1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KAI HUANG, No. 1:25-cv-02046-DC-SCR 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee representing himself in this habeas corpus 19 action filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This action was referred to the undersigned by 20 operation of Local Rule 302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The briefing deadlines set by the court in 21 this case have passed and the habeas petition is therefore deemed submitted on the record. See 28 22 U.S.C. § 2243 (emphasizing that “the court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and 23 dispose of the matter as law and justice require”). 24 I. Factual and Procedural History 25 Based on the verified § 2241 petition that petitioner filed under penalty of perjury, 26 petitioner is a native of China who has been in immigration detention since May 30, 2025.1 ECF 27 1 The circumstances and length of petitioner’s residence in the United States are not clear from 28 the present record. 1 No. 1 at 2. Petitioner is detained at the Golden State Annex in McFarland, California which is 2 located in this judicial district. Petitioner indicates that Immigration and Customs Enforcement 3 (“ICE”) detained him without the opportunity to contest his detention in the last six months. ECF 4 No. 1 at 2. According to petitioner, the government cannot show that there is a “significant 5 likelihood of [his]removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Petitioner further indicates 6 that a travel document, which is necessary in order for him to be removed to China, is also not “in 7 sight.” Id. In his first ground for relief, petitioner contends that his continued detention violates 8 the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because there is no significant likelihood that he will 9 be removed to China in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 13. Petitioner submits that his 10 ongoing detention violates the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 11 (2001). Id. He also challenges ICE’s third country removal practices although it is not clear 12 whether ICE is seeking to remove him to a country other than China. By way of relief, petitioner 13 seeks to be immediately released from immigration detention and to be provided notice and an 14 opportunity to challenge his removal to any third country. ECF No. 1 at 19. 15 On December 31, 2025, the undersigned ordered respondents to file an answer/return to 16 the habeas petition within 14 days. ECF No. 5. This order further directed respondents to include 17 “any and all transcripts or other documents relevant to the determination of the issues presented in 18 the habeas application.” ECF 5 at 2. 19 However, respondents did not file an answer or return. Nor did respondents include any 20 transcripts or other documents pertaining to petitioner’s immigration proceedings. Instead, 21 respondents filed a document captioned as a “Combined Opposition.” ECF No. 6. This pleading 22 filed by counsel makes no meaningful substantive points and includes multiple assertions that are 23 not supported by either the facts of this case or any legal authority. To highlight this point, for 24 example, respondents submit that “the detention authority in this case is lawful under the 25 Constitution and applicable provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act” without ever 26 identifying which portion of the INA applies to petitioner. ECF No. 6 at 1. Respondents also 27 state that “appeals are currently pending in the Ninth Circuit that are likely to have precedential 28 effect on current immigration habeas litigation, including this case,” but do not identify what 1 those appeals are of how they might impact this case. Given that the squarely-presented issue in 2 this case is whether petitioner’s detention is constitutional in light of Zadvydas, a 25-year-old 3 Supreme Court precedent, this assertion is dubious. Instead of following the court’s order by 4 responding substantively to the petition and including relevant agency documents, respondents 5 choose to simply delay these proceedings involving a detained individual by requesting “that the 6 Court set a briefing schedule, with [a] deadline for filing Respondents’ opposition to the habeas 7 petition and any relevant documents… 180 days from the date of the Court’s order.” ECF No. 6 8 at 2.2 9 According to the Executive Office of Immigration Review’s Automated Case Information 10 system, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) issued a final order of removal in petitioner’s case on 11 September 15, 2025. See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation. This system also 12 indicates that “no appeal was received for this case” by the Board of Immigration Appeals 13 (“BIA”). Id. The Court takes judicial notice of this information related to petitioner’s 14 immigration proceedings. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (court may take judicial notice of facts that are 15 capable of accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); 16 Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012) (a court may take judicial 17 notice of undisputed matters of public record including documents on file in federal or state 18 courts). 19 II. Legal Standards 20 Title 8 Section 1231(a) of the United States Code governs the detention of a noncitizen 21 after a final order of removal has been issued. Detention is mandatory during the 90-day 22 “removal period” following the entry of a final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(2). 23 2 Other aspects of respondents’ “Combined Opposition” are baffling. For example, respondents 24 write, as to petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, “[t]his Court appeared to construe this filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus[.]” The court did not construe anything. 25 Petitioner filed a “petition for writ of habeas corpus,” and the court ordered a response to the petition. Moreover, respondents invite the court to construe the petition as a motion for a 26 temporary restraining order (“TRO”), while still opposing the granting of a TRO. In combination 27 with the issues identified above, these statements leave the court with the distinct sense that the U.S. Attorney’s Office filed this “Combined Opposition” without meaningfully attempting to 28 determine whether there is a factual and legal basis to oppose the petition. 1 “This ‘removal period’ begins on the latest of either (1) the date a noncitizen’s ‘order of removal 2 becomes administratively final,’ (2) the date of a court’s final order, if the noncitizen’s removal 3 order is judicially reviewed and [the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals] stays the noncitizen’s 4 removal, or (3) the date the noncitizen is released from criminal detention or confinement.” 