Julian Ruiz Zaldivar v. Samuel Olson et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

JULIAN RUIZ ZALDIVAR,

Petitioner,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:26cv919 DRL-SJF

SAMUEL OLSON et al.,

Respondents.

OPINION AND ORDER Immigration detainee Julian Ruiz Zaldivar, by counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging he is unlawfully confined in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States. The parties agree Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection [9-2]. He says he has been here for almost two decades, and he has a criminal history in Indiana and Michigan dating back to 2014. He came to the attention of immigration officials in May 2026 when he was arrested for a traffic offense in Indiana. On May 31, 2026, he was taken into custody by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in Indiana pursuant to an administrative warrant. He is currently detained at Miami Correctional Facility pending the outcome of his removal proceedings. He argues that he has been unlawfully denied an opportunity for release on bond because officials view him as categorically ineligible for bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). He seeks immediate release from custody or a prompt custody redetermination hearing before an immigration judge. In an order to show cause, the court directed the respondents to answer the petition in light of De Jesús Aguilar v. English, No. 3:25cv898, 2025 WL 3280219, 8 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 25, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 26-1145 (7th Cir. Jan. 26, 2026), which joined

a large majority of other courts in concluding that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens when they are not “seeking admission” within the statute’s meaning. See also Singh v. English, No. 3:25cv962, 2025 WL 3713715, 5 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 23, 2025) (“In short, under § 1225(b)(2), an alien must be an ‘applicant for admission,’ and the alien must be ‘seeking admission,’ and an examining immigration officer must determine that this alien ‘is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted’ for mandatory detention to occur under

this subsection.”). The respondents were instructed to address why this case differs from Aguilar and Singh, why the court should examine subject matter jurisdiction differently, and whether there is cause to address the outcome differently. That response was filed, and Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar filed a reply. As a preliminary matter, Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar was ordered to show cause why every

respondent but the Miami Correctional Facility Warden, the only respondent who exercises “day-to-day control” over him, should not be dismissed under Kholyavskiy v. Achim, 443 F.3d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 2006). Relying on Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), the court of appeals concluded the proper respondent in an immigration habeas case challenging the constitutionality of a petitioner’s confinement is the warden of the facility where the

petitioner is being held, not a supervisory official who has the authority to free the petitioner. See also Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2024); Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 444 (3rd Cir. 2021). He argues that all the respondents are properly named and should remain in the case.1 The court disagrees. Kholyavskiy and other cases from this circuit make clear that it is

improper to name an immigration official as a respondent in a habeas case challenging immigration-related detention. Doing so “conflate[s] the person responsible for authorizing custody with the person responsible for maintaining custody,” but “[o]nly the latter is a proper respondent.” al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707, 708 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he President as a respondent was not only unavailing but also improper, and we have removed his name from the caption. . . . True, the President authorized al-Marri’s custody by designating him

as an enemy combatant, but there is a difference between authorizing and exercising custody.”); Robledo-Gonzales v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is not sufficient that the named respondent simply be involved, in some manner, with the petitioner’s detention. Sections 2242 and 2243 indicate that the custodian is the person having a day-to- day control over the prisoner.”) (quotations omitted). The court concludes that dismissal of

the non-custodial respondents is appropriate. For clarity, the court refers to the responding party as the Warden from this point forward. The Warden (through his federal counsel) repeats his arguments from Aguilar and other recent cases that the court lacks jurisdiction over the petition and that Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar’s detention is authorized by § 1225(b)(2). These arguments were rejected in Aguilar

and Singh (and other decisions). See supra; see also Mejia Diaz v. Noem, No. 3:25cv960, 2025

