Justin Leffler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 9, 2020
• Docket: 19A-CR-2939
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 09 2020, 9:27 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Darren Bedwell Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Steven Hosler Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Justin Leffler, July 9, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2939 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Mark D. Stoner, Appellee-Plaintiff, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G06-1806-F1-19158

Robb, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 1 of 12 Case Summary and Issue [1] Following a jury trial, Justin Leffler was found guilty of two counts of child

molesting, a Level 1 and a Level 4 felony, and not guilty of three additional

counts of child molesting, all Level 4 felonies. The trial court entered judgment

of conviction on the guilty verdicts and sentenced Leffler to a total of forty-two

years at the Indiana Department of Correction. Leffler appeals his convictions,

raising one issue for our review: whether the State committed prosecutorial

misconduct amounting to fundamental error during its closing argument.

Concluding there was no error, but if there was, it was not fundamental, we

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] In October of 2017, thirty-three-year-old Leffler lived with Tianna Doty and her

daughter, J.M., who was seven or eight, and her son, D.M., who was five or

six. On March 9, 2018, Leffler was arrested on charges unrelated to the present

case. On March 12, Siara Cox, a family case manager from the Indiana

Department of Child Services (“DCS”), did a general safety evaluation of the

Doty family because of those charges. In conducting such an evaluation, Cox

asks questions related to “body safety, drugs, alcohol, all things related to any

kind of safety.” Transcript of Evidence, Volume III at 4. When she asked J.M.

body safety questions, J.M. denied that she had ever been touched

inappropriately. Leffler did not return to the home after his arrest.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 2 of 12 [3] Approximately one week later, Doty called both Cox and the Indianapolis

Metropolitan Police Department and reported that J.M. claimed Leffler had

molested her. Two police officers came to the apartment and took a report.

The case was referred to a child abuse detective who requested a forensic

interview. On March 21, Jill Carr of the Child Advocacy Center conducted a

forensic interview of J.M. during which J.M. said Leffler had molested her. No

details of the police report or the forensic interview were revealed other than

that J.M. said Leffler molested her.

[4] At trial, J.M. described several occasions on which Leffler touched her. She

recalled that on Halloween night, Leffler “slept with” her on the couch. Tr.,

Vol. II at 142. She was laying on her side and Leffler was laying behind her,

also on his side, both facing the same direction. Leffler did not touch her, but

she felt uncomfortable in that situation. Approximately one week after

Halloween, Leffler was in J.M.’s bed with her at night and touched her skin-to-

skin on her “front private” with his “front private.” Id. at 144. On another

occasion when Leffler was in J.M.’s bed with her at night, he touched her “back

private” with his “front private.” Id. at 147.1 Another time, J.M. and Leffler

were laying in a blanket fort they had made in the living room and J.M. saw

Leffler’s penis and he touched J.M.’s “front private” with it. Id. at 149. On a

different night when they were sleeping in J.M.’s bedroom, Leffler licked his

1 Through questioning by the State, J.M. clarified that her “front private” was her vagina, her “back private” was her buttocks, and Leffler’s “front private” was his penis. Id. at 144-45, 147.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 3 of 12 finger and touched J.M.’s “front private” and chest. Id. at 151. That same

night, Leffler again touched J.M.’s “back private” with his “front private.” Id.

at 152. And on one occasion, Leffler asked J.M. to touch his “front private”

with her mouth, which she did even though she did not want to. Id. at 153.

Every time, J.M. felt uncomfortable, and every time, Leffler told her that

something would happen to her mom if she told. She did not tell anyone,

including the DCS family case manager, what was happening because she was

“scared and anxious.” Id. at 154. After it was clear to J.M. that Leffler would

not be returning to the home, she felt more comfortable and told her mom, who

immediately called the police.

[5] Stephany Knight, a close friend of Doty’s, had been living with Doty and her

children but moved out when Leffler moved in. She still visited and would

occasionally stay overnight at the apartment even after moving out, however.

At first, Knight believed Leffler was trying to be a good role model, but she

became concerned when she noticed that Leffler was “a little too touchy-feely”

with J.M. and favored her over her brother. Id. at 198. Knight was at the

apartment Halloween night and saw Leffler and J.M. on the couch together.

She thought they “were laying more like a couple than someone looking out for

someone’s child.” Id. at 196. Knight never witnessed any inappropriate

touching, but she did witness Leffler and J.M. come into the living room

together from J.M.’s bedroom upon waking one morning.

[6] The State initially charged Leffler with one count of child molesting as a Level

1 felony and two counts of child molesting as Level 4 felonies. The information

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 4 of 12 was later amended to add two additional counts of child molesting as Level 4

felonies. Although the information itself is worded vaguely as to which

allegations support which count,2 during its closing argument, the State

explained that Count One, the Level 1 felony, was based on the incident where

Leffler made J.M. touch his penis with her mouth. Counts Two through Five,

the Level 4 felonies, were based on, sequentially, Leffler touching J.M.’s vagina

with his penis shortly after Halloween; Leffler touching J.M.’s buttocks with his

penis; Leffler touching J.M.’s vagina with his penis when they were in the

blanket fort; and Leffler licking his finger and touching J.M.’s vagina. See Tr.,

Vol. III at 17-20; see also Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 137-41 (verdict forms

requiring specific findings as to each count).

