1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JULIO CESAR CASTRO VALLE, Case No.: 26cv3321-LL-MMP
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING AMENDED 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN et al.,
15 Respondents. [ECF No. 7] 16 17 18 Before the Court is Petitioner Julio Cesar Castro Valle’s Amended Petition for a 19 Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 7 (“Pet.”). Respondents filed a 20 Response [ECF No. 8, (“Ret.”)], and Petitioner filed a Traverse [ECF No. 9]. For the 21 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 22 ORDERS an immediate release. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who entered the United States in 1996, 25 fleeing from political persecution and violence. ECF No. 7-1, Declaration of Julio Cesar 26 Castro Valle (“Valle Decl.”) ¶¶ 1–2. In 1999, Petitioner was granted Temporary Protected 27 Status (“TPS”). Id. ¶ 3. Through TPS, Petitioner received a work permit and obtained a 28 driver’s license. Id. ¶ 4. In 2015, Petitioner started his own construction company, installing 1 tile and porcelain. Id. Petitioner is married and have two children who are U.S. citizens. Id. 2 ¶ 9. In 2025, Petitioner filed for asylum and withholding of removal. Id. ¶ 5. He was 3 allowed to remain out of custody on parole. Id. ¶ 6. Petitioner has no criminal history. Id. 4 ¶ 4. 5 On May 1, 2026, Petitioner was pulled over by an unmarked vehicle. Id. ¶ 7. 6 Petitioner was asked whether he was a citizen or a legal permanent resident. Id. When 7 Petitioner answered he was neither, Petitioner was arrested. Petitioner was not provided a 8 warrant or any paperwork explaining why his parole was being revoked. Id. When 9 Petitioner asked why he was being detained, the arresting officer did not provide any 10 reason. Id. Petitioner has been detained since. Id. 11 On June 12, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Amended Petition alleging that the 12 government violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Administrative 13 Procedures Act (“APA”). Pet. 4–10. 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 16 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 17 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 18 that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 19 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 20 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he is “in custody in violation of the 21 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, 22 “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive 23 detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” Hamdi, 542 24 U.S. at 536 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without notice or a 27 hearing violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the APA. Pet. 4–10. In 28 their two-page response, Respondents do not directly address Petitioner’s claims; they 1 merely state that they “have insufficient information regarding termination of [Petitioner’s] 2 parole” and that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). 3 Ret. at 2. 4 First, the Court finds that Petitioner is wrongfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 5 As a noncitizen who, at the time of his detention, had been at liberty in the United States 6 for 30 years, Petitioner is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b). Section 1225(b) 7 applies to noncitizens arriving at the border or who very recently entered the United States. 8 See Beltran v. Noem, No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *4–7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9 4, 2025). As the Supreme Court explained, the government may “detain certain 10 [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” while § 11 1226(a) allows the government to “detain certain [noncitizens] already in the country 12 pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 13 (2018) (emphasis added). The Court adopts its reasoning stated in Beltran v. Noem, No. 14 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *4–7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) and finds the 15 appropriate remedy is a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 16 The Court also finds that having been previously released on parole, Petitioner has 17 a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention. The Fifth Amendment 18 guarantees that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 19 process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment 20 entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Demore v. Kim, 21 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). The Due 22 Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a 23 person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). 24 “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose 25 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 26 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). 27 Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 28 government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 1 creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will 2 be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting 3 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)) (alterations in original). 4 Because Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 5 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 6 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JULIO CESAR CASTRO VALLE, Case No.: 26cv3321-LL-MMP
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING AMENDED 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN et al.,
15 Respondents. [ECF No. 7] 16 17 18 Before the Court is Petitioner Julio Cesar Castro Valle’s Amended Petition for a 19 Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 7 (“Pet.”). Respondents filed a 20 Response [ECF No. 8, (“Ret.”)], and Petitioner filed a Traverse [ECF No. 9]. For the 21 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 22 ORDERS an immediate release. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who entered the United States in 1996, 25 fleeing from political persecution and violence. ECF No. 7-1, Declaration of Julio Cesar 26 Castro Valle (“Valle Decl.”) ¶¶ 1–2. In 1999, Petitioner was granted Temporary Protected 27 Status (“TPS”). Id. ¶ 3. Through TPS, Petitioner received a work permit and obtained a 28 driver’s license. Id. ¶ 4. In 2015, Petitioner started his own construction company, installing 1 tile and porcelain. Id. Petitioner is married and have two children who are U.S. citizens. Id. 2 ¶ 9. In 2025, Petitioner filed for asylum and withholding of removal. Id. ¶ 5. He was 3 allowed to remain out of custody on parole. Id. ¶ 6. Petitioner has no criminal history. Id. 4 ¶ 4. 5 On May 1, 2026, Petitioner was pulled over by an unmarked vehicle. Id. ¶ 7. 6 Petitioner was asked whether he was a citizen or a legal permanent resident. Id. When 7 Petitioner answered he was neither, Petitioner was arrested. Petitioner was not provided a 8 warrant or any paperwork explaining why his parole was being revoked. Id. When 9 Petitioner asked why he was being detained, the arresting officer did not provide any 10 reason. Id. Petitioner has been detained since. Id. 11 On June 12, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Amended Petition alleging that the 12 government violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Administrative 13 Procedures Act (“APA”). Pet. 4–10. 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 16 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 17 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 18 that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 19 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 20 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he is “in custody in violation of the 21 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, 22 “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive 23 detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” Hamdi, 542 24 U.S. at 536 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without notice or a 27 hearing violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the APA. Pet. 4–10. In 28 their two-page response, Respondents do not directly address Petitioner’s claims; they 1 merely state that they “have insufficient information regarding termination of [Petitioner’s] 2 parole” and that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). 