Julia Beth Coda v. Warden Gunther, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: February 13, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-03055
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Julia Beth Coda, No. CV-25-03055-PHX-DWL (ASB)

10 Petitioner, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

11 v.

12 Warden Gunther, et al.,

13 Respondent. 14 15 TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 16 JUDGE: 17 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Julia Beth Coda’s pro se Petition for a Writ 18 of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). Petitioner is in the custody of the 19 Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Respondent timely filed an Answer to the Petition 20 (Doc. 17), and no Reply followed. For the reasons that follow, undersigned recommends 21 the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed without prejudice. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner filed her Petition on August 25, 2025. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner is serving a 24 sentence of 57 months’ imprisonment for a conviction in the United States District Court 25 for the Central District of California for Use of Interstate Commerce Facilities in the 26 Commission of a Murder-for-Hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1958. (Doc. 17-1 at 13.) 27 At the time she filed the Petition, Petitioner was incarcerated at the minimum security 28 satellite camp located at the Federal Correctional Institution-Phoenix (“FCI-Phoenix”), in 1 Phoenix, Arizona, in the District of Arizona. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Now, Petitioner remains in the 2 custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, but it appears that she has been transferred 3 prerelease custody at a “halfway house” overseen by BOP’s Residential Reentry 4 Management field office in Long Beach California, located in the Central District of 5 California.1 See Federal BOP, Find an Inmate, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last 6 visited February 13, 2026). Indeed, Petitioner apparently sent an email to the Clerk of 7 Court on January 26, 2026, indicating she would be housed at a halfway house in California 8 effective February 3, 2026. (Doc. 18.) 9 In her Petition, Petitioner includes two Grounds. In her first Ground, she argues 10 that BOP has refused to accurately calculate her sentence to reflect 65 federal time credits 11 (FTCs) that she earned by successfully completing programming under the First Step Act 12 (“FSA”) for 195 days. (Doc. 1 at 6, 17.) Second, Petitioner contends she “has the right to 13 obtain her accurately stacked First Step Act and Second Chance Act credits in accordance 14 with the Director of BOP’s memo (dated 6/17/25) instructing [P]etitioner to be eligible to 15 be transferred into prerelease custody.” (Id. at 7.) Essentially, Petitioner contends she was 16 engaging in programming (for which she is eligible for FTCs) when she inadvertently 17 declined to participate in another mandatory program. (See id. at 12.) Petitioner’s 18 declination was reversed within a day. (Id.) However, due to that apparently inadvertent 19 declination, Petitioner was disallowed for the entire period of time she had programmed 20 (195 days, or 65 FTCs). (Id.) Petitioner argues she should receive those credits. (Id.) 21 Petitioner asserts she exhausted her administrative remedies within BOP before 22 filing her Petition, and she provides documentation to support that assertion. (Doc. 1 at 2- 23 4, Doc. 1-1 at 23-39.) For relief, Petitioner requests she be credited with those 65 FTCs 24 and “order the BOP to accurately stack First Step Act and Second Chance Act credits in 25 accordance with the Director of BOP’s memo (dated 6/17/25) instructing [P]etitioner to be 26 eligible to be transferred into prerelease custody.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) 27 1 The Court takes judicial notice of the BOP Inmate Locator, which is publicly 28 available on the BOP’s website. See United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice of same). 1 In his Answer to the Petition, Respondent argues that the Petition is not ripe, the 2 Court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review [BOP’s] placement decisions and 3 individualized determinations regarding prerelease custody placement of inmates still in 4 Bureau custody”, and Petitioner does not have a liberty interest in the application of the 5 credits for early release. (Id. at 5-6, 9-10.) 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in federal custody if the federal 8 prisoner can demonstrate he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 9 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal prisoner may seek a writ 10 of habeas corpus to challenge the manner of the execution of his sentence pursuant to 28 11 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000); Tucker v. 12 Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1990) (challenges to the execution of a sentence are 13 “maintainable only in a petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241”); 14 see also United States v. Giddings, 740 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a 15 petitioner may challenge the execution of a sentence by bringing a petition under 28 U.S.C. 16 § 2241). Petitioner challenges the execution of her sentence. 