5 Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 531 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii)). 6 An order of removal becomes final “only upon the earlier of (i) a BIA determination affirming the 7 order or (ii) the expiration of the deadline to seek the BIA’s review of the order.” Ocampo v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KAI HUANG, No. 1:25-cv-02046-DC-SCR 12 Petitioner, 13 v. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee representing himself in this habeas corpus 19 action filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This action was referred to the undersigned by 20 operation of Local Rule 302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The briefing deadlines set by the court in 21 this case have passed and the habeas petition is therefore deemed submitted on the record. See 28 22 U.S.C. § 2243 (emphasizing that “the court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and 23 dispose of the matter as law and justice require”). 24 I. Factual and Procedural History 25 Based on the verified § 2241 petition that petitioner filed under penalty of perjury, 26 petitioner is a native of China who has been in immigration detention since May 30, 2025.1 ECF 27 1 The circumstances and length of petitioner’s residence in the United States are not clear from 28 the present record. 1 No. 1 at 2. Petitioner is detained at the Golden State Annex in McFarland, California which is 2 located in this judicial district. Petitioner indicates that Immigration and Customs Enforcement 3 (“ICE”) detained him without the opportunity to contest his detention in the last six months. ECF 4 No. 1 at 2. According to petitioner, the government cannot show that there is a “significant 5 likelihood of [his]removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Petitioner further indicates 6 that a travel document, which is necessary in order for him to be removed to China, is also not “in 7 sight.” Id. In his first ground for relief, petitioner contends that his continued detention violates 8 the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because there is no significant likelihood that he will 9 be removed to China in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 13. Petitioner submits that his 10 ongoing detention violates the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 11 (2001). Id. He also challenges ICE’s third country removal practices although it is not clear 12 whether ICE is seeking to remove him to a country other than China. By way of relief, petitioner 13 seeks to be immediately released from immigration detention and to be provided notice and an 14 opportunity to challenge his removal to any third country. ECF No. 1 at 19. 15 On December 31, 2025, the undersigned ordered respondents to file an answer/return to 16 the habeas petition within 14 days. ECF No. 5. This order further directed respondents to include 17 “any and all transcripts or other documents relevant to the determination of the issues presented in 18 the habeas application.” ECF 5 at 2. 19 However, respondents did not file an answer or return. Nor did respondents include any 20 transcripts or other documents pertaining to petitioner’s immigration proceedings. Instead, 21 respondents filed a document captioned as a “Combined Opposition.” ECF No. 6. This pleading 22 filed by counsel makes no meaningful substantive points and includes multiple assertions that are 23 not supported by either the facts of this case or any legal authority. To highlight this point, for 24 example, respondents submit that “the detention authority in this case is lawful under the 25 Constitution and applicable provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act” without ever 26 identifying which portion of the INA applies to petitioner. ECF No. 6 at 1. Respondents also 27 state that “appeals are currently pending in the Ninth Circuit that are likely to have precedential 28 effect on current immigration habeas litigation, including this case,” but do not identify what 1 those appeals are of how they might impact this case. Given that the squarely-presented issue in 2 this case is whether petitioner’s detention is constitutional in light of Zadvydas, a 25-year-old 3 Supreme Court precedent, this assertion is dubious. Instead of following the court’s order by 4 responding substantively to the petition and including relevant agency documents, respondents 5 choose to simply delay these proceedings involving a detained individual by requesting “that the 6 Court set a briefing schedule, with [a] deadline for filing Respondents’ opposition to the habeas 7 petition and any relevant documents… 180 days from the date of the Court’s order.” ECF No. 6 8 at 2.2 9 According to the Executive Office of Immigration Review’s Automated Case Information 10 system, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) issued a final order of removal in petitioner’s case on 11 September 15, 2025. See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation. This system also 12 indicates that “no appeal was received for this case” by the Board of Immigration Appeals 13 (“BIA”). Id. The Court takes judicial notice of this information related to petitioner’s 14 immigration proceedings. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (court may take judicial notice of facts that are 15 capable of accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned); 16 Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012) (a court may take judicial 17 notice of undisputed matters of public record including documents on file in federal or state 18 courts). 19 II. Legal Standards 20 Title 8 Section 1231(a) of the United States Code governs the detention of a noncitizen 21 after a final order of removal has been issued. Detention is mandatory during the 90-day 22 “removal period” following the entry of a final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(2). 23 2 Other aspects of respondents’ “Combined Opposition” are baffling. For example, respondents 24 write, as to petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus, “[t]his Court appeared to construe this filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus[.]” The court did not construe anything. 25 Petitioner filed a “petition for writ of habeas corpus,” and the court ordered a response to the petition. Moreover, respondents invite the court to construe the petition as a motion for a 26 temporary restraining order (“TRO”), while still opposing the granting of a TRO. In combination 27 with the issues identified above, these statements leave the court with the distinct sense that the U.S. Attorney’s Office filed this “Combined Opposition” without meaningfully attempting to 28 determine whether there is a factual and legal basis to oppose the petition. 