James Jackson v. State of Arkansas

2025 Ark. App. 611

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: December 10, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 611 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-24-826

Opinion Delivered December 10, 2025 JAMES JACKSON APPEAL FROM THE INDEPENDENCE APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 32CR-23-81] V. HONORABLE TIM WEAVER, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED APPELLEE

WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

Appellant James Jackson was found guilty at a jury trial of possession of methamphetamine

and drug paraphernalia for which he was sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty years’

incarceration in the Arkansas Division of Correction and fined $5,000. On appeal, Jackson argues

(1) there was insufficient evidence that he constructively possessed the contraband; (2) there was

insufficient evidence the paraphernalia was used to ingest methamphetamine; (3) the circuit court

abused its discretion by permitting an officer to testify that the contraband was a “meth pipe”; (4) the

circuit court imposed an illegal public-defender attorney fee; and (5) the circuit court imposed an

illegal drug-crime assessment fee. The State concedes error on Jackson’s final point, and we affirm

as modified. On April 20, 2023, Jackson was charged by criminal information as a habitual offender with

possession of methamphetamine—between two and ten grams; and possession of drug paraphernalia

with purpose to use methamphetamine.

Jackson’s jury trial was held on August 8, 2024. Chief Deputy Aaron Moody with the

Independence County Sheriff’s Office testified that, on April 19, 2023, he conducted a traffic stop

on a vehicle registered to Littleroy Davidson. Davidson, the driver of the vehicle, had a suspended

driver’s license. Jackson, sitting in the passenger seat, was the only other occupant of the vehicle.

While speaking to Davidson, Chief Deputy Moody saw a plastic bag with what appeared to be

methamphetamine on the center console in plain view. He removed Davidson from the vehicle and

retrieved the bag from the console. Davidson denied that the bag belonged to him.

Chief Deputy Moody testified that he then ordered Jackson out of the vehicle and began a

search of his person. After removing a cigarette lighter, he saw Jackson place his hand back in his left

pants pocket and “manipulate” something. Chief Deputy Moody stated that, in his experience,

Jackson’s behavior indicated an attempt to conceal evidence, such as narcotics. In response, Chief

Deputy Moody himself retrieved the item from Jackson’s pocket. It was a black zipper pouch that

contained numerous clear plastic bags; two of the bags contained a white crystalline substance he

suspected was methamphetamine. He continued to search the area of the vehicle within reach of the

passenger seat. A “glass smoking device” containing residue was found between the console and the

passenger seat. Chief Deputy Moody testified that the pipe is consistent with a methamphetamine

pipe. A brown sack containing marijuana and a grinder was also found. On cross-examination, Chief

Deputy Moody testified that Jackson stated “they were smoking CBD” with the glass pipe; Davidson

2 denied any knowledge of the pipe. Chief Deputy Moody’s body-camera footage of the traffic stop

was admitted and played for the jury without objection.

Littleroy Davidson testified that he was pulled over by Chief Deputy Moody and received a

citation for driving on a suspended license. Davidson denied ownership or knowledge of the bag of

methamphetamine seen in plain view on the center console by Chief Deputy Moody during the traffic

stop. He further denied ownership of the “meth pipe” that was found in the vehicle and stated that,

other than Jackson, no other passengers had ridden in the vehicle in several days. Davidson

acknowledged that he was charged with possession of the methamphetamine found on the console;

he stated that he was promised leniency on that case in exchange for his testimony in the case at bar.

He denied having “anything to do with” the black pouch containing methamphetamine found on

Jackson’s person.

Dammon McGilton, deputy commander of the Sixteenth Judicial District Drug Task Force,

testified that he has vast experience working cases involving methamphetamine. He stated that he

was contacted to assist with the investigation related to the traffic stop. Deputy McGilton described

the evidence as including a black cloth-style bag containing two baggies of a white crystalline

substance, a glass meth pipe with crystal meth in the bulb, and other baggies and paraphernalia. He

testified that the items are “common in the use of methamphetamine.” Deputy McGilton field-tested

the contents of the bags and the “meth pipe” residue; both results were positive for

methamphetamine. Jackson objected to the testimony about the field-testing results, arguing that it

was not disclosed in discovery. He asserted that field-testing lacks scientific standards of certainty and

that, without a report, Deputy McGilton’s testimony violates the confrontation clause. The circuit

3 court overruled the objection as well as his renewed objection to Deputy McGilton’s “continued

reference to the pipe as a methamphetamine pipe.”

