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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 JUSTIN DOMONIC BELL, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01320-BHS-GJL 11 Petitioner, v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 12 KAREN ARNOLD, Noting Date: January 6, 2026 13 Respondent. 14
15 The District Court referred this action to United States Magistrate Judge Grady J. 16 Leupold. Petitioner Justin D. Bell, proceeding pro se, has filed a federal Petition for writ of 17 habeas corpus (“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from his state court conviction 18 and sentence. Dkt. 9. The Petition contains four grounds for relief. 19 After considering the record, the Court concludes that Petitioner failed to properly 20 exhaust his state court remedies as to Grounds 1 and 2 in the Petition. Because Petitioner is now 21 barred from pursuing state court remedies, Petitioner has also procedurally defaulted on these 22 Grounds. Further, the Court finds that the state courts’ adjudication of Grounds 3 and 4 was not 23 contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 24 1 Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS the federal habeas Petition (Dkt. 9) be DENIED 2 on all Grounds with prejudice and a certificate of appealability not be issued. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 A. Factual Background
5 On October 15, 2021, in the Superior Court of Washington for Snohomish County (“trial 6 court”), a jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree assault (count 1) and drive-by shooting 7 (count 2). Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 1 at 2 (judgment and sentence). The trial court subsequently imposed a 8 171-month term of imprisonment. Id. at 7. The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington 9 (“state court of appeals”) summarized the facts of Petitioner’s case as follows: 10 Justin Bell shot Freddie Brooks several times on December 14, 2017. Earlier that day, Brooks had argued with Bell, a coworker, over a carpooling 11 payment Brooks owed Bell. As reported by another coworker, their argument escalated and “g[ot] kind of pushy.” They were told to leave their employer’s 12 building and they did, exchanging blows in the parking lot. When the fight ended, the two went their separate ways. Brooks headed to a corner store and then a bus 13 stop with his girlfriend, Briann Jenkins, while Bell went toward his car.
14 As Jenkins and Brooks crossed the street to the bus stop, Jenkins heard gunshots, quickly ran toward a nearby Value Village store, and hid behind a car. 15 Witnesses later described hearing six to eight shots. When Jenkins looked back, Brooks was crawling on the ground, hit by several bullets. A passing car transported 16 him to the hospital, where he was treated for several potentially life-threatening bullet wounds. He recovered successfully. 17 Numerous individuals testified to seeing the shooting and the events 18 surrounding it at trial. One witness, a passenger in a nearby car, testified that he heard gunfire while stopped at a light. Looking in the direction of the gunshots, he 19 saw a black four-door sedan driving erratically, swerving through traffic and cutting off other cars.1 This witness called the police to provide updates as his girlfriend 20 followed the car. A recording of his 911 call in which he describes the first three letters of the license plate, BTB or BGB, was admitted at trial. Another witness who 21 observed the license plate wrote down the last four numbers: 9767. Bell’s registered vehicle was a 2017 Hyundai Elantra with the license plate BGB9767. 22 Eyewitnesses who managed to get a look at the shooter were able to match 23 his age and race roughly with Bell’s. One witness, peering into the sedan from less 24 1 than a car-length away, managed to get a quick glimpse and confirmed his age and race. Another witness was able only to get a sense of his race. 2 Other evidence confirmed the origin of the gunshots. Most significantly, the 3 State introduced video footage depicting the shooting and Brooks’s collapse onto the ground.2 This footage was then supported by eyewitness and forensic testimony 4 and evidence. One witness, the passenger in a car located behind a vehicle he identified as a dark-colored Kia Sorento, saw the shooter’s hand stretching out of 5 the vehicle holding a gun. Still another witness, perhaps 10 or 15 feet away from the shooter’s car, saw gunfire come from the driver’s side window. The police used 6 lasers to reconstruct the flight path of the fired bullets and concluded that they originated in the street. 7 Bell owned a firearm, a 9 mm caliber Kahr. Casings and bullet holes found 8 at the scene of the shooting matched this caliber. In February 2018, Bell called the Marysville Police Department to report this firearm stolen. According to the police 9 officer who took the call, Bell said he had reached out “in case something was to be done with that pistol” and demonstrated concern that “if a crime [occurred] or 10 the pistol was used inappropriately that it could be associated with him.”