1 He agrees the Warden is currently the proper respondent, but expresses concern about what might happen if he were transferred to a different facility before the court could rule on his petition, suggesting that some of the officials should remain in the case for this reason. However, this concern is unnecessary because his petition is being resolved today. WL 3640419 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 16, 2025) (Brisco, J.). The court continues to be of the view that jurisdiction is secure insofar as this opinion goes, and that § 1225(b)(2) cannot reasonably be

interpreted in the manner urged by the government. Notably, the court of appeals recently found in deciding a motion for a stay pending appeal that the government was not likely to succeed on the merits of its argument that the mandatory detention provision contained in § 1225(b)(2) applies to individuals who are arrested in the interior of the United States, see Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025), and thereafter reached an opinion on the merits that

echoed what this court has done, though one judge concurred in the judgment and not in each part of the opinion’s rationale and one judge dissented such that at times it reads as a 2-1 decision and at times, in effect, as a 1-1-1 decision, see Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2026 WL 1223250 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026). The Second Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Tenth Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion on the merits to Aguilar

and Singh. The court also read the split decisions from the Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuit. These opinions, together with others, illustrate just how complicated this patchwork of statutes is, but the court remains persuaded in its current course under Aguilar and Singh, not least in light of Castañon-Nava. The question remains whether there is anything unique here that would warrant a

different conclusion than that reached in both Aguilar and Singh. The court can find no such reason. Whether Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar is an “applicant for admission” within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2), he cannot be said to be “seeking admission” for the same reasons the court articulated in both Aguilar and Singh. That leads the court to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the “default rule” for detention of noncitizens who are “already present in the United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.

281, 303 (2018). “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained” while removal proceedings are pending, and the Attorney General “(1) may continue to detain the [noncitizen]; and (2) may release the [noncitizen] on (A) bond . . . or (B) conditional parole” until removal proceedings conclude. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The court, as it always does, begins with the statute’s plain language. It is permissive, not mandatory, and it affords an election (insofar as the limitations in § 1226(c) do not apply of course).

Immigration officials issued a warrant for Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar’s arrest [9-2]. By statute, a noncitizen detained pursuant to a warrant may be released by the Attorney General (subject to certain statutory limitations that no one argues apply here), or he may be detained pending a decision on whether he will be removed from the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), (c). Our high court likewise has recognized the permissive nature of this

language. See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 526-27 (2021); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306. The Attorney General has delegated this discretion by regulation—first, to specified immigration officers who may “release an alien not described in [§ 1226(c)(1) (regarding criminal aliens)], under [bond or conditional parole]; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to

property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8). That is called an initial custody determination. After that initial custody determination, a noncitizen may apply to an immigration judge for a custody redetermination, and the immigration judge is authorized to exercise the authority in § 1226 “to detain the alien in custody, release the alien, and determine the amount of bond, if any, under which the respondent may be released.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); see also

8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (detailing procedures for custody or bond redeterminations by an immigration judge). When a noncitizen files this motion, an immigration judge, under immigration court rules, must “in general” schedule a “hearing for the earliest possible date,” though in “limited circumstances” the immigration judge may rule on a bond redetermination request without a hearing. Immig. Ct. Practice Manual § 9.3(d). A noncitizen may appeal a decision relating to bond and custody determinations to the Board

of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3). Both noncitizens and the government alike must comply with our immigration laws, as they are written and as they must work within constitutional demands. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954). The government has predetermined the procedures that apply to noncitizens who

are arrested and detained under § 1226, and due process requires merely that these procedures be fairly given, not taken away. See Accardi, 347 U.S. at 266-68; see, e.g., Jideonwo v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2000); Montilla v. I.N.S., 926 F.2d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 1991). Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar gives no reason to believe this process is insufficient. Absent something else, the court will order no more and no less than what is expected of immigration officials

by law. See Accardi, 347 U.S. at 268; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974) (“So long as this regulation [delegating Attorney General’s discretion] remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of the three branches is bound to respect and to enforce it.”). The court has the same expectation of compliance for the petitioner—follow the rules. It appears Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar did not seek a custody redetermination before an immigration

judge before filing his petition. When “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not statutorily mandated,” “sound judicial discretion governs” whether it must be done. Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A court may require administrative exhaustion in § 2241 cases challenging a noncitizen’s detention as a matter of judicial economy and administrative comity. Id. at 1017. A petitioner “with a statutory argument that has a reasonable prospect of affording him relief may not skip the

