Justin Schimandle v. DeKalb County Sheriff's Office

114 F.4th 648

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: August 28, 2024
• Docket: 23-2151
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-2151 JUSTIN SCHIMANDLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

DEKALB COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE and JOSH DUEHNING, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. No. 3:21-cv-50477 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2024 — DECIDED AUGUST 28, 2024 ____________________

Before RIPPLE, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Justin Schimandle, a high-school administrator, forcibly restrained a student at school. After an investigation, Detective Josh Duehning of the Dekalb County, Illinois Sheriff’s Office submitted affidavits to support an ar- rest warrant against Schimandle for battery. An Illinois state magistrate judge issued the warrant, and Schimandle turned himself in. The criminal case proceeded to a bench trial. After 2 No. 23-2151

the prosecution rested, Schimandle moved for a directed find- ing, which the trial court granted, and Schimandle was found not guilty. Schimandle then sued the Dekalb County Sheriff’s Office and Duehning, alleging false arrest. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the district court granted that motion, dismissing Schimandle’s claims. The court found that there was probable cause to arrest Schimandle and that Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity. Arguable prob- able cause supported Schimandle’s arrest, so we affirm the district court. I We view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—here, Schimandle—on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 471–72 (7th Cir. 2023); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). But where video recordings are referenced in the complaint and central to the claims, we may view those vid- eos in addition to the facts alleged in the complaint. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378; Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2024); Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 2013). The facts of this case are disputed. Three videos recorded the incident. Most of the specifics of the encounter cannot be seen on the videos, and the videos do not contain audio. Be- low, we take Schimandle’s description as true, deviating only where the videos contradict Schimandle or to add infor- mation that Schimandle does not include. A. The Underlying Incident Schimandle was the Dean of Students at Kishwaukee Ed- ucation Consortium, a high school in Malta, Illinois. No. 23-2151 3

Kishwaukee offers vocational classes to juniors and seniors with non-violent disciplinary issues from neighboring high schools. On September 26, 2019, during school hours, Kishwaukee students reported to Schimandle that another student, “C.G.,” was in a school bathroom using a vaping device. Schimandle went to the “Commons” area to investigate the report. He searched C.G.’s bag and found a vaping device. Schimandle alleges that as he retrieved the device, C.G. ran up to him, grabbed his wrist, took the bag, and ran off. Schimandle then went to the office to notify his superiors. Later that day, Schimandle saw C.G. in the Commons area again. Schimandle asked C.G. to come to his office so that he could explain why he had searched C.G.’s bag. C.G. re- sponded with profanity and refused to speak with Schiman- dle. Schimandle went to his office to call C.G.’s guardian to inform him that C.G. would be suspended because of the in- cident. Schimandle returned to the Commons area to notify C.G. of the suspensions. When Schimandle told C.G. about the sus- pension, C.G. responded, “let me tell you something man to [expletive] man. How would you like it if I searched you?” C.G. also moved toward Schimandle, grabbed Schimandle’s pants, and pulled Schimandle toward him. C.G. then tried to reach into Schimandle’s pants. Schimandle grabbed one of C.G.’s arms, fearing he would be struck with C.G.’s free arm, and told C.G., “do not touch me again.” C.G. ignored the warning, tried to reach into Schimandle’s pants again, became more aggressive, and yelled profanity. 4 No. 23-2151

As Schimandle tells it, in response and out of fear for his own safety, he bear hugged C.G. and began walking him out of the Commons area. Holding C.G. in that manner, Schiman- dle walked with him into the foyer through a set of doors. When they moved into the foyer, Schimandle and C.G. fell to the ground, with Schimandle landing on top of C.G. After fall- ing, Schimandle continued holding C.G. on the ground. Schimandle alleges he did so because C.G. continued to strug- gle and curse, and he feared that releasing C.G. would esca- late the incident. Schimandle told C.G., “I can let you go when I feel safe to do so.” At that point, a Kishwaukee employee, referred to in Schimandle’s complaint as “Mr. Peek,” and a school resource officer arrived to assist in restraining C.G. Once the others arrived, Schimandle retreated from the alter- cation. B. The Investigation The day after the incident, the Associate Principal of Kish- waukee, Matthew Pierce, called the Sheriff’s Office to report what happened. The Sheriff’s Office opened an investigation and assigned the case to Duehning. In the course of the inves- tigation, an officer obtained school video surveillance and a cell phone video, which Duehning viewed. The videos confirm much but not all of Schimandle’s story because they do not depict the entire encounter and do not have audio. They show Schimandle approaching C.G. through the Commons area. C.G. was seated in a classroom next to a partially-open room divider which separated the classroom from the Commons area. Schimandle and C.G. talked. During the conversation, C.G. stood up to leave, but Schimandle reached for him to stop him. In doing so, Schimandle pushed C.G. into the room divider, which gave No. 23-2151 5

way. When Schimandle finally grabbed C.G., he placed him in a bear hug. Schimandle then walked with C.G. in front of him in that position and at times seemed to drag C.G. across the Commons area and through a double set of doors. They passed into a foyer and Schimandle and C.G. fell to the ground. The videos end with Schimandle lying on top of C.G. and holding C.G. under control while on the ground. Duehning interviewed Schimandle and other Kishwaukee employees involved in the incident, including Peek and Pierce. Schimandle also gave Duehning a written timeline of the incident. Duehning interviewed three additional Kish- waukee employees who witnessed the incident. The record does not state whether C.G. was interviewed. In a report Duehning later prepared about the events, he described these interviews. He wrote that “Schimandle’s ac- count was similar to his written statement of events” and noted it is “consistent to what the surveillance video depicts.” He made this same notation about Peek’s, Pierce’s, and three other employees’ statements. C. Schimandle’s Arrest, Trial, and Finding of Not Guilty On November 26, 2019, Duehning submitted four affida- vits in support of an arrest warrant for Schimandle. Those af- fidavits supported charges of criminal battery. Specifically, they alleged that Schimandle caused bodily harm to C.G. and made physical contact of an insulting and provoking nature to C.G. while (1) carrying C.G. and falling on top of C.G. with his body weight, and (2) carrying C.G. and using C.G.’s body to open a door, striking C.G.’s head and side into the door. 6 No. 23-2151

They do not mention exculpatory facts, such as evidence of an affirmative defense for Schimandle’s actions. 1 Relying on Duehning’s affidavits, a Dekalb County mag- istrate judge found the battery charges were supported by probable cause and issued an arrest warrant for Schimandle. Schimandle turned himself in to the Sheriff’s Office, where he was handcuffed and detained. Shortly after, the school district placed Schimandle on administrative leave, and eventually his employment with Kishwaukee was terminated. Schimandle’s criminal case proceeded to a bench trial. Af- ter the prosecution rested, Schimandle moved for a directed finding. The trial court granted Schimandle’s motion, and he was found not guilty. D. Schimandle’s Lawsuit and District Court Dismissal As relevant to this appeal, Schimandle brought a claim un- der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as an Illinois state law claim for malicious prosecution. He sought to hold liable Duehning and the Sheriff’s Office, the latter under the doc- trines of respondeat superior and indemnification. The de- fendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Schimandle failed to state a cause of action for false arrest against Duehning and that Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. The

1 On appeal, Schimandle argues Duehning should have known dur-

ing his investigation that Schimandle had an affirmative defense under 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24. That statute allows teachers to use reasonable force against students in self-defense. Nothing in the record indicates that Duehning was aware of this statute or that Schimandle made him aware of it. No. 23-2151 7

defendants answered Schimandle’s First Amended Com- plaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), again raising the same two defenses. The district court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment for the defendants. The court found that probable cause existed to arrest Schimandle and that Duehning was entitled to qualified immunity for his ac- tions. For probable cause, the court found, “[t]he allegations taken in the light most favorable to Schimandle as well as the video recordings, overwhelming[ly] establish the existence of probable cause.” In reaching this conclusion, the court em- phasized that Schimandle admitted to putting C.G. in a bear hug, which satisfies the physical contact element of battery under Illinois law. The court also disagreed with Schiman- dle’s argument that Duehning knew or should have known that Schimandle had authority to restrain C.G., so Duehning must have lied about his knowledge or omitted a potential af- firmative defense from the affidavits for an arrest warrant. Rather than credit that contention, the court found that Duehning’s affidavits did not contain false statements or ma- terial omissions. On qualified immunity, the court concluded that “[e]ven assuming probable cause did not exist,” “arguable probable cause existed” supporting Schimandle’s arrest. This appeal followed. 2 II We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Lisby, 74 F.4th at 472. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same

2 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367,

and this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 8 No. 23-2151

standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2017). A com- plaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to demon- strate a plausible entitlement to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555−56 (2007); see Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2018). On appeal, Schimandle claims the district court erred by ruling first, that probable cause existed to arrest him for bat- tery, and second, that Duehning was entitled to qualified im- munity. Whether there was “probable cause to arrest [Schimandle] is separate from the question relating to quali- fied immunity.” Fleming v. Livingston County, 674 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2012); see Jump v. Village of Shorewood, 42 F.4th 782, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2022). We place to the side the first question and address the second, although the qualified immunity analysis requires us to consider the issue of arguable probable cause. Both issues can be extensive, and the latter is disposi- tive here. A Qualified immunity requires the court to determine: (1) whether the record evidences the violation of a federal statu- tory or constitutional right; and if so (2) whether the right violated was clearly established at the time the violation oc- curred. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pierner-Lytge v. Hobbs, 60 F.4th 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 2023); Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2022). “If either inquiry is answered in the negative,” qualified immunity protects the defendant of- ficial. Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2014); see Pear- son v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009); Harlow v. Fitzger- ald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 737 No. 23-2151 9

(7th Cir. 2021). Qualified immunity provides “’ample room for mistaken judgments’ and protects all but the ‘plainly in- competent and those who knowingly violate the law.’” Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)). Schimandle bears the burden of demonstrating that the right was clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred. Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017). To be clearly established, the right must be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has frequently cau- tioned at this step not to define that law at too high a level of generality. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (citing Ashcroft v. al- Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)); see also City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam); Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104. Although the plaintiff need not point to an identical case finding the alleged conduct unlawful, he must point to prec- edent placing the “statutory or constitutional question be- yond debate.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741); see also Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook County, 993 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Otherwise, the plaintiff must persuade the court that the conduct is so egregious and unreasonable that, notwith- standing the lack of an analogous decision, no reasonable of- ficer could have thought he was acting lawfully. See Wheeler, 539 F.3d at 639. “There is no question that [Schimandle’s] constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly established at the time of the incident.” See Fleming, 674 F.3d 10 No. 23-2151

at 879 (collecting cases reiterating the constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause). But an officer is still entitled to qualified immunity in a false arrest case when “’a reasonable officer could have mis- takenly believed that probable cause existed.’” Id. at 880 (quoting Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998)). This inquiry is sometimes referred to as “arguable probable cause.” Id. Although closely related, for qualified immunity purposes, a determination of actual probable cause is separate and distinct from arguable probable cause. Id. at 880. Arguable probable cause is established when “a reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of well-established law.” Id. (cleaned up). Whether arguable probable cause “supports qualified immunity ‘is a pure question of law’ to be decided by the court.” Cibulka v. City of Madison, 992 F.3d 633, 639 n.2 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012)) (finding in false- arrest case that officers had arguable probable cause to arrest appellant for disorderly conduct where he admitted to actively resisting officers). And to decide it, we look to the totality of the circumstances. See id. at 638; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232–33 (1983); Garcia v. Posewitz, 79 F.4th 874, 880 (7th Cir. 2023) (per curiam). Turning to this case, the underlying charge for which Schimandle claims he was falsely arrested is battery in viola- tion of 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3(a). Count I of the indict- ment charged Schimandle under the first prong of that stat- ute, which provides: “A person commits battery if he or she No. 23-2151 11