11 The State initially charged Bell with first degree assault. It later added a count of drive-by shooting. During jury selection, Bell requested that jurors not 12 wear face masks that obstructed their noses and mouths, a request the trial court denied. After hearing testimony, the jury convicted Bell of first degree assault with 13 a firearm enhancement and drive-by shooting. The court sentenced Bell to 171 months in prison, the low end of the standard range, using an offender score that 14 included both crimes. 15 Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 9 at 1–4. 16 B. Procedural Background 17 1. Direct Appeal 18 On October 24, 2021, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total term of imprisonment 19 of 171 months. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 1 at 7. Represented by counsel, Petitioner raised three grounds for 20 review in a challenge to his conviction and sentence. See Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 2 at 1–2. In a published 21 opinion issued on January 30, 2023, the state court of appeals affirmed the trial court, finding no 22 reversible error. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 5 at 1. On a motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 6), the 23 state court of appeals issued a new opinion, again finding no reversible error. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 9 at 24 1. 1 Petitioner sought discretionary review by the Washington Supreme Court (“state supreme 2 court”). Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 10. On October 3, 2023, the state supreme court denied Petitioner’s 3 petition for review without comment. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 11. The state court of appeals issued its 4 mandate on October 19, 2023. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 12.
5 2. Personal Restraint Petitions 6 On June 26, 2024, Petitioner filed a pro se Personal Restraint Petition (“PRP”) in the 7 state court of appeals. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 13. The state court of appeals dismissed the PRP on August 8 21, 2024. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 14. The order dismissing the PRP became final on October 2, 2024. Dkt. 9 15-1, Ex. 15. On October 28, 2024, Petitioner filed a corrected PRP in the state court of appeals. 10 Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 16. The state court of appeals dismissed Petitioner’s corrected PRP as untimely. 11 Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 17 at 1. 12 Petitioner then sought discretionary review by the state supreme court. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 18. 13 On April 16, 2025, a commissioner of the state supreme court denied Petitioner’s Motion for 14 Discretionary Review. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 19. The state court of appeals issued its mandate on July
15 11, 2025. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 20. 16 3. Federal Petition 17 On July 14, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant Petition raising four grounds for relief. Dkts. 18 1, 9. On October 23, 2025, Respondent filed, and served on Petitioner, an Answer. Dkt. 14. 19 Finally, on November 19, 2025, Petitioner filed a Traverse. Dkt. 16. Thus, the Petition is ripe for 20 consideration. 21 // 22 // 23 //
24 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 In the Petition, Petitioner raises the following four grounds for relief: 3 1. The trial court reduced the promised time for jury selection without allowing the attorneys sufficient time to adjust to the change. Dkt. 9 at 5. 4 2. The trial court “explicitly permitted dramatic changes to the usual voir dire 5 procedure,” such as changes including remote jury selection. Id. at 7. 6 3. The trial court violated Petitioner’s “right” by requiring prospective jurors to wear face masks. Id. at 8. 7 4. The evidence at trial was insufficient to convict Petitioner. Id. at 10. 8 In the Answer, Respondent asserts that Petitioner failed to exhaust Grounds 1 and 2, and 9 these Grounds are now barred from federal review. Dkt. 14 at 11–16. Additionally, Respondent 10 maintains that the state courts’ adjudication of Grounds 3 and 4 was not contrary to, or an 11 unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Id. at 16–20. As exhaustion and 12 procedural default are threshold matters, the Court will discuss Grounds 1 and 2 before 13 addressing the remaining Grounds. 14 A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default (Grounds 1 and 2) 15 Respondent contends that Petitioner failed to exhaust Grounds 1 and 2 raised in the 16 Petition. These Grounds are, therefore, procedurally barred from federal review. 17 1. Exhaustion of State Remedies 18 “[A] state prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a 19 federal court will entertain his petition for habeas corpus.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 20 (1971). Petitioner’s claims will be considered exhausted only after “the state courts [have been 21 afforded] a meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error without interference 22 from the federal judiciary.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986). “[S]tate prisoners must 23 give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one 24 1 complete round of the State’s established appellate review.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 2 838, 845 (1999). 3 A federal habeas petitioner must provide the state courts with a fair opportunity to correct 4 alleged violations of federal rights. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Middleton v.