Last, Lindsey Reith with the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory testified that she tested the

evidence submitted in this case. Both bags that were in the black pouch found in Jackson’s pocket

contained methamphetamine. One bag contained a net weight of 1.45 grams of methamphetamine,

and the second bag contained a net weight of 1.24 grams of methamphetamine, for a total weight of

2.69 grams of methamphetamine.

Jackson moved for a directed verdict after the State rested, contending the State failed to

prove that he possessed the methamphetamine or the glass pipe and that there was no evidence that

the paraphernalia contained methamphetamine residue. The circuit court denied the motion. The

defense rested without calling witnesses. Jackson renewed his directed-verdict motion, which was

again denied.

Following the jury trial, Jackson was convicted of possession of more than two grams but less

than ten grams of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced to an

aggregate term of twenty years’ incarceration. The sentencing order also noted a $5,000 fine, a

$1,000 public-defender attorney fee, a $100 public-defender user fee, and $150 drug-crime-

assessment fee. Jackson timely appealed.

On appeal, Jackson argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.

Specifically, he asserts that the State failed to prove that he constructively possessed the contraband

found in the jointly occupied vehicle.

4 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. 1 We will

affirm a judgment of conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. 2 Substantial evidence is

evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion

one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. 3 We defer to the jury’s

determination on the matter of witness credibility.4 Jurors do not and need not view each fact in

isolation; rather, they may consider the evidence as a whole. 5 The jury is entitled to draw any

reasonable inference from circumstantial evidence to the same extent that it can be from direct

evidence.6 The jury may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence and

may choose to believe the State’s account of the facts rather than the defendant’s. 7 We need only

consider testimony that supports the guilty verdict.8 Circumstantial evidence may provide the basis

for a conviction if it is consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable

explanation of the crime.9

1 Kelley v. State, 103 Ark. App. 110, 286 S.W.3d 746 (2008).

2 Id. 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Dunn v. State, 371 Ark. 140, 264 S.W.3d 504 (2007).

8 Holcomb v. State, 2014 Ark. 141, 432 S.W.3d 600. 9 Robinson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 240, 491 S.W.3d 481.

5 Jackson was charged with possession of more than two but less than ten grams of

methamphetamine in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-419(b)(1)(B)10 and

possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-

443(a)(2)(A).11 Both offenses require a showing that he possessed the contraband.

To convict a person of possession, the State is not required to prove actual possession;

constructive possession, which is the control or right to control the contraband, is sufficient.12 Actual

possession occurs when a defendant has actual physical possession of contraband. 13 Constructive

possession requires that the State prove that the defendant exercised care, control, and management

over the contraband.14 Constructive possession may be established by circumstantial evidence and

can be inferred when the contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the

defendant and subject to his control.15 However, joint occupancy of a vehicle, standing alone, is not

sufficient to establish possession or joint possession. 16 There must be some other factor linking the

accused to the contraband.17 Other factors to be considered in cases involving vehicles occupied by

10 (Supp. 2023). 11 (Supp. 2023). 12 Morgan v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 220.

13 Id. 14 Hyatt v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 544, 680 S.W.3d 84. 15 Szczerba v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 27, 511 S.W.3d 360.

16 Thomas v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 159, 686 S.W.3d 576. 17 Id.

6 more than one person are (1) whether the contraband is in plain view; (2) whether the contraband is

found with the accused’s personal effects; (3) whether it is found on the same side of the car seat as

the accused; (4) whether the accused owned the car or exercised dominion and control over it; and

(5) whether the accused acted suspiciously before or during the arrest.18 There is no requirement

that all or even a majority of the linking factors be present to establish constructive possession of the

contraband.19 An accused’s suspicious behavior coupled with proximity to the contraband is clearly

indicative of possession.20

To the extent that Jackson argues that insufficient evidence supports a finding that he

constructively possessed the bag of methamphetamine found in plain view on the vehicle’s center

console, it has no relevance here. Jackson was not convicted of or even charged with possession of

the bag of methamphetamine located on the console. He was convicted of possession of the two bags

containing approximately 2.7 grams of methamphetamine found on his person in the pocket of his

pants. He fails to challenge the evidence supporting his actual physical possession of that contraband;

therefore, we need not address it further.

