Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 121 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-23-812
JULIUS RAY WILLIAMS, Opinion Delivered February 26, 2025
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE HEMPSTEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 29CR-22-64]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JOE C. SHORT, APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge
Appellant, Julius Ray Williams, appeals the Hempstead County Circuit Court’s order
denying and dismissing his petition to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, he argues that
the circuit court erred in denying his petition, claiming that (1) the sentence is illegal because
his counsel was ineffective for failing to correctly advise him as to parole eligibility; (2) his
Due Process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when he was
designated a habitual offender without a hearing; (3) the Arkansas Division of Correction
(ADC) miscalculated his parole eligibility; and (4) there was insufficient evidence of his guilt.
We affirm.
This is the second time Williams’s appeal has been before this court. In Williams v.
State, 2024 Ark. App. 578, we remanded the case to settle the record because it did not
contain the transcript of the February 21, 2023 plea hearing, which we needed to address Williams’s arguments on appeal. The record has now been supplemented with a transcript
of that hearing.
Williams was originally charged with residential burglary, a Class B felony. The
information alleged that he should receive an extended term of imprisonment as a violent
offender with two or more previous convictions of felonies involving violence. In a hearing
on February 21, 2023, Williams entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the residential-burglary
charge. On March 8, the State filed an amended information removing the violent-offender
enhancement and replacing it with the allegation that Williams should receive an extended
term of imprisonment as a habitual offender having four or more felony convictions. Later
that day, a sentencing order was entered sentencing Williams as a habitual offender with
four or more felony convictions to fifteen years in the ADC with an additional five-year
suspended imposition of sentence.
On October 6, Williams filed a petition to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016). This statute provides that a
circuit court may correct an illegal sentence at any time when a petition for relief has been
filed by the aggrieved party. In his petition, Williams alleged the State erred when it failed
to explain to him that he would have to serve the entire fifteen-year sentence because,
pursuant to his guilty plea, he had agreed to serve one-half of his sentence, or seven and a
half years; that his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights were violated; and that his
Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. Also on October 6, Williams filed a
motion to correct a clerical mistake in his judgment and commitment order. He admitted
2 that he had been sentenced to a term of fifteen years’ imprisonment, but instead of reflecting
the seven-and-a-half-year sentence he had agreed to, the judgment and commitment order
erroneously reflected fifteen years’ imprisonment.
In its October 12 order denying and dismissing Williams’s petition to correct an
illegal sentence, the circuit court found that Williams had entered a plea of guilty to one
count of residential burglary set forth in the information, which had been amended to
remove the violent-offender-status allegation and replaced with a large-habitual-offender-
status allegation; that the range of punishment for large-habitual status for a Class B felony
was not less than five years nor more than forty years in the ADC; that Williams had been
sentenced to twenty years in the ADC with five years suspended; and that the sentence
imposed was not beyond the court’s authority to impose and was therefore not an illegal
sentence. The circuit court further found that Williams’s allegation that he had been given
incorrect advice about parole eligibility by his appointed counsel was a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel pursuant to Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure; that
Williams’s sentencing order had been filed on March 8; that because Williams had not filed
a direct appeal, any petition filed pursuant to Rule 37 for ineffective assistance of counsel
had to be filed within ninety days of the date of entry of judgment; and that Williams’s
petition had not been filed within ninety days after entry of the judgment.
On December 14, Williams filed a pro se motion for belated appeal. This court
granted that motion on February 2, 2024.
3 Sentencing is entirely a matter of statute in Arkansas. White v. State, 2024 Ark. 79.
A circuit court has authority to correct an illegal sentence at any time; a sentence is illegal on
its face when it is beyond the circuit court’s authority to impose. Id. The petitioner bears
the burden of demonstrating that his or her sentence was illegal on its face. Id. A circuit
court’s decision to deny relief under section 16-90-111 will be reversed only if it is clearly
erroneous. Id.
Williams argues that his sentence is illegal on its face. It is not. Pursuant to Arkansas
Code Annotated section 5-4-401(b)(2)(C) (Repl. 2013), a person who has previously been
convicted of four or more felonies may be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment
for a Class B felony of not less than five years nor more that forty years. Williams was
sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment, with five years suspended, which clearly falls
within the parameters of the sentencing guidelines for a large habitual offender convicted of
a Class B felony.