5 Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating petitioner “fairly presented” the claim to the 6 state even though the state court did not reach the argument on the merits). The petitioner does 7 not satisfy this obligation merely because all the facts necessary to support the federal claim 8 were before the state courts or simply because the petitioner made a somewhat similar state law 9 claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365–66 (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 275; Anderson v. Harless, 459 10 U.S. 4 (1982)). 11 To the contrary, Petitioner must include a reference to a specific federal constitutional 12 guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts entitling Petitioner to relief. Gray v. Netherland, 13 518 U.S. 152, 162–63 (1996). Petitioner bears the burden of proving he has exhausted available 14 state remedies and retains the burden to prove all facts relevant to the exhaustion requirement.
15 See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 16 a. Grounds Raised in State and Federal Proceedings 17 In his direct appeal, Petitioner raised the following claims to the state court of appeals: 18 1. The trial court violated Petitioner’s rights when it denied his request that jurors wear clear face shields so he could choose jurors and present his arguments to 19 them at trial. 20 2. The drive-by shooting conviction constituted double jeopardy. 21 3. The trial court erred in sentencing Petitioner when it used an incorrect offender score. 22 Dkt. 15-1, Ex 2 at 23. 23 24 1 Following the state court of appeals’ decision on direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition 2 for discretionary review with the state supreme court and raised the same claims as in his appeal 3 in the lower court. See Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 10 at 2–3. 4 In his first PRP, filed pro se, Petitioner submitted the following as his only ground for
5 relief: “[Physical] altercation not natural action plus no show on court, discount self from the 6 whole situation. Jury decision altered mask. On film person not reco[gn]izable an attempt to gain 7 Judgment.” Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 13 at 4. 8 After the state court of appeals denied Petitioner’s PRP, he filed a second PRP, stating 9 that the evidence against him was insufficient to prove he fired the gun in his crimes of 10 conviction. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 16 at 3. The state court of appeals denied the second PRP, so 11 Petitioner sought discretionary review with the state supreme court on the following issues: 12 1. The state court of appeals wrongly denied his PRPs, violating his right to Due Process. 13 2. The evidence to convict him was insufficient. 14 Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 18 at 2. 15 In the instant Petition, Petitioner raises four grounds for relief, set forth in detail above. 16 See supra, Part II at 5. As relevant here, Petitioner asserts the following with respect to Grounds 17 1 and 2: 18 1. Ground 1: The trial court reduced the promised time for jury selection without 19 allowing the attorneys to sufficient time to adjust to the change. 20 2. Ground 2: The trial court “explicitly permitted dramatic changes to the usual voir dire procedure,” such as changes including remote jury selection. 21 Dkt. 9. 22 // 23 // 24 1 b. Grounds 1 and 2 Are Not Properly Exhausted 2 In the Answer, Respondent asserts that Petitioner never presented Grounds 1 and 2 to the 3 state court of appeals or the state supreme court. Dkt. 14 at 12. Upon review, the Court agrees 4 that Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust Grounds 1 and 2.
5 The record reveals that Petitioner did not raise these claims with any court. Dkt. 15-1, 6 Exs. 2, 10, 13, 16, 18. On direct appeal, Petitioner, through counsel, failed to argue to the state 7 court of appeals and the state supreme court that the trial court improperly reduced jury selection 8 time and altered the usual voir dire procedure.1 See Dkt. 15-1, Exs. 2, 10. And the state court of 9 appeals’ opinion on direct appeal did not address these issues when it affirmed the trial court and 10 denied all of Petitioner’s claims. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 9. 11 It is even clearer that Petitioner did not raise Grounds 1 and 2 in his PRPs. See Dkt. 15-1, 12 Exs. 13, 16. His first PRP was extremely difficult to decipher, while his second PRP only raised 13 a claim concerning the insufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. Id. In his petition for 14 review before the state supreme court, Petitioner raised a Due Process claim and reiterated his
15 insufficiency of the evidence claim. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 18. 16 Petitioner did not give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to determine if federal 17 constitutional violations occurred in the circumstances surrounding the time allotment of the jury 18 and the voir dire. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (“To provide the State with the 19 necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in each appropriate state 20 court (including state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that 21 court to the federal nature of the claim.”); Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 138 (9th Cir. 1992) 22 1 While Petitioner did not raise Grounds 1 and 2 on direct appeal, the state court of appeals mentioned in the context 23 of Petitioner’s claim about masked jurors that the trial court offered Petitioner more time for jury selection than normally allotted, but he did not use all his time. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 9 at 13 (stating that the trial court “indicated a 24 willingness to offer more time of jury selection than would otherwise have been allotted.”). 1 (finding claims were unexhausted when they were not raised on every level of direct review). In 2 the Traverse, Petitioner does not address Respondent’s arguments regarding exhaustion of 3 Grounds 1 and 2. Dkt. 16 at 1–2. Therefore, Grounds 1 and 2 were not properly exhausted. 4 2. Procedural Default