We now turn to Jackson’s conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. Chief Deputy

Moody testified that he found the glass pipe between the vehicle’s console and the passenger seat

where Jackson was sitting; because of its location, it could be said that it was under Jackson’s

18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Polk v. State, 348 Ark. 446, 73 S.W.3d 609 (2002).

7 dominion and control.21 Davidson, the driver and owner of the vehicle, denied knowledge of the

glass pipe. Jackson admitted knowledge of the glass pipe; he claimed that he used the pipe to smoke

CBD. Clearly, the glass pipe was found on Jackson’s side of the vehicle in close proximity to his seat,

he admitted knowledge and use of the pipe, and he had actual possession of methamphetamine that

the pipe was used to ingest. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold

that substantial evidence supports a finding that Jackson constructively possessed the glass pipe.

Jackson next argues that there was “insufficient evidence that the glass smoking device was

used to ingest meth.” He contends that, as testified by Chief Deputy Moody, Jackson claimed that

the pipe was used to smoke CBD. Jackson asserts that because no scientific testing was conducted

by the crime lab to determine if the residue in the glass pipe was CBD or methamphetamine, his

conviction must be reduced from a felony to a Class A misdemeanor.

In relevant part, Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-443(a)(2)(A) provides that it is

unlawful for a person to possess drug paraphernalia with the purpose of using it to ingest

methamphetamine into the human body. A person’s intent or state of mind is rarely capable of direct

evidence and most often is inferred from the circumstances of the crime. 22 A jury is not required to

lay aside common sense and may infer guilt from improbable explanations or incriminating conduct. 23

21 See Heard v. State, 316 Ark. 731, 876 S.W.2d 231 (1994) (holding that it is not necessary for the State to prove an accused physically held the contraband in order to sustain a conviction if the location of the contraband was such that it can be said to be under the dominion and control of the accused). 22 Jenkins v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 45, 593 S.W.3d 51. 23 Id.

8 Insofar as Jackson asserts that, because of a lack of scientific testing on the residue, the

evidence was insufficient to prove that the glass pipe was drug paraphernalia used for the purpose of

ingesting methamphetamine, we find no merit. The State does not have to use chemical analysis to

prove the identity of a controlled substance.24 Chemical tests are not necessary to obtain a drug-

related conviction.25 Lay testimony may provide substantial evidence of the identity of a controlled

substance, even in the absence of expert chemical analysis.26

During the search of Jackson’s person, a black pouch containing two bags of

methamphetamine was discovered in the pocket of his pants. The glass pipe was found directly beside

Jackson’s seat. Chief Deputy Moody testified, without objection, that the glass pipe was a “meth

pipe” and was used to ingest methamphetamine. Additionally, Deputy McGilton testified, also

without objection, that the glass pipe had “crystal meth in the bulb.” The jury was not required to

lay aside common sense, and we conclude that the lay testimony—even in the absence of chemical

analysis—identifying the residue in the glass pipe as methamphetamine amounted to substantial

evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Jackson possessed drug paraphernalia with the purpose

of using it to ingest methamphetamine.

Next, Jackson argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by permitting Deputy

McGilton “to repeatedly testify the contraband was a meth pipe.” He contends that Deputy

McGilton’s testimony was improper because it mandated a legal conclusion and was unduly

24 Abernathy v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 532, 699 S.W.3d 842.

25 Kellensworth v. State, 2021 Ark. 5, 614 S.W.3d 804. 26 Abernathy, supra.

9 prejudicial. Specifically, Jackson asserts that Deputy McGilton’s opinion testimony was improper

because it invaded the province of the jury and mandated two legal conclusions: (1) that the

contraband was a pipe; and (2) that the pipe was used to ingest methamphetamine. He contends that

Deputy McGilton’s testimony “[told] the jury to find against Jackson on two key elements of the

paraphernalia charge without any proof or corroboration.” This argument is not preserved for

review.

