlikely Congress intended to permit brokers to act as negligently as they
see fit, with no redress for an injured party, without making this intent clear on the statute’s face.
Consider a scenario where a broker has used a motor carrier multiple times in the past, and each time
the company assigned a certain driver, that driver caused a collision. If that broker subsequently uses
that same company knowing the company will assign that same driver, and another collision occurs,
should a plaintiff not even have the ability to seek redress from the broker? Such a result would run
counter to the principle that courts should not interpret a law to give an injured plaintiff no recourse.
See Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 265 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). It
would also be an absurd result to interpret the intent of Congress to allow brokers to act as negligently
as they want with impunity, and courts will not engage in such interpretations. See Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982).
¶ 34 Finally, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress designed the Act, like its
predecessor in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, to
address inconsistent economic regulations from state to state that made it difficult for companies in
the trucking industry to account for the various rules in different states. See Miller, 976 F.3d at 1022-
23, 1026. These concerns do not apply to the general duty to act with reasonable care. See American
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he standard of
ordinary care is a general background rule against which all individuals order their affairs. Surely
Congress did not intend to give airlines free rein to commit negligent acts subject only to the
supervision of the Department of Transportation ***.”).
10 No. 1-24-0530
¶ 35 The courts that have ruled the opposite way have focused on the phrase “with respect to” in the
safety exception. In Dan’s City, the Supreme Court described the phrase as having a
“massively” limiting effect. 569 U.S. at 261. The Ye and Aspen courts keyed on the “massive
limitation” to conclude that negligent selection claims against brokers were too attenuated to be
considered “with respect to motor vehicles,” as they did not have a “direct” effect on motor vehicles.
See generally Ye, 74 F.4th 453; Aspen, 65 F.4th 1261. The Ye court explained that the broker “does
not own or operate motor vehicles,” meaning an “extra link to connect the alleged chain of events”
was required to get from the broker to the driver who caused the collision, and “this additional link
goes a bridge too far.” Ye, 74 F.4th at 461-62. The Miller court interpreted this phrasing differently,
reasoning that “with respect to” was the functional equivalent of the “related to” language in the
preemption clause itself. Miller, 976 F.3d at 1030. Miller accordingly discounted any reliance on a
direct versus indirect effect analysis and instead emphasized that state negligence laws regarding
trucking brokers are “genuinely responsive” to safety concerns, per the Supreme Court’s guidance in
Columbus. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 36 We reject the reasoning from Ye and other courts that reached the same conclusion. The safety
exception uses the full phrase “safety regulatory authority with respect to motor vehicles,” meaning
the question is not whether a regulation has a direct or indirect relationship with respect to motor
vehicles alone, but a direct or indirect relationship with the safety of motor vehicles. Using this
interpretation to consider the full breadth of the safety exception, negligent selection claims are
sufficiently responsive to safety concerns to satisfy any directness standard. Though the brokers
themselves do not employ the drivers or own the trucks, they are directly responsible for the presence
of a truck on a road within the state. If the broker did not perform its service, then the trucking company
would not have provided the truck and driver to haul the load in question. Given these realities, there is
no gap between the service the broker provides and the presence of the truck (the motor vehicle) on the
11 No. 1-24-0530
State’s roads. In this court’s estimation, application of that State’s negligence laws to that truck is as
direct a connection as there could be between a motor vehicle regulation and public safety. See Milne
v. Move Freight Trucking, LLC, No. 7:23-cv-432, 2024 WL 762373, *8 (W.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2024)
(“State law recognizes these tort claims in part to incentivize safe practices in the trucking industry.
To preempt such claims would undercut an important tool in the states’ efforts to maintain reasonably
safe roadways, a practice expressly shielded by the safety [exception].”).
¶ 37 Echo and its amici argue that this interpretation of the safety clause renders trucking brokers
“de facto insurers,” or imposes on the brokers responsibility for the conduct of motor carries and
drivers. We disagree because the fact that the safety exception makes negligent selection claims
cognizable does not constitute a factual finding in any specific case that the broker had the
responsibility or ability to control the carrier or driver’s conduct or a define a broker’s standard of care;
instead, of course, it merely subjects the broker to liability if a plaintiff can establish that the broker’s
conduct was negligent in the context of that particular case.
¶ 38 The amici argue that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is “charged
with making safety determinations,” and the applicable regulations maintain that carriers are
responsible for the conduct of their drivers, as support for their position. But neither Echo nor the amici
provide any reference, in the regulations or the Act or anywhere else, to rules absolving brokers from
the duty to act reasonably or adopting the stance that brokers are incapable of negligence. See Wolens,
513 U.S. at 236-37 (Stevens, J., concurring). Echo and its amici start from the standpoint that they are
immune from responsibility for their own negligence, and it would take an act of Congress to lift that
immunity. Without any authority backing this unique stance, we cannot adopt this position. While we
agree with the amici that freight brokers are not insurers of motor carriers, nor are they responsible for
performing the FMCSA’s regulatory functions, we cannot agree that they are inherently absolved from
their own negligent conduct.