5 Grounds 1 and 2 are procedurally defaulted. Procedural default is distinct from 6 exhaustion in the habeas context. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002). The 7 procedural default rule bars consideration of a federal claim when it is clear the state court has 8 been presented with the federal claim but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons or it 9 is clear the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Id. at 1230–31 (citations 10 omitted). If a state procedural rule would now preclude the petitioner from raising his claim at 11 the state level, the claim is considered “procedurally defaulted” and the federal courts are barred 12 from reviewing the petition on the merits. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731–32 (1991); 13 Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845. 14 Importantly, under Washington State law, the state court of appeals will not consider a
15 second or successive personal restraint petition (“PRP”) unless a petitioner certifies he has not 16 filed a previous petition on similar grounds and shows good cause as to why he did not raise the 17 grounds in the previous PRP. See RCW 10.73.140. 18 Petitioner has not presented facts which could show good cause for his failure to raise 19 Grounds 1 and 2 in his collateral attack on his conviction and sentence. Therefore, Grounds 1 20 and 2 in the Petition are also subject to an implied procedural bar because these Grounds would 21 be “prohibited by an independent, adequate, and mandatory rule of state procedure, RCW 22 10.73.140, making a return to state court futile.” See Bolar v. Luna, No. 05-CV-2029-TSZ, 2007 23 WL 1103933, at *11 (W.D. Wash. April 10, 2007).
24 1 Petitioner would be precluded from asserting Grounds 1 and 2 in the state courts. Thus, 2 these Grounds are procedurally defaulted in federal court. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731; 3 Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1231 (holding a federal habeas claim is procedurally defaulted when it is 4 clear a petitioner has “no further recourse in state courts.”).
5 3. Overcoming Procedural Default 6 The procedural default will be excused and a petitioner will be entitled to federal habeas 7 corpus review if he “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the 8 alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a 9 fundamental miscarriage of justice[.]” See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 10 1998) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must show some 11 objective factor external to him being prevented from complying with the state’s procedural rule. 12 Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). And only in an 13 “extraordinary case” may the habeas court grant the writ without a showing of cause and 14 prejudice to correct a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 495.
15 Here, Petitioner has not made any arguments concerning cause or prejudice regarding 16 Grounds 1 and 2 in the Petition. He has not demonstrated some objective factor external to him 17 prevented him from complying with the State’s procedural bar rule. Because Petitioner has not 18 shown cause, the Court need not reach the issue of prejudice. See Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 19 1119, 1123 n.10 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating a finding of lack of cause eliminates the need to discuss 20 whether the petitioner was prejudiced). 21 4. Conclusion 22 In sum, there is no evidence Petitioner exhausted the state court remedies to the highest 23 court for Grounds 1 and 2. As Petitioner bears the burden of proving he exhausted the available
24 1 state court remedies and as there is no evidence showing Petitioner gave the state courts a full 2 and fair opportunity to determine if a federal constitutional violation occurred, Grounds 1 and 2 3 were not properly exhausted. Moreover, these Grounds are procedurally defaulted. As Petitioner 4 has not overcome the procedural default, the Court RECOMMENDS Grounds 1 and 2 of the
5 Petition be DISMISSED with prejudice. 6 B. Merits Review (Grounds 3 and 4) 7 Respondent claims that Grounds 3 and 4 of the Petition were fairly presented to the state 8 courts and, therefore, can be addressed on the merits. Dkt. 14 at 16–20. The Court will set forth 9 the standard of review under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) 10 before addressing each ground in turn. 11 1. Legal Standard – AEDPA Merits Review 12 Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief on the basis of a claim 13 adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was 14 contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
15 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In interpreting 16 this portion of the federal habeas rules, the Supreme Court has ruled a state decision is “contrary 17 to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court either (1) arrives at a 18 conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or (2) confronts 19 facts “materially indistinguishable” from relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at an 20 opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). 21 Moreover, under § 2254(d)(1), “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 22 because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 23 applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must
