NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0195n.06
Case No. 25-3736
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Apr 29, 2026 ) JULIO FRANCISCO SEBASTIAN; KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) A.A.F.B., ) Petitioners, ) ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM v. ) THE UNITED STATES BOARD OF ) IMMIGRATION APPEALS TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting U.S. ) Attorney General, ) OPINION Respondent. ) )
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; DAVIS and RITZ, Circuit Judges.
RITZ, Circuit Judge. Julio Francisco Sebastian and his minor child applied for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration
judge denied the claims, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. We deny Francisco’s
petition for review.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual background
Francisco is a native and citizen of Guatemala who, with his minor son, entered the United
States without documentation in December 2017.1 Francisco identifies as Chuj, an indigenous
Mayan people, and his native language is Chuj San Sebastian. Although Francisco learned Spanish
at school, he and other indigenous students were punished and ostracized there because of their
1 References to Francisco throughout this opinion include his minor son, who was included on Francisco’s asylum application. No. 25-3736, Francisco Sebastian v. Blanche
ancestry. Francisco further testified that he was molested by one of his teachers when he was
eleven years old because he was indigenous. He did not testify as to any interactions with this
teacher in the years after the alleged assault.
Later in his life, Francisco had several run-ins with gang members in Guatemala. In
January 2017, he was approached by four gang members while he was shopping. The gang
members pointed a knife at him and said, “Give me everything that you have.” AR 154, Hr’g Tr.
They then took his money and the items that he had purchased, telling him that they would kill
him if he reported the robbery to the police. Francisco reported the incident to the police anyway,
but an officer laughed at him and declined to help.
Next, in April 2017, five or six gang members approached Francisco while he was waiting
for a bus. They beat him, pointed a knife and pistol at him, and said, “We know you. We know
who you are. . . . We know where you come from. We know you have money. Give us the
money.” Id. at 155. Francisco did not report this incident to the authorities.
Finally, while he was shopping in August 2017, Francisco received at least two phone calls
from gang members in close succession. During the first call, the callers told him that they knew
who he and his family were and that he had money with him. They also told him that if Francisco
did not do as the callers said, they would kill him or one of his family members. During the next
call, the callers again told Francisco that they knew who he was and that they wanted his money.
They added that they were following him. Francisco “got really scared.” Id. at 158.
Francisco testified that the callers called again while he was in a store and said, “[W]e
know right now that you’re at the store buying equipment . . . so you need to pay us some money.”
Id. at 159. Francisco borrowed money from a friend in the United States and deposited it into a
bank account as instructed by the caller. But he did not report these calls to the police.
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Within a few months of these phone calls, Francisco left Guatemala with his son and
traveled to the United States. His wife and their two other children continue to live in Guatemala,
where they have not been harmed or contacted by gang members.
II. Procedural background
Francisco and his son entered the United States on December 5, 2017, after crossing the
border at Nogales, Arizona. The next day, the Department of Homeland Security issued Francisco
a notice to appear. The notice charged him with removability as an arriving noncitizen lacking
valid documentation at the time of seeking entry. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Francisco
admitted the factual allegations in the notice and conceded the charge of removability. His
pleadings stated that his best language was “Chuj San Sebastian” and requested an interpreter in
that language. AR 384, Written Pleadings.
A. Proceedings before the Immigration Judge
Francisco filed an application for asylum, withholding, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He claimed relief based on his indigenous race and
membership in the particular social group of “Guatemalan Chuj males without police protection.”
AR 150, Hr’g Tr.; AR 223, Supp. B. His application included declarations from two witnesses:
Salomon Jose Diego, who stated that Francisco was extorted and threatened by gang members in
August 2017 because “Francisco is a working man, that is why the gangs follow him; because he
is always trying to get ahead,” AR 227, Diego Decl.; and David Sebastian Miguel, who stated that
Francisco was threatened by gang members in August 2017 because he “is a worker and of good
faith,” AR 233, Miguel Decl.