17 A. Venue 18 When Petitioner filed her Petition, she was incarcerated at FCI-Phoenix in the 19 District of Arizona. (See Doc. 1.) As discussed supra, Petitioner has since been transferred 20 to prerelease custody in the Central District of California. Because Petitioner was confined 21 in this District when she filed the Petition, this Court properly has jurisdiction. See Brown 22 v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990) (§ 2241 petition must be brought in the 23 district of confinement). This Court may continue to exercise jurisdiction, notwithstanding 24 Petitioner’s transfer outside of this District. See Johnson v. Gill, 883 F.3d 756, 761 (9th 25 Cir. 2018); see also Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (“‘[J]urisdiction 26 attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of 27 the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change.’” (quoting Santillanes v. U.S. 28 Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985))). Venue is therefore proper in the 1 District of Arizona. 2 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 3 “Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own 4 jurisdiction,’ … and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no 5 jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 6 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). To determine the issue of 7 subject matter jurisdiction, the Court considers the relevant statutory scheme and 8 controlling case law. 9 The FSA, enacted in 2018, included an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3624 concerning 10 the FSA’s creation of an earned time credit system. Bottinelli v. Salazar, 929 F.3d 1196, 11 1197 (9th Cir. 2019). The FSA added subsection (g) to 18 U.S.C. § 3624 for that purpose; 12 § 3624(g) “details the criteria for when a prisoner becomes eligible, considering earned 13 time credit, for transfer to prerelease custody or supervised release.” Id. at 1198. Thus, 14 FSA credits often operate to make a prisoner eligible for an earlier release date. 15 Persons who “suffer[] legal wrong because of agency action” may generally seek 16 judicial review of the agency action, unless another statute provides otherwise. Reeb v. 17 Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). In Reeb, the Ninth 18 Circuit considered the effect of 18 U.S.C. § 3625 on a prisoner’s ability to challenge a 19 discretionary determination made by BOP under 18 U.S.C. § 3621 through a petition for 20 habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Circuit observed that 18 U.S.C. § 3625 21 specifically states judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 22 701-706) does not apply to “‘any determination, decision, or order’ made pursuant to 18 23 U.S.C. §§ 3621-3624.” Id. at 1227. The Reeb court continued, “[a] habeas claim cannot 24 be sustained based solely upon the BOP’s purported violation of its own program statement 25 because noncompliance with a BOP program statement is not a violation of federal law.” 26 Id. (citing Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 985 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) and Reno v. Koray, 515 27 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)). Reeb held that when a prisoner’s “habeas petition alleges only that the 28 BOP erred in his particular case,” the district court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the 1 merits of that petition. Id. at 1228-29. However, when a habeas petition alleges “that BOP 2 action is contrary to established federal law, violates the United States Constitution, or 3 exceeds its statutory authority,” judicial review “remains available.” Id. at 1228. 4 Under Reeb, this Court considers Petitioner’s specific challenge in her instant 5 Petition. 636 F.3d at 1228-29. Petitioner alleges in her Petition that BOP failed to credit 6 her for the 195 days she was programming, for a total of 65 FTCs. (Doc. 1 at 7.) She 7 argues that BOP is acting contrary to the FSA’s language the prisoners shall be released if 8 eligible, and therefore this Court has jurisdiction. (See id. at 13.) It appears, though, that 9 Petitioner’s challenge is to BOP’s individualized determination of her eligibility for credits 10 under § 3624(g), the type Reeb would indicate is exempted. Thus, the Court could arguably 11 dismiss the Petitioner for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1228. 12 In any event, though, the Petition is premature, as described infra, and undersigned 13 recommends dismissal on that basis. 14 C. Ripeness 15 Respondent argues Petitioner lacks standing because the Petition is not ripe. (Doc. 16 17 at 5.) Respondent asks the Court to deny the Petition as premature “because Petitioner’s 17 remaining term of imprisonment exceeds her FSA time credits” and Petitioner is therefore 18 “not eligible to have those ETCs applied to her sentence computation.” (Id. at 8.) 19 “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that 20 may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 21 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 22 568, 580-81 (1985) (internal quotations omitted)). The ripeness doctrine is designed “to 23 prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling 24 themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the 25 agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized 26 and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. 