To the extent Williams argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly
explain parole eligibility to him, the circuit court properly found that such a claim would
need to be raised in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of
Criminal Procedure 37; claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not cognizable in
proceedings to correct an illegal sentence. Jefferson v. State, 2024 Ark. 64. Although a
petition for postconviction relief attacking a judgment, regardless of the label placed on it by
the petitioner, can be considered pursuant to Rule 37.1, Williams’s petition was not timely
filed. Rule 37.2(c)(i) provides that if the petitioner pled guilty, which Williams did, “a
4 petition claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within
ninety (90) days of entry of judgment.” Here, judgment was entered against Williams on
March 8, 2023, but he did not file his petition until October 6, more than ninety days after
entry of judgment; therefore, Williams’s petition was not timely filed. The time limitations
imposed in Rule 37.2(c) are mandatory, and the circuit court may not grant relief on an
untimely petition. Latham v. State, 2018 Ark. 44.1
Williams next asserts that his Due Process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments were violated because no hearing was held to give him an opportunity to be
heard regarding his habitual-offender status. A review of the February 21, 2023 guilty-plea
hearing reveals that this assertion is incorrect. At that hearing, the prosecutor orally
amended the criminal information from “violent felon,” which required a minimum
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Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 121 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CR-23-812
JULIUS RAY WILLIAMS, Opinion Delivered February 26, 2025
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE HEMPSTEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 29CR-22-64]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JOE C. SHORT, APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge
Appellant, Julius Ray Williams, appeals the Hempstead County Circuit Court’s order
denying and dismissing his petition to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, he argues that
the circuit court erred in denying his petition, claiming that (1) the sentence is illegal because
his counsel was ineffective for failing to correctly advise him as to parole eligibility; (2) his
Due Process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when he was
designated a habitual offender without a hearing; (3) the Arkansas Division of Correction
(ADC) miscalculated his parole eligibility; and (4) there was insufficient evidence of his guilt.
We affirm.
This is the second time Williams’s appeal has been before this court. In Williams v.
State, 2024 Ark. App. 578, we remanded the case to settle the record because it did not
contain the transcript of the February 21, 2023 plea hearing, which we needed to address Williams’s arguments on appeal. The record has now been supplemented with a transcript
of that hearing.
Williams was originally charged with residential burglary, a Class B felony. The
information alleged that he should receive an extended term of imprisonment as a violent
offender with two or more previous convictions of felonies involving violence. In a hearing
on February 21, 2023, Williams entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the residential-burglary
charge. On March 8, the State filed an amended information removing the violent-offender
enhancement and replacing it with the allegation that Williams should receive an extended
term of imprisonment as a habitual offender having four or more felony convictions. Later
that day, a sentencing order was entered sentencing Williams as a habitual offender with
four or more felony convictions to fifteen years in the ADC with an additional five-year
suspended imposition of sentence.
On October 6, Williams filed a petition to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016). This statute provides that a
circuit court may correct an illegal sentence at any time when a petition for relief has been
filed by the aggrieved party. In his petition, Williams alleged the State erred when it failed
to explain to him that he would have to serve the entire fifteen-year sentence because,
pursuant to his guilty plea, he had agreed to serve one-half of his sentence, or seven and a
half years; that his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights were violated; and that his
Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. Also on October 6, Williams filed a
motion to correct a clerical mistake in his judgment and commitment order. He admitted
2 that he had been sentenced to a term of fifteen years’ imprisonment, but instead of reflecting
the seven-and-a-half-year sentence he had agreed to, the judgment and commitment order
erroneously reflected fifteen years’ imprisonment.
In its October 12 order denying and dismissing Williams’s petition to correct an
illegal sentence, the circuit court found that Williams had entered a plea of guilty to one
count of residential burglary set forth in the information, which had been amended to
remove the violent-offender-status allegation and replaced with a large-habitual-offender-
status allegation; that the range of punishment for large-habitual status for a Class B felony
was not less than five years nor more than forty years in the ADC; that Williams had been
sentenced to twenty years in the ADC with five years suspended; and that the sentence
imposed was not beyond the court’s authority to impose and was therefore not an illegal
sentence. The circuit court further found that Williams’s allegation that he had been given
incorrect advice about parole eligibility by his appointed counsel was a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel pursuant to Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure; that
Williams’s sentencing order had been filed on March 8; that because Williams had not filed
a direct appeal, any petition filed pursuant to Rule 37 for ineffective assistance of counsel
had to be filed within ninety days of the date of entry of judgment; and that Williams’s
petition had not been filed within ninety days after entry of the judgment.
On December 14, Williams filed a pro se motion for belated appeal. This court
granted that motion on February 2, 2024.
3 Sentencing is entirely a matter of statute in Arkansas. White v. State, 2024 Ark. 79.
A circuit court has authority to correct an illegal sentence at any time; a sentence is illegal on
its face when it is beyond the circuit court’s authority to impose. Id. The petitioner bears
the burden of demonstrating that his or her sentence was illegal on its face. Id. A circuit
court’s decision to deny relief under section 16-90-111 will be reversed only if it is clearly
erroneous. Id.