Francisco also submitted evidence of country conditions, including the 2019 Department
of State Crime and Safety Report (“Safety Report”) and the 2018 Department of State Country
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Report (“Country Report”). The Safety Report noted that gang extortion in Guatemala is common,
affecting “all sectors of society.” AR 343, Safety Report. The Country Report noted that
indigenous people, who make up 44% of Guatemala’s population, are often marginalized, but the
government has established police precincts in indigenous-majority communities to reduce
violence and establish the rule of law.
On February 18, 2020, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) held a hearing, during which Francisco
testified in Chuj San Sebastian through an official Chuj interpreter. The IJ informed Francisco,
“If at any time you do not understand a question, do not answer it. Simply tell us that you do not
understand.” AR 151, Hr’g Tr. Francisco said that he understood. He indicated only one time
during the hearing that he did not understand a question, asking, “What was that?”; the IJ repeated
the question, which Francisco then answered. Id. at 182-83.
The IJ denied Francisco’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
protection. The IJ found that Francisco had testified credibly with respect to some of the events
he described but at times had testified inconsistently with his application materials. In particular,
the IJ found that Francisco had “embellished” his testimony because he had not previously
described his sexual assault in detail, nor detailed the beating he allegedly received in April 2017,
and had been inconsistent in his description of the timing of the threatening phone calls he
received. AR 101-02, IJ Dec. The IJ also noted that Francisco’s witnesses said Francisco had
been targeted for reasons other than his indigenous status.
The IJ found that Francisco had failed to establish that “Guatemalan Chuj males without
police protection” was a cognizable social group under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id.
at 103. Moreover, assuming that Francisco had in fact been sexually assaulted as a child, the IJ
found that Francisco had not shown that the assault was on account of a protected ground. And
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even if Francisco had been harmed by the teacher on account of his race or ethnicity, circumstances
had changed—namely, the passage of time, the fact that Francisco did not see the teacher again,
and the lack of evidence that the teacher molested him again—such that Francisco’s fear of
returning to Guatemala was not objectively reasonable.
Nor, according to the IJ, had Francisco shown that the gangs targeted him on account of a
protected ground. Rather, Francisco was targeted by the gangs because he had money. The IJ also
found that Francisco failed to show that relocation within Guatemala was unreasonable, because
he did not testify as to any harm that took place in his home village and his wife and children
continued to live there undisturbed by gangs.
The IJ therefore ruled that Francisco had not shown eligibility for asylum or withholding
of removal. As to the CAT, the IJ found that Francisco had not shown that the Guatemalan
government or anyone acting with its acquiescence would torture him; at most, he had shown that
the police did not respond to his complaints.
B. The BIA’s ruling
Francisco appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which
affirmed in August 2025. As an initial matter, the BIA noted that its Practice Manual limited briefs
to 25 pages, unless a motion to increase the page limit is filed. Francisco, without moving to
increase the page limit, had filed a 27-page brief and attached additional documents. The BIA
stated that it would not consider the additional documents because Francisco had not complied
with its Practice Manual.
On the merits, the BIA upheld the IJ’s conclusion that Francisco “has not shown that his
proposed particular social group is cognizable under the [Immigration and Nationality Act].” AR
4, BIA Dec. Nor had he demonstrated a nexus between his indigenous background and the harm
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he suffered from the teacher or the gangs. The BIA also found no clear error in the IJ’s
determination that there had been a “fundamental change in circumstances” concerning
Francisco’s sexual-assault claim. Id. at 5. With respect to the CAT claim, the BIA held that the
IJ did not clearly err in finding that Francisco had failed to show he would be tortured by the
Guatemalan government or by anyone acting with its acquiescence. Finally, the BIA rejected
Francisco’s argument that his due process rights were violated by not allowing him to testify in
the Chuj language, because he had in fact done so, through an interpreter, and because he did not
raise this issue during the hearing.
ANALYSIS
On petition for review, Francisco argues that the BIA violated his due process rights in
rejecting his overlarge brief and in affirming the IJ’s decision despite interpretation issues during
his hearing. He also argues that the BIA erred by denying his application for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the CAT. None of his arguments have merit.
I. Standard of review
We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo and its factual findings under the
substantial-evidence standard. Tista-Ruiz de Ajualip v. Garland, 114 F.4th 487, 495 (6th Cir.