administrative process and go straight to federal court,” id. at 1018, though “individual interests demand that exhaustion be excused when . . . appealing through the administrative process would be futile because the agency . . . has predetermined the issue,” id. at 1016. Perhaps he thought it futile, because an immigration judge might follow In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), but thus far in this circuit that guidance has been

found erroneous such that, as the days pass, that futility seems harder to presume. At the same time, maybe only a United States Supreme Court decision will make it so. Based on the early stages of now many § 2241 petitions and an unbroken record of denials of custody redeterminations (even when noncitizens have been arrested pursuant to a warrant like he was) because immigration officials believe they must be classified under § 1225(b)(2), the

court finds there was no reasonable prospect of success, absent a determination by the court that he must be classified under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2). Recent proceedings in a case out of California suggest that Hurtado remains a barrier to relief for petitioners like Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar. In February 2026, a judge in the Central District of California issued an order vacating Hurtado on behalf of a nationwide class of individuals who were arrested by ICE within the interior of the United States and denied

an opportunity for bond. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25cv1873, 2026 WL 468284 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026), appeal docketed, In re Lazaro Maldonado Bautista, No. 26-1044 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026). The government appealed; and, at the government’s request, the Ninth Circuit recently stayed the court’s class certification order and final judgment “insofar as they extend beyond the Central District of California,” and stayed the court’s post-judgment order vacating Hurtado in its entirety. Maldonado Bautista, No. 26-1044 (9th Cir. order dated

Mar. 31, 2026). The district judge’s decision vacating Hurtado is thus unlikely to change the outcome of a custody redetermination motion filed by an individual like Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar, who is outside of California. These recent proceedings also indicate that the government remains committed to its interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) notwithstanding the prior rulings of this court and others.

This doesn’t affect the court’s jurisdiction, but it does affect his relief. The appropriate remedy is to put the ball in his court to file a motion for custody redetermination in his pending removal proceedings, with the benefit of a finding from the court that he is not categorically ineligible for bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The court likewise must deny immediate release because Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar has not met his burden of showing his current

detention unlawful under § 1226. As a final matter, Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar asserts an entirely new claim in his reply that he has a right to be free from detention as a beneficiary of a T-visa application filed by his relative. In support, he cites an order (currently on appeal) granting preliminary injunctive relief in a California class action suit brought under the Administrative Procedures Act addressing whether, and under what terms, individuals who have received a bona

fide determination regarding eligibility for U-visas, T-visas, and certain other types of programs are subject to removal proceedings. Immigr. Ctr. for Women et al. v. Noem et al., No. 2:25cv9848-AB-AS, 2026 WL 1455004, 19 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2026), appeal filed No. 26-3961 (9th Cir. June 22, 2026). He argues that his “immediate release is warranted to comply with the Classwide Preliminary Injunction in ICWC” [11]. Mr. Ruiz Zaldivar did not include this claim in his petition, meaning the government

had no opportunity to respond to it; and instead his petition focused entirely on the issue of whether his detention was governed by § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226. A reply brief is not the appropriate place to assert a new ground for habeas relief.2 See Rule 2(c)(1) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“The petition must . . . specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner[.]”). But even if the claim were properly presented, the California

case is still in the early stages, and another court’s non-final order is not subject to preclusive effect in this proceeding. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008); Williams v. Comm’r, 1 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 1993). Whether he has some additional avenue of relief through the California lawsuit is an issue this court does not reach. For these reasons, the court:

2 He does not provide an explanation for his belated assertion of this claim, nor is there a basis to conclude that the claim arose after the petition was filed. His support for the claim consists of a mailing dated November 2025 notifying him of a bona fide determination regarding the T-visa application and the California court’s May 2026 preliminary injunction ruling [11], both of which predate his petition filed on June 22, 2026. (1) DISMISSES Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General of the United States; Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security;

Samuel Olson, Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Chicago Field Office; United States Department of Homeland Security; and Executive Office for Immigration Review as respondents; (2) DENIES the petition [1], except to FIND that Julian Ruiz Zaldivar must be classified under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), including for purposes of any custody redetermination; and

(3) DIRECTS the clerk to enter final judgment and to close this case. SO ORDERED. July 22, 2026 s/ Damon R. Leichty Judge, United States District Court