Williams argues that his sentence is illegal on its face. It is not. Pursuant to Arkansas
Code Annotated section 5-4-401(b)(2)(C) (Repl. 2013), a person who has previously been
convicted of four or more felonies may be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment
for a Class B felony of not less than five years nor more that forty years. Williams was
sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment, with five years suspended, which clearly falls
within the parameters of the sentencing guidelines for a large habitual offender convicted of
a Class B felony.
To the extent Williams argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly
explain parole eligibility to him, the circuit court properly found that such a claim would
need to be raised in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of
Criminal Procedure 37; claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not cognizable in
proceedings to correct an illegal sentence. Jefferson v. State, 2024 Ark. 64. Although a
petition for postconviction relief attacking a judgment, regardless of the label placed on it by
the petitioner, can be considered pursuant to Rule 37.1, Williams’s petition was not timely
filed. Rule 37.2(c)(i) provides that if the petitioner pled guilty, which Williams did, “a
4 petition claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within
ninety (90) days of entry of judgment.” Here, judgment was entered against Williams on
March 8, 2023, but he did not file his petition until October 6, more than ninety days after
entry of judgment; therefore, Williams’s petition was not timely filed. The time limitations
imposed in Rule 37.2(c) are mandatory, and the circuit court may not grant relief on an
untimely petition. Latham v. State, 2018 Ark. 44.1
Williams next asserts that his Due Process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments were violated because no hearing was held to give him an opportunity to be
heard regarding his habitual-offender status. A review of the February 21, 2023 guilty-plea
hearing reveals that this assertion is incorrect. At that hearing, the prosecutor orally
amended the criminal information from “violent felon,” which required a minimum
sentence of thirty years, to a large habitual offender with four or more prior felonies, which
was punishable by five to forty years. The court, in turn, addressed Williams, stating:
Mr. Willaims, you’ve now been charged by the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office with residential burglary. It is alleged that that is a Class B felony, but that the sentence can be enhanced as you are a Large Habitual Offender in the you have four (4) of more previous felony convictions to where you could be sentenced to a term of not less than five (5) years, nor more than forty (40) years, in the Arkansas Department of Correction and a fine not exceeding Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) Dollars or both such fine and imprisonment. Do you understand the nature of the amended charge and the possible punishment?
1 To the extent any of Williams’s arguments can be construed that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, as opposed to a facially illegal sentence, those arguments are also untimely, as they are governed by the time constraints of Rule 37. 5 Williams replied, “Yes, sir.” There was no objection to the amendment. Later in the
hearing, after the circuit court had accepted Williams’s guilty plea and asked the State’s
recommendation on sentencing, the prosecutor, in recommending twenty years with five
suspended, stated that during negotiations, the State believed Williams would have to serve
100 percent of the sentence, “day for day,” and he just wanted “to put that on the record as
well.”
The State filed the amended information on March 8, reflecting that Williams was
charged as a habitual offender having four or more prior felony convictions. Later that day,
the court entered a sentencing order reflecting Williams’s negotiated guilty plea to residential
burglary as a habitual offender.
Even if Williams’s assertion was factually correct, this argument is being made for
the first time on appeal. A due-process issue must be raised to the circuit court to preserve
the issue for appellate review, see Cantrell v. State, 2009 Ark. 456, 343 S.W.3d 591; because
the issue was not raised to the circuit court, it is not preserved for appellate review.
Furthermore, claims of trial error, even allegations of constitutional error, are not cognizable
within the purview of section 16-90-111. Lukach v. State, 2017 Ark. 128, 516 S.W.3d 711.
Williams next argues that the ADC miscalculated his parole eligibility. This argument
is not a cognizable claim in a petition to correct an illegal sentence. Eligibility for parole as
set forth by statute is not a ground for relief pursuant to section 16-90-111 because
determinations concerning parole eligibility do not call into question the legality of the
original judgment in the case. Rainer v. State, 2022 Ark. 159, 651 S.W.3d 713. Furthermore,
6 claims pertaining to parole eligibility as fixed by statute fall clearly within the domain of the
ADC. Id. Because parole eligibility falls clearly within the executive branch, and specifically,
the ADC, the appellate courts lack jurisdiction to instruct the circuit court to apply specific
parole statutes to criminal convictions. Sims v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 187, 678 S.W.3d 766.
Williams’s last argument on appeal is that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt on the allegation of burglary. But Williams pled guilty to that charge; with
respect to whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, any issue
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence was an issue to be settled before a plea of guilty
was entered. Swift v. State, 2015 Ark. 381. Nevertheless, a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict is not a cognizable claim under section 16-90-111 because it does not
implicate the facial validity of the judgment. Dirickson v. State, 2021 Ark. 36, 617 S.W.3d
712.
Williams failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that his sentence was facially
illegal. Furthermore, the circuit court did not clearly err by denying his petition as untimely
pursuant to Rule 37.2(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and WOOD, J., agree.
Julius Ray Williams, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Walker K. Hawkins, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.