27 Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 28 136, 148-49 (1967)). 1 “Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A), FSA earned time credits can be applied toward 2 prerelease custody or supervised release only when accumulated credits are equal to the 3 remainder of the prison term.” Turner v. Heisner, CV-22-00178-PHX-JAT (ESW), 2022 4 WL 2195348, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2022). “District courts throughout the Ninth Circuit 5 (including within the District of Arizona) have cited [18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A)] in finding 6 § 2241 petitions premature because they cannot award the relief sought under the FSA until 7 the petitioner’s recalculated time credits would equal the remainder of the imposed term of 8 imprisonment.” Cook v. Gunther, No. CV-25-00966-PHX-KML, 2025 WL 3170931, at 9 *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2025) (citations omitted) (finding petition premature and declining 10 to consider other arguments in petition due to lack of ripeness). 11 At the time of Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s projected release date, assuming 12 good conduct but excluding the application of earned time credits (“ETCs”), was April 1, 13 2028. (Doc. 17 at 6.) That is 848 days from the date the Answer was filed on December 5, 14 2025. By December 5, 2025, Petitioner had accumulated 180 days of credits, and thus, 15 was ineligible to apply those credits because 180 days is less than 848 days. (See id.) 16 Moreover, Respondent points out that even if this Court were to apply the additional credits 17 that Petitioner seeks, the number of days of credits would still far short of the number of 18 days needed (848).2 19 To the extent that Petitioner is asking the Court to require that the BOP apply her 20 credits toward prerelease or supervised release, her request is not ripe for review because 21 she is not yet eligible for application of the credits. See Cook, 2025 WL 3170931, at *1 22 (citing inter alia Tapia v. Barron, 2:23-cv-01531-BJR-BAT, 2024 WL 2946184, at *4-5 23 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2024) (“[T]he Court finds because Petitioner is not yet eligible for 24 2 Undersigned further observes that Petitioner is now at a halfway house. Although 25 someone housed at such a facility remains “in custody” for purposes of habeas relief, undersigned notes that part of Petitioner’s requested relief is transfer to prerelease custody. 26 (See Doc. 1 at 7.) Thus, to the extent that Petitioner seeks to be transferred to prerelease custody, that portion of the Petition would appear to be moot. See Bisel v. Birholz, No. CV 27 22-7266 CJC, 2023 WL 2356691, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2023) (dismissing § 2241 petition as moot where prisoner sought transfer to halfway house and was so transferred 28 during the pendency of the petition) (citing Green v. Jenkins, 859 Fed. App’x. 186, 197 (9th Cir. 2021)). 1 application of time credits under the FSA, even though she may have accrued some credits, 2 her § 2241 Petition is not ripe for review and subject to dismissal without prejudice.”) and 3 Turner, 2022 WL 2195348, at *3 (“Because Petitioner is not yet eligible for application of 4 time credits under the FSA, the undersigned is persuaded by Respondent's argument that 5 the § 2241 Petition is not ripe for review.”). Indeed, Petitioner has “failed to establish an 6 immediate injury that would be redressed by the relief that she seeks.” Ford v. Chapman, 7 371 F. App’x 513, 513 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Tumbaco v. Birkholz, No. 2:23-cv-10663- 8 FMO-AJR, 2024 WL 47440235, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2024) (“[W]here, as here, a 9 prisoner alleges they were denied time credits under the FSA, the ripeness requirement is 10 not met until a favorable disposition of their claim would result in immediate release.”), 11 report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4839791 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2024). 12 Therefore, undersigned concludes the Petition is not ripe and recommends dismissing the 13 Petition without prejudice. 14 RECOMMENDATION 15 Based on the foregoing, 16 IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 17 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 18 EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION 19 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 20 Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 21 Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 22 parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 23 which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. 24 R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a 25 response to the objections. 26 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 27 Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 28 district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1 || 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 2|| Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 5 Dated this 13th day of February, 2026.

9 Honorable Alison S. Bachus 10 United States Magistrate Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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