[7] At Leffler’s jury trial,3 in a lengthy sidebar discussion about whether the defense

had opened the door to the State eliciting evidence about coaching, counter-

intuitive victim behavior, and child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome,

Leffler’s counsel summarized his defense as “essentially that [J.M.]'s testimony

evolved over time, not because she was coached on what to say but because she

was improperly questioned by multiple people.” Tr., Vol. II at 210. The

defense reiterated this theory during its closing argument, challenging J.M.’s

credibility by noting that her description of the molestations had “evolved,

2 The information alleges Leffler engaged in “fondling or touching” with respect to all Level 4 felonies. Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 55. 3 Doty passed away shortly before trial.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 5 of 12 changed over time” as she “had the opportunity to discuss her story with adults

over the last two and a half years[; a]nd when she gave her story to those adults,

they provided her with positive reinforcement[.]” Tr., Vol. III at 24. In

rebuttal, the State argued:

Her mom called the police. The officers come out and they ask enough details to know what they’re looking for. . . . And then . . . [an officer] pages the detective, and [J.M.] comes in for a forensic interview where she has said from day one it happened multiple times, that he did it and that he put his penis in her mouth and touched her over and over and over. And this evolution is adding details.

Id. at 28-29 (emphasis added).4

[8] The jury found Leffler guilty of Count One, child molesting as a Level 1 felony

based on Leffler putting his penis in J.M.’s mouth, and Count Five, child

molesting as a Level 4 felony based on Leffler licking his finger and touching

J.M.’s vagina. The jury found him not guilty of the remaining counts. Leffler

now appeals his convictions.

Discussion and Decision

4 Although the entire case is based upon this statement during the State’s rebuttal argument, instead of a clear, up front presentation of the statement in the Statement of Facts or at the outset of the Argument, both parties bury the actual statement at issue in the Argument section.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 6 of 12 I. Standard of Review [9] Leffler argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing

argument when it told the jury a detail that was not in evidence; that is, “that

J.M. had disclosed the most important detail of the most serious charge of all

‘from day one[.]’” Brief of Appellant at 16.

[10] As our supreme court has explained,

[i]n reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct properly raised in the trial court, we determine (1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected otherwise. A prosecutor has the duty to present a persuasive final argument and thus placing a defendant in grave peril, by itself, is not misconduct. Whether a prosecutor’s argument constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The gravity of peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.

Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014) (quotations and citations omitted).

[11] To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must—at the

time the alleged misconduct occurs—request an admonishment to the jury, and

if further relief is desired, move for a mistrial. Gridley v. State, 121 N.E.3d 1071,

1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Failure to comply with these

requirements forfeits a prosecutorial misconduct claim. Delarosa v. State, 938

N.E.2d 690, 696 (Ind. 2010). Leffler concedes he did not properly preserve his

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 7 of 12 claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal because he did not object during

the State’s rebuttal argument. See Br. of Appellant at 15. Thus, to prevail on

appeal, Leffler must establish not only the grounds for prosecutorial misconduct

but must also establish that the prosecutorial misconduct constituted

fundamental error. Ferree v. State, 124 N.E.3d 109, 114 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019),

trans. denied.

[12] Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to waiver, and a

defendant faces the heavy burden of demonstrating that the alleged error is so

prejudicial to his rights that it rendered a fair trial impossible. Jerden v. State, 37

N.E.3d 494, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[T]o establish fundamental error, the defendant must show that, under the circumstances, the trial judge erred in not sua sponte raising the issue because alleged errors (a) “constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process” and (b) “present an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” The element of such harm is not established by the fact of ultimate conviction but rather “depends upon whether [the defendant’s] right to a fair trial was detrimentally affected by the denial of procedural opportunities for the ascertainment of truth to which he otherwise would have been entitled.

Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668 (citations and footnote omitted). To determine whether

the misconduct had such an undeniable and substantial effect on the jury’s

decision that a fair trial was impossible, we look at the alleged misconduct in

the context of all that happened and all relevant information given to the jury—

including evidence admitted at trial, closing arguments, and jury instructions.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 8 of 12 Jerden, 37 N.E.3d at 498. Review for fundamental error is not intended to grant

the defendant a second bite at the apple; it is meant to permit appellate courts

“to correct the most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have

been procedurally barred[.]” Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668.