2024). Under the substantial-evidence standard, we “will uphold a BIA determination as long as
it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a
whole.” Mazariegos-Rodas v. Garland, 122 F.4th 655, 664 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation modified).
We will reverse a factual finding only if “the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion,
but compels it.” Ceraj v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Marku v. Ashcroft,
380 F.3d 982, 986 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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We consider the BIA’s decision “the final agency determination” when it issues a “separate
opinion.” Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). We
“also review the [IJ]’s decision to the extent that the [BIA] adopted it.” Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959
F.3d 778, 788 (6th Cir. 2020).
II. Due process claims
We first address Francisco’s due-process-related arguments. Francisco argues that the BIA
violated his due process rights by rejecting some of his appellate submissions; that there were
mistranslations of his testimony before the IJ; and that the IJ and BIA failed to consider country-
conditions and human-rights evidence in support of his asylum claim. He also contends that the
BIA’s affirmance was perfunctory and without analysis. These arguments fail.
A. The BIA reasonably enforced its appellate-submission rules.
The BIA is authorized to “prescribe procedures governing proceedings before it,” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(4), and the BIA Practice Manual “provides official guidance to parties and counsel
who appear before the BIA,” Bulatovic v. Holder, 351 F. App’x 978, 980 (6th Cir. 2009). When
the BIA creates a requirement and puts it in the Practice Manual, and the “failure to adhere to that
requirement could result in rejection or dismissal of a filing, the BIA makes this clear.” Pineda-
Guerra v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2025).
Here, everyone agrees that at the time of Francisco’s appeal to the BIA, the Practice Manual
set a 25-page limit on briefs, and Francisco submitted materials beyond that limit. He now insists
that the BIA violated his due process rights by failing to consider his extra pages and attachments,
because the Practice Manual grants the board the discretion to consider materials over the limit.
(Id. at 18-19.) The discretion to consider additional materials does not, however, mandate that
the BIA consider them, particularly where, as here, a party was informed of page limits but did not
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follow them. (See id. at 18-19 (admitting that Francisco was notified that briefs were limited
to 25 pages).)
Francisco also argues that the BIA’s refusal to consider his supplemental materials was
arbitrary and capricious. The BIA can act arbitrarily “if it applies the wrong legal standard to the
facts before it or fails to explain inconsistent outcomes that aren’t readily apparent.” Yousif v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 928, 938 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Francisco points only to the BIA’s
“discretion” to consider overlarge submissions and to his belief that the attachments were “central”
to his case. CA6 R. 14, Pet’r Br., at 21. He does not argue that the BIA applied the wrong legal
standard or failed to explain an inconsistent outcome. As we have concluded, the BIA’s discretion
to consider additional materials does not require it to do so. Francisco cannot demonstrate that
the BIA acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
B. Francisco failed to exhaust his argument about mistranslation.
Francisco next argues, without citation to the record, that several instances of
mistranslation occurred during his hearing before the IJ. But he argued to the BIA only that he
was “not allow[ed] . . . to testify in the Chuj language,” an argument that the BIA rejected because
the transcript demonstrated that Francisco testified in Chuj and that an interpreter translated for
him. Francisco’s new argument to this court is that he did testify in Chuj, but that mistranslations
and misunderstandings through the interpreter affected his testimony. He did not raise these issues
before the IJ or the BIA and thus failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1). Although § 1252(d)(1) does not limit our jurisdiction, it does create a mandatory
claim-processing rule. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417 (2023). Besides, even if
Francisco had properly raised these issues below, we cannot locate any misunderstanding or
mistranslation in the transcript of the proceeding before the IJ.
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C. Francisco cannot show that the IJ and BIA failed to consider country and human rights conditions.
Francisco argues that the IJ and BIA failed to consider “documentary evidence central to
asylum eligibility,” such as United Nations, human-rights, and country-conditions reports, “based
on page-limit technicalities.” CA6 R. 14, Pet’r Br., at 45-46. But these documents were included
in the record before the BIA, because Francisco filed them with the IJ in support of his application
for asylum. In any event, Francisco does not demonstrate that the IJ and BIA failed to consider
these documents or any due process violation with respect to his supporting documentary evidence.
