Julia Rimes v. Claire's Stores, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-55113
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 4 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIA RIMES, an individual, No. 23-55113

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01488-SPG-JEM

v. MEMORANDUM* CLAIRE’S STORES, INC., a Delaware corporation; DOES, 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendant-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sherilyn Peace Garnett, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 2, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: R. NELSON, VANDYKE, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

After taking five consecutive leaves of absence totaling more than eight

months, Julia Rimes was terminated from her position as Associate Director of

Brand Communications at Claire’s Stores, Inc. She now appeals the district court’s

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). order granting summary judgment for Claire’s Stores on each of her California Fair

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California Family Rights Act (CFRA), and

related claims. We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary

judgment. San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 568

F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2009). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we affirm.

1. The district court properly ruled that Rimes failed to present either

direct evidence of discrimination or evidence to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), framework for her FEHA discrimination claim.

See Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (Cal. 2000) (explaining that

California law follows the federal burden-shifting test in the absence of direct

evidence of discrimination). The emails and termination letter that Rimes relies on

as direct evidence of discrimination at most show that Claire’s was motivated by the

fact that she had been absent from work for over eight months, not that it was

motivated by any disability. Rimes has not presented evidence showing that Claire’s

was aware of any disability in connection with her request for leave of absence. At

most, the evidence shows that Claire’s knew she had been referred for

psychotherapy.

Further, Rimes failed to present evidence that she was able to perform her job

with reasonable accommodations. While Rimes is correct that a “finite leave” may

2 be a reasonable accommodation if “it is likely that at the end of the leave, the

employee would be able to perform his or her duties,” Rimes took five extensions of

her leave and gave no indication that the requested fifth extension would be the last

one or that she would be able to return to work at its completion. Hanson v. Lucky

Stores, Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 487, 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). “Reasonable

accommodation does not require the employer to wait indefinitely for an employee’s

medical condition to be corrected.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Finally, Claire’s presented evidence—which Rimes did not dispute—

showing that it restructured Rimes’s department during the eight months she was

away and outsourced many of her duties. Rimes cannot show that this restructuring

and outsourcing was pretext to avoid keeping her as an employee.

2. Under the FEHA, employers must provide reasonable accommodations

and must “engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee …

to determine effective reasonable accommodations.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n).

“Where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable

accommodations, are not open, obvious, and apparent to the employer, … the initial

burden rests primarily upon the employee ... to specifically identify the disability

and resulting limitations, and to suggest the reasonable accommodations.” Scotch

v. Art Inst. of Cal., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 360–61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (alterations in

original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Claire’s engaged in

3 good faith with Rimes regarding her leave of absence, the only accommodation she

requested. Without Rimes requesting any accommodation other than leave or

sharing any details of her condition, Claire’s could not suggest other

accommodations and thus satisfied its burden. And as discussed above, additional

leave was no longer a reasonable accommodation.

3. The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Rimes’s

CFRA interference and retaliation claims. Rimes does not dispute that she was given

far more than the twelve weeks of leave required under the CFRA, but she argues

that Claire’s failed to notify her in the employee handbook of her CFRA rights.

While Rimes is correct that failure to notify can constitute interference, she has not

shown that the failure to notify in any way impacted her ability to take her leave.

Contrast Faust v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729, 741 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2007) (determining summary judgment was precluded where employee did not

take full leave before he was fired and was not provided notice of his rights). As

with her FEHA discrimination claim, Rimes’s evidence does not show that she was

fired because she exercised her CFRA rights given that Claire’s restructured and

outsourced much of her department during the eight months she was gone.

4. Rimes’s invasion of privacy claim also fails as a matter of law. Claire’s

required Rimes’s doctor to fill out a Department of Labor form supporting her need

for leave. Her doctor only indicated that she had been referred for “psychotherapy,”

4 and did not include any diagnosis, symptom, or treatment information. Claire’s kept

that form on a secure drive accessed only by certain staff with a need to view it. This

does not rise to a “serious invasion of the protected privacy interest” or an “egregious

breach of the social norms.” Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab’y, 135

F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hill v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 655 (Cal. 1994).

5. Because the district court properly granted summary judgment against

Rimes on her discrimination and retaliation claims, her wrongful termination claim

premised on those same allegations likewise fails. Casella v. Sw. Dealer Servs., Inc.,

69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 445, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).

AFFIRMED.