II. Closing Argument [13] Leffler correctly notes that because there were no corroborating witnesses, the

State’s case rested on J.M.’s testimony about the acts of molestation and

therefore on her credibility. See Br. of Appellant at 12. He couches his

argument in terms of the State’s closing argument impermissibly encroaching

on the jury’s right to determine the credibility of witnesses. “[T]he jury is the

sole judge of a witness’s credibility.” Kemper v. State, 35 N.E.3d 306, 310 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Therefore, the prosecutor may not state his or her

personal opinion of the credibility of a witness during trial. Thomas v. State, 965

N.E.2d 70, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. A prosecutor may comment

on witness credibility “if the assertions are based on reasons arising from the

evidence presented in the trial[,]” however. Id. (emphasis added); see also Ind.

Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(e) (stating a lawyer shall not allude to any

matter “that will not be supported by admissible evidence [or] assert personal

knowledge of facts in issue[.]”).

[14] Leffler interprets the State’s comment during its rebuttal to mean that “J.M.

specifically accused Leffler of putting his penis in her mouth ‘from day one[,]’”

and argues that the statement was unsupported by the evidence from trial

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 9 of 12 because the content of J.M.’s pretrial statements was not admitted. Br. of

Appellant at 15. We do not interpret the comment so narrowly. In considering

the propriety of a particular statement, we consider it in the context of the

argument as whole. Hand v. State, 863 N.E.2d 386, 394 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

The challenged statement does reference the specific allegation that Leffler put

his penis in J.M.’s mouth, and there was no evidence that J.M. specifically

disclosed that act to her mom or to police on the day she first disclosed the

molestation or to Carr several days later. But considering the oral sex

allegation in the larger context of the entire statement—"he put his penis in her

mouth and touched her over and over”—and the State’s entire closing and

rebuttal arguments, the State was not necessarily saying J.M. had disclosed that

particular allegation on “day one,” or even that she had disclosed every

instance of molestation on “day one.” Rather, the statement could be

interpreted to convey that she had consistently said from the time she finally felt

safe to disclose the molestation that Leffler had molested her multiple times

(“she has said from day one it happened multiple times”) and then disclosed

additional details of the molestations throughout the process as she was

questioned and interviewed (“that he put his penis in her mouth and touched

her over and over. And this evolution is adding details.”). Tr., Vol. III at 29;

see also id. at 22 (State arguing that “when she did first disclose to mom and then

to [the police] and then to Jill Carr, her brain had been repressing those

memories for months. So you got more detail today.”); at 22-23 (arguing kids

“tell on their own time. And they test the waters first, so they give some details

and they see an adult’s reaction and then they feel safe telling more.”); and at Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 10 of 12 27-28 (State arguing on rebuttal that “[t]hese aren’t inconsistencies. . . . Those

are details being added, not inconsistencies.”). Thus, as the evidence would

support an assertion that J.M. consistently disclosed multiple instances of

abuse, and as the prosecutor is allowed to comment on witness credibility based

on evidence presented at trial, see Thomas, 965 N.E.2d at 77, we conclude the

prosecutor did not commit misconduct in making this statement.

[15] However, even if we interpret the statement as Leffler does and assume the

prosecutor committed misconduct by making an improper statement during

rebuttal, we conclude this was not fundamental error. The challenged

statement was brief, it was immediately followed by an acknowledgement that

the details of J.M.’s allegations had evolved since day one, and the trial court

gave the jury the following instruction:

The unsworn statements or comments of counsel . . . should not be considered as evidence in the case. It is your duty to determine the facts from the testimony and evidence admitted by the Court and given in your presence and you should disregard any and all [other] information[.]

Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 127. The trial court’s jury instructions are

presumed to cure any improper statements made during trial. Guy v. State, 755

N.E.2d 248, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

[16] Fundamental error “must be of such magnitude to persuade the reviewing court

that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial or that the verdict

is clearly wrong or of such dubious validity that justice cannot permit it to

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 11 of 12 stand.” Id. We do not believe the prosecutor’s statement, even if improper,

made it impossible for Leffler to receive a fair trial. See Wright v. State, 690

N.E.2d 1098, 1112 (Ind. 1997) (providing that the prosecutor’s statement, while

improper, was fleeting, and when considered together with the trial court’s

instructions that statements of counsel are not evidence and that it is the duty of

the jury to decide a case only on evidence given in court, did not place

defendant in a position of grave peril). J.M testified at Leffler’s trial about the

instances of molestation. Although the jury found Leffler guilty of the count

related to Leffler putting his penis in J.M.’s mouth, it also found him not guilty

of three additional charges of child molesting, indicating it carefully parsed the

evidence and considered the proof relevant to each charge. We are not

persuaded that the verdicts are clearly wrong or of dubious validity and

therefore, Leffler has failed to show fundamental error.

Conclusion [17] Leffler has failed to prove prosecutorial misconduct, and even if we assume

there was misconduct, he has failed to prove that any such misconduct

constituted fundamental error. Accordingly, Leffler’s convictions for child

molesting are affirmed.

[18] Affirmed.

May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2939 | July 9, 2020 Page 12 of 12