JustM2J LLC v. Brewer

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 7, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00380
StatusUnknown

This text of JustM2J LLC v. Brewer (JustM2J LLC v. Brewer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
JustM2J LLC v. Brewer, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUSTM2J LLC, No. 2:25-cv-00380-DAD-SCR 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 14 AYDEN BREWER, et al., EXPEDITED DISCOVERY 15 Defendants. (Doc. No. 2) 16 17 This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining 18 order and plaintiff’s motion for expedited discovery. (Doc. No. 2.) For the reasons explained 19 below, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order and will grant in 20 part plaintiff’s motion for expedited discovery. 21 BACKGROUND 22 On January 27, 2025, plaintiff JustM2J LLC initiated this fraud action against named 23 defendants Ayden Brewer, Jon Litz, and Jason St. George, and unknown defendant John Doe 1. 24 (Doc. No. 1.) In its complaint, plaintiff alleges the following. 25 Plaintiff is a Delaware limited liability company that is the assignee of all claims 26 belonging to Nakamoto LLC related to a series of cyber-attacks (“the Bittensor attacks”) against 27 the participants of Bittensor. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 10.) Nakamoto LLC, as the assignor of plaintiff, 28 ///// 1 purportedly lost approximately $13,000,000 in crypto assets as a result of the Bittensor attacks.1 2 (Id. at ¶ 6.) Bittensor is a decentralized network that is designed to foster collaboration and 3 competition among AI researchers. (Id. at ¶ 21.) It does this by allowing participants to earn 4 rewards in the form of a digital token called TAO for providing computations and machine 5 learning models aimed at completing certain tasks, such as image recognition. (Id.) Bittensor is 6 open-source in that its source code is freely available to the public. (Id.) To participate in 7 Bittensor, participants must have a piece of software called a wallet which enables them to 8 receive, store, and transfer TAO and a private key that allows a user to access and control a wallet 9 and its contents. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Defendant St. George was an employee of Opentensor Foundation 10 (“Opentensor”), which maintains, develops, and improves Bittensor. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 27.) During 11 his tenure there, defendant St. George had access to Opentensor’s proprietary key which allowed 12 access to Opentensor’s PyPI account.2 (Id. at ¶ 27.) Defendants Brewer, St. George, Litz, and 13 John Doe 1 entered into an agreement to plan and execute the Bittensor attacks around April of 14 2024. (Id. at ¶ 28.) On May 20, 2024, defendants registered a domain named opentensor.io 15 which appeared as though it belonged to Opentensor. (Id. at ¶ 29.) 16 On May 22, 2024, Opentensor released an upgrade to Bittensor’s software called version 17 6.12.2. (Id. at ¶ 30.) This release first took place on Github, which is an open-source code 18 repository that Opentensor uses for Bittensor. (Id.) This release was also intended to be 19 published on PyPI by Opentensor. (Id. at ¶ 31.) However, defendants used the proprietary 20 Opentensor key to upload a malicious version of the Bittensor update. (Id.) This prevented the 21 upload of the legitimate version 6.12.2 of Bittensor to PyPI by Opentensor. (Id.) Bittensor users 22 who downloaded version 6.12.2 from PyPI prior to July 2, 2024, therefore received a malicious 23

24 1 Neither in its complaint nor in the pending ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order does plaintiff address how or why Nakamoto LLC assigned its claims in this regard to plaintiff 25 nor does plaintiff explain the nature of the relationship between itself and Nakamoto LLC.