1 “This ‘removal period’ begins on the latest of either (1) the date a noncitizen’s ‘order of removal 2 becomes administratively final,’ (2) the date of a court’s final order, if the noncitizen’s removal 3 order is judicially reviewed and [the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals] stays the noncitizen’s 4 removal, or (3) the date the noncitizen is released from criminal detention or confinement.” 5 Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 531 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii)). 6 An order of removal becomes final “only upon the earlier of (i) a BIA determination affirming the 7 order or (ii) the expiration of the deadline to seek the BIA’s review of the order.” Ocampo v. 8 Holder, 629 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)). “If the [noncitizen] 9 does not leave or is not removed within the removal period, the [noncitizen], pending removal, 10 shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 11 1231(a)(3). ICE “may” only continue to detain the noncitizen after the 90 day removal period if 12 he falls into certain categories, including that he entered “the United States without being 13 admitted or paroled,” or arrived “in the United States at any time or place other than as designated 14 by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(6), 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). 15 This federal statutory scheme also implicates petitioner’s due process rights under the 16 Fifth Amendment. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001) (describing “[t]he serious 17 constitutional problem arising out of a statute that, in these circumstances, permits an indefinite, 18 perhaps permanent, deprivation of human liberty without any such protection” as “obvious.”); see 19 also Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 152 (D. Mass. 2025) (noting that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) 20 was “promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal 21 statute….”). In Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, the Supreme Court read an implicit due process 22 limitation into the immigration statute governing the removal of noncitizens who had already 23 entered the United States and were subject to a final order of removal in order to avoid serious 24 constitutional problems. The High Court concluded that “the Due Process Clause applies to all 25 ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, 26 unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. As a result, the Supreme Court 27 concluded that “once [a noncitizen’s] removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued 28 detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. In order to establish a 1 uniform standard for determining when ongoing detention crosses constitutionally acceptable 2 limits, the Court created a presumptively reasonable six month period of detention. Id. at 701. If 3 a noncitizen “provides a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal 4 in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to 5 rebut that showing.” Id. 6 III. Analysis 7 Petitioner contends that his continued detention is unconstitutional under the standard 8 established in Zadvydas because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable and he has been 9 detained for more than 6 months. The only record available in this case indicates that an IJ issued 10 a removal order for petitioner on September 15, 2025. An order of removal made by an 11 immigration judge at the conclusion of proceedings becomes final “[u]pon expiration of the time 12 allotted for an appeal if the respondent does not file an appeal within that time.” 8 C.F.R. § 13 1241.1(c). Therefore, the deadline to appeal the IJ’s order of removal in this case expired on 14 October 15, 2025 rendering it a final administrative order at that time. Id. Respondents had 90 15 days from that date to effectuate petitioner’s removal to China while continuing to detain him. 16 That 90 day removal period expired on January 13, 2026 without any indication or travel 17 document being issued which establishes that petitioner is not likely to be removed in the 18 foreseeable future. Respondents do not suggest, much less demonstrate, that petitioner is subject 19 to an additional period of detention beyond the 90 day removal period for any of the reasons 20 enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Therefore, the undersigned finds that there is no evidence 21 in the record to establish any statutory basis for petitioner’s detention beyond the 90 day removal 22 period which has already expired. By failing to substantively respond to the petition, respondents 23 have not rebutted petitioner’s showing that there is no significant likelihood of his removal to 24 China in the reasonably foreseeable future. Thus, in accordance with Zadvydas, the undersigned 25 recommends granting petitioner’s § 2241 application by immediately releasing him on any 26 necessary conditions of supervision pending his removal to China. Since there is no indication on 27 the present record that respondents are attempting to remove petitioner to a third country, the 28 undersigned recommends denying the remaining § 2241 claims related to respondents’ third 1 | country removal practices. 2 Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 3 1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be granted, in part, 4 | based on the lack of any substantive answer filed by respondents in this case as well as the 5 | undisputed record before this Court. 6 2. Respondents be ordered to release petitioner on any necessary conditions of 7 | supervision pending any attempts respondents may be making to remove him to China. 8 3. Respondents be further directed to file a notice certifying compliance with the 9 | above provision within 3 days from the date of any order adopting these Findings and 10 || Recommendations. 11 4. All pending motions be denied as moot. 12 5. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of petitioner and to close this 13 || case. 14 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 15 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days after 16 | being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 17 | the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period 18 | is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties 19 | have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v. 20 | Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets 21 | the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties 22 || are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 23 | the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 24 | DATED: January 23, 2026 25
27 SEAN C. RIORDAN 28 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE