Justin Longworth v. A. Mansukhani

134 F.4th 755

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: April 16, 2025
• Docket: 21-7609
• Status: Published

Opinion

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7609

JUSTIN M. LONGWORTH,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

A. MANSUKHANI; ANTHONY T. SCARANTINO; PATRICK BURRELL; MATTHEW W. HAUGHT; SHERRY M. BECK,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:19-ct-03199-FL)

Argued: January 29, 2025 Decided: April 16, 2025

Before AGEE and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and Michael Stefan NACHMANOFF, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Nachmanoff wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Richardson joined.

ARGUED: Thomas Ross Brugato, COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jonathan Silberman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina; Frederick C. Kieser, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Samuel Weiss, Oren Nimni, RIGHTS BEHIND BARS, Washington, D.C.; David M. Zionts, Matthew Quallen, USCA4 Appeal: 21-7609 Doc: 93 Filed: 04/16/2025 Pg: 2 of 9

COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, Sharon C. Wilson, Assistant United States Attorney, for Appellees. J. Scott Ballenger, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee Sherry M. Beck.

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MICHAEL S. NACHMANOFF, District Judge:

A party injured by a federal employee generally has two avenues of recourse. He

may pursue a claim against the employee “directly under the Constitution, as recognized

in Bivens,” or against the United States for a cognizable tort under the Federal Tort Claims

Act (“FTCA”). Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103, 121 (4th Cir. 2009). These claims are not

exclusive and may be brought together or in sequential suits. But a plaintiff who pursues

both remedies “runs the risk that [the] constitutional claim will be subject to the FTCA’s

‘judgment bar’ provision.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2676). The judgment bar provides that

an FTCA judgment is a “complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same

subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to

the claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2676. In other words, if a party obtains a judgment on his FTCA

claim, he can no longer pursue a Bivens action based on the same conduct.

That is precisely the scenario Justin Longworth faces. A federal inmate alleging

abuse by Federal Bureau of Prison (“FBOP”) officials, Longworth filed two separate

lawsuits: the first presented a Bivens claim directly against those officials, and the second

an FTCA claim against the United States. The district court dismissed both claims, and

Longworth appealed only the Bivens dismissal. The question before us is simple: does the

entry of judgment on Longworth’s FTCA claim “bar” his Bivens appeal? We conclude that

it does. For that reason, the appeal must be dismissed.

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I.

Justin Longworth was an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner,

North Carolina (“FCI Butner”) from July 22, 2016, until January 16, 2019. J.A. 47, 52, 54.1

Longworth claims that while there he faced repeated sexual harassment and abuse. Id.

Specifically, Longworth alleges that during his work assignment as a plumber, he came

into frequent contact with Defendant Sherry M. Beck, an FBOP correctional officer who

served as the Secretary of Facilities and managed payroll for all inmate employees. J.A. 52.

Longworth claims that Defendant Beck took an inappropriate interest in him and engaged

in daily aggressive sexual harassment and abuse including forced oral sex, fondling and

groping of the genitals, kissing, and biting. Id. Longworth did not immediately report

Defendant Beck’s conduct because he feared retaliation. J.A. 53.

According to Longworth, Defendants Andrew Mansukhani (warden of FCI-Butner

Medium), Anthony T. Scarantino (correctional institution administrator at FCI-Butner),

Patrick Burrell (plumber for the FCI-Butner facilities department), and Matthew W.

Haught (maintenance mechanic for the FCI-Butner facilities department) initially did

nothing to stop or report Defendant Beck’s abuse. J.A. 48–49, 53. Eventually, Defendant

Haught reported Defendant Beck to her facilities supervisors, but failed to report the

conduct to his own supervisors, a Special Investigative Agent, or the wardens (Defendants

1 In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual allegations set forth in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

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Mansukhani and Scarantino) as required by prison policy. J.A. 53. Longworth was then

fired from his work assignment and placed in solitary confinement. J.A. 54.

After Longworth was moved to solitary confinement, he decided to report

Defendant Beck’s conduct to Special Investigative Agent Sean Kearney. Id. Following this

report, an investigation ensued, Defendant Beck was terminated, and Longworth was

transferred to a low security Federal Correctional Institution in Petersburg, Virginia (“FCI

Petersburg Low”). J.A. 47, 54. But neither Longworth’s transfer nor Defendant Beck’s

termination abated the misconduct—Longworth claims that Defendant Beck continued to

harass him at FCI Petersburg Low by sending him sexually explicit and threatening letters.

J.A. 55.

II.

On July 2, 2019, Longworth commenced this action in the Eastern District of North

Carolina, asserting claims for violations of his civil rights pursuant to Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and related

state law claims. J.A. 87.2 Longworth alleged that Defendant Beck sexually assaulted him

in violation of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, and that the remaining Defendants

acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. J.A. 95.

Defendants Mansukhani, Scarantino, Burrell, and Haught moved to dismiss.3 J.A. 87.

2 Longworth filed an amended complaint, operative here with respect to his Bivens action, on June 1, 2020. J.A. 88. 3 Defendant Beck, proceeding pro se at the time, did not file a motion to dismiss.

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Proceeding under the framework established by the Supreme Court in Ziglar v. Abbasi,

582 U.S. 120 (2017), the district court found that both Longworth’s Fourth Amendment

and Eighth Amendment claims presented “new contexts where they have ‘no analogue in

the Supreme Court’s prior Bivens cases.’” J.A. 95 (quoting Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, 922 F.3d

514, 525 (4th Cir. 2019)). Continuing to the “second inquiry” under Abbasi, the district

court found that special factors counseled hesitation in extending Bivens to this context.4

J.A. 99–102. Accordingly, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and

entered its dismissal order on September 21, 2021.5 J.A. 102, 104. On November 11, 2021,

Longworth noticed this appeal.6 J.A. 105–106.

But prior to Longworth’s appeal (and even prior to the district court’s Bivens

dismissal order), Longworth filed a separate complaint, on August 16, 2021, under the

FTCA, alleging that the United States was liable for its employees’ negligence.7 J.A. 108.

Longworth’s FTCA complaint alleged the same underlying facts as his Bivens complaint—

4 The special factors inquiry “must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 136. The district court outlined several special factors but emphasized two in particular that counseled hesitation: (1) the alternative remedial scheme available to Longworth through the FBOP’s administrative remedy program, and (2) Congress’s failure to create a damages remedy despite enacting legislation in the prisoner sexual abuse context. J.A. 99–102. 5 The district court also dismissed the claims against Defendant Beck pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). J.A. 103–104. 6 Longworth does not appeal the dismissal of his Fourth Amendment claims. See Opening Br. 9 n.3. 7 See Justin M. Longworth v. United States of America, 5:21-ct-03242-FL (E.D.N.C.).

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that Beck sexually assaulted him and negligently caused him emotional distress, and that

other FBOP officials (Mansukhani, Scarantino, Burrell, and Haught) were negligent in

their supervision and retention of Beck. J.A. 117. On September 29, 2022, the district court

granted the United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding

that Longworth had not adequately pled that Beck was acting within her scope of

employment during the alleged misconduct (one of the six elements required to bring a

meritorious FTCA claim). J.A. 124, 126.8 Longworth did not appeal the judgment on his

FTCA claim.

III.

The question now facing the Court is whether the district court’s FTCA judgment

precludes this Bivens appeal. The FTCA judgment bar provides that an FTCA judgment is

a “complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against

the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2676. This Court specifically asked the parties to address whether the FTCA’s judgment

bar applies retroactively. And the parties addressed that question in their supplemental

briefs. But the Court need not resolve that question today because there is nothing

“retroactive” about the judgment bar’s effect on this case.

The FTCA judgment bar “preclude[s] a Bivens claim against a government

employee when a judgment has been entered on an FTCA claim arising out of the same

8 The Court also found that even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, Longworth’s claims were deficient under Rule 12(b)(6) as “defendant cannot be held vicariously liable for tortious acts taken outside the scope of employment.” J.A. 128–135.

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actions, transactions, or occurrences as the Bivens claim.” Unus, 565 F.3d at 122 (internal

quotation and citation omitted). That is what we have here. A judgment (on the merits)9

has been entered with respect to Longworth’s FTCA claim, but Longworth wishes to

continue to pursue his Bivens claim. Because that claim is based on the same actions as his

FTCA claim, however, it is now precluded.

Longworth urges this Court to interpret the text of § 2676 “to apply solely to actions

filed after or contemporaneous with the FTCA action, not appeals of separate, earlier-filed

actions.” Appellant’s Suppl. Br. 12 (emphasis added). In Longworth’s view, application of

the judgment bar to this matter implicates retroactivity because the Bivens suit was filed

first. We disagree. There is nothing “retroactive” about application of the FTCA judgment

bar here. Longworth’s Bivens claim (whether or not it was filed first) is still on appeal. It

therefore remains an “action” that is subject to the bar. See, e.g., Brownback, 592 U.S. at

220–21 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“An ‘action’ refers to the whole of the lawsuit.”);

Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “action” as a “civil or criminal judicial

proceeding” and “‘action’ in the sense of a judicial proceeding includes . . . any other

9 The FTCA judgment bar is only triggered by a “final judgment on the merits.” Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 214 (2021). Because the district court determined that Beck was not acting within the scope of her employment—and that question goes to the one of the six elements of a meritorious FTCA claim—the dismissal order was “on the merits.” See id. at 218 (“[W]here, as here, pleading a claim and pleading jurisdiction entirely overlap, a ruling that the court lacks jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits that triggers the judgment bar.”). The judgment bar is therefore appropriately triggered here.

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proceeding in which rights are determined”). Put simply, the plain language of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2676 could not be clearer: this action cannot proceed.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the instant appeal.

DISMISSED