26 2 Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to the PyPI account are vague and unclear. It may be that 27 plaintiff is attempting to allege that Opentensor has an account on PyPI that it uses to upload updates to its Bittensor software as packages and that defendants improperly gained access to the 28 login credentials for that account. 1 version of the update which executed the same functions but also intercepted private keys 2 associated with the wallets of those users and sent those keys to opentensor.io. (Id. at ¶ 33.) On 3 May 30, defendants used one private key obtained in this manner to steal a total of 1039.9 TAO 4 from the wallets of one user, amounting to roughly $480,000. (Id. at ¶ 35.) On June 1, 5 defendants used a different private key obtained in this manner to steal a total of 28,368 TAO 6 from Nakamoto’s wallet, amounting to roughly $13,000,000. (Id. at ¶ 36.) On July 2, defendants 7 transferred 32,395 TAO, valued at approximately $15,000,000, from the wallets of 30 users. (Id. 8 at ¶ 37.) 9 Opentensor then placed the Bittensor network in safe mode and on July 3 discovered that 10 the malicious version that had been uploaded to PyPI. (Id. at ¶¶ 38, 39.) A series of transfers and 11 exchanges occurred which caused the assets taken in these three attacks to be deposited into 12 specific wallet addresses (“the Destination Addresses”) across several exchanges. (Id. at ¶¶ 41, 13 42.) Plaintiff does not allege when these transfers occurred. Opentensor retained a forensic 14 investigator and contacted law enforcement regarding the Bittensor attacks, though plaintiff does 15 not allege when the investigation conducted by the forensic investigator was completed. (Id. at ¶ 16 40.) Plaintiff has provided a declaration attached to its ex parte motion for a temporary 17 restraining order which states that the forensic investigator was hired in July 2024. (Doc. No. 2-2 18 at ¶ 6.) 19 Assets from the May 30 cyberattack, amounting to 1030.9 TAO, were transferred to the 20 TAO-wTAO bridge which allows users to convert TAO to wTAO, a separate cryptocurrency. 21 (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 43.) Those wTAO assets were then converted to Ethereum (“ETH”), a separate 22 cryptocurrency, and deposited into the following cryptocurrency wallet addresses: 23 Cryptocurrency Address 24 and Volume Destination Address Type USD Value3 0x5e92aB69eB102cFC4A7 WhiteBit 25 103 ETH C507D8Dc3cC1eEdE25Eb0 Deposit $412,206 26 3 Plaintiff represents that the value of the funds located in each of the destination addresses listed 27 in this order were calculated using the peak ETH/USD conversion rate over the past thirty (30) days. (Doc. No. 1 at 9 n.1.) 28 1 Cryptocurrency Destination Address Address USD Value3 and Volume Type 2 Address 3 June 1, 0x09F76d4FC3bcE5bF2854 .884 ETH 2024 Hack $3,537 3F45c4CeE9999E0a0AAf 4 Address 5 (Id. at ¶ 46.)4 6 According to plaintiff, assets from the June 1 attack, amounting to 28,368 TAO, were 7 transferred to the TAO-wTAO bridge and temporarily deposited to the wallet address identified 8 as the traced endpoint for the .884 ETH taken in the May 30 attack. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Those wTAO 9 assets were then exchanged for ETH, wETH, a separate cryptocurrency, and USD Coin. (Id. at ¶ 10 48.) USD Coin is a stablecoin cryptocurrency designed to maintain a 1:1 conversion rate with 11 USD. (Id. at 9 at n.2.) Those assets were then distributed over several deposit addresses in 12 Binance, WhiteBit, and HTX, which are exchanges used to store and trade cryptocurrencies. (Id. 13 at ¶ 49.) Approximately 1,205 ETH from those assets was routed through the Railgun Privacy 14 Protocol, which is a system designed to hide the details of cryptocurrency transactions. (Id. at ¶ 15 51.) Plaintiff claims that 1,055 ETH was transferred from the Railgun Privacy Protocol to the 16 Synapse Protocol bridge, a tool used to transfer cryptocurrency assets between different 17 blockchains, and then transferred to a variety of cryptocurrency exchanges while the remaining 18 150 ETH was sent to two specific deposit addresses. (Id.

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JustM2J LLC v. Brewer, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/justm2j-llc-v-brewer-caed-2025.