D. The BIA issued a reasoned decision.
Finally, Francisco contends that the BIA conducted a perfunctory review because it issued
a one-sentence affirmance of the IJ’s decision that did not include any analysis. But this is
incorrect. The BIA issued a four-page opinion that analyzed multiple issues. Francisco has not
shown a due process violation here.
III. Asylum and withholding-of-removal claims
Francisco argues that the BIA erred by denying his application for asylum and withholding
of removal. These forms of relief are similar—they protect a noncitizen from removal based on
the noncitizen’s membership in a protected group. To illustrate, the Department of Homeland
Security or the Attorney General may grant asylum to an applicant who proves he is “unable or
unwilling to return to” his “country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1101(a)(42)(A). And the Attorney General may not remove a
noncitizen to a country if that person’s “life or freedom would be threatened in that country because
of” his “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
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Both asylum and withholding-of-removal claims require an applicant to show a “nexus”
between his “risk of persecution in the country of removal” and his “membership in a protected
group.” Patel v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 377, 381 (6th Cir. 2025). To show a nexus, the applicant must
present “some evidence” that “the government, or persons the government is unwilling or unable
to control,” sought “to overcome a [protected] characteristic.” Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87
F.4th 838, 847 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). “This is a question of motive, not just simple
causation.” Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, 920 F.3d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 2019).
The standard for showing a nexus differs for asylum and withholding-of-removal claims.
“[A]n asylum claim requires that a statutorily protected ground be ‘at least one central reason’ for
alleged persecution.” Sebastian-Sebastian, 87 F.4th at 851 (quoting Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr, 959
F.3d 253, 270 (6th Cir. 2020)). But a withholding-of-removal “claim requires only that a
statutorily protected ground be ‘a reason’ for alleged persecution.” Id. (quoting Guzman-Vazquez,
959 F.3d at 271). Because “‘a reason’ is different from—and weaker than—‘a central reason,’”
Guzman-Vazquez, 959 F.3d at 272, an applicant who cannot satisfy the nexus requirement for his
withholding-of-removal claim necessarily cannot satisfy the more stringent requirement for his
asylum claim.
A. Persecution by gangs
For purposes of our analysis, we will assume, without deciding, that “Guatemalan Chuj
males without police protection” qualifies as a particular social group. AR 103, IJ Dec.; AR 150,
Hr’g Tr. Francisco argues that his persecution stemmed from his identity as a member of this
group. Specifically, he argues that the gang members called him “Indio,” a derogatory term for an
indigenous person, and mocked him for his inability to obtain police protection due to his
powerlessness. CA6 R. 14, Pet’r Br., at 28. Francisco also claims that the gangs targeted him
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because they believed that members of the indigenous community are vulnerable. And he argues
that country-conditions evidence demonstrates that indigenous men in Guatemala are
“systematically targeted for extortion” because they are believed to be powerless. Id. at 29.
The BIA did not err in finding that Francisco failed to establish the requisite nexus between
his race or particular social group and the gangs’ persecution of him. “A nexus determination is a
finding of fact and is thus reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard.” Sebastian-
Sebastian, 87 F.4th at 847. To obtain relief, Francisco needed to show that his status as a Chuj
male without police protection was a reason for his persecution. But, as the BIA found, the gangs
did not target him based on his indigenous status or his relationship with the police; they targeted
him because he had money. We have declined to find a nexus where the petitioner was targeted
in his or home country by alleged persecutors seeking money, rather than because of some
protected ground. See, e.g., Ghimire v. Holder, 525 F. App’x 411, 415 (6th Cir. 2013); accord
Cruz-Guzman, 920 F.3d at 1037; Khozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187, 196 (6th Cir. 2011),
abrogated on other grounds by Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020).
Francisco argues that, under Mazariegos-Rodas, “a protected ground cannot be dismissed
as an incidental or tangential reason for the persecution simply because a persecutor might have
pecuniary goals.” 122 F.4th at 671. But in that case, the persecutors “expressly connected their
actions to the Petitioners’” protected status. Id. at 672-73. Here, there is no such evidence that the
gang members connected their extortion and threats to Francisco’s indigenous identity or his
proposed social group. When Francisco was approached by gang members while shopping, the
gang members did not make any comment about his indigenous identity. They said, variously,
“Give me everything that you have,” AR 154, Hr’g Tr.; “We know you. We know who you are. . . .