12 No. 1-24-0530
¶ 39 The concerns of Echo and its amici are more akin to responses to an argument on summary
judgment challenging a plaintiff’s evidence on proximate cause, not whether negligent selection
claims are expressly preempted by the Act. That the brokers may not hire the drivers or operate the
trucks themselves are potentially valid arguments to raise against proximate cause. But this does not
fundamentally alter the nature of a negligent selection claim as arising from the state’s regulatory
authority, exercised through the common law, to ensure motor vehicles are safely operated within its
borders. While it may be a high evidentiary burden for a plaintiff to establish such claims, in instances
when the record permits a negligence claim to survive a motion to dismiss or summary judgment, the
statute contains no provision from which we could conclude Congress intended nonetheless to
indemnify the broker.
¶ 40 Echo claims that the circuit court erred by finding the phrase “with respect to” had no
functional difference from the term “related to” in the preemption clause. On this point, we agree with
Echo, but it does not require reversal on de novo review. The circuit court, echoing Miller, maintained
that “related to” and “with respect to” were essentially synonymous, but this interpretation runs counter
to the rule that different phrases employed so close together in a statute suggest Congress intended
some difference in meaning. See People v. Begay, 2018 IL App (1st) 150446, ¶ 48. Where we disagree
with Echo, and Ye and Aspen, is that we conclude the application of state law negligent selection claims
fall under “the safety regulatory authority of a State ‘with respect to’ motor vehicles” under even the
“massively limit[ed]” understanding of “with respect to” as characterized in Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at
261.
¶ 41 Echo next argues that because the preemption clause explicitly lists “brokers,” while the safety
exception does not, we should read this exclusion as exempting brokers from the safety exception
under the statutory interpretation canon that “when Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another,” that omission is purposeful. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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See Maine Community Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 314 (2020)). The Ye court used a
similar rationale. See Ye, 74 F.4th at 461-62.
¶ 42 We reject this reasoning because the rule of interpretation does not apply in this instance.
Instead, it is clear from the plain language of 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) that Congress did not
purposefully omit certain parties to exclude them from the safety exception; it omitted any reference
to any parties because the exception applies to the conduct of anyone, so long as such conduct falls
under the “safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” The safety regulatory
authority of a state encompasses broader conduct than just that referenced in the preemption clause,
and thus the absence of “brokers” or any other set of actors in the exception does not limit the safety
exception’s application to any particular set of actors.
¶ 43 Echo argues that an interpretation that includes broker services in the safety exception would
be so broad as to obviate the other exceptions listed in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), violating the
statutory interpretation maxim of not interpreting a law to render passages meaningless or redundant.
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, JJ.). The other exceptions are “the authority of a State to impose
highway route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous
nature of the cargo” and the “the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum
amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance
authorization.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).
¶ 44 This argument fails because while there may be room to interpret the subsequently listed
exceptions as touching on safety, the regulation of safety and the regulation of these subjects by the
enumerated exceptions are sufficiently distinct. Specifically, the areas covered in both subsequent
exceptions have obvious economic aspects, which distinguishes each area from that conduct
regulated under a state’s safety regulatory authority. Accordingly, to the extent there is overlap
14 No. 1-24-0530
between the safety exception and the subsequent exceptions, this overlap does not render the additional
exceptions superfluous. See Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 346 (2019)
(“Redundancy is not a silver bullet,” meaning, “[s]ometimes the better overall reading of the statute
contains some redundancy.”).
¶ 45 Finally, we reject Echo’s argument that interpretating the safety exception to protect state
negligence claims against brokers would lead to the safety exception “swallowing” the preemption
clause itself. The preemption clause’s application to attempted economic regulation of broker conduct
unrelated to safety is left untouched by this ruling. Only when a plaintiff can establish that the broker’s
conduct implicated the state’s safety regulatory authority will a claim survive preemption per the
present ruling. This regime allows the Act to prevent states from enacting inconsistent economic
regulations of the trucking broker industry, while preserving the state’s ability to regulate when
protecting the safety of its residents, the underlying intent of the ADA and the Act.
¶ 46 CONCLUSION
¶ 47 The Act preempts state law negligence claims against a trucking broker for negligent selection,
but such claims are protected by the safety exception to Act preemption. The answer to both certified
questions is “Yes.”
¶ 48 Certified question answered; cause remanded.
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Kaipust v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc., 2025 IL App (1st) 240530
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 22-L- 10688; the Hon. Scott D. McKenna, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Timothy S. McGovern, of Floyd Zadkovich (US) LLP, of for Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Timothy M. Whiting, of Whiting Law Group, Ltd., of Chicago, for Darrin M. Walker, of Law Office of Darrin Walker, of Appellee: Kingwood, Texas, Eric T. Penn, of Penn Law Firm, of Jacksonville, Texas, and Peter John Kestner and Mary Ellen Eliasen, of Penn, Kestner & McEwen, PLLC, of Inver Grove, Minnesota, for appellee.
Amicus Curiae: Bradley Albert Bertkau and Sophia Marcella Rago, of Canty Novy Bertkau Gordon, LLC, of Chicago, for amici curiae C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., et al.
Matthew J. Belcher, of Aleksy Belcher, LLC, of Chicago, for amicus curiae for Institute for Safer Trucking.