knowingly without legal justification by any means, (1) causes bodily harm to an individual … .” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3(a)(1). 3 Counts II and III of the indictment charged him under the second prong. That prong criminalizes “physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3(a)(2). Each element of battery is supported here. First, Schiman- dle had physical contact with C.G. The video and Schiman- dle’s admissions depict him grabbing C.G. and placing C.G. in a bear hug. Second, that physical contact could have caused bodily harm to C.G. Schimandle pushed C.G. into the room divider, placed C.G. in a bear hug, and walked with C.G. in front of him through the Commons area and a double set of doors. And Schimandle, a much bigger man, fell on top of C.G., a child, after moving through the doors. Third, Schiman- dle’s contact with C.G. was of an insulting and provoking na- ture. He carries and drags C.G. as C.G. struggles to get away. Plus, after the fall, Schimandle lays on top of C.G. to pin him down. Last, Schimandle intended to make this contact with C.G. Schimandle admitted he sought out C.G. and placed him in a “bear hug.” Given the videos capturing the physical altercation, the multiple eyewitness interviews, and Schimandle’s own ad- missions, a reasonable officer considering the same circum- stances could have reasonably believed probable cause

3 Per Illinois Jury Instruction 11.05, the phrase “without legal justifi-

cation” is used “whenever an instruction is to be given on an affirmative defense contained in Article 7 of Chapter 38.” Because Schimandle had an affirmative defense, but the case proceeded as a bench, not a jury, trial, we note this caveat but leave the phrase in the text above. 12 No. 23-2151

existed for each of those charges. See Mwangangi v. Nielsen, 48 F.4th 816, 825 (7th Cir. 2022). The conclusion that there was at least arguable probable cause to arrest is supported by precedent. In many respects, the analysis here is similar to a recent decision from this court. In Gaddis v. DeMattei, the plaintiff complained of false arrest. This court held that the officer there had a reasonable belief that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff for an Illinois disorderly conduct violation. 30 F.4th 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2022). The officer interviewed bystanders, who discussed the dis- turbance plaintiff caused and plaintiff’s pattern of disruptive behavior. Based on those interviews, the officer made his own assessment. After the investigation, the officer concluded that the plaintiff posed a risk to others and arrested him. Id. In the court’s analysis, it noted that the facts were “gleaned firsthand” by the officer and cited our precedent on arguable probable cause. Id. Here, like the officer in Gaddis, Duehning had firsthand in- formation from interviews about a disturbance. He even had corroborating video showing the altercation. Both the inter- views and videos confirmed that Schimandle grabbed C.G., placed him in a bear hug, and pushed him through a double set of doors, supporting an inference Schimandle caused bod- ily harm to C.G. and showing that he had physical contact with C.G. Unlike in Gaddis, Duehning did not believe Schimandle’s conduct was ongoing or a problem beyond this isolated inci- dent. Also unlike that case, Schimandle told Duehning that he placed C.G. in a bear hug. Thus, Schimandle admitted to some of the elements of Illinois battery, while the plaintiff in Gaddis did not admit to the elements of a crime. The information No. 23-2151 13