At trial, Jackson objected to Deputy McGilton’s testimony that the contraband was a

methamphetamine pipe on the basis that field-testing on the glass pipe was not disclosed in discovery

in violation of the confrontation clause. He also argued that field-testing does not meet the required

scientific standards of certainty. Jackson failed to object to the relevant testimony on grounds that

it mandated a legal conclusion or that it was unduly prejudicial. A party cannot enlarge or change

the grounds for an objection or motion on appeal but is bound by the scope and nature of the

arguments made at trial.27

Additionally, the law is well settled that to preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must

object at the first opportunity; otherwise, he has waived his argument regarding that issue on appeal. 28

Chief Deputy Moody had already testified, without objection, that the glass pipe found by Jackson’s

seat was a meth pipe used to ingest methamphetamine. Because Jackson failed to object at the first

opportunity, we conclude, for this reason also, that his argument is not preserved for appellate

27 Allen v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 124, 707 S.W.3d 516. 28 Scarbrough v. State, 2024 Ark. 71, 687 S.W.3d 557.

10 Jackson next argues that the circuit court imposed an illegal attorney fee beyond the public-

defender fee authorized by statute. He contends that the circuit court illegally imposed a public-

defender attorney fee of $1,000 in addition to a $100 public-defender user fee. Jackson asserts that

the relevant statute authorizing a public-defender user fee permits a maximum fee of $400, and as

such, the $1,000 public-defender fee is illegal and must be reversed.

Sentencing is entirely a matter of statute in Arkansas.29 A circuit court has authority to

correct an illegal sentence at any time; a sentence is illegal on its face when it is beyond the circuit

court’s authority to impose.30 Sentencing shall not be other than in accordance with the statute in

effect at the time of the commission of the crime.31 The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating

that his or her sentence is illegal on its face.32

Jackson is correct that he was ordered to pay a $100 user fee and then was additionally

assessed a $1,000 fee after a public defender represented him at trial. However, he is mistaken in

his contention that the $1,000 fee exceeds the maximum authorized by statute.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-87-213(b)(1) provides that, at the time of appointment

of an attorney, the court shall immediately assess a fee of not less than ten dollars nor more than four

hundred dollars to be paid to the Commission in order to defray the costs of the public-defender

system. Pursuant to this statute, at the time he was appointed a public defender, Jackson was assessed

29 Williams v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 121, 708 S.W.3d 73. 30 Id.

31 Malone v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 83, 705 S.W.3d 896. 32 Id.

11 a $100 public-defender user fee. Importantly, the statute also contemplates additional fees.

Subdivision (b)(3) of the statute provides that the fee under the aforementioned subdivision (b)(1)

shall be collected at the beginning of the proceeding and is separate from any additional attorney’s

fee that might be assessed by the court.33

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-87-218(b) further provides that at the time of final

disposition of any charges pending against a defendant represented by a public defender, the public

defender shall ask the court to enter a judgment against the defendant in favor of the State of Arkansas

for legal services rendered by the public defender. The nonbinding fee schedule contemplates that

when the disposition of a Class C or Class D felony offense results from trial, a judgment of up to

$2,500 may be entered against the defendant for the public-defender services.34 Jackson was

convicted of both a Class C and Class D felony. In accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated section

16-87-218(c)(4)(C), the circuit court was authorized to impose the $1,000 public-defender attorney

fee at final disposition of the charges. We hold that Jackson has failed to demonstrate that this

sentence is illegal.

For his last point on appeal, Jackson contends that he was assessed a $150 drug-assessment

fee, which exceeds the $125 drug-assessment fee authorized by the statute in effect at the time of the

commission of the offenses. The State concedes error, and we agree. Although the current version

of Arkansas Code Annotated section 12-17-106(a)35 authorizes a $150 drug-crime special assessment

33 Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-213(b)(3) (Supp. 2023). 34 See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-218(c)(4)(C) (Supp. 2023). 35 (Repl. 2016).

12 against any person convicted of a drug crime, it became effective on August 1, 2023. Jackson’s

offenses were committed on April 19; the statute then in effect authorized only a $125 drug-crime

special assessment. If we hold that a circuit court’s sentence is illegal and that the error has nothing

to do with guilt but only with the illegal sentence, we can correct the sentence in lieu of remand. 36

Therefore, we affirm Jackson’s convictions for possession of methamphetamine and possession of

drug paraphernalia but modify his sentence to reflect a drug-crime special assessment fee of $125.

Affirmed as modified.

TUCKER and WOOD, JJ., agree.

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

36 Norton v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 507, 563 S.W.3d 584.