Julie Kithima v. Sergio Albarran, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 JULIE KITHIMA (A-Number: 221-493- Case No. 1:26-cv-1659-DJC-JDP 511), 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner Julie Kithima entered the United States in 2016 on a tourist visa—which 18 expired in 2017—and she was detained by ICE in 2026. Petitioner, proceeding with counsel, 19 seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondents move to dismiss her petition 20 on the basis that she has not exhausted her administrative remedies. For the following reasons, I 21 recommend that respondents’ motion be granted and that the petition be dismissed. 22 Background 23 In December 2016, petitioner entered the United States on a tourist visa. ECF No. 7-2 at 24 3. After her visa expired in July 2017, petitioner remained in the United States. Id. Later in 25 2017, petitioner filed applications for permanent residency and work authorization, both of which 26 were denied. Id. In 2024, petitioner was arrested for forgery, unlawful possession of an ID, and 27 providing false information to a police officer; all charges were subsequently dismissed. Id. 28 1 On January 7, 2026, petitioner was detained by ICE. Id. On February 11, 2026, petitioner 2 was afforded a bond hearing, where the immigration judge (“IJ”) denied her bond based on the 3 finding that petitioner “is a danger to the community” and “a significant flight risk such that no 4 bond amount would be appropriate.” ECF No. 7-3 at 2. Petitioner did not appeal the IJ’s order to 5 the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). See ECF No. 10. 6 Procedural History 7 On February 27, 2026, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion 8 for temporary restraining order. ECF Nos. 1 & 4. On March 3, 2026, respondents filed a motion 9 to dismiss the petition. ECF No. 7. Thereafter, the court denied petitioner’s motion for 10 temporary restraining order and referred the matter to me for further proceedings. See ECF No. 11 8; Local Rule 302(c)(17). On March 19, 2026, petitioner filed an opposition to respondents’ 12 motion to dismiss. ECF No. 10. The matter is submitted. See ECF No. 9. 13 Legal Standard 14 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates 15 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 16 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 17 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 18 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 19 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 20 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 21 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have 22 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction 23 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 24 Analysis 25 Both parties agree that petitioner’s detention is governed by section 1226. See ECF No. 4 26 at 7; ECF No. 7 at 4. Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed because, by not 27 appealing the IJ’s order, petitioner has not exhausted her administrative remedies under section 28 1226. ECF No. 7 at 1. Petitioner counters that “requiring exhaustion would not meaningfully 1 develop the record or provide effective relief.” ECF No. 10 at 2. 2 “The exhaustion requirement is prudential, rather than jurisdictional, for habeas claims.” 3 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). To decide whether exhaustion is 4 required, courts consider the Puga factors to determine if: 5 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation 6 of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to 7 allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. 8 9 Id. (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). 10 Where a court finds that the petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative 11 remedies, it “ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings 12 until the petitioner has exhausted remedies.” Id. (quoting Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 13 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)). However, even if a consideration of the Puga factors favors prudential 14 exhaustion, a court may nonetheless waive exhaustion if “administrative remedies are inadequate 15 or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury 16 will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 17 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). I begin by considering the Puga factors in turn. 18 First, respondents argue that BIA review is necessary to generate a proper record because 19 “the immigration judge denied bond after full consideration of the evidence presented.” ECF No. 20 7 at 3. This argument, however, does not support the finding that “agency expertise makes 21 agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision.” See 22 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. The IJ provided a written decision, and respondents do not explain 23 why BIA consideration is necessary to generate a proper record. See ECF No. 7-3 at 2; ECF No. 24 7 at 3. On the contrary, courts have found that where, as here, petitioner is entitled to a bond 25 hearing under section 1226, the first Puga factor weighs against prudential exhaustion. See Okoth 26 v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-1936-KES-SAB, 2026 WL 45199, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026); 27 Hernandez Burruel v. Murray, No. 1:25-cv-1569-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3240356, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 28 1 Nov. 20, 2025). 