provided to and collected by Duehning in his investigation made it reasonable for him to believe probable cause existed to arrest Schimandle for battery. Moreover, the magistrate judge’s approval of the arrest warrant bolsters the officer’s reasonable belief that probable cause supported the warrant and the application of qualified immunity. Cf. Fleming, 674 F.3d at 881 (explaining the fact that the officer had consulted with the District Attorney prior to arresting the plaintiff-arrestee “goes a long way toward solid- ifying his qualified immunity defense”); see also Johnson v. My- ers, 53 F.4th 1063, 1070 n.2 (7th Cir. 2022) (same); Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 251 (7th Cir. 2015) (same). The Su- preme Court has noted that “[w]here the alleged Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner or … in ‘objective good faith.’” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984)); see also Socha v. City of Joliet, 107 F.4th 700, 710 (7th Cir. 2024). We heed that direction and give credence to the magistrate judge’s determi- nation here. Last, Schimandle agrees that his Illinois state law claim for malicious prosecution stands or falls on the existence of arguable probable cause for his arrest. See Brief for Plaintiff- Appellant at 23, Schimandle v. Dekalb Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 23-2151 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2023), ECF No. 9. Other than this concession, the parties do not discuss this claim. Given this lack of development, and our conclusion that arguable prob- able cause existed here, we do not disagree with this conces- sion. 14 No. 23-2151

B Schimandle lodges two additional arguments. He con- tends that even if there was at least arguable probable cause, Duehning is not entitled to qualified immunity because he fal- sified information and intentionally omitted material, excul- patory evidence from the warrant affidavits. Falsifying the factual basis for a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (holding a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant is unreasonable if the affidavit supporting the warrants contains deliberate “falsity or reckless disregard” for the truth); see also Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2019); Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 591 (7th Cir. 2015). This rule applies equally to material omissions. See United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Garcia, 79 F.4th at 879 (“[A]n official violates the Fourth Amendment by intention- ally or recklessly omitting from a warrant application infor- mation that is material to determining probable cause.”). Schimandle provides little information as to what those false statements or material omissions were. 4 Viewing his ar- guments in their best light, he seems to contend that the falsi- fications or omissions were: (1) that Duehning noted Schimandle’s testimony was “consistent” with the video yet still signed affidavits for an arrest warrant; and (2) that Duehning knew about and omitted Schimandle’s claimed af- firmative defense under 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 (a statute permitting teachers and other qualified individuals in schools

4 At oral argument, we inquired as to the nature of the omissions, but

Schimandle’s counsel did not offer an explanation. See Oral Arg. at 6:10– 7:28. No. 23-2151 15

to use “reasonable force” to maintain safety in some situa- tions). Neither argument has merit. First, Schimandle states that Duehning reported, “Schimandle’s account was similar to his written statement of events and is consistent to what the surveillance video de- picts.” This argument has two parts. The court should con- clude that Duehning believed Schimandle’s description of the incident matched what the surveillance videos showed. So, Duehning must have falsified information on the affidavits by determining Schimandle committed battery because the video did not depict a battery. The problem is that the videos only show clips of the al- tercation between Schimandle and C.G. Duehning had no ev- idence of what happened before the altercation began. The videos started too late, and the witnesses did not see anything until Schimandle already had C.G. in a bear hug. Addition- ally, there is no audio recording of the conversation between Schimandle and C.G., so there is no way to tell what Schiman- dle and C.G. are saying, if anything. Duehning had to make his own conclusions and could not have fully adopted Schimandle’s version of events because he had no evidence beyond Schimandle’s account of the conversation occurring during the altercation. Duehning would have also gleaned additional facts from the videos that are not reported in Schimandle’s version of events. These additional facts are consistent with Schimandle’s version of events but provide further support for the elements of battery. One example is the portion of the video showing Schimandle pushing C.G. through the room divider in Schimandle’s attempt to grab C.G. and stop him from fleeing. Schimandle did not discuss this part of the altercation, but Duehning would have seen it 16 No. 23-2151

