Justice v. Stuyvesant Insurance Company

265 F. Supp. 63, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11580
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. West Virginia
DecidedMarch 16, 1967
DocketCiv. A. 2101
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 265 F. Supp. 63 (Justice v. Stuyvesant Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Justice v. Stuyvesant Insurance Company, 265 F. Supp. 63, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11580 (S.D.W. Va. 1967).

Opinion

CHRISTIE, District Judge.

This diversity action has been submitted to the Court upon stipulation and concerns the interpretation of a contract of reinsurance 1 executed May 6, 1963, effective March 1, 1963, between Crown Insurance Company, the ceding company, and defendant, The Stuyvesant Insurance Company, the reinsurer. The contract was amended by a “Termination Addendum” dated March 2, 1964, providing that,

“It is mutually understood and agreed this Agreement is to be can-celled as respects losses occurring subsequent to 11:59 P.M., Eastern Standard Time, December 31, 1963.
“In accordance with Article IX, the Reinsurer shall return the unearned portion of premiums ceded hereunder.
“All other terms and conditions of this Agreement remain unchanged.”

The amount in dispute is $10,227.12 and involves the manner in which the premiums were to be divided between the respective parties. Solution of the problem calls for a determination and reconciliation of two clauses contained in the reinsurance agreement. One of the clauses is the fourth paragraph of Article IV, which is the basis of defendant’s position; the other is contained in the second paragraph of Article IX, which is the basis of plaintiff’s position. These Articles, in pertinent part, read:

“ARTICLE IV — Premium
“The Company shall pay to the Re-insurer as premium for this Agreement an amount equal to One Hundred Percent (100%) of the Company’s unearned premiums in force as of 12:01 A.M., Eastern Standard Time, March 1, 1963 for limits in excess of the Company’s retention as provided in ARTICLE III above plus One Hundred Percent (100%) of the net premium income of the Company after 12:01 A.M., Eastern Standard Time, March 1, 1963 for limits in excess of the Company’s retention as provided in ARTICLE III above, said excess limits premium in both cases having been determined by applying to the premiums charged by the Company for its respective net retained limits, the factors contained in the applicable excess tables used by the Company (not less than the factors used in the manuals of the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters) for limits in excess of-the respective net retained limits.
“The Reinsurer shall allow the Company a commission of Forty Percent (40%) of the net premium ceded above. This commission allowance shall cover all expenses of the Company whatsoever excepting losses and loss adjustment expenses. Return commission shall be allowed on (return premiums at the same rate.
“The term ‘net premium income’ shall mean written premiums less return premiums on policies in force on the effective date of this Agreement and policies, contracts and binders of insurance covering classes of business reinsured hereunder and becoming effective during the period this Agreement remains in force.
“The net reinsurance premium ceded hereunder after deducting the commission provided above shall, however, be subject to an annual minimum premium of Sixty Thousand Dollars ($60,-000.00) payable in equal monthly installments of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) due on the first day of each month beginning with March 1, 1963.”
“ARTICLE IX — Commencement and Termination
“This Agreement shall be effective from 12:01 A.M., Eastern Standard *65 Time, March 1, 1963, and shall continue in effect until cancelled by the Company or the Reinsurer as hereinafter provided.
“This Agreement may be cancelled by either party by giving sixty (60) days’ written notice to the other stating when thereafter cancellation shall be effective. In the event of cancellation, this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect on all policies covered prior to the effective date of such cancellation, until the termination of such policies either by cancellation or natural expiration, but in any event not longer than one (1) year from the effective date of such cancellation. Either party to this Agreement, however, shall have the option of cancel-ling the Reinsurer’s liability on all business in force as of the cancellation date of this Agreement. If the option is exercised, the Reinsurer shall return to the Company the unearned portion of all premiums ceded hereunder.”

It has been stipulated that the total earned premium during the contract’s ten months’ effective period was $66,288.14. The defendant has withheld therefrom $50,000.00 on the theory that it is entitled to this amount as a minimum under the terms of Article IV of the Agreement. On the other hand, plaintiff takes the position that upon defendant’s exercise of its option to cancel the Agreement under Article IX, it was required to return to Crown the unearned portion of all premiums ceded, or 40% of the $66,288.-14. Thus, it is contended that defendant should have retained $39,772.88 rather than the $50,000.00 withheld and that Crown is entitled to the difference of $10,227.12.

In general the rules which govern the construction of contracts generally and original policies of insurance are applicable to reinsurance contracts. They should, like any other contract, be construed to give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed by the language used, and the language used should be given its usual and ordinary meaning. The courts should not, under the guise of construction, make a new contract for the parties. A reasonable and sensible construction and one that conforms with the justice of the case and the purpose which the parties sought to accomplish is the goal. However, any ambiguity in the contract will be resolved against the reinsurer unless the language is that of the original insurer. 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1226 (1946). Unless subject to statutory regulations, the right to recovery of unearned premiums on cancellation of a reinsurance contract is dependent on the terms of the contract. 46 C.J.S., supra, § 1227.

The instant controversy involves no statutory regulations and it is controlled by the contract’s terms. Simply stated, the issue is whether, as plaintiff contends, the proviso in Article IX of the Agreement, “If the option is exercised, (to cancel the reinsurer’s liability on all business in force as of the cancellation date) the Reinsurer shall return to the Company the unearned portion of all premiums ceded hereunder,” has the effect of rendering ineffectual the $60,-000.00 minimum annual premium when the reinsurer terminates the agreement after only ten months. If it does not, plaintiff’s case must fail.

In the interpretation of a written contract every part of the contract must, if possible, be made to take effect, and every word of it must be made to operate in some shape or other. Williams v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W.Va. 181, 43 S.E. 214, 60 L.R.A. 795 (1903). Where possible, all parts of the contract will be construed as to give force and validity to all. of them, and to all the language used. Rhoades v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 49 W.Va. 494, 39 S.E. 209, 55 L.R.A. 170 (1901). A desire to effectuate the intentions of the parties creates the necessity of looking to the constituent elements of the contract, elucidating one by the other, and reconciling them, if practicable, to one common intent or design present to the minds of the contracting parties.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
265 F. Supp. 63, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11580, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/justice-v-stuyvesant-insurance-company-wvsd-1967.