2 Second, respondents argue that if the court were to relax the exhaustion requirement, 3 petitioner would be allowed to “bypass the administrative scheme under Section 1226.” ECF No. 4 7 at 3-4. I agree and find that “[g]ranting petitioner’s requested relief would ‘bypass’ the 5 administrative scheme under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations.” See Okoth, 2026 WL 6 45199, at *3 (finding that the second Puga factor weighs in favor of prudential exhaustion). 7 Notably, the Court of Appeals has held that section 1226’s procedures facially satisfy due 8 process. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1213 (9th Cir. 2022). While the Court of 9 Appeals did not foreclose as-applied challenges, petitioner does not argue that section 1226’s 10 procedures violate her due process rights. See id.; ECF No. 10. I find that “relaxing the 11 exhaustion requirements in this case would encourage others to immediately seek habeas review 12 if they deem the federal courts to be a more sympathetic forum.” See Martinez v. Scott, No. 2:25- 13 cv-1538-TSZ-GJL, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2025), report and 14 recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2689066 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 19, 2025). 15 Third, respondents argue that “administrative review would be likely to allow the agency 16 to correct any mistakes and preclude the need for judicial review.” ECF No. 7 at 4. I agree 17 because the BIA “has the authority to correct the erroneous factual determinations and evidentiary 18 errors alleged” by petitioner. See Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5 (citing 8 C.F.R. 19 § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii)). The BIA’s review of the IJ’s order would “allow the agency to correct its 20 own mistakes” and potentially “preclude the need for judicial review.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d 21 at 988. 22 Accordingly, while the first factor weighs against prudential exhaustion, the second and 23 third factors support the finding that petitioner has failed to exhaust prudentially required 24 administrative remedies. 25 As noted, a court may waive exhaustion if “administrative remedies are inadequate or not 26 efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will 27 result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. In her opposition to respondents’ 28 motion, petitioner only argues that a BIA appeal would not “provide effective relief.” See ECF 1 No. 10 at 2. Petitioner, however, does not provide any reasoning to support that finding. See id. 2 As the court in Martinez held when considering a similar argument: 3 Even assuming arguendo Petitioner had shown that immediate federal judicial review of his claims would be more efficient, this is 4 not the same as demonstrating that the available administrative processes are inadequate and inefficient. Indeed, a version of 5 Petitioner’s argument could be made by virtually every litigant attempting to bypass the administrative process by proceeding 6 directly to the federal courts. Permitting Petitioner to avoid the administrative scheme based solely on the additional time required 7 to pursue administrative remedies would create an exception to exhaustion that would swallow the rule. 8 9 Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *6 (emphasis in original). 10 I agree with the analysis in Martinez and find that petitioner has not established that her 11 “administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. 12 Petitioner therefore has not demonstrated that the court should waive the exhaustion requirement.1 13 Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed without prejudice. See 14 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (holding that a petition may be dismissed without prejudice where 15 the petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies); Okoth, 2026 WL 45199, at *4 16 (dismissing the petition because the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies); 17 Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *7 (same). 18 Conclusion 19 Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 20 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 7, be GRANTED. 21 2. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be dismissed without 22 prejudice. 23 3. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 24 1 Petitioner alleges in the petition that an appeal to the BIA would be “futile” in light of 25 the BIA’s recent decision that “immigration judges lack jurisdiction to conduct bond hearings or grant bond to individuals” detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4-6. However, as 26 noted, respondents acknowledge that petitioner is detained under section 1226, and the 27 immigration judge decided petitioner’s custody status on the merits. See ECF No. 7 at 4; ECF No. 7-3 at 2. Accordingly, to the extent that petitioner still advances this argument, there is no 28 evidence that the BIA would decline to exercise jurisdiction over her appeal. ] These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 2 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of 3 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 4 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 5 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 6 | within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 7 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 8 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 9 | 1991). 10 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ April 21, 2026 Q——— 13 JEREMY D. PETERSON 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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