in the video and been able to draw his own conclusion based on such information. Therefore, this argument does not support the contention that Duehning falsified information because the video and Duehning’s attestations did not contra- dict the affidavits for an arrest warrant. Second, Schimandle argues that Duehning knew or should have known about Schimandle’s claimed affirmative defense under 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 and that Duehning purposely omitted it from the affidavits supporting Schiman- dle’s arrest warrant. We are far from certain that statute provides an affirma- tive defense in this type of action. Even assuming that it could apply, once a law enforcement officer discovers sufficient facts to establish probable cause, he has no constitutional ob- ligation to conduct any further investigation in the hope of discovering exculpatory evidence or possible defenses. See Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 718 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Madero v. McGuinness, 97 F.4th 516, 522–23 (7th Cir. 2024). An officer “‘may not ignore conclusively established evidence of the ex- istence of an affirmative defense,’” but the Fourth Amend- ment imposes no duty to investigate whether a valid defense exists. McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2009) (quot- ing Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Madero, 97 F.4th at 523; Doe v. Gray, 75 F.4th 710, 719 (7th Cir. 2023). Moreover, the existence and validity of an affirmative de- fense does not necessarily negate probable cause to arrest. See Humphrey, 148 F.3d at 724 (validity of affirmative defense is irrelevant to whether police officer sued for false arrest had probable cause to make arrest). The “[p]olice are entitled to leave to the criminal process the full examination of potential No. 23-2151 17

defenses[,]” Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 2012), and “[a] person’s ability to explain away seemingly damning facts does not negate the existence of probable cause, even though it might provide a good defense should the case go to trial.” Deng v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 552 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2009). Plus, there is no evidence that Duehning knew teachers could use force against students in certain situations. Schimandle does not allege that he told Duehning about his authority to restrain C.G. or that anyone else told Duehning. He just asserts that Duehning “knew or should have known” about the defense. After viewing the videos, questioning Schimandle and other witnesses, and reasonably determining probable cause existed to arrest Schimandle for battery, Duehning did not need to investigate possible defenses and their potential application. See Madero, 97 F.4th at 523. Even if Duehning should have investigated possible affirmative defenses and included that information in the af- fidavits, it would not have changed the probable cause deter- mination. Again, only omitting material facts violates the Fourth Amendment. See Garcia, 79 F.4th at 879; Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. “[A]n omitted fact is material if its inclusion would have negated probable cause.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2010). We weigh materiality by asking “whether a hypothetical affidavit that included the omitted material would still establish probable cause.” Hart, 798 F.3d at 593. Information about the claimed affirmative defense was ul- timately immaterial. Duehning would have had to consider whether Schimandle’s use of force was reasonable, one way or the other. 18 No. 23-2151

An objectively reasonable officer could still find probable cause in the face of Schimandle’s affirmative defense. Schimandle admitted to placing C.G. in a bear hug, and the video shows Schimandle moving with C.G. through a door- way, then Schimandle later falling on top of C.G. That could be enough to show willful and wanton conduct that may not fall under the affirmative defense Schimandle raised. So even assuming omission, that omission does not negate probable cause and is immaterial. See, e.g., id. at 592–93 (omission of ex- culpatory information from affidavit was immaterial because the omitted information did not change the probable cause determination). Duehning was not required to include Schimandle’s affirmative defense in the affidavits for an arrest warrant. * * * “Rarely do we see qualified immunity awarded at the pleading stage.” Roldan v. Stroud, 52 F.4th 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2022); see Reed, 906 F.3d at 548. That is because whether qual- ified immunity applies “most often depend on facts a plaintiff is not required to plead at the outset of litigation to avoid dismissal.” Roldan, 52 F.4th at 337. But here, the district court appropriately analyzed videos of the incident, witness testi- mony, and reports incorporated in Schimandle’s pleadings. That substantial evidence allowed the district court—and us now—to consider and recognize qualified immunity at this stage. III We conclude by noting that despite this prosecution end- ing with Schimandle’s vindication—he is not guilty of the charged offense—Schimandle lost his job and endured No. 23-2151 19

prosecution and scrutiny. Notwithstanding the difficulties Schimandle faced, the law of qualified immunity compels an affirmance here. Because arguable probable cause supported Schimandle’s arrest, entitling Duehning to qualified immun- ity and barring Schimandle’s malicious prosecution claim, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Schimandle’s com- plaint.