3 Ret. at 2. 4 First, the Court finds that Petitioner is wrongfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 5 As a noncitizen who, at the time of his detention, had been at liberty in the United States 6 for 30 years, Petitioner is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b). Section 1225(b) 7 applies to noncitizens arriving at the border or who very recently entered the United States. 8 See Beltran v. Noem, No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *4–7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9 4, 2025). As the Supreme Court explained, the government may “detain certain 10 [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” while § 11 1226(a) allows the government to “detain certain [noncitizens] already in the country 12 pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 13 (2018) (emphasis added). The Court adopts its reasoning stated in Beltran v. Noem, No. 14 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *4–7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) and finds the 15 appropriate remedy is a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 16 The Court also finds that having been previously released on parole, Petitioner has 17 a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention. The Fifth Amendment 18 guarantees that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 19 process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is well established that the Fifth Amendment 20 entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Demore v. Kim, 21 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). The Due 22 Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a 23 person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). 24 “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose 25 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 26 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). 27 Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 28 government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 1 creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will 2 be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting 3 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)) (alterations in original). 4 Because Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 5 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 6 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally 7 sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court considers the following factors: 8 (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an 9 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 10 if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s 11 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 12 additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335. 13 Here, Petitioner alleges that he was detained without any explanation as to why his 14 parole was revoked. Valle Decl. ¶ 7. For 30 years, Petitioner lived in the community and 15 pursued immigration relief. Id. ¶¶ 2–5. He is married and has two children who are U.S. 16 citizens. ¶ 9. In contrast, Respondents have not shown that Petitioner violated the 17 conditions of his release or explain why his parole was revoked that would justify his 18 renewed detention. See generally Ret. 19 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the revocation of 20 Petitioner’s release without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be heard denied 21 Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has a significant 22 liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 23 3d at 1032 (“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 24 pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a 25 protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” (citations omitted)). Freedom from 26 detention is a fundamental part of due process protection. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 27 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]reedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty 28 1 protected by the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 2 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))). 3 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s 4 parole was revoked without providing him a reason for the revocation or giving him an 5 opportunity to be heard. After the initial determination that Petitioner should remain out of 6 custody on parole because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, 7 Respondents have not produced any argument or evidence that these findings have 8 changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub 9 nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Release reflects a 10 determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a 11 flight risk.”). There is no indication that Petitioner has failed to abide by the conditions of 12 his parole. “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from 13 rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings.” Id. “Rather, the 14 federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances— 15 namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk . . . .” 16 Id. The risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is high because neither the 17 government nor Petitioner has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid 18 basis for his detention. Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (citation omitted). It follows that 19 the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, such as notice and a pre-deprivation 20 hearing, is also high. 21 Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 22 and a hearing is low. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“[T]he government has 23 articulated no legitimate interest that would support arresting [petitioner] without a pre- 24 detention hearing.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01206-KES-SKO (HC), 25 2025 WL 2817795, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 26 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the government wishes to re-arrest [petitioner] at any 27 point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a 28 hearing is low.”). There is no indication that providing proper notice, reasoning, and a pre- | deprivation hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome on the government. 2 || See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“In immigration court, custody hearings are routine 3 |}and impose a minimal cost.” (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801-KES-SKO 4 || (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025))). 5 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release without 6 || notice or a pre-deprivation hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is 7 unlawful. See, e.g., Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, 8 *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding the petitioner’s parole was revoked without notice 9 a hearing and without a showing of a change of circumstances, thus violating her due 10 || process rights and rendering her detention unlawful). The proper remedy for the unlawful 11 || detention is Petitioner’s immediate release subject only to the conditions of his preexisting 12 ||parole. See Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1163-66 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (finding 13 violated the petitioner’s due process rights by revoking his parole without notice or a 14 hearing and ordering his immediate release); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (ordering 15 |/immediate release after the petitioner was detained while out on bond without notice or 16 || pre-deprivation hearing). 17 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition. 18 CONCLUSION 19 For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ 20 || of Habeas Corpus and ORDERS that Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from 21 custody subject only to the conditions of his preexisting parole. The Clerk of Court shall 22 || enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor and close this case. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: June 23, 2026 NO 25 QF | 26 Honorable Linda Lopez 57 United States District Judge 28