We know where you come from. We know you have money. Give us the money,” id. at 155; and
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that they knew his family, id. at 157. That gang members knew who Francisco was and where he
came from does not inevitably mean that they targeted him based on his indigenous status. Indeed,
they did not mention his Chuj background at all.2
According to Francisco’s own witness statements, he was targeted because he “is a working
man . . . always trying to get ahead,” and because he “is a worker and of good faith,” not because
of his indigenous identity. AR 227, Diego Decl.; AR 233, Miguel Decl. His country-conditions
evidence, moreover, states that gang extortion in Guatemala is common and affects “all sectors of
society.” AR 343, Safety Report. Such “[g]eneral conditions of rampant gang violence alone are
insufficient to support a claim for asylum.” Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 670 (6th Cir.
2013). Accordingly, we uphold the BIA’s rejection of Francisco’s gang-related asylum and
withholding-of-removal claims.
B. Persecution by the teacher
Francisco also contends that the teacher who assaulted him was “motivated by [his]
ethnicity and status as a poor, fatherless Chuj boy.” CA6 R. 14, Pet’r Br., at 29. A showing of
past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The government may rebut this presumption by showing there is “a
fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of
persecution in the applicant’s country of nationality.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). Changes in a
petitioner’s “personal circumstances,” such as “ag[ing] out” of a threat, can rebut the presumption
if the petitioner’s fear of future persecution is no longer well-founded. Dieng v. Holder, 698 F.3d
866, 873 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation modified).
2 Francisco argues that he testified that gang members called him “Indio,” a derogatory term, but he provides no citation to the record for this statement, and we cannot locate any such testimony. CA6 R. 14, Pet’r Br., at 28. - 12 - No. 25-3736, Francisco Sebastian v. Blanche
Here, assuming without deciding that the sexual assault by Francisco’s teacher constituted
past persecution on account of his race, we find that the BIA permissibly concluded that the
presumption of future persecution was rebutted by changed circumstances. First, it has been more
than two decades since the teacher’s sexual assault. Second, Francisco did not demonstrate any
continuing threat from the teacher or suggest that he had interacted with this teacher at any point
after the assault. The passage of time and lack of interactions make the harm “too remote to
constitute a well-founded fear of persecution.” Cristobal v. Holder, 439 F. App’x 538, 541 (6th
Cir. 2011).
Francisco contends that the presumption can be rebutted only if there has been a
fundamental change in country conditions “countrywide.” CA6 R. 14, Pet’r. Br., at 30. But
Francisco relies on outdated authority that discussed a different version of the regulations. See id.
(citing Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 606 (6th Cir. 2010) (interpreting a prior version of the
regulations)). The current version of the regulations, which the BIA applied here, ask broadly if
the applicant has experienced “a fundamental change in circumstances.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A); AR 5, BIA Dec. Aside from relying on outdated law, Francisco offers no
basis on which to challenge the BIA’s analysis of the changed circumstances with his teacher.
IV. CAT claim
Francisco’s claim for protection under the CAT also fails. To warrant protection under the
CAT, the applicant bears the burden of proving it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if
sent to the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). To qualify as torture, “severe pain or
suffering” must be “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a
public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.” Id.
§ 1208.18(a)(1).
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Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Francisco did not warrant
protection under the CAT. The only relevant evidence Francisco provides, without citation to the
record, is country-conditions material purporting to show that police in Guatemala do not respond
to or prevent gang violence and that the police “apparently” shared his “location information” with
gangs. CA6 R. 14, Pet’r Br., at 41-42. But Francisco offers no evidence to show that the teacher
will harm him in the future or that the police will not protect him from harm, let alone torture, from
the gangs. Thus, Francisco is not eligible for protection under the CAT. See Cristales-de Linares
v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 401, 415 (6th Cir. 2025).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Francisco’s petition for review.
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