24 1 also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 69 (2003). An 2 unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent occurs “if the state court identifies the 3 correct governing legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts 4 of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. In addition, a state court
5 decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent “‘if the state court 6 either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context 7 where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where 8 it should apply.’” Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams, 529 9 U.S. at 407). 10 With respect to § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner may only obtain relief by showing that the state 11 court’s conclusion was based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 12 evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) 13 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (“[A] 14 decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not
15 be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 16 presented in the state-court proceedings.”). The Court presumes the state court’s factual findings 17 to be sound unless the petitioner rebuts “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 18 evidence.” Dretke, 545 U.S. at 240 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 19 2. Ground 3 20 In Ground 3, Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his “right” by requiring 21 prospective jurors to wear face masks.2 Dkt. 9 at 8. Respondent counters that the United States 22 2 Petitioner never explicitly stated what “right” was violated when prospective jurors were required to wear face 23 masks. Dkt. 9 at 12. The Court, however, construes Petitioner’s arguments as raising a Sixth Amendment claim regarding his right to an impartial jury because that is the claim he raised on direct appeal. See Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 2 at 24 23. 1 Supreme Court “has not held requiring prospective jurors to wear face masks violates a 2 defendant’s right to an impartial jury” under the Sixth Amendment. Dkt. 14 at 2. Respondent 3 further argues that the state court of appeals reasonably applied the law when it “thoroughly 4 examined the record and reasonably determined ‘that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
5 when, during a pandemic, it required jurors to wear face masks during jury selection.’” Id. at 18 6 (quoting Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 9 at 15). 7 The state court of appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s claim reflects a reasonable application 8 of governing Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has never held that a criminal 9 defendant’s Sixth Amendment right is violated when potential jurors are masked. See United 10 States v. Thompson, 543 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1164 (D.N.M. 2021) (“[T]he Court is aware of no 11 authority, nor has [the defendant] cited any, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to an 12 impartial jury or Due Process demand that the defendant have unimpeded visual access to 13 prospective jurors’ facial expressions during jury selection.”) (citation omitted). On the contrary, 14 the Supreme Court has held that exceptions to the Sixth Amendment are constitutionally
15 permissible when “necessary to further an important public policy.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 16 836, 850 (1990) (holding that the Sixth Amendment was not violated when a child abuse victim 17 was allowed to testify at trial by one-way closed-circuit television outside of the defendant’s 18 physical presence); United States v. Rothenberg, No. 20-266, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39510, at 19 *9–14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2024) (relying on Craig in holding that masking at trial during the 20 COVID-19 pandemic passes constitutional muster). 21 In the state court of appeals’ thorough analysis, it found the trial court properly exercised 22 its broad discretion to conduct jury selection when it required the prospective jurors to wear a 23 mask. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 9 at 6. It further noted that the trial court was adhering to state-wide
24 1 protocols to combat the COVID-19 pandemic when it required jurors to wear masks. Id. at 7. 2 Finally, the state court of appeals considered the legal landscape and determined that courts 3 around the country implemented similar mask mandates for jurors during the COVID-19 4 pandemic. Id. at 10. And while Petitioner raised this issue on direct appeal with the state supreme
5 court, it did not review his petition for review. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 11. Accordingly, the state court of 6 appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim was not contrary to, or an 7 unreasonable application of, clearly established law as set forth by the United States Supreme 8 Court. 9 Based on the above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Ground 3 of the Petition be 10 DENIED with prejudice. 11 3. Ground 4 12 Petitioner asserts in Ground 4 that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence. Dkt. 13 9 at 10. In response, Respondent counters that the state court of appeals reasonably determined 14 that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner. Dkt. 14 at 18–19.
15 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the prosecution 16 prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged offense. Carella v. California, 491 17 U.S. 263, 265 (1989). Due process claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence are 18 evaluated under the standard announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The 19 Supreme Court stated in Jackson that the relevant question in reviewing a claim of insufficient 20 evidence is “whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 21 any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 22 reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. Under this standard, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact, and 23
24 1 not a reviewing court, to decide what conclusions should be drawn from the evidence admitted at 2 trial. Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011). 3 Sufficiency of the evidence claims are subject to a second layer of judicial deference on 4 federal habeas review. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that “a federal court may not
5 overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because 6 the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the 7 state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 8 (2012) (citing Cavazos, 565 U.S. at 2). 9 The state court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s insufficiency of the evidence claim on 10 direct appeal, explaining its conclusions as follows: 11 Finally, Bell challenges whether the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that it was. 12 Evidence is sufficient if “‘after viewing the evidence in the light most 13 favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 14 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). Because credibility 15 determinations are for the trier of fact—in this case, the jury—appellate courts “defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, 16 and the persuasiveness of the evidence.” State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). 17 Here, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict. Bell had fought 18 with Brooks earlier in the day. He owned a gun of the same caliber used in the shooting, a gun he later claimed he had lost. The witnesses’ descriptions of the 19 make, model, and license plate of the shooter’s car very closely matched Bell’s car. And eyewitness testimony of the shooter’s appearance, though very vague, roughly 20 described Bell. Bell’s arguments amount to the assertion that his conviction requires particular forms of evidence—namely, testimony from his victim and 21 witnesses testifying that they recognized him as the shooter—to stand. This is incorrect. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient. 22 Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 9 at 26–27. 23 24 1 Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court of appeals’ adjudication of his 2 insufficiency of the evidence claim was objectively unreasonable. In the Traverse, Petitioner 3 argues that he did not possess a firearm, and he was not present at the scene of the crime. Dkt. 16 4 at 4. He goes on to state that the alleged shooter was not recognizable because he was wearing a
5 hood. Id. 6 This Court’s review of the trial transcript confirms the state court of appeals’ description 7 of the evidence presented at trial. Witness testimony indicated Petitioner had an altercation with 8 the victim the day of the shooting. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 21 at 311–15. Trial evidence also supported the 9 notion that Petitioner had a gun the day of the shooting, which was the same caliber as the gun 10 used in the shooting. Id. at 321–22. After the shooting occurred, Petitioner claimed his gun was 11 stolen. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 22 at 464, 467, 505. Petitioner’s car make, model, and license plate 12 appeared to match those of the shooter’s car. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 21 at 334–39, 344–49, 355–57, 407– 13 12. Finally, witness testimony about the shooter’s physical characteristics generally matched the 14 Petitioner’s physical description. Dkt. 15-1, Ex. 22 at 392–93.
15 Petitioner’s regurgitation of his arguments concerning the identity of the shooter to 16 support his insufficiency of the evidence claim is unavailing. The state court of appeals 17 reasonably applied Jackson and concluded that, viewing the facts in light most favorable to the 18 state, and crediting the jury’s determinations, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of 19 fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty of both charged offenses. 20 For these reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Ground 4 of the Petition be DENIED 21 with prejudice. 22 // 23 //
24 1 III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING 2 The decision to hold an evidentiary hearing is committed to the Court’s discretion. 3 Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). “[A] federal court must consider whether such a 4 hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if true, would
5 entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Id. at 474. In determining whether relief is 6 available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the Court’s review is limited to the record before the 7 state court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011). A hearing is not required if the 8 allegations would not entitle Petitioner to relief under § 2254(d). Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 474. “It 9 follows that if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas 10 relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. Further, the Supreme 11 Court in Shinn held that when reviewing a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the 12 federal court may not consider any facts beyond the factual record presented to the state post- 13 conviction relief court – unless one of the limited exceptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) applies. 14 Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 382 (2022).
15 The Court finds it is not necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing in this case because, as 16 discussed in this Report and Recommendation, Petitioner’s claims may be resolved on the 17 existing state court record. 18 IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 19 A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may appeal a district 20 court’s dismissal of the federal habeas petition only after obtaining a certificate of appealability 21 from a district or circuit judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). “A certificate of appealability may issue 22 . . . only if the [petitioner] has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 23 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner satisfies this standard “by demonstrating that jurists of reason
24 1 could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could 2 conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller- 3 El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 4 No jurist of reason could disagree with this Court’s evaluation of Petitioner’s claims or
5 would conclude the issues presented in the Petition should proceed further. Therefore, the Court 6 concludes Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability with respect to the Petition. 7 V. CONCLUSION 8 For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes Petitioner has not shown he is entitled 9 to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Additionally, an evidentiary hearing is not required. Therefore, 10 the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition (Dkt. 9) be DENIED with prejudice and a certificate 11 of appealability not be issued. 12 // 13 // 14 //
15 // 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 //
24 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the parties 2 shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also Fed. 3 R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of 4 de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can result in a waiver of
5 those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda 6 v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Accommodating the time 7 limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on January 8 6, 2026, as noted in the caption. 9 10 Dated this 22nd day of December, 2025. 11 A 12 Grady J. Leupold